USA v. Campbell

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
NORTHERN DIVISION
filed
JAM 1 'i ®
CLERK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1:17-CR-10033-CBK
Plaintiff,
vs.
DESI DUNCAN CAMPBELL, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Defendant.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant Desi D. Campbell("defendant") has moved this Court to reduce his
term of imprisonment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Doc. 79. The United States
responded on January 3, 2022, in opposition to Mr. Campbell's motion. Doc. 82. Unlike
most motions for compassionate release, Mr. Campbell does not request an immediate
release from his incarceration at Federal Correctional Institute ("FCl") Sandstone in
Minnesota. Rather, he asks this Court for a reduction from the end of his sentence by 21
months, because that is the length oftime his imprisonment has been affected by the
COVlD-19 pandemic. Mr. Campbell's anticipated release date is scheduled for August
20, 2024. So instead of being released immediately, he asks this Court for a release in
approximately November 2022.
The defendant pled guilty to Abusive Sexual Contact, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153,
2244(a)(1), 2246(3), for his years-long molestation of his former partner's young
daughter, J.R.A. J.R.A. was approximately seven or eight-years-old when the sexual
abuse began, which lasted for around four to five years, with instances of molestation
occurring up to several times a week. Mr. Campbell was not held to account for these
acts of abuse until years later, when the victim was 20-years-old. In 2018, this Court
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sentenced Mr. Campbell to a term of imprisonment of 84 months, markedly below his
advisory guideline range of 120 months, the statutorily authorized maximum,' followed
by a term of supervised release of five years.
No doubt, COVID-19 is a severe public health crisis that has upended our federal
prison system, and the nation more broadly. But because none of the reasons offered by
the defendant approach an extraordinary and compelling circumstance, nor do the factors
listed under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)lean in favor of an early release, Mr. Campbell's motion
for a reduetion in term of imprisonment should be denied.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, § 212, authorized,
inter alia, the district court, upon motion of the Director of the BOP,to reduce a prison
term after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),"if it finds that
extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction and that such a reduction
is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission."
The United States Senteneing Commission was established by the Sentencing Reform
Aet, Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, §217(a), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3582(e)(1)(A). Effective
November 1, 2006, the Senteneing Commission adopted Guideline §IB 1.13, the policy
statement on reduction of a term of imprisonment pursuant to § 3582(c)(1)(A). These
provisions are known as the compassionate release provisions ofthe federal criminal
code and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
On December 21, 2018, the First Step Act of 2018 was enacted. Pub. L. 115-391.
The First Step Aet amended, inter alia, § 3582(c)(1)(A) to increase the use and
transparency ofthe compassionate release process. Pub. L. 115-391, § 603(b). The Act
added district court authority to grant compassionate release upon motion of a defendant
after the exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have
'Mr. Campbell's original advisory guideline range was 235-293 months, but was adjusted to the statutory
maximum of 120 months.
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not been amended since passage of the First Step Act in 2018.^ This Court proceeds in
three steps:(1)assessing whether Campbell has exhausted his administrative remedies,
(2) determining whether defendant has "demonstrated that there are extraordinary and
compelling circumstances warranting early release," and (3)if he has demonstrated such
circumstances,"whether the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of early release."
United States v. Ramos. 2021 WL 4507464, at *4(N.D.Iowa Oct. 1, 2021).
B. Jurisdiction
Since sentences are final judgments, a court ordinarily "may not modify a term of
imprisonment once it has been imposed." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). However, an exception
exists where a court"may reduce the term of imprisonment" when "extraordinary and
compelling reasons" exist and the "reduction is consistent with applicable policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." Id § 3582(c)(l)(A)(i). Further, the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)factors must support a reduction. Id. The defendant carries the
burden to show a sentence reduction is warranted under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). United
States V. Jones. 836 F.3d 896, 899(8th Cir. 2016).
C. Administrative Exhaustion
This Court can only grant a sentence reduction upon motion of the defendant
"after [he] has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau
of Prisons("BOP")to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of30 days
from the receipt of such a request by the warden ofthe defendant's facility, whichever is
earlier." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). While the (outdated) Federal Sentencing Guidelines
only provide for district courts to consider motions for sentence reduction on request by
the BOP,this Court has previously explained why the First Step Act grants courts the
authority to hear such motions made by the defendant himself. See United States v.
