USA v. Maldonado Rodriguez

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
CARMELO MALDONADO
RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 25-cr-116-JJM-AEM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR., United States District Court Chief Judge.
The question presented is whether the Court should dismiss the indictment
brought against Defendant Carmelo Maldonado Rodriguez with prejudice or without
prejudice. 	Finding 	that 	any 	future 	court 	proceedings 	against 	Mr. Maldonado
Rodriguez would be fundamentally unfair and against the public interest, the Court
dismisses the indictment with prejudice, for the reasons stated below.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The Government initially charged Mr. Maldonado Rodriguez via complaint
with Illegal Entry after Deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1). ECF No. 3. 1
At his initial appearance on October 8, 2025, the Magistrate Judge held a detention
hearing, heard argument from Mr. Maldonado Rodriguez and the Government, and
1 The parties filed the briefing at the beginning of this matter under C.A.
No. 1:25-mj-60-AEM, but later relevant filings, including the indictment, have been
filed under the related criminal matter number C.A. No. 1:25-CR-00116-JJM-AEM.
Unless otherwise specified, citations to refer to the docket in 1:25-mj-00060-AEM.
Case 1:25-cr-00116-JJM-AEM Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 1 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
released Mr. Maldonado Rodriguez on conditions of release under the Bail Reform
Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142.
See Minute Entry for Initial Appearance on October 8, 2025.
Significantly, at his initial appearance, Mr. Maldonado Rodriguez exercised
his right to have a preliminary hearing that the Court scheduled for October 29, 2025,
a date agreed to by the parties at the initial appearance. 	On October 8, a Writ of
Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum issued with the hearing notice commanding the
Government to produce Mr. Maldonado Rodriguez for his October 29 preliminary
hearing. ECF No. 10.
At 	the 	preliminary 	hearing, 	counsel 	was 	present, 	but 	Mr. Maldonado
Rodriguez was not because the Government had deported him from the United
States. 	Defense counsel stated that the Government notified her of the deportation
only two days before the scheduled preliminary hearing. 	ECF No. 16 at 2. 	The
Government said it was prepared to move forward with the preliminary hearing, but
Mr. Maldonado Rodriguez’s counsel objected to going ahead without Mr. Maldonado
Rodriguez present. When the Court raised its concern about the inability to hold the
preliminary hearing, the Government expressed its intention to seek an indictment
against Mr. Maldonado Rodriguez, despite his deportation.
The Magistrate Judge did not proceed with the preliminary hearing, but
ordered briefing on “whether the Magistrate Judge can hold a preliminary hearing
where [the Defendant] is not present because the government deported him; and, if
that hearing cannot be held, whether [the Defendant] is entitled to have the
Magistrate Judge dismiss the complaint for lack of probable cause because the
Case 1:25-cr-00116-JJM-AEM Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 2 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
government prevented the preliminary hearing.”
	See Minute Entry for Preliminary
Hearing on October 29, 2025.
In the briefing, Mr. Maldonado Rodriguez’s counsel argued that he has an
“absolute right to be present at his preliminary hearing” under the Rules of Criminal
Procedure and that the Court must dismiss the complaint with prejudice because the
Government has not established probable cause due to its own prevention of
Mr. Maldonado Rodriguez’s appearance. 	ECF No. 16 at 3-4. 	In response, the
Government noted that all Circuits that have considered the issue have determined
that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), an agency of the United States
Department of Homeland Security, has authority to remove defendants regardless of
the pendency of a federal criminal case. ECF No. 17 at 4.
Then, on November 5, 2025, 28 days after his initial appearance, the grand
jury returned a single-count indictment charging Mr. Maldonado Rodriguez with
Illegal Reentry After Deportation, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1) and (2). ECF No. 16.
Both Mr. Maldonado Rodriguez and the Government now move to dismiss the
indictment, although one seeks dismissal with prejudice, and one seeks it without.
ECF Nos. 19, 20.
II. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 48(a)
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a), the Government “may, with
leave of court, dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint.” The “leave of court”
requirement vests the Court with discretion to decide whether dismissal is warranted
Case 1:25-cr-00116-JJM-AEM Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 3 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
and 	“advances 	two 	objectives: 	(1) 	protecting 	defendants 	against 	prosecutorial
harassment and (2) ensuring that any dismissal is not contrary to the public interest.”
United States v. Guimaraes, No. 1:25-cr-10129-JEK, 2025 WL 1899046, at *2 (D.
Mass. July 9, 2025).
If the Court is to grant leave to dismiss an indictment, the question then
becomes whether it should be with or without prejudice. The legal analysis that leads
the Court to decide whether the dismissal of Mr. Maldonado Rodriquez’s indictment
should be with or without prejudice is largely left to the discretion of the district
judge. 	“Customarily Rule 48(a) dismissals are without prejudice and permit the
government to reindict within the statute of limitations.”
