Soscia Holdings, LLC et al v. Town of Coventry et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
SOSCIA HOLDINGS LLC, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
TOWN OF COVENTRY, et al.,
Defendants.
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C.A. No. 25-cv-274-MRD-AEM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Melissa R. DuBose, United States District Judge.
Johnson’s Pond is a 938-acre fresh-water reservoir in Coventry, Rhode Island
with waterfront homes scattered across miles of shoreline. 	ECF No. 34 at 2. 	It is
home to popular fish species and is frequently used by individuals who enjoy
canoeing, kayaking, and boating. In 2024, the Town of Coventry made a big splash
when it took Johnson’s Pond from Soscia Holdings by eminent domain. 	While the
issues between the Town and Soscia Holdings go back several years,1 the controversy
before this Court is limited to the condemnation and what has occurred since. 	The
parties here do not agree on much, but one thing they do agree on is that the issue of
“just compensation” for the taking must be decided by a court. 	The Plaintiffs2 seek
1 Readers who are curious about past issues should consult
Soscia Holdings,
LLC v. Rhode Island, 167 F.4th 14 (Mem) (1st Cir. 2026).
2 The Plaintiffs in this case are Soscia Holdings, LLC; Structures at Johnson’s
Pond, LLC; Boating at Johnson’s Pond, LLC; Waterfront at Johnson’s Pond, LLC;
Common 	Area 	at 	Johnson’s 	Pond, 	LLC; 	and 	Land 	at 	Johnson’s 	Pond, 	LLC.
Throughout this Order, the Court may use Plaintiffs and Soscia interchangeably.
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to have that issue decided by this Court and claim an absolute right to proceed here
under
	Knick v. Township. of Scott, Pa., 588 U.S. 180 (2019). Meanwhile, the
Defendants3 ask this Court to let the Rhode Island State Superior Court handle the
issue, which it seems prepared to do. 	If the State Court proceeds as planned, then
the Plaintiffs’ claims here may be precluded based on the holding in
San Remo Hotel,
L.P. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., Cal., 545 U.S. 323 (2005).
And so, the Plaintiffs seek an injunction to preserve this Court’s ability to
proceed on the just compensation claim—and other claims—despite a Superior Court
decision finding that it has and is prepared to exercise jurisdiction over the just
compensation issue. The Defendants object to the issuance of an injunction and argue
that this Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint or abstain from
ruling on any issues until the Superior Court proceeding is complete. 	Currently
pending before this Court, therefore, are Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction
(ECF No. 45) and Defendants’ motion to dismiss or abstain (ECF No. 51). 	For the
reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary
Injunction and DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Abstain.
3 The Defendants (collectively, the “Town”) in this case are the Town of
Coventry; Town of Coventry by and through its Finance Director Robert J. Civetti in
his Official Capacity; Hillary V. Lima, in her Official Capacity as Council President
and Individually; James E. LeBlanc in his Official Capacity as Council Vice President
and Individually; Jonathan J. Pascua in his Official Capacity as Councilmember and
Individually; Alisa M. Capaldi in her Official Capacity in her Official Capacity as
Councilmember and Individually; Kimberly A. Shockley in her Official Capacity as
Councilmember and Individually; Jennifer M. Ludwig in her Official Capacity as
Councilmember and Individually; Daniel O. Parillo Jr. in his Official Capacity as
Town Manager and Individually; and Stephen J. Angell Esq. in his Official Capacity
as Town Solicitor and Individually.
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I. 	TRAVEL
A. State Court
On June 21, 2024, the Defendants initiated an action in the Kent County
Superior Court seeking to have the Court accept $157,000 into its registry as
“estimated just compensation” based on the “Town of Coventry’s acquisition by
eminent domain of the property, rights, and interest commonly known as Johnson’s
Pond, its dam structures, and a parcel of undeveloped land immediately downstream
of the Pond and dam.” Petition at 1, 6,
In Re: Town of Coventry, KM-2024-0578 (June
21, 2024). 	One week later, on June 28, 2024, an Associate Justice of the Superior
Court entered a Condemnation Order for the property and accepted $157,000 into the
Superior Court registry. Order on Motion to Deposit Funds,
In Re: Town of Coventry,
KM- 2024-0578 (June 28, 2024).
There was no further activity in the Superior Court until July 28, 2025 when
the Town filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment or, Alternatively, Assignment for
Trial. 	Motion for Entry of Judgment or, Alternatively, Assignment for Trial,
In Re:
Town of Coventry, KM- 2024-0578 (July 28, 2025). 	At that point, Soscia Holdings,
who was not a party in the condemnation action, filed a limited scope entry of
appearance and objected to the Town’s motion, essentially arguing that the Supreme
Court’s decision in
Knick (more to come on this soon) allowed the former property
owners to pursue their claims in federal district court. 	Objection to Motion,
In Re:
Town of Coventry, KM- 2024-0578 (August 8, 2025). 	On November 25, 2025, the
Superior Court entered an Order finding that the Superior Court had jurisdiction “to
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hear the Town’s Motion for Entry of Judgment, or in the Alternative, Assignment for
Trial.” Order ¶ 1,
In Re: Town of Coventry, KM-2024-0578 (November 25, 2025). The
Superior Court scheduled a hearing on the Town’s motion for December 17, 2025, but
then continued the hearing date to March 16, 2026.
B. Federal Court
On June 13, 2025, the Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in this Court against the
Defendants, alleging the following counts: (1) Takings Clause violation under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, (2) 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, 	violation 	of 	procedural 	due 	process 	under 	the 	Fifth 	and 	Fourteenth
Amendments, (3) § 1983, violation of substantive due process under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, (4) § 1983, violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, (5) Declaratory Judgment Act under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201,
2202, (6) Assessment of Damages under R.I. Gen. Laws § 24-1-8, (7) Tortious
Interference with Prospective Economic Relations, and (8) Civil Conspiracy. ECF No.
1 at 39–55. After the Town moved to dismiss that Complaint, the Plaintiffs filed their
First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) which included the same counts minus the
Declaratory Judgment count. ECF No. 34 at 48–67. The FAC no longer contests the
condemnation itself and instead seeks just compensation and other damages based
on the Defendants’ decision to take the Johnson’s Pond property by eminent domain
and the execution thereof. ECF No. 45 at 5–6.
The Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion for Injunctive and Declaratory relief
following the Superior Court’s November 25, 2025 Order finding it had jurisdiction to
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hear the Town’s Motion for Entry of Judgment, or in the Alternative, Assignment for
Trial, and scheduling a hearing on that motion. 	The Court heard arguments from
the parties on this and the other pending motions on February 18, 2026.4
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Motion for Preliminary Injunction
There are two authorities under which this Court could issue a preliminary
injunction: The All Writs Act and pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The All Writs Act provides that “all courts established by Act of Congress
may issue all writs necessary and appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions
and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 	28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). 	“[The
Supreme Court] has repeatedly recognized the power of a federal court to issue such
commands under the All Writs Act as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate
and prevent the frustration of orders it has previously issued in its exercise of
jurisdiction otherwise obtained[.]”
United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159,
172 (1977). 	That said, an injunction issued pursuant to the All Writs Act must not
run afoul of the so-called Anti-Injunction Act. The Anti-Injunction Act provides that
“[a] court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a
4 At the February 18, 2026 hearing, the parties argued Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Injunctive and Declaratory Relief and the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or Abstain.
At that same hearing, the Court heard argument on the Town’s Motion to Remand in
Lima, et al. v. Soscia Holdings, LLC, et al., 25-cv-676, where it is the Plaintiff and
Soscia is the Defendant (opposite from this proceeding). 	This Court will issue a
separate Order on the Motion to Remand.
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State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in
aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
B. Motion to Dismiss or Abstain
Defendants’ motion to dismiss or abstain invokes both Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants assert that they succeed regardless
of the rule applied because the Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over
this case.
	See ECF No. 51 at 11–13. Plaintiffs urge the Court to view the motion to
dismiss or abstain as a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c)
because the Defendants filed the motion after they filed their Answer to the First
Complaint (ECF No. 50). 	ECF No. 56 at 10. 	Ultimately, whether examined under
Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), the standard for dismissal is the same.
See Marrero-Gutierrez
v. Molina, 491 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2007) (explaining “[t]he standard of review of a
motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is
the same as that for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)”)
Regardless, Defendants’ motion to dismiss or abstain is premised entirely on
the abstention principles and doctrines they contend should apply in this case.
	See
generally ECF No. 51 at 13–55. Each abstention doctrine they raise will be addressed
below.
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. The
Knick/San Remo Dilemma
Underlying the Motion for Injunctive and Declaratory relief is Plaintiffs’
concerns that a state court decision on the “just compensation” issue would force this
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Court to give preclusive effect to that decision. 	Plaintiffs’ concerns stem from
statements made by Defendants during the Superior Court proceedings and the
Supreme Court’s holding in
San Remo Hotel, L.P., 545 U.S. at 323 (2005). According
to Plaintiffs, Defendants argue that “[o]nce [the State] Court enters final judgment of
just 	compensation 	for 	the 	taking—whether 	after 	a 	trial 	or 	not—that 	final
adjudication, that judgment will have full preclusive effect and relitigation of that
issue will be barred by
res judicata.” ECF No. 45 at 11 (quoting Petitioner the Town
of Coventry’s Supplemental Memorandum in Support of the Town’s Motion for Entry
of Judgment or Alternatively, Assignment for Trial at 13–15,
	In Re: Town of
Coventry, KM- 2024-0578 (December 1, 2025). In making this statement, the Town
Defendant relies on
San Remo, which held that federal courts “are not free to
disregard the full faith and credit statute solely to preserve the availability of a
federal forum.” 545 U.S. at 347–48.
The dilemma forms when a plaintiff, based on
Knick, elects to file their ripe
“just compensation” claim in federal district court rather pursuing its claim in state
court. The plaintiff in
Knick brought a § 1983 claim directly in federal court against
a town based on an ordinance she contended effectuated a taking of her property. 588
U.S. at 185–87. When she filed her inverse condemnation claim,
Williamson County
Regional 	Planning 	Commission 	v. 	Hamilton 	Bank 	of 	Johnson 	City 	governed,
requiring litigants to seek “just compensation” in state court before coming to federal
court.
	See 473 U.S. 172, 194–95, 200 (1985) (holding that a property owner whose
property has been taken by a local government has not suffered a violation of his Fifth
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Amendment rights—and thus cannot bring a federal takings claim in federal court—
until a state court has denied his claim for just compensation under state law). 	In
Knick, the Supreme Court acknowledged a “Catch-22” created by
Williamson County
and
San Remo. 588 U.S. at 184–85. The “Catch-22” or “
San Remo preclusion trap,”
is that “[the litigant] cannot go to federal court without going to state court first; but
if he goes to state court and loses, his claim will be barred in federal court. The federal
claim dies aborning.”
	Id. 	To rectify this Catch-22, the Supreme Court expressly
overruled
Williamson County and explained the following:
We conclude that a government violates the Takings Clause when it
takes property without compensation, and that the property owner may
bring a Fifth Amendment claim under § 1983 at that time … because
the violation is complete at the time of the taking,
pursuit of a remedy
in federal court need not await any subsequent state action.
…
The state-litigation requirement of
Williamson County is overruled. A
property owner may bring a takings claim under § 1983 upon the taking
of his property without just compensation by a local government.
Id. at 202, 206 (emphasis added).
Here, 	the 	Plaintiffs 	rely 	on
	Knick 	for 	the 	proposition 	that 	their 	“just
compensation” claim against the Town became ripe on June 28, 2024, the same day
the Town completed the taking. The Defendants created a jurisdictional conundrum
when they commenced a claim for assessment of damages under R.I. Gen Laws § 24-
1-8 in the Superior Court after Plaintiffs filed their federal Complaint. If allowed to
proceed in state court, Plaintiffs contend that “this Court would be hard-pressed not
to honor a preclusive ruling by the Superior Court on the ‘just compensation’ due for
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the Taking.” 	ECF No. 45 at 22. Given all this, the Court must choose between two
options: (1) allow the Town to proceed in Superior Court on March 16, which would
require ignoring the clear holding of
Knick, or (2) enjoin the Superior Court from
proceeding as scheduled because Plaintiffs have established this Court may issue the
requested injunction and none of the abstention principles argued by the Defendants
require this Court to abstain.
Defendants 	contend 	that 	Plaintiffs’ 	arguments 	premised 	on
	Knick 	are
misplaced and argue that it does not apply here for two reasons. 	First, Defendants
argue that
Knick merely held that property owners did not have to exhaust state
remedies before bringing a Fifth Amendment takings claim in federal court. ECF No.