^ The Commission lost its quorum in January 2019, stopping any progress in the Commission's work these past
three years. See United States v. Rodd.966 F.3d 740, 746 n.7(8lh Cir. 2020)('"As the Sentencing Commission
lacks a quorum to amend the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, it seems unlikely there will be a policy statement
applicable to [compassionate-release] motions brought by defendants in the near future.'")(alteration in original)
{quoting United States v. Beck. 425 F.Supp.3d 573, 579 n.7(M.D.N.C. 2019)). The Court hopes the other branches
of the federal government will soon resolve this long lapse in a quorum, inhibiting the Commission from pursuing
much-needed work.
3
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Spotted Horse. 2020 WL 4932808, at *2-3(D.S.D. Aug. 24, 2020). Here, Mr. Campbell
requested a Reduction in Sentence("RIS")to the BOP, which was received on June 11,
2021. Doc. 79-1. On October 28, 2021, Warden J. Fikes denied the defendant's RIS,
thus ripening Campbell's motion before this Court upon the exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Id.
D. Extraordinary and Compelling
Compassionate release offers defendants with "extraordinary and compelling
reasons" the opportunity to leave prison prior to the conclusion of their sentence. 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(l)(A)(i). However,§ 3582(c)(l)(A)(i) does not define what
"extraordinary and compelling reasons" may be; rather, that was left to the Commission.
And as this Court has noted, the Commission has failed to offer such explanations to
date. Prior to the First Step Act, however, the Commission established four categories
for district courts to consider when reducing a defendant's term of imprisonment;
pursuant to U.S.S.G. §IB 1.13, Application Note 1, four examples of extraordinary and
compelling reasons for compassionate release are:
(A)Medical Condition of the Defendant. —
(i) The defendant is suffering from a terminal illness (i.e., a serious and advanced
illness with an end of life trajectory). A specific prognosis of life expectancy (i.e.,
a probability of death within a specific time period) is not required. Examples
include metastatic solid-tumor cancer, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis(ALS), end-
stage organ disease, and advanced dementia.
(ii) The defendant is—
(I) suffering from a serious physical or medical condition,
(II) suffering from a serious functional or cognitive impairment, or
(III) experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health because of the
aging process,
that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care
within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not
expected to recover.
(B)Age of the Defendant. — The defendant(i) is at least 65 years old;(ii) is
experiencing a serious deterioration in physical or mental health because of the aging
process; and (iii) has served at least 10 years or 75 percent of his or her term of
imprisonment, whichever is less.
(C)Family Circumstances.
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(i) The death or incapacitation ofthe caregiver ofthe defendant's minor child or
minor children.
(ii) The incapacitation of the defendant's spouse or registered partner when the
defendant would be the only available caregiver for the spouse or registered
partner.
(D)Other Reasons. — As determined by the Director ofthe Bureau ofPrisons, there
exists in the defendant's case an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in
combination with, the reasons described in subdivisions(A)through (C).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has not yet decided
whether the district court is bound by the Sentencing Commission's policy statement
when considering a compassionate release motion under the First Step Act amendment
to § 3582(c)(1)(A). "While some courts adhere to the pre-First Step Act policy
statements, other courts have ruled that the pre-First Step Act policy statements are
inapplicable, and that a judge has discretion to determine, at least until the Sentencing
Commission acts, what qualifies as extraordinary and compelling reasons." United States
V. Rodd. 966 F.3d 740, 745 (8th Cir. 2020)(cleaned up). In both Eighth Circuit cases
that have addressed compassionate release since the adoption of the First Step Act, the
Eighth Circuit declined to address the issue because, whether or not § IB 1.13 applies, the
Eighth Circuit held that the district court in both cases considered the § 3553(a) factors
and determined that, even assuming the First Step Act envisioned a more expansive
definition of ordinary and compelling reasons than set forth in § IB 1.13, compassionate
release was not warranted in those instances. Rodd. 966 F.3d at 745-46; United States v.
Loggins. 966 F.3d 891, 892-93(8th Cir. 2020).
Chief Judge Lange has held that the "discretion given to the Director of the BOP
in § IB 1.13 comment note 1(D), also allows federal judges to consider 'extraordinary and
compelling reason[s] other than' those specifically described." United States v.
Dillabaugh. 2020 WL 3402392, at *3(D.S.D. June 19, 2020). In other words, district
courts are not limited by § IB 1.13, even if it applies to post First Step Act motions for
compassionate release. Reading what is "extraordinary and compelling" beyond the strict
confines authored by the Commission comports with the purpose ofthe Act, which as
this Court has previously noted,"was to expand the availability of compassionate release
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based on judicial findings of extraordinary and compelling reasons without being
restricted to those categories identified by the Sentencing Commission or the rationale
used by the BOP before the passage ofthe First Step Act." United States v. Shangreaux,
2021 WL 1611500, at *3(D.S.D. April 26, 2021)(emphasis added). Because the
Commission has not yet updated relevant factors for district courts to consider, they
"need not conform" to the factors listed above. United States v. McCov,981 F.3d 271,
283(4th Cir. 2020).