	United States v. Raineri,
42 F.3d 36, 43 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing
United States v. Matta, 937 F.2d 567, 568 (11th
Cir. 1991)). That said,
[D]ismissal with prejudice may be appropriate if retrial would be
fundamentally unfair or would constitute harassment. 	In assessing
whether a Rule 48(a) dismissal should be with or without prejudice,
courts have generally looked to the same principles that motivate the
leave 	of 	court 	requirement, 	including 	whether 	dismissal 	without
prejudice is in the public interest. Relevant factors may also include (1)
the purpose of the government's dismissal, (2) the presence or absence
of good faith, and (3) the objective effect that dismissal without prejudice
would have on the defendant. In all events, the inquiry is case specific,
and no one factor is required for a court to conclude that dismissal with
or without prejudice is warranted.
Guimaraes, 2025 WL 1899046, at *3 (cleaned up).
B. 	Right to Preliminary Hearing
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.1 guarantees a defendant’s right to have
a preliminary hearing when charged in federal criminal court by complaint with an
Case 1:25-cr-00116-JJM-AEM Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 4 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
offense other than a petty offense. A defendant may waive the hearing. Fed. R. Crim.
P. 5.1(a)(1). If a defendant opts to exercise this right, the preliminary hearing must
be held no later than 14 days after the initial appearance if the defendant is in custody
and no later than 21 days if not in custody; the magistrate judge may extend the time
limits under certain limited circumstances. Fed. R. Crim. P. 5.1(c), (d).
At the preliminary hearing, the defendant has the right to counsel and to cross-
examine adverse witnesses and may introduce evidence on his own behalf. 	Fed. R.
Crim. P. 5.1(e), 44(a). 	If, after the hearing, the magistrate judge determines that
there is not probable cause to support that the offense has been committed by the
defendant, she must dismiss the complaint and discharge the defendant. 	Fed. R.
Crim. P. 5.1(f). 	This dismissal is without prejudice and “does not preclude the
government from later prosecuting the defendant for the same offense.”
Id.
The right of federal criminal defendants to a preliminary hearing “to determine
whether there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and
that 	the 	arrested 	person 	committed 	it” 	is 	also 	guaranteed 	by 	statute. 	18
U.S.C. § 3060(a). Pursuant to statute, “an arrested person who has not been accorded
the preliminary examination” within the required time “shall be discharged from
custody or from the requirement of bail or any other condition of release, without
prejudice, however, to the institution of further criminal proceedings against him
upon the charge upon which he was arrested.”
Id. § 3060(d).
The preliminary hearing is a critical stage in the judicial process—“a screening
device, designed to provide an early judicial check on whether the prosecutor has
Case 1:25-cr-00116-JJM-AEM Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 5 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
sufficient evidence to send the case forward to trial.” 	Charles Wright & Andrew
Leipold,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 91, at 248 (4th ed., 2008). 	It is also an
important preliminary hurdle that the Government must overcome for a defendant
to remain detained or bound by conditions of release pending trial.
	See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3060(d).
As shown by the travel of this case, it appears that when defendants have ICE
detainers, the only way to ensure that they can exercise their right to a preliminary
hearing is to allow the Court to detain them—typically by reserving their right to
argue for bail. 	While defendants are in court-ordered detention, ICE does not have
custody of them and cannot remove them from the United States, and they will be
transported to Court to attend their preliminary hearings to test the Government’s
proof of their charges. 	If defendants argue for and secure release under the Bail
Reform Act, then they are subject to the ICE detainer and find themselves in ICE
custody or out of the United States and therefore unable to attend their preliminary
hearings.
That said, a return of the indictment constitutes a finding of probable cause
and thus obviates the right to a preliminary hearing under both the statutory
framework and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 	18 U.S.C. § 3060(e); Fed.
R. Crim. P. 5.1(a)(2). Courts have also stated that whether a defendant was denied
a preliminary hearing—and his right to any remedy therefore—is typically mooted
by an indictment.
See, e.g.,
United States v. Williams, 526 Fed. Appx. 29, 36 (2d Cir.
2013);
United States v. Smith, 22 Fed. Appx. 137, 138 (4th Cir. 2001). 	In some
Case 1:25-cr-00116-JJM-AEM Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 6 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
circumstances, however, Courts have found that a failure to hold a preliminary
hearing within the required timeframe calls for dismissal of the pending indictment.
See United States v. Vaughn, C.A. No. 20-803 (KM), 20-78, 2020 WL 5902614, at *3
(D.N.J. Oct. 5, 2020) (dismissing indictment and vacating detention order after the
Government misstated the reasons it was seeking, and later received, a continuance
of the preliminary hearing, because “[r]equiring the government, at a minimum, to
start over seems just and proportionate; it should not enjoy any advantage as a result
of its conduct”).