46 at 24. This is true, but Plaintiffs’ claim was brought here
because there is no need
to exhaust state remedies. 	Second, they attempt to distinguish
Knick based on the
fact that it dealt with an inverse condemnation claim, not a direct condemnation.
Id.
at 25–29. 	In support, Defendants urge this Court to adopt the reasoning in
Providence City v. Thompson, No. 1:19-cv-88, 2019 WL 4932759 (D. Utah Oct. 7,
2019).
Providence City addressed a direct condemnation proceeding initiated by the
government in state court.
	Id. at *1. 	After being served with the state court
complaint, 	defendant 	Thompson, 	relying 	on
	Knick, 	attempted 	to 	remove 	the
condemnation to federal court.
Id. at *3. The district court explained that Thompson
“misinterprets the
Knick decision in a number of ways.”
	Id. at *4. 	The court
explained that
Knick (1) “overruled the state-exhaustion requirement, but it did not
convert state eminent domain actions into federal claims,” (2) “did not grant
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defendants in state eminent domain actions the power to remove to federal court,”
and (3) “unlike
Knick, there is no takings plaintiff in this action.”
	Id. 	This Court
concludes this reasoning is unpersuasive. The issue before both courts in this case is
one of “just compensation”
for the taking that has already occurred. Further, this is
not a case where Plaintiffs seek to remove the state court “just compensation”
determination to federal court after engaging in the state court case. 	Rather, the
situation presented before this Court is a ripe Fifth Amendment claim filed before
Defendants initiated the just compensation determination in state court pursuant to
Rhode Island law.
Ultimately, the Court finds persuasive the following language from
Knick:
In sum, because a taking without compensation violates the self-
executing Fifth Amendment at the time of the taking, the property
owner can bring a federal suit at that time. Just as someone whose
property has been taken by the Federal Government has a claim
founded … upon the Constitution that he may bring under the Tucker
Act, someone whose property has been taken by a local government has
a claim under § 1983 for a deprivation of a right secured by the
Constitution that he may bring upon the taking in federal court. The
general rule is that plaintiffs may bring constitutional claims under
§ 1983 without first bringing any sort of state lawsuit, even when state
court actions addressing the underlying behavior are available … This
is as true for takings claims as for any other claim grounded in the bill
of rights.
588 U.S. at 194 (cleaned up).
Lastly, while
Knick was decided in the context of an inverse condemnation,
nothing in the Supreme Court’s opinion limits its holding to only that specific kind of
taking action. For example, the Court explained “[t]he availability of
any particular
compensation remedy, such as an inverse condemnation claim under state law,
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cannot infringe or restrict the property owner’s federal constitutional claim.”
	Id. at
191 (emphasis added). 	This Court reads the use of “such as” to mean that the
Supreme Court used “indirect condemnation claim” as an example of “any particular
compensation remedy” available to a property owner. Moreover, that language does
not 	support 	the 	argument 	that
	Knick’s 	principles 	apply 	only 	to 	inverse
condemnations suits. 	While the Supreme Court mentioned that the holding “will
simply allow into federal court takings claims that otherwise would have been
brought as inverse condemnation suits,” it went on to broadly hold that “[a] property
owner may bring a takings claim under § 1983 upon the taking of his property without
just compensation.”
Id. at 205–06. That comment was in response to concerns raised
by 	the 	dissenting 	Justices 	that 	overruling
	Williamson 	County 	could 	expose
government officials to new liability.
	Id. at 218 (Kagan J., dissenting). 	Whether
pursued in state court or this Court, the Town is exposed to no new liability because
it is constitutionally obligated to provide just compensation for the taking under both
state and federal law.
Ultimately, this Court finds Plaintiffs’ “just compensation” claim ripened
before Defendants’ claim.
	Knick expressly overruled the
Williamson state litigation
requirement and found “that a property owner may bring a Fifth Amendment claim
under § 1983” when a government takes property without just compensation.
	Id. at
202. That is what happened here. Thus, the Plaintiffs’ claim for “just compensation”
under the Fifth Amendment, and the related federal and state law claims, are
properly before this Court.
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B. All Writs Act & Anti-Injunction Act
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Injunctive and Declaratory relief suggests this Court has
the authority to issue a writ under the All Writs Act that does the following: (1)
exercises subject-matter, personal, federal question, and supplemental jurisdiction,
(ECF No. 45 ¶¶ 1–4 (starting on p. 50)); (2) declares various principles of law, (
id.
¶¶ 5–7); (3) declares that Plaintiffs have a right to just compensation under the
federal constitution in federal district court, (
id. ¶¶ 8–10); (4) prohibits Defendants
from engaging in various action in the state court cases, (
id. ¶¶ 11–13); and (5)
requests other various forms of relief (¶¶ 14–18).
Id. at 50–53. Plaintiffs also contend
that this broad relief does not run afoul of the Anti-Injunction Act because two
exceptions to the Act apply: (1) the relief is expressly authorized; and (2) the relief is
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction. ECF No. 45 at 15–16.
Defendants disagree, arguing that Plaintiffs’ requests for declaratory and
injunctive relief are not properly before the Court, and that any writ issued by this
Court would violate the Anti-Injunction Act. ECF No. 46 at 7–17. Before moving on
to the Anti-Injunction Act, the Court will address Defendants’ argument that
Plaintiffs are not entitled to injunctive or declaratory relief. 	To support their
argument that the requested relief is not properly before the Court, Defendants cite
to district court orders from within this Circuit that support the legal principle that
injunctive relief must relate to the claims pled in the complaint.
Id. at 8–9. But those
cases are easily distinguishable.
	Cf. Beers v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, No. 20-cv-
968-LM, 2021 WL 6883209, at *1 (D.N.H. Dec. 15, 2021) (denying request for
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injunctive relief—more time in the law library—because no claim pending related to
lack 	of 	law 	library 	time);
	P.R. 	Soccer 	League 	NFP, 	Corp. 	v. 	Federación
Puertorriqueña de Futbol, et al., Civil No. 23-1203 (RAM), 2024 WL 149618, at *1–2
(D.P.R. Jan. 12, 2024) (denying injunctive relief—that defendants not interfere with
attendance at soccer games—because it was unrelated to the RICO or Sherman Act
claims asserted in the third amended complaint);
Kosilek v. Misi, 630 F. Supp. 3d
328, 334–35 (D. Mass. 2022) (denying injunctive relief—housing a transgender
prisoner in a single cell—when the original action was to access gender-affirming
surgery and be housed in a women’s prison facility). 	Here, Plaintiffs’ FAC asserts
various federal constitutional and state statutory claims for just compensation and
damages related to the taking of Johnson’s Pond. The instant request for injunctive
and declaratory relief, while broad, is directly related to those claims and requests
for monetary relief.
