Kenyon et al v. U.S. Department of Justice et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
BRUCE L. KENYON, FRANK
ANDRADE, and TIMOTHY
SCANLON,
Plaintiffs,
v.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE;
U.S. OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS; and MAUREEN
HENNEBERG, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General for Operations and Management for the
Office of Justice Programs, in her official
capacity,
Defendants.
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C.A. No. 1:25-cv-0351-JJM-AEM
ORDER
Bruce Kenyon, Frank Andrade, and Timothy Scanlon are pro se Plaintiffs
bringing this suit against the Department of Justice and others (Defendants),
alleging that federal conditions under Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
(“SORNA”) violate their rights. ECF No. 1 at 5. The Defendants move to dismiss for
failure to state a claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ECF No. 10. For the
reasons stated below, the Court agrees and GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Both parties acknowledge that the State of Rhode Island had a sex offender
registration system before enactment of the federal SORNA1 . 	ECF No. 10 at 2; 14
1 34 U.S. Code § 20911, et. seq.
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at 4. After SORNA was enacted, Congress conditioned a state’s receipt of Byrne JAG
grants 2 	on 	state 	registration 	laws 	meeting 	certain 	minimum 	standards 	under
SORNA. ECF No. 10 at 2. States that do not comply with these standards risk a 10
percent reduction in their Byrne JAG grant funding.
	Id. at 2-3. 	Byrne JAG grants
are only awarded to states, not private individuals, and the conditioning of funds,
along with a 10 percent reduction for not following SORNA standards, has been found
to be not coercive under the
Dole test.3
	Id. at 2-3;
Id. at 3 n. 1;
Id. at 7-8 n. 4.
Therefore, the funds, and their conditions under SORNA, are a relationship between
the states and the federal government. 	As such, any actions governing individuals
pursuant to these grants are actions taken by the states, not the federal government.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 	Plausibility is based on assuming the pleaded facts are true
and reading them in the plaintiff’s favor.
	Klunder v. Tr. & Fellows of Coll. or Univ.
in English Colony of Rhode Island & Providence Plantations, No. C.A. 10-410 ML,
2012 WL 5936565, at *1 (D.R.I. Nov. 27, 2012). “Where a complaint pleads facts that
2 The Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) program is the
leading source of federal justice funding to state and local jurisdictions.
3 The
Dole test, from
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), is the test for
Constitutionality of attaching conditions to state funds by the federal government.
One of the criteria is that the conditions cannot be coercive. If the conditions are
coercive, then they are unconstitutional.
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are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’”
	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 	550 	U.S. 	at 557). 	However, 	pro 	se 	pleadings 	should 	be 	“liberally
construed,” and “a
pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
Regarding subject matter jurisdiction, the party invoking federal jurisdiction
bears the burden of showing jurisdiction.
Lujan v. Def. of Widlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561
(1992). 	The 	standing 	requirement 	comes 	out 	of 	the 	“case 	and 	controversy”
requirement.
	Id. at 560. As such, if a party does not have standing, then the Court
does not have jurisdiction to hear the case.
	Id. 	The three elements required for
standing 	are 	(1) 	an 	“injury 	in 	fact,” 	which 	is 	a 	legally 	protected, 	concrete,
particularized interest and is actual or imminent, not hypothetical; (2) the injury
must be “fairly traceable” from the defendant’s conduct and from a third party; and
(3) it must be “likely” that the injury “can be redressed by a favorable decision.”
	Id.
at 560-61.
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	There Is No Standing, and Therefore, the Court Does Not Have Subject
Matter Jurisdiction.
The Plaintiffs’ injuries are not “fairly traceable” to the Defendants’ conduct.
Id. 	The Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are due to actions taken by the State of Rhode
Island, a third party, pursuant to its Byrne JAG grant. 	ECF No. 14 at 2 (“
Rhode
Island adopted…”) (emphasis added). 	Even if Rhode Island’s actions were federally
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incentivized, as the Plaintiffs claim, that still is not grounds for standing.
	Id.;
Food
& Drug Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 383 (2024) (“When the
plaintiff is an unregulated party, causation ordinarily hinges on the response of the
regulated… third party to the government action or inaction... Yet the Court has said
that plaintiffs attempting to show causation generally cannot rely on speculation
about the unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the courts.”)
(citation omitted). 	Because causation hinges on the actions of the State of Rhode
Island, a third party, the Plaintiffs cannot show traceability, and therefore, do not
have standing. 	Thus, this Court lacks jurisdiction since there is no case or
controversy.
B. 	The Plaintiffs Fail To State a Claim upon Which Relief Can Be Granted.
As the Court mentioned, the State of Rhode Island’s actions are the cause of
the Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries. ECF No. 14 at 2. Therefore, any relief that the Court
grants in this case would do nothing to redress that injury since the federal
government agencies are a party to this suit. Thus, the Plaintiffs have not stated a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS the Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss. ECF No. 10. 4
4 The Court therefore DENIES AS MOOT, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Transfer Venue
to the District of Columbia Pursuant to 28 U.S.C:1404(a).
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/John J. McConnell, Jr.
_________________________________
JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR.
Chief Judge
United States District Court
October 27, 2025
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