Siaway v. Webster Bank, N.A.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
PETE Z. SIAWAY,
Plaintiff,
v.
WEBSTER BANK, N.A.,
Defendant.
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C.A. No. 1:25-cv-00446-MSM-AEM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Mary S. McElroy, United States District Judge.
The plaintiff, Pete Z. Siaway, brings this action
pro se against Webster
National Bank (“Bank”), a federally chartered bank, alleging violations of federal
statutes in the Bank’s conduct regarding an extension of a home equity loan (“Loan”).
Specifically, Mr. Siaway brings claims under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(“ECOA”) (Count I), Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) (Count II), the Electronic
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (“E-SIGN”) and Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act (“UETA”) (Count III), and the Rhode Island Deceptive Trade
Practices Act (“DTPA”) (Count IV). (ECF No. 6.) The Bank is now moving to dismiss
Mr. Siaway’s Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.12(b)(6). (ECF
No. 13.)
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must set forth a
“plausible claim.” That means the plaintiff must “plead[] factual content that allows
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the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged . . . The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.”
	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 	The reviewing court must
assume the truth of all “well-pleaded facts and give the plaintiff the benefit of all
reasonable inferences therefrom.”
	Thomas v. Rhode Island, 542 F.3d 944, 948 (1st
Cir. 2008).
In ruling on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may look to “the
complaint, documents annexed to it, and other materials fairly incorporated within
it,” as well as “matters that are susceptible to judicial notice” and documents “referred
to in the complaint.”
	Rodi v. S. New England Sch. of Law, 389 F.3d 5, 12 (1st Cir.
2004). It may also consider “documents the authenticity of which are not disputed by
the parties,” “documents central to [plaintiff's] claim,” and “documents sufficiently
referred to in the complaint.”
	Foley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 772 F.3d 63, 74 (1st
Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 	Here, these documents include the loan Note, Closing
Disclosure, Notice of the Right to Cancel, and the letter correspondence regarding the
loan amount and rate, of which both parties had prior notice, have attached, and do
not dispute authenticity. (ECF Nos. 13-3; 13-4; 15-2.)
Mr. Siaway sought a loan in the amount of $50,000 from the Bank. (ECF No.
6 ¶ 5.) 	Instead, the Bank initially offered a loan in the amount of $16,500 with an
interest rate of 7.115%. 	(ECF No. 13-3.) 	In response to Mr. Siaway’s protest of the
loan amount offered, the Bank increased the loan offer to $35,000 with an interest
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rate of 6.865%. 	(ECF Nos. 6 ¶ 6; 13-4).1 	Mr. Siaway accepted the Bank’s loan for
$35,000 on August 24, 2023.
	Id. 	Prior to, or on August 24, the Bank provided Mr.
Siaway with a Notice of Right to Cancel, (ECF No. 15-2 at 8), and a Closing
Disclosure, (ECF No. 15-2 at 7), both of which he signed.
In his Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Siaway’s ECOA claim (Count I),
invokes ECOA’s anti-discrimination provision, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a), but he asserts no
factual allegations supporting an inference that the Bank discriminated against him
on the basis of a protected characteristic. 	The Second Amended Complaint alleges
only that Mr. Siaway is a member of a minority group and that he did not receive the
loan amount he initially sought. 	It does not allege that the Bank knew of Mr.
Siaway’s protected status, acted with discriminatory intent, denied credit because of
that status, or treated similarly situated applicants outside the protected class more
favorably.
See Wilson v. Atlanticus Servs. Corp., No. 19-11672, 2020 WL 2393198, at
*3 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 10, 2020) (setting forth factual allegations necessary to support a
§1691(a) claim).
In any event, in his opposition papers, Mr. Siaway does not argue his
discrimination claim as pled and instead argues that the Bank failed to disclose an
appraisal. (ECF No. 15 at 5.) But that theory does not plausibly state a claim under
§ 1691(a), which prohibits discrimination and not dissatisfaction with loan terms or
document production. 	As Mr. Siaway’s complaint does not include any factual
1 The .25% rate reduction was offered because Mr. Siaway opened an account with
the Bank and provided additional requested information. Mr. Siaway alleges that he
was due an additional .25% reduction.