The Court turns now to the Anti-Injunction Act, which usually prevents a
federal court from staying or enjoining a state court proceeding unless certain
conditions are present. 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
i. 	Expressly Authorized
Plaintiffs contend that “Congress has ‘expressly authorized’ injunctive relief
against state court proceedings under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” relying on
Mitchum v.
Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972). 	ECF No. 45 at 15. 	In that case, the Supreme Court
examined “whether [§ 1983] comes within the ‘expressly authorized’ exception of the
anti-injunction statute so as to permit a federal court in a § 1983 suit to grant an
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injunction to stay a proceeding pending in a state court.”
Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 226.
Defendants argue that
	Mitchum does not apply because, unlike that plaintiff,
Plaintiff here is not pursuing any § 1983 claim in equity. ECF No. 46 at 13.
In
Mitchum, a city attorney obtained a preliminary injunction in a state court
against a bookstore because it was a public nuisance under Florida law. 407 U.S. at
227. 	After some further proceedings in the state court, the bookstore, relying on
§ 1983, filed a case in federal court alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. 	A 	three-judge 	panel 	denied 	the 	bookstore 	owner’s 	request 	for
injunctive and declaratory relief against the state court proceedings.
	Id. at 227–28.
After an in-depth review of the case law along with the history and purpose behind
§ 1983, the Supreme Court explained the following:
Congress plainly authorized the federal courts to issue injunctions in
§ 1983 actions, by expressly authorizing a ‘suit in equity’ as one of the
means of redress. And this Court long ago recognized that federal
injunctive 	relief 	against 	a 	state 	court 	proceeding 	can 	in 	some
circumstances be essential to prevent great, immediate, and irreparable
loss of a person’s constitutional rights.
Id. at 242 (citing
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). The Court also explained that
“[t]he very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States
and the people, as guardians of the people’s federal rights—to protect the people from
unconstitutional 	action 	under color of 	law, 	‘whether that 	action 	be 	executive,
legislative, or judicial.’”
	Id. (quoting
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879)).
The Supreme Court held “only that the District Court … was in error in holding that,
because of the anti-injunction statute, it was absolutely without power in this § 1983
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action to enjoin a proceeding pending in a state court under any circumstances
whatsoever.”
Id. at 243.
To 	decide 	whether 	the 	Plaintiffs’ 	§ 	1983 	claim 	satisfies 	this 	“expressly
authorized” exception, this Court must decide whether the FAC needed to establish
a “suit in equity” or if that element is satisfied by “Plaintiffs[’] invocation of this
Court’s federal question jurisdiction through their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983[.]”
ECF No. 47 at 4–5. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that a writ enjoining the state
court proceedings would fall squarely under the “expressly authorized” exception
because the FAC pleads a claim under § 1983, the relief requested includes “[a]ny
other relief that the Court deems fair, equitable, and just,” and they are seeking a
similar form of relief as the plaintiff in
Mitchum.
See 407 U.S. at 227–29. The Court
acknowledges that these Plaintiffs did not initiate a separate suit that sought
injunctive relief, like in
Mitchum, but that difference does not move this Court to
decide differently because the Supreme Court is clear “that … § 1983 is an Act of
Congress that falls within the ‘expressly authorized’ exception of that law.”
	Id. at
242–43;
see also, Casa Marie, Inc. v. Super. Ct. of P.R. for Dist. of Arecibo, 988 F.2d
252, 261 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing
Mitchum and stating “it is beyond dispute that the []
section 1983 claims come within an ‘express’ exception to section 2283[.]”) 	Finally,
like the Supreme Court explained, “[i]n so concluding, we do not question or qualify
in any way the principles of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a
federal court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding.”
	Mitchum, 407 U.S. at
243.
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ii. 	Necessary in Aid of its Jurisdiction
Another Anti-Injunction Act exception invoked by Plaintiffs is the “necessary
in aid of its jurisdiction” exception. 	ECF No. 45 at 16. 	“On a general level, the in-
aid-of-jurisdiction exception under the Anti-Injunction Act permits federal injunctive
relief to stay a state court proceeding where ‘necessary to prevent a state court from
so interfering with a federal court’s consideration or disposition of a case as to
seriously impair the federal court’s flexibility and authority to decide that case.”
State
Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Parisien, 352 F. Supp. 3d 215, 225 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)
(quoting
Atl. Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281,
295 (1970)).
Both parties cite to
James v. Bellotti, in which the First Circuit explained that
“[t]he ‘necessary in aid of’ language in the Anti-Injunction Act has been read as
incorporating a historical exception for cases in which a federal court obtains in rem
jurisdiction prior to a state-court suit.” 733 F.2d 989, 993 (1st Cir. 1984) (citing
Vendo
Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 641 (1977)). Defendants cling to the phrase
“in rem jurisdiction” and argue that the Superior Court obtained in rem jurisdiction
in June 2024, before the Plaintiffs invoked jurisdiction in this Court. True, but
James
goes on to explain that “[the necessary in aid of jurisdiction language]
is not
necessarily limited to in rem actions, however, and is meant to ‘give sufficient
flexibility that a federal court, as a court of equity, may, when it has jurisdiction deal
adequately with the situation at hand.’”
	Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 1A Moore’s
Federal Practice ¶ 0.208a[2] at 2336).
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While the Town initiated the condemnation and taking of Johnson’s Pond in
state court, Plaintiffs invoked this Court’s jurisdiction over the “just compensation”
issue when they filed their Complaint on June 13, 2025. This was approximately six
weeks before the Defendants asked the state court to exercise jurisdiction over the
“just compensation” issue on July 28, 2025.
	See Knick, 588 U.S. at 202; R.I. Gen.
Laws § 24-1-8. To remind, the Supreme Court says “that a government violates the
Takings Clause when it takes property without compensation, and that a property
owner may bring a Fifth Amendment claim under § 1983 at that time.”
	Knick, 588
U.S. at 202. 	This indicates that the Plaintiffs—now the former property owners—
had a ripe § 1983 claim immediately once the taking was complete on June 28, 2024.