C. 	Speedy Trial
Both 	the 	United 	States 	Constitution 	and 	federal 	statute 	guarantee 	a
defendant’s right to a speedy trial. 	The Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution mandates: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed[.]” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Speedy
Trial Act “commands that a defendant be tried within 70 days of the latest of either
the filing of an indictment or information, or the first appearance before a judge or
magistrate [judge].”
	United States v. Barnes, 159 F.3d 4, 9 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting
Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 322 (1986);
see 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1)).
“The sanction for failure to adhere to this time limit is severe—the indictment is
dismissed on motion of the defendant.”
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2)). The speedy
trial right “is an important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration
prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation[,] and
Case 1:25-cr-00116-JJM-AEM Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 7 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend
himself.”
United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).
D. 	With Prejudice or Without Prejudice
Not every case in which a defendant has been deported during the pendency of
his 	criminal 	case 	automatically 	warrants 	dismissal 	without 	prejudice.
	See
Guimaraes, 2025 WL 1899046, at *4 (“[A]bsent indications that the Executive Branch
has acted in bad faith or that dismissal without prejudice would conflict with the
public interest, deportation of a defendant during a criminal prosecution typically
does not warrant dismissal of the indictment with prejudice.”);
cf. United States v.
Castillo, 537 F. Supp. 3d 120, 131 (D. Mass. 2021) (cautioning that although restraint
of the court’s supervisory power dictates dismissal without prejudice in this case, “if
ICE continues a practice of removing defendants without regard to ongoing criminal
proceedings, such restraint is likely to not be warranted.”). 	Many courts have,
however, considered the specific facts of the criminal prosecution and deportation
proceedings and determined that dismissal with prejudice is appropriate,2 and the
2
See, e.g.,
United States v. Tamup-Tamup, C.R. No. 25-cr-0066-MSM-PAS,
2025 WL 2662293, at *2 (D.R.I. Sept. 17, 2025) (dismissing indictment with prejudice
when Government opted to deport defendant only after he claimed his right to
proceed to trial);
United States v. Lopez, 587 F. Supp. 3d 835, 845 (S.D. Iowa 2022)
(dismissing indictment with prejudice because defendant’s deportation violated his
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial);
United States v. Escobedo-Molina, 790 F.
Supp. 3d 1283, 1288 (D.N.M. 2025) (dismissing information with prejudice because
“[t]ime and time again the Government has initiated a prosecution (at the behest of
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)), only to turn around within days and
deport the defendant while the charges are pending and thereby necessarily imperil
the defendant’s Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, and Speedy Trial Act rights.”);
United States v. Ferreira-Chavez, Case No. 1:20-cr-00145-BLW, 2021 WL 602822 (D.
Idaho Feb. 12, 2021) (dismissing indictment with prejudice where defendant “has
Case 1:25-cr-00116-JJM-AEM Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 8 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

9
Court 	finds 	that 	given 	the 	circumstances 	at 	play 	here, 	the 	same 	outcome 	is
warranted.
First, it was the United States Government that caused Mr. Maldonado
Rodriguez’s unavailability and his inability to timely confront and defend against the
charge against him in the criminal complaint or the charge against him in the
indictment. As to the criminal complaint, he was entitled to a probable cause hearing
where the Government would have to put forward sufficient evidence to proceed, and
the Court scheduled one at his initial appearance. The Government did not object to
scheduling the preliminary hearing and purportedly was fully intending to pursue its
criminal 	case 	and 	make 	its 	probable 	cause 	showing. 	Nevertheless, 	once
Mr. Maldonado Rodriguez was released under the Bail Reform Act, the Government
reversed course and opted to deport him before his preliminary hearing, so he was
unable to have one. 	Despite knowing he had been deported, the Government still
presented 	the 	case 	to 	the 	grand 	jury. 	Due 	to 	the 	Government’s 	actions,
Mr. Maldonado Rodriguez was not here in the United States to face the charge in the
already been deported” and “[h]is constitutional and statutory rights have been and
will continue to be violated.”);
United States v. Munoz-Garcia, 455 F. Supp. 3d 915,
918 (D. Ariz. 2020) (dismissing indictment with prejudice because defendant’s
deportation violated her Sixth Amendment right to counsel);
United States v. Castro-
Guzman, No. CR-19-2992-TUC-CKJ (LCK), 2020 WL 3130395, at *6 (D. Ariz. May 11,
2020) (dismissing indictment with prejudice because the defendant, who was removed
to Mexico, continued to suffer violations of his right to counsel and speedy trial and
those violations were “due solely to the actions of the Government”);
United States
Lutz, No. CR-19-00692-001-TUC-RM (BGM), 2019 WL 5892827, at *5 (D. Ariz Nov.
