Wang v. Lanphear

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
____________________________________
)
WEIXING V. WANG, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:26-cv-00720-MSM-RLA
)
JUDGE JEFFREY LANPHEAR 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
____________________________________)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Mary S. McElroy, United States District Judge.
This Complaint was brought by Weixing V. Wang who, in addition to being the
Plaintiff in this action, was the Plaintiff in Wang v. AMGEN, P.C. 2025-05511, an
action in the Superior Court of Rhode Island in which Mr. Wang contended he was
the victim of employment discrimination. 	The defendant 	here, Judge Jeffrey
Lanphear, presided over the state court case and determined that the matter was
subject to mandatory arbitration based on a contract Mr. Wang had signed. Over his
objection, the lawsuit was dismissed. In addition, finding the lawsuit frivolous, Judge
Lanphear granted attorney fees to the defendant in the amount of $98,381.50.
Mr. Wang quickly brought this action against Judge Lanphear, contending
that the jurist had committed various criminal acts (primarily of fraud) in his
Case 1:26-cv-00720-MSM-RLA Document 7 Filed 10/15/26 Page 1 of 3 PageID #:
<pageID>

handling of the case, that he lied, that he hid evidence, and that, in essence, he had
deprived Mr. Wang of his civil and constitutional rights by his rulings in the case.
The Complaint runs to 40 pages as a compendium of all the wrongful rulings and
actions that the defendant allegedly committed.
The Court’s review is required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii), which mandates
that whenever a request for waiver of filing fees is made, as Mr. Wang has done here
(ECF No. 2), the Court must determine whether the Complaint states a plausible
federal claim for relief.
	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009) (plausible claim
standard). Under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), no Motion to Proceed
In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”)
can be granted unless that threshold is met. In this case, the Court not only denies
the IFP Motion, it dismisses the case for lack of jurisdiction because of the absolute
immunity enjoyed by the defendant.
Everything Mr. Wang complains about – the handling of testimony, the
assessment of evidence, the enforcement of the arbitration clause, the awarding of
attorney fees to the prevailing party, and the like – falls squarely within the
protection of judicial immunity. 	Judges are absolutely immune from suits for
damages with only two exceptions not relevant here.
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-
12 (1991). 	Not even allegations of malice or bad faith will defeat the shield.
	Id. at
11. 	Here, every action that Mr. Wang complains of as wrong or unlawful is clearly
judicial and the Superior Court had jurisdiction over the action Mr. Wang filed
against AMGEN.
Id.
Case 1:26-cv-00720-MSM-RLA Document 7 Filed 10/15/26 Page 2 of 3 PageID #:
<pageID>

Ordinarily, a court should offer a
pro se litigant the opportunity to amend the
Complaint to cure any deficiencies before dismissing.
Zarlenga v. United States, No.
22-cv-00372-MSM-PSA, ECF No. 56, No. 24-1672 (Mandate, 1st Cir. Mar. 24, 2025).
Here, however, there is nothing Mr. Wang can reasonably or plausibly allege that
would remove the cloak of judicial immunity that Judge Lanphear enjoys. 	In
addition, while immunity is an affirmative defense that would ordinarily be raised by
a defendant, judicial immunity is designed to protect judicial officers from the burden
and chilling effect of having to defend their actions in a lawsuit, not simply from
awards of damages. 	It should therefore be addressed at the earliest stage possible,
and that is now. The case is DISMISSED and the IFP Motion is DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
______________________________
Mary S. McElroy
United States District Judge
October 15, 2026
Case 1:26-cv-00720-MSM-RLA Document 7 Filed 10/15/26 Page 3 of 3 PageID #:
<pageID>