Compare this with the Town’s cause of action in state court, which under Rhode
Island law could not have become ripe until June 28, 2025 at the earliest.
	See R.I.
Gen. Laws § 24-1-8 (stating that “[a]ny owner of … real property so taken, who cannot
agree with the city or town council upon the price to be paid for his or her
estate … may, within one year from the time the sum of money is deposited in the
superior court … apply by petition to the superior court … setting forth the taking of
his or her land or estate or interest therein and praying for an assessment of damages
by the court or by a jury.”) 	Because the Town was statutorily required to wait one
year before acting on the just compensation part of the exercise of eminent domain,
Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim became ripe before the Town’s claim.
Therefore, here, like in
James, “some federal injunctive relief may be necessary
to prevent [the] state court from interfering with [the] federal court’s consideration
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or disposition of [the] case as to seriously impair the federal court’s flexibility and
authority to decide [the] case.” 733 F.2d at 993 (citing
Atl. Coast Line Railroad Co.,
398 U.S. at 295). This Court finds that the “necessary in aid of jurisdiction” exception
applies and the Court may issue a writ enjoining the state court proceedings, as it is
not prevented from doing so by the Anti-Injunction Act. 5
C. Abstention
Just because this Court could issue an injunction under the All Writs Act and
move 	forward 	on 	hearing 	Plaintiffs’ 	claims 	does 	not 	mean 	it 	should 	or 	will.
Defendants raise various abstention doctrines and suggest this case presents the
“discrete set of ‘exceptional circumstances’ in which the exercise of jurisdiction may
be declined.”
Chico Serv. Station, Inc. v. Sol P.R. Ltd., 633 F.3d 20, 29 (1st Cir. 2011)
(citing
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996)). 	As the First
Circuit noted in
Chico, “[a]bstention occupies an uneasy position in the jurisprudence
of federal court jurisdiction” because “federal courts have a ‘virtually unflagging
obligation … to exercise the jurisdiction given them.’” 	633 F.3d at 28–29 (quoting
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705 (1992)). 	The Court will examine each
doctrine the Defendants raise, including
Younger,
Wilton Brillhart,
Pullman,
Rooker-
Feldman,
Burford, and
Colorado River, to determine whether any requires this Court
to abstain from proceeding with the adjudication of this case.
i. 	Younger Abstention
5 After concluding that two Anti-Injunction Act exceptions are applicable, the
Court will not address Plaintiffs other arguments, namely the “relitigation” and
“strangers” exceptions.
See ECF No. 45 at 16–17.
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“The
Younger doctrine reflects a longstanding public policy against federal
court interference with state court proceedings.”
	Mass. Delivery Ass’n v. Coakley,
671 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). In
Sprint Communications v. Jacobs, the
Supreme Court explained that “circumstances fitting within the
Younger doctrine are
‘exceptional’ 	[and] 	[] 	include 	‘state 	criminal 	prosecutions,’ 	‘civil 	enforcement
proceedings,’ and ‘civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in
furtherance of the state court’s ability to perform their judicial functions.’” 571 U.S.
69, 72–73 (2013). 	After the
Sprint decision and relying on the Supreme Court’s
opinion, the First Circuit distilled and explained a three-step approach to
Younger
abstention:
To begin, a federal court must ascertain whether a particular state
proceeding falls within the
Younger taxonomy. 	If so, the court must
then take the second step and consider whether the
Middlesex factors
support abstention. 	And if these two steps leave the case on track for
abstention, the court must take the third step and determine whether
any of the isthmian exceptions to the
Younger doctrine apply.
Sirva Relocation, LLC v. Richie, 794 F.3d 185, 192–93 (1st Cir. 2015). The
Middlesex
factors cited in step two of the analysis and pulled from Supreme Court case
Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, require the
Court to consider the following: “(1) an ongoing state judicial proceeding, which (2)
implicates important state interests, and (3) … provide[s] an adequate opportunity to
raise [federal] challenges.”
	Sprint Commc’n, 571 U.S. at 80 (citing
Middlesex Cnty.
Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982) (cleaned up)).
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This considered, the Court here must first decide whether the Superior Court
proceeding falls within the
Younger taxonomy.6 	Defendants briefly assert that
Younger abstention is warranted “[w]hen noncriminal judicial proceedings involve
important state interests,” and then they jump into the
Middlesex analysis. ECF No.
46 at 20. Plaintiffs argue that this case is akin to “judicial review of executive action”
so
Younger abstention does not apply.
See ECF No. 56 at 50–52.
In presenting their position, Plaintiffs discuss the First Circuit’s decision in
Rio Grande Cmty. Health Ctr., Inc. v. Rullan, 397 F.3d 56, 70 (1st Cir. 2005). In that
case, a federally qualified health center sued the Secretary of Health in Puerto Rico,
seeking an injunction to require payment of certain Medicaid funds when due.
Id. at
60. 	The plaintiff also sued in state court where it sought damages and other relief.
Id. In holding
Younger did not apply, the First Circuit explained the following:
Neither of the two core rationales that the Supreme Court has used in
extending
Younger to certain civil proceedings applies here. This is not
an enforcement proceeding brought by the state or an agency against
[the town] …
Nor are the fundamental workings of the state’s judicial
system (like its contempt process or method of enforcing judgments) put
at risk by the relief asked of the federal court. As well, the Supreme
Court has made it clear that it has never remotely suggested that every
pending state proceeding between a state and a private plaintiff justifies
abstention if that private plaintiff then sues the state in federal court.
Id. at 70 (emphasis added) (cleaned up). 	As the Court explained, “[n]ormal res
judicata effects of federal actions on state actions—which are possible here—are of
course not enough to trigger
Younger.”
Id. at 71.
6 Neither party contends that the State Court action is a criminal prosecution
or a civil enforcement proceeding, so the Court will only address the third type of
cases where
Younger may apply.
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The Circuit likened
Rio Grande to
New Orleans Pub. Service, Inc. v. Council of
City of New Orleans et al., 491 U.S. 350 (1989) (“
NOPSI”), a case in which the
Supreme Court held that
Younger abstention did not apply.
NOPSI, a public utility, sought a rate increase from the New Orleans
City Council due to increased costs. When such an increase was denied,
NOPSI filed suit both in federal district court and in state court, in both
instances seeking to have the Council order set aside and the Council
enjoined to approve a rate increase.
Rio Grande Cmty. Health Ctr., 397 F.3d at 70 (citing
NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 355–58).