12, 2019) (dismissing with prejudice based on violation of right to counsel and “to
promote respect for the BRA and to deter ICE and the U.S. Attorney’s Office from
continuing to engage in turf battles in lieu of inter-agency cooperation”).
Case 1:25-cr-00116-JJM-AEM Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 9 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

10
indictment 	and 	remains 	fundamentally 	unable 	to 	stand 	trial. 	As 	it 	stands,
Mr. Maldonado Rodriguez is facing an “indefinite delay” in his ability to have a trial
and 	were 	the 	Government 	not 	now 	moving 	to 	dismiss 	the 	charges, 	a 	Sixth
Amendment and Speedy Trial Act violation “would have been a certainty.”
Escobedo-
Molina, 790 F. Supp. 3d at 1291-92.
Second, the Government’s actions denied Mr. Maldonado Rodriguez his right
to a preliminary hearing. 	Statute and rule guarantee the right of federal criminal
defendants to a preliminary hearing “to determine whether there is probable cause
to believe that an offense has been committed and that the arrested person committed
it.” 	18 U.S.C. § 3060(a);
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.1. 	The Government ignored the
Court’s 	writ 	ordering 	it 	to 	make 	Mr. Maldonado 	Rodriguez 	available 	for 	the
preliminary hearing when it opted to deport him before the hearing date. 	The
Government’s action here gives Mr. Maldonado Rodriguez a fundamentally unfair
Hobson’s choice—either remain detained by the Court so that he could have his
preliminary hearing, or be released by the Court, only to have the Government (ICE)
remove him from the country, thus denying him of his right to a preliminary hearing.
Does our justice system require people to give up their liberty to exercise a basic right
to confront a charge and test the Government’s evidence? 	Is that in the public
interest? Certainly not. The Court is also concerned that when the Magistrate Judge
questioned the impact of Mr. Maldonado Rodriguez’s deportation on his right to a
preliminary 	hearing, 	the 	Government 	expressed 	that 	it 	would 	be 	seeking 	an
indictment seemingly to moot the important question the Court was asking.
Case 1:25-cr-00116-JJM-AEM Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 10 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

11
Third, 	the 	situation 	leaves 	the 	Government 	holding 	all 	the 	cards 	and
Mr. Maldonado Rodriquez none. The Government has conducted its investigation of
the alleged crime, gathered all the evidence it needs to show probable cause, arranged
for witnesses, and was prepared to go ahead with the prosecution. 	Mr. Maldonado
Rodriguez, on the other hand, is denied the ability to timely investigate the charges,
find witnesses, and prepare his defense because of the actions of the Government.
One of the reasons we cherish the right to a speedy trial in this country is that it
ensures that the Court affords the defendant equal footing as the Government at
litigating the case. 	The Government had within its sole control a choice—either
prosecute 	Mr. Maldonado 	Rodriguez 	or 	deport 	him—and 	“their 	choice 	has
consequences,” namely, the end of their ability to pursue this prosecution.
	Tamup-
Tamup, 2025 WL 2662293, at *2.
Finally, dismissing without prejudice would not be in the public interest. The
Government presented the case to the grand jury after the required timeframe for
putting on their showing of probable cause had lapsed and knowing full well that
Mr. Maldonado Rodriguez was no longer in the country to answer on the charges.
Shortly thereafter, the Government sought to dismiss the charges. 	This type of
manipulation, and waste of the Court’s and taxpayers’ resources, is not in the public
interest and should not result in a do-over by the Government at the expense of
Mr. Maldonado Rodriguez and the public, and “[d]eterring such conduct through a
dismissal with prejudice is consistent with this Court’s duty to safeguard the public
interest.”
See Guimaraes, 2025 WL 1899046, at *4.
Case 1:25-cr-00116-JJM-AEM Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 11 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>

12
III. 	CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, individually and collectively, the Court finds here that
to 	protect 	Mr. Maldonado 	Rodriguez 	against 	fundamental 	unfairness 	and
prosecutorial harassment, ensure that the dismissal is not contrary to the public
interest, and safeguard the public interest, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss With
Prejudice (ECF No. 19) is GRANTED and the Government’s Motion to Dismiss
Without Prejudice (ECF No. 20) is DENIED. The Court DISMISSES the Indictment
WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/John J. McConnell, Jr.
_________________________________
JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR.
Chief Judge
United States District Court
January 12, 2026
Case 1:25-cr-00116-JJM-AEM Document 22 Filed 01/12/26 Page 12 of 12 PageID #:
<pageID>