Defendant requests compassionate release based upon his medical condition and
the fact that COVID 19 is wide-spread in the BOP system. Chief Judge Lange has
observed:
There can be no doubt that the effects of the global COVID-19
pandemic are extraordinary, and that the disease in some situations may be
an "other reason" to grant compassionate release under § IB 1.13 comment
note (D). The illness and the potential for its spread has affected the daily
life of nearly every American citizen and has resulted in massive
disruptions to the economy. Despite these drastic effects,"the mere
existence of COVID-19 in society and the possibility that it may spread to a
particular prison alone cannot independently justify compassionate release,
especially considering BOP's statutory role, and its extensive and
professional efforts to curtail the virus's spread." The question becomes
whether [defendant's] medical conditions . . . combined with the crowded
conditions of confinement justify compassionate release.
United States v. Frost. 2020 WL 3869294, at *4(D.S.D. July 9, 2020)(cleaned up).
E. Analysis
Mr. Campbell raises five factors that he asserts rise to the high bar of
extraordinary and compelling circumstances for an early release. However, as the Court
has previously explained, Campbell is not requesting an immediate release, but rather 21
months cut from the end of his sentence, in approximately November 2022. The
defendant's arguments are:(1)lack of fresh air and exercise;(2)lack of rehabilitative
programming;(3)inhumane housing;(4)inability to attend to spiritual needs; and(5)no
visitation. Doc. 79 at 4-6. Each will be addressed in turn.
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1. Lack ofFresh Air and Exercise
First, defendant Campbell argues he is entitled to an early release because he is
receiving an average of"less than 90 minutes of outdoor exercise per week." Id. at 4. He
asserts this raises "serious Constitutional questions, in addition to constituting an
extraordinary and compelling reason." Id. Campbell cites to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals' decision in Heams v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036(9th Cir. 2005), for the assertion
that exercise is a basic human necessity within the context of the Eighth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. However, in Heams. the prisoner was not able to go into
the prison yard for nine months due to high heat, lack of drinkable water, as opposed to
here where the defendant still could go outside for an hour and a half a week. Heams.
413 F.3d at 1042^3. Further, the Heams Court explicitly declined answering whether
the lack of going outside to the yard for nine months would in fact constitute an
independent basis for an unconstitutional living condition. Id at 1043. This Court will
consider these concerns alongside the rest of Campbell's arguments.
Within the Eighth Amendment context, a "Tack of exercise may be a
constitutional violation if one's muscles are allowed to atrophy or if an inmate's health is
threatened.'" Hosna v. Groose. 80 F.3d 298, 306(8th Cir. 1996)(quotim Wishon v.
Gammon.978 F.2d 446,449(8th Cir. 1992)). However,"[t]o prevail," Campbell must
show that the prison officials "'were deliberately indifferent to his exercise needs.'" Id
{quoting Wishon. 978 F.2d at 448-^9). Further, the Eighth Circuit has previously held
that prisoners who were permitted only 45 minutes of exercise a week when in protective
custody were not unconstitutionally deprived of their opportunity to be outside. Wishon.
978 F.2d at 449.
This motion is not the proper vehicle for Campbell to raise constitutional
challenges to his confinement. Rather, the defendant would need to bring a civil action
pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents. 403 U.S. 388(1971). Nevertheless,
case law fi-om this circuit makes bare the high threshold required for a showing of prison
staff unconstitutionally depriving inmates of exercise time outside. Tossing aside any
requirement of a showing of deliberate indifference on the part of the FCI Sandstone
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staff, Campbell's arguments still fall flat. Considering the global pandemic upending
lives across the United States and world, Mr. Campbell was nevertheless still able to
average twice the amount oftime outside than deemed constitutionally permissible by the
Eighth Circuit in Wishon v. Gammon, and six times longer than what a prisoner received
every other week for outside recreation by a sister District Court. See Wishon,978 F.2d.
at 449; Altman v. Loggins. 2008 WL 3539513 at *9(W.D. Ark. Aug. 11, 2008). This
factor does not approach the demanding threshold for a showing of extraordinary and
compelling circumstances.
2. Lack ofRehabilitative Prosramminz
Next, Mr. Campbell argues, briefly and in broad strokes, that FCI Sandstone lacks
rehabilitative programming, failing to explain substantively what in fact is missing.