The Supreme Court explained that
Younger abstention did not apply to this type of
state proceeding, “which was a mere ‘state judicial proceeding reviewing legislative
or executive action,’ because ‘[s]uch a broad abstention requirement would make a
mockery of the rule that only exceptional circumstances’ justify abstention.”
	Id.
(quoting
NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 368).
Defendants, for their part, point the Court to an Eighth Circuit case that
concluded the
Middlesex factors weighed in favor of applying
Younger abstention,
Aaron v. Target Corp., 357 F.3d 768, 779–780 (8th Cir. 2004). That case is different
from this one because no condemnation process occurred in the state court before the
plaintiffs filed in federal court.
Id. at 772. The issues before that court involved the
state’s eminent domain process, and the Plaintiff challenged the taking itself. 	In
addition, the Eighth Circuit decided
Target before the Supreme Court issued its
opinions in
Knick—which reaffirmed the right to seek just compensation in federal
court, 588 U.S. at 194—and
Sirva—which directed district courts to first determine
whether the “state proceeding falls within the
Younger taxonomy,” 794 F.3d at 192–
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93. 	This Court concludes that this case falls out of the taxonomy because this case
does not involve any risk to the “the fundamental workings of the state’s judicial
system (like its contempt process or method of enforcing judgments).”
	Rio Grande,
397 F.3d at 70.
Defendants 	argue 	that 	“[c]ourts 	have 	continued 	to 	apply 	[the]
	Younger
abstention in takings cases even after the Supreme Court decided
Knick,” and cite
Serna v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of the Cnty. of El Paso, C.A. No. 22-cv-02998-DDD-
MDB, 2024 WL 1715014, at *12–14 (D. Colo. Feb. 28, 2024). ECF No. 46 at 19. The
District Court in Colorado found
Knick “inconsequential to th[e] case” because those
“[p]laintiffs ha[d] already been awarded … just compensation for their property.”
Serna, 2024 WL 1715014, at *6 (focusing on the fact that the just compensation trial
occurred before the complaint was filed in federal court). 	Here, the facts differ
because Plaintiffs had not been awarded just compensation for the taking before filing
the instant case.
Finally, the Superior Court proceedings only involve the Town, not any of the
town council defendants named in this case, and none of Plaintiffs have any pending
claims in the Superior Court. 	Based on the above, the state proceedings here fall
outside of the
Younger taxonomy and do not trigger
Younger abstention.
ii. 	Wilton/Brillhart Abstention
“‘Under what is known as the
Wilton/Brillhart abstention doctrine, district
courts possess significant discretion to dismiss or stay claims seeking declaratory
relief, even though they have subject matter jurisdiction over such claims.’”
	OHI
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Asset (CT) Lender, LLC v. Woodland Manor Improvement Ass’n ex rel. Shine, 687 F.
Supp. 2d 12, 19 (D.R.I. 2010) (quoting
R.R. Street & Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 569
F.3d 711, 713 (7th Cir. 2009)). 	The
Wilton/Brillhart factors require the court to
consider the following:
The scope of the pending state court proceedings, the available state
court defenses, and whether the claims of all parties in interest can be
settled in the state court proceeding. 	Specifically, where parallel
proceedings presenting an opportunity for ventilation of the same state
law issues are underway in state court, these considerations clearly
support a district court’s decision to stay or dismiss a declaratory
judgment action.
Id. at 20–21 (internal citation and quotation omitted).
Beginning with the parallel proceedings consideration, in
OHI Asset the court
found “that there [were] not parallel state and federal court proceedings because OHI
was not a party to the [defendants’ action] in state court when th[e] [federal] action
was filed.”
	Id. at 24. 	When it comes to the time of determining whether parallel
proceedings are in fact underway, the court explained “that the determination should
be made as of the time the federal action was filed.”
	Id. at 22. 	In the instant case,
the Court finds the same reasoning applicable and arrives at the same result. 	As
previously 	mentioned, 	Plaintiffs 	filed 	the 	federal 	action 	(asserting 	various
constitutional and state-law claims) on June 13, 2025 against all named Defendants.
Thereafter, the Town filed a petition for entry of judgment on the just compensation
issue several weeks later on July 28, 2025. 	None of the Plaintiffs or Defendants
(except the Town of Coventry) in this case are named in any action or petition pending
in the Superior Court, and neither are any constitutional claims. 	Thus, here it is
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clear 	that 	the 	relevant 	federal 	and 	state 	court 	proceedings 	are 	not 	parallel
proceedings.
Moving on, the Court looks to the remaining factors, including source of law,
scope of the state court proceedings, and the state court’s familiarity with the issues.
As to the source of law, the Plaintiffs here raise issues of federal constitutional law
and state law. However, as was the case in
OHI Asset, none of the state law claims
at issue, are “novel, unsettled, difficult, complex, or otherwise problematic.” 	687 F.
Supp. 2d at 24, 24–26 (quoting
First Fin. Ins. Co. v. Crossroads Lounge, Inc., 140 F.
Supp. 2d 686, 695 (S.D.W. Va. 2001)). Therefore, none of these factors apply to this
Court hearing the claim for just compensation in conjunction with Plaintiffs’ other
federal constitutional and state statutory claims. Furthermore, the scope of the state
court proceedings are much narrower than the proceedings in this Court.
The last factor—the Superior Court’s familiarity with the issues—may tip in
favor of Defendants given the state court handled the initial June 2024 petition. Still,
the Superior Court has not made any determination on “just compensation,” nor is it
presented with any other claims. Therefore, while this factor slightly leans in favor
of Defendants, it fails to overcome the other factors and leads this Court to conclude
that
Wilton/Brillhart abstention does not apply here.
iii. 	Pullman Abstention
The First Circuit has explained that “[t]he purpose of Pullman abstention is to
enable courts ‘to avoid resolving … federal question[s] by encouraging state-law
determination that may moot the federal controversy.’”
	29 Greenwood, LLC v. City
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of Newton, 128 F.4th 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting
San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 339).
In deciding whether to apply
Pullman, courts are to consider whether “(1) substantial
uncertainty exists over the meaning of the state law in question, and (2) settling the
question of state law will or may well obviate the need to resolve a significant federal
constitutional question.”