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allegations that might plausibly suggest that the denial of the credit amount he
sought was because of, or on the basis, of his protected status, the Court must grant
the Bank’s motion to dismiss this discrimination claim.
Next, Mr. Siaway’s TILA claim (Count II) is time-barred. 	An action for
damages under TILA must be brought “within one year from the date of the
occurrence of the violation.” 	15 U.S.C. § 1640(e). 	The alleged disclosure violations
concern loan documents provided at the closing in August 2023. Mr. Siaway did not
file this action until September 2025, well beyond the one-year limitations period.
See Viera v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 2018 WL 4964545, at *6 (D.R.I. Oct. 12, 2018).
Mr. Siaway’s E-SIGN and UETA claims (Count III) fail as a matter of law.
Neither the E-SIGN nor the UETA affords a private right of action, nor does Plaintiff
even allege he signed the documents electronically.
	See Diaz-Santiago v. Sanchez-
Acosta, No. CV 24-1011 (PAD), 2024 WL 1254076, at *1 (D.P.R. Feb. 9, 2024),
appeal
dismissed, No. 24-1256, 2025 WL 2670236 (1st Cir. July 23, 2025),
reconsideration
denied, No. 24-1256, 2025 WL 3028815 (1st Cir. Oct. 7, 2025);
Stephens v. Bank of
Am. Home Loans, Inc., 2017 WL 4322816, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 28, 2017) (“like the
E-Sign Act, no provision within UETA either explicitly or implicitly supports any
legislative intent to create a private cause of action”).2
2 The cited persuasive authority is particularly relevant here where the UETA is to
be “construed and applied . . . [t]o effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the
law with respect to the subject of this chapter among states enacting it.”
	See R.I.
Gen. Laws § 42-127.1-6.
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Mr. Siaway’s claim under the DTPA (Count IV) fails as a matter of law because
the Bank is a regulated entity exempted from the DTPA.
	See R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-
13.1-4 (“Nothing in this chapter shall apply to actions or transactions permitted
under 	laws 	administered 	by 	the 	department 	of 	business 	regulation 	or 	other
regulatory body or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or the United
States.”) 	The Bank and the relevant conduct at issue is subject to regulation by
federal agencies responsible for oversight of lending institutions, like the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) and the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (“OCC”). 	Therefore, Mr. Siaway’s “private action under the DTPA is
precluded as a matter of law.”
	See Chavers v. Fleet Bank (RI), N.A., 844 A.2d 666,
671–72 (R.I. 2004);
see, e.g.,
State v. Piedmont Funding Corp., 382 A.2d 819, 822
(1978) (finding conduct exempted when it “was clearly subject to the control of
governmental agencies on both the state and federal level”);
Petrarca v. Garrison
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2019 WL 1453058, at *2 (D.R.I. Apr. 2, 2019) (same).
Finally, in his memoranda opposing the Bank’s Motion, Mr. Siaway asks that
if the Court were to find “any technical pleading defect” that he be granted leave to
amend. 	Such an approach—to ask for leave to amend contingent upon a court
determining a complaint must be dismissed—is disfavored in the First Circuit
because it “would impose unnecessary costs and inefficiencies on both the courts and
party opponents” and “would dramatically undermine the ordinary rules governing
the finality of judicial decisions.”
	ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Advest, Inc., 512 F.3d 46,
57 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting
James v. Watt, 716 F.2d 71,78 (1st Cir. 1983)). Moreover,
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the Court previously allowed Mr. Siaway leave to amend, setting forth in detail
deficiencies in his original Complaint. (ECF No. 5.) The Court therefore declines any
further leave to amend.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Bank’s Motion to Dismiss
with prejudice. (ECF No. 13.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
Mary S. McElroy
United States District Judge
March 3, 2026
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