Rather, the defendant summarily asserts he "participated in productive activities" without
explaining what these activities were, whether they were cancelled because of the
pandemic, or any other cognizable information for this Court to analyze. Doc. 79 at 5.
Because this is a mere threadbare recitation without a specific basis, the Court proceeds
to Campbell's next argument.
3. Inhumane Housins
Third, defendant Campbell claims he was subjected to inhumane dormitory style
housing which resulted in him contracting COVID-19. Id. It is unquestioned that prisons
can be a hotbed for infection during the pandemic. See generallv The COVID Prison
Project, https://covidprisonproject.com/data/nationaI-overview/. But wisely, Mr.
Campbell has received two doses of the COVID-19 Moderna vaccine.
Regardless, the COVID-19 rates where Campbell would return if released are grim
and pose serious risk of transmission. In his pre-sentence investigation interview, the
defendant stated he "plans to continue residing in Summit,[South Dakota]" once
released. Doc. 66 at 9. Summit is inside the Lake Traverse Reservation in Roberts
County, in northeastern South Dakota. Roberts County's total population is
approximately 10,280. SOUTH DAKOTA:2020 CENSUS,
https://www.census.gov/library/stories/state-by-state/south-dakota-population-change-
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between-census-decade.html. As of December 30, 2021, Roberts County has 71 active
cases, with a weekly polymerase chain reaction("PGR")test positivity rate of 19.4%,
labelling it a county of high community spread per the South Dakota Department of
Health.^ South Dakota COVID-19 Dashboard,
https://doh.sd.gOv/COVID/Dashboard.aspx (last visited Dec. 30, 2021). To reach a
hospital from Summit, the defendant must either drive 25 miles west to Sanford Webster
Medical Center, or similar distances north to reach the Indian Health Service's Woodrow
Wilson Keeble Memorial Health Care Center or Coteau Health Care System Hospital,
both in Sisseton. As of Deeember 29, 2021, there is only one FCI Sandstone inmate
currently infected with COVID-19, and no staff infections, out of a prison population of
962. COVID-19 Cases, Federal Bureau of Prisons,
https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/(last visited Dec. 30, 2021).
While COVID-19 eertainly constitutes an unprecedented public health risk, the
unfortunate reality is that defendant's risk of reinfection at FCI Sandstone has not been
shown to be any higher than his risk of contracting the virus while residing in Summit, a
town 30 minutes from a hospital and inside a county of high transmission rates. This
Court has previously lamented the oftentimes lacking and substandard access to needed
medical care on South Dakota's reservations.'* Because ofthese systemic inadequacies.
^ Out of South Dakota's 66 counties, all but four are currently labelled with "high" or "substantial" community
spread. Eric Mayer, COVID-19 in South Dakota: 809 Total new Cases; Death Toll Rises to 2,486; Active Cases at
8,323, Keloland, Dec. 30, 2021, https://www.keloland.com/news/healthbeat/coronavirus/covid-19-in-south-
dakota-809-total-new-cases-death-toll-rises-to-2486-active-cases-at-8323/.
The Indian Health Service readily admits that "[t]he American Indian and Alaska Native people have long
experienced lower health status when compared with other Americans. Lower life expectancy and the
disproportionate disease burden exist perhaps because of inadequate education, disproportionate poverty, and
discrimination in the delivery of health services, and cultural differences. These are broad quality of life issues
rooted in economic adversity and poor social conditions." DISPARITIES, Indian Health Serv.,
https://www.ihs.gov/newsroom/factsheets/disparities/(last visited Dec. 30, 2021). Buoyed by "decades-long
underfunding" these rural communities often lack seasoned medical personnel, or personnel at all." Mary Smith,
Native Americans: A Crisis in Health Equity, HUMAN RIGHTS MAGAZINE,Am.Bar ASSOC., Aug. 1,2018
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/the-state-of-healthcare-in-the-
united-states/native-american-crisis-in-health-equity/. The national secretary ofthe American Bar Association and a
former principal deputy director of the Indian Health Service has cited to the national Congress of American
Indians' analysis that "to match the level of care provided to federal prisoners (for Native Americans on
reservations), funding would have to nearly double," while also noting that "[fjunding would need to be even higher
to match the benefits guaranteed by programs such as Medicaid." Id.
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the defendant's access to healthcare on a reservation in South Dakota is far inferior to
that of a Federal Bureau ofPrisons facility, including FCI Sandstone.