	Batterman v. Leahy, 544 F.3d 370, 373 (1st Cir. 2008)
(citing
Ford Motor Co. v. Meredith Motor Co., 257 F.3d 67, 71 (1st Cir. 2001)). If those
questions are answered affirmatively, then “declining to exercise jurisdiction is
warranted.”
Id.
Defendants argue abstention pursuant to
Pullman is warranted because “there
are at least four state law questions that should be resolved by the state courts and
resolution of those state law questions will or may obviate the need to resolve the
federal constitutional questions presented here.” ECF No. 51 at 15. The four state-
law questions the Defendants articulate are whether: (1) Rhode Island law precludes
the Former Property Owners from challenging the taking and seeking an assessment
of damages based on their failure to comply with an explicit condition precedent; (2)
the Town’s state court eminent domain action should be reduced to a final judgment;
(3) the Speech in Debate clause of the Rhode Island Constitution bars the former
Property owners from basing their claims on the statements of individual council
members purportedly made during executive session and recorded in minutes that
were erroneously and inadvertently made public; and (4) the Superior Court must
determine fair market value and any additional compensation that may be granted.
Id.
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The Court finds that none of these questions meet both prongs of the
Pullman
inquiry. 	Turning initially to the first state law question, the Defendants contend
“substantial uncertainty” exists over whether state law precludes the Plaintiffs from
“challenging the taking and seeking an assessment of damages” for failing to comply
with R.I. Gen. Laws § 24-1-8. ECF No. 51 at 15. Yet, Plaintiffs are not challenging
the taking and are seeking an assessment of damages for the taking and monetary
relief for their other claims. 	Their claims for assessment of damages are brought
under the Federal Constitution and § 24-1-8. Whether looking at the claims through
the
Knick lens or the plain text of the state statute, it seems clear to this Court that
Plaintiffs sufficiently preserved their claims for an assessment of damages. 	Again,
Knick holds that the federal claim became ripe as soon as the taking occurred, and
§ 24-1-8 requires an interested party apply by petition for just compensation within
one year of the taking. 	Both appear to be satisfied at this point, and there is no
“substantial uncertainty” around the state law question.
Next, the Defendants contend “[t]he state court has determined that the Town
properly exercised its power of eminent domain pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws § 24-1-1
et seq. and that determination should be reduced to a final judgment.” 	ECF No. 51
at 26. Specifically, they contend that Plaintiffs’ counterarguments about the property
taken for economic redevelopment mandating greater compensation is an issue of
state law that precedes the federal constitutional issues presented in this case.
	Id.
at 26–28. But as Defendants point out, “the application of this 150% state remedy is
not even before the Superior Court, nor did the Superior Court’s Decision of
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November 7, 2025 address that remedy or have any impact on Plaintiffs’ claims in
this Court whatsoever.” 	ECF No. 56 at 45. 	Because of this, it seems unlikely that
the State Court will encounter this question of state law.
The third state law question Defendants raise relates to the executive session
meeting minutes that were the subject of a prior order from this Court.
See ECF No.
40 (denying Defendants’ motion to seal and for a protective order). When this Court
issued its Memorandum and Order denying Defendants’ motion to seal and for a
protective order, the Speech in Debate clause issue was pending before the Superior
Court, which is why this Court decided not to rule on that issue.
	Id. at 16–18.
Thereafter, the Defendants withdrew this issue from the state court action and
initiated a declaratory action related to those minutes, which the Plaintiffs then
removed to this Court.7	
See Lima et al. v. Soscia Holdings LLC, et al., 25-cv-676-
MRD-JJM. Ironically, Defendants had asked this Court for a ruling on the Speech in
Debate clause issue when the issue was also pending before the State Court. 	Now
they argue it must be heard and decided there because substantial uncertainty exists
over the Clause’s application to the executive session minutes.
See ECF No. 51 at 28.
The Court agrees that the Superior Court may decide that issue, however “settling
th[at] question of state law will [not] … obviate the need to resolve [the] significant
federal constitutional question” presented to this Court in Plaintiffs’ FAC.
	See
7 The Defendants (plaintiffs in the
Lima case) moved to remand to state court,
a now ripe motion which is currently under advisement. Plaintiffs point out that this
declaratory action is no longer pending before the Superior Court, which, while true,
could change after this Court decides the motion to remand.
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Batterman, 544 F.3d at 373. Ultimately, this Court will face two questions regarding
the executive session minutes: 1) whether to provide comity to the Superior Court
decision on the Speech in Debate clause (if it is that court which decides that issue)
and 2) whether the federal rules of evidence allow or bar admissibility of the minutes
in this Court. 	Those questions will not be answered by a potential State Court
decision on whether the Speech in Debate clause applies to the executive session
minutes. 	Therefore,
Pullman abstention is not warranted based on this question of
state law.
Defendants’ fourth argument is that “[t]he state court should determine the
fair market value and any additional compensation that may be granted for the
alleged taking.” 	ECF No. 51 at 32. 	This does not establish any substantial
uncertainty over the meaning of the state laws that govern fair market value and just
compensation and this question therefore fails on prong one.
	See Batterman, 544
F.3d at 373.
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that
Pullman abstention is not
warranted in this case.
iv. 	Rooker-Feldman Abstention
“For the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply, the case must: (1) be brought by a
state-court losing party, (2) who is ‘complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments,’ (3) that is ‘rendered before the district court proceedings commenced,’
and (4) ‘inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.’”
	Thompson
v. Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 24-cv-365-MRD-LDA, 2025 WL 990162, at *2
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(D.R.I. April 2, 2025) (quoting
Silva v. Massachusetts, 351 F. App’x. 450, 454 (1st Cir.
2009)). 	Based solely on the language of the test, Defendants lose this argument on
the second factor. 	They argue that Plaintiffs are complaining of injuries caused by
the state-court judgment because “[Plaintiffs’ FAC] implicitly seeks review of the
Superior Court’s determination that the condemnation was proper.” 	ECF No. 51 at
44. 	The Court rejects this argument because Plaintiffs are not asking this Court to
review the Condemnation Order. 	In fact, Plaintiffs admit “that the Taking of the
Plaintiffs’ Property
has been completed, and therefore, the Plaintiffs are entitled to
Just Compensation.” ECF No. 56 at 5 (emphasis added). Defendants have similarly
acknowledged that Plaintiffs’ FAC merely seeks just compensation.
