Jackson v. Lynch Bernard

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
JAMES WILBERT ANDREW
JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
KAREN LYNCH BERNARD,
Defendant.
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C.A. No. 1:25-cv-00319-MSM-PAS
ORDER
Mary S. McElroy, United States District Judge.
Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 22) of the defendant, Karen
Lynch Bernard, a Rhode Island Family Court judge. 	The plaintiff, James Wilbert
Andrew Jackson, proceeding pro se, alleges constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against Judge Lynch Bernard based on her actions and decisions during an
ongoing child custody and child support proceeding in the Rhode Island Family Court.
See ECF Nos. 1 (original Complaint); 17 (“First Amended Verified Complaint”).
Judge Lynch Bernard seeks dismissal of Mr. Jackson’s claims pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). 	(ECF No. 22.) 	For the following
reasons, the Court GRANTS Judge Lynch Bernard’s Motion.
According to his First Amended Verified Complaint, Mr. Jackson, who is an
Australian citizen, initiated a custody petition in Australia in 2017. (ECF No. 17 at
2.) Mr. Jackson’s former partner filed a Rhode Island Family Court case in 2019.
Id.
at 3. The Australian case was purportedly dismissed in 2020 on procedural grounds
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stemming from international law.
	Id. 	at 2. 	The Rhode Island case proceeded
notwithstanding 	Mr. 	Jackson’s 	objections 	to 	the 	Rhode 	Island 	Family 	Court’s
jurisdiction over the matter.
See id. at 2–4.
Mr. Jackson’s original Complaint (ECF No. 1), which is expressly incorporated
by reference into his First Amended Verified Complaint,
see ECF No. 17 at 8, includes
eight alleged constitutional violations by Judge Lynch Bernard as a result of her
decisions in the Rhode Island case. 	See ECF No. 1-1. 	Those decisions include (1)
denial of physical visitation with Mr. Jackson’s children; (2) barring of a witness’s
testimony; (3) a child support order issued before jurisdictional challenges were fully
adjudicated; (4) closing of livestream video hearings; (5) prohibition of further
affidavits 	by 	Mr. 	Jackson; 	(6) 	allegedly 	improper 	admission 	of 	evidence; 	(7)
interruption of Mr. Jackson’s testimony during court proceedings; and (8) other
alleged improprieties.
Id. Mr. Jackson alleges that those decisions violated his rights
under 	the 	First, 	Fifth, 	and 	Fourteenth 	Amendments 	to 	the 	United 	States
Constitution.
Id.
In her Motion to Dismiss, Judge Lynch Bernard asserts two jurisdictional
defenses against Mr. Jackson’s claims: (1) the doctrine of
Younger abstention, which
generally bars federal jurisdiction where a plaintiff seeks an injunction against
certain kinds of ongoing state court proceedings; and (2) the “Domestic Relations”
exception, under which federal courts abstain from exercising jurisdiction over family
law issues. 	(ECF No. 22-1 at 9–19.) 	While both of these exceptions to federal
jurisdiction are implicated in at least some respect here, the nature of Mr. Jackson’s
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suit—which alleges constitutional violations and seeks not only injunctive relief
against the Rhode Island Family Court, but also declaratory relief, compensatory
damages, and punitive damages—more clearly implicates the third defense raised by
Judge Lynch Bernard: the principle of judicial immunity.
	See ECF No. 22-1 at 19–
23.1 The Court thus proceeds to the merits of that defense.2
Judges have absolute immunity for their judicial acts.
Zenon v. Guzman, 924
F.3d 611, 616 (1st Cir. 2019). 	Judicial immunity protects judges not only from
monetary penalties, but from lawsuits themselves.
	Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11
(1991). This absolute judicial immunity protects judges even if they make procedural
errors when adjudicating lawsuits. 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978). The Court does not, by
citing this expansive definition of absolute judicial immunity, suggest Judge Lynch
Bernard committed any error during Mr. Jackson’s family court case.
1 Judicial immunity, as a form of absolute immunity, is not a jurisdictional defense.
See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 373 (2001) (determining that “[t]here is no
authority 	whatever 	for 	the 	proposition 	that 	absolute- 	and 	qualified-immunity
defenses pertain to the court's jurisdiction”).
2 The First Circuit has permitted the application of “hypothetical jurisdiction”—under
which a court bypasses a more complex jurisdictional challenge to reach a simpler
decision on the merits favoring the party challenging the court’s jurisdiction—when
Article III jurisdiction is not in question.
See Akebia Therapeutics, Inc. v. Azar, 976
F.3d 	86, 	91 	(1st 	Cir. 	2020) 	(“Although 	hypothetical 	jurisdiction 	is 	generally
disfavored, such a barrier is insurmountable only when Article III jurisdiction is in
issue.”);
First State Ins. Co. v. Natl. Cas. Co., 781 F.3d 7, 11 n.2 (1st Cir. 2015) (“We
may continue to bypass thorny jurisdictional issues and resolve cases on the merits
where, as here, those jurisdictional issues implicate only statutory or prudential
considerations.”).
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There are only two ways to overcome judicial immunity.
See Mireles, 502 U.S.
at 11–12. 	First, judges are not immune from liability for actions they take outside
their judicial capacity.
	Id. Second, judges are not immune from liability for judicial
actions “taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.”
	Id. Whether an action is
a judicial action depends on (1) whether the action is one normally performed by a
judge; and (2) whether the judge’s interaction with the parties was conducted in the
judge’s official capacity.
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978).
Here, all of Mr. Jackson’s claims are based on Judge Lynch Bernard’s judicial
actions.
See ECF No. 1-1. While he purports to challenge “conduct plausibly outside
the core adjudicative function” that “concerns court administration rather than the
substance of adjudication,” (ECF No. 23 at 8),
Mireles forecloses that argument to
support his claims because all of the challenged actions are clearly the kinds of
functions “normally performed by a judge.”
	See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. 	Although
Mr. Jackson cites
Goldstein v. Galvin, 719 F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir. 2013), for the
proposition that assessing whether an action is judicial or administrative “cannot be
resolved on a Rule 12 motion,” that case provides no support for that proposition, a
proposition 	that 	conflicts 	with 	the 	principle 	that 	judicial 	immunity 	provides
immunity from suit and is inconsistent with existing case law.
	See, e.g.,
Silva v.
Smith, 	No. 	20-CV-12-PJB-AKJ, 	2021 	WL 	1193408 	(D.R.I. 	Mar. 	30, 	2021)
(determining judicial immunity on a Rule 12 motion). 	As for the other exception to
judicial immunity, Judge Lynch Bernard’s actions were not “taken in the complete
absence of jurisdiction” because the Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the Rhode
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Island Family Court’s jurisdiction over Mr. Jackson’s family court case.
	See
Fitzgerald v. Jackson, 307 A.3d 1283 (R.I. 2024),
cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 275 (2024).
Neither exception to absolute judicial immunity applies here. 	Judge Lynch
Bernard is therefore entitled to absolute immunity from Mr. Jackson’s suit, and the
Court consequently GRANTS her Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 22.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
Mary S. McElroy
United States District Judge
February 12, 2026
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