See ECF No. 46
at 2 (stating Plaintiffs are seeking to complicate “a straightforward federal damages
action”). Since Defendants cannot establish the second element, the Court need not
examine any of the other elements and rejects the invitation to apply
Rooker-
Feldman abstention.
v. 	Burford Abstention
In 	evaluating
	Burford 	abstention, 	courts 	consider 	three 	factors: 	(1) 	the
availability of timely and adequate state-court review; (2) the potential that federal
court jurisdiction over the suit will interfere with state administrative policymaking;
and 	(3) 	whether 	conflict 	with 	state 	proceedings 	can 	be 	avoided 	by 	careful
management of the federal case.
	Chico Serv. Station, Inc., 633 F.3d at 32. 	As the
Supreme Court has noted,
Burford abstention “is concerned with protecting complex
state administrative processes from undue federal interference.”
NOPSI, 491 U.S. at
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362. 	In
Chico Service Station, the First Circuit acknowledged this statement and
explained that “[w]hile
Burford’s principle of deference to state administrative bodies
could be interpreted expansively, requiring that federal courts abstain from hearing
any case involving important state regulatory policies, we have declined to give it so
broad a reading.” 633 F.3d at 29–30. Neither of these reasons behind the application
Burford abstention are present here.
As to the
Burford abstention first prong, while R.I. Gen. Laws. § 24-1-8 was an
option for Plaintiffs to request just compensation, so was the federal forum. 	That
said, Defendants are simultaneously asking this Court to abstain from deciding the
issue while actively pursuing a final order in State Court that excludes the Plaintiffs.
See ECF No. 51 at 23–26 (Defendants arguing the state court should determine
whether R.I. law precludes Plaintiffs from challenging the assessment of damages).
Thus, this Court has serious concerns about the availability of state-court review to
Plaintiffs.
Similarly, the second
Burford abstention prong supports not abstaining. While
the taking was initiated by the Coventry Town Council and completed in Superior
Court in June 2024, those policymaking decisions are not under review here. Instead,
the issue is how much Plaintiff is entitled to for “just compensation” for the already
completed taking. 	Further, like in
Chico Service Station, “[t]he questions of law at
issue in this suit are therefore only marginally questions of [Rhode Island] law, with
a strong federal cast. Moreover they are of no particular difficulty.” 633 F.3d at 33.
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For these reasons, and the purposes behind
Burford abstention, the Court will not
abstain on this basis.
vi. 	Colorado River Abstention
“[T]he circumstances permitting abstention under
Colorado River for reasons
of ‘wise judicial administration are quite ‘limited’ and indeed ‘exceptional.’”
	Rio
Grande Cmty. Health Ctr., Inc., 397 F.3d at 71 (citing
Colo. River Water Conservation
Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976)). In
Rio Grande, the First Circuit delineated a
list of factors for when
Colorado River abstention might be appropriate. The factors
are:
(1) whether either court has assumed jurisdiction over a res; (2) the
[geographical] inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) the desirability
of avoiding piecemeal litigation; (4) the order in which the forums
obtained jurisdiction; (5) whether state or federal law controls; (6)
the adequacy of the state forum to protect the parties’ interests; (7)
the vexatious or contrived nature of the federal claim; and (8) respect
for the principles underlying removal jurisdiction.
Id. at 71–72. 	As that Court then explained, “[n]o one factor is meant to be
determinative, but rather courts must make a ‘carefully considered judgment taking
into account both the obligation to exercise jurisdiction and the combination of factors
counseling against that exercise.”
Id. at 72 (quoting
Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818).
Here, the first
Colorado River abstention factor favors abstention because it is
undisputed that the Superior Court assumed jurisdiction over a res when the Town
deposited money into the court registry to complete the taking in June 2024.8
8 Plaintiffs note they have no claim to that res as they have not filed a claim in
the Superior Court.
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Meanwhile, the second
Colorado River abstention factor does not move the
needle because both courts are in the same geographic area.
The third
Colorado River abstention factor supports not abstaining because
Plaintiffs raise many claims in the FAC that are not before the State Court for
consideration. 	Further, Defendants seek an order in Superior Court that Plaintiffs
are precluded from pursuing the “just compensation” claim in that Court. This Court
can hear all Plaintiffs’ claims, including their claim for just compensation. The same
cannot be said for the Superior Court.
The order in which the judicial fora obtained jurisdiction is surely a closer call.
This Court acknowledges that the Town initiated a condemnation proceeding in
Superior Court in June 2024. 	But the condemnation is not the issue before either
Court; 	the 	issue 	is 	determining 	the 	amount 	of 	money 	that 	will 	provide 	just
compensation. 	Whether looking at the claims through the
Knick lens or the plain
text of the state statute, it seems clear to this Court that Plaintiffs’ claim for just
compensation/assessment 	of 	damages 	became 	ripe, 	and 	was 	filed, 	before 	the
Defendants’ claim. This weighs against abstention.
The remaining factors also counsel against abstention. The claims before this
Court present a mix of federal and state law questions. The Plaintiffs’ constitutional
claims are not pending before the Superior Court, and Defendants are similarly
trying to prevent that Court from allowing Plaintiffs to proceed there under § 24-1-8
(even though they asserted that claim here within the allotted time period). 	In all,
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this is not the “exceptional circumstance” required for the Court to abstain under
Colorado River.
All in all, for the reasons explained in the discussion above, none of the
abstention principles and doctrines raised by the Defendant have persuaded this
Court that it must or should abstain from adjudicating this case on the merits.
D. Scope of Relief
The Plaintiffs’ requested relief is broad and encompasses various requests for
declarations about this Court’s jurisdiction over the parties and claims and seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief on various other principles of law.
	See ECF No. 45
at 50–54. The requested relief is far too broad for this stage of the case. This Court
is mindful that it should not fashion relief that is greater than necessary.
	See
DraftKings Inc v. Hermalyn, 118 F.4th 416, 423 (1st Cir. 2024) (“Judges must closely
tailor injunctive relief to the specific harm alleged.”). Accordingly, the Court declines
to adopt Plaintiffs’ requested relief and, instead, enjoins the Superior Court from
proceeding with the scheduled adjudication of the just compensation issue pending
before it in KM-2024-0578.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
To recap, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ claims are properly before this
Court and that none of the abstention doctrines argued by Defendants require this
Court to abstain. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or Abstain is DENIED.
Further, pursuant to this Court’s authority under the All Writs Act and consistent
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with exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act, the Superior Court proceedings are hereby
ENJOINED and Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
Melissa R. DuBose
United States District Judge
03/12/2026
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