4. Inability to Attend to Spiritual Needs
At three sentences void of meaningful claims, Campbell fails to make a modicum
of an argument asserting an inability to have his spiritual needs met. The defendant does
not explain what services he has previously taken advantage of, what specific services he
is currently not able to attend due to FCI Sandstone COVID-related policies, or other
indicia to this argument. Further, like his inhumane conditions claim, this argument is
more appropriate for a Bivens civil action than a motion for compassionate release.
5. No Visitation
Lastly, Campbell rightly points to the lack of visitation services currently being
offered at Sandstone. Certainly, it is lamentable that the defendant cannot embrace his
son and daughter, whom he has not seen in nearly two years. However, this factor alone
cannot warrant an extraordinary and compelling circumstance to justify an early release,
a release the defendant is not even asking for at this moment but rather later in the future.
6. Claims Asserted do not Rise to Hish Bar ofExtraordinary and Compellins
The defendant's arguments fall markedly short of the high bar for extraordinary
and compelling circumstances. Some of Campbell's arguments do not squarely fit within
the applicable analysis for compassionate release, while the others are not adequately
briefed or do not justify release. And again, vexingly, Campbell is not even asking for
immediate release, but rather to have 21 months cut from the end of his sentence, with an
anticipated adjusted release date of late 2022.^ Nor does Campbell assert he has any of
the increased risk factors for severe illness from COVID-19. See People with Certain
Medical Conditions, COVID-19,Ctrs.FOR Disease Control & Prevention,
https://www.cdc.gOv/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-with-
medical-conditions.html (last updated Dec. 14, 2021). This Court cannot peer into the
future and assume what the living conditions at FCI Sandstone will be like come
'Although Campbell "would accept the Court's granting of immediate release," his motion instead centers on a
release later in compensation for the difficult conditions imposed from the pandemic. Doc. 79 at 7.
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November, prior to Mr. Campbell's release, and whether the arguments listed in his
motion would even be applicable at that later date. Accordingly, the defendant has not
met his burden. The Court nevertheless proceeds to analyze whether the factors listed in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weigh in favor of granting compassionate release.
F. 18 U.S.C. S 3553(a) Factors
I have considered all the § 3553(a) factors,just as I did during Campbell's original
2018 sentencing. These factors include the nature and circumstances ofthe offense, the
history and characteristics of the defendant, the need to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, afford adequate deterrence, promote respect for the law, provide just
punishment, deter criminal conduct and protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant, among others. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(l)-(7).
1. Nature and Circumstances ofthe Offense
Mr. Campbell mercilessly sexually abused the victim, J.R.A., beginning when she
was around 7 or 8-years-old. The defendant's brazen abuse was not a one-off event;
rather, his transgressions occurred several times a week, for approximately the next four
to five years. The defendant moved in with J.R.A.'s mother, Ms. Jaime Lee, in Agency
Village, South Dakota, in approximately 2001, when the victim was around five-years-
old. Campbell cohabitated with J.R.A., her mother, and her brother through 2007 when
the relationship with the victim's mother ended due to the defendant's infidelity. J.R.A.'s
mother worked at the Dakota Sioux Casino near Watertown, South Dakota, often at
nights. Thus, Mr. Campbell would be tasked with getting Ms. Lee's children to bed.
Instead of ensuring J.R.A. had a safe home, he molested her several times a week, for
years on end.
The sexual abuse began when J.R.A. was around seven or eight-years-old. When
recalling the first time, J.R.A. remembers the defendant laying down next to her and
touching her body in inappropriate ways. He would place his hands on her breasts and
nipples, grabbing and rubbing them in a sexual manner. The defendant kissed the young
girl's breast and nipples, touching her vagina with his hand. Next, the defendant
removed J.R.A.'s clothes, and removing his own as well so that he was naked from the
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waist down. Campbell then put J.R.A. on top of him, rubbing his erect penis on her
vagina. During this abuse, Campbell penetrated J.R.A.'s labia majora and minor. Once
finished, Campbell left the room without saying a word.
With nobody to hear her cries for help, J.R.A. remained silent, frozen in fear and
confusion. Feeling humiliated, J.R.A. did not want to talk to anyone about the horrid acts
wrought upon her by the defendant. Tragically, this abuse would continue and worsen.
At later instances of abuse, J.R.A. reported the defendant would make clear he
wanted her to give him oral sex. He would push her face and head down towards his
exposed penis, which she would resist. The young girl endured Campbell touching his
penis to her face and lips.
Disastrously for J.R.A., the abuse did not end when Campbell moved out in 2007.
J.R.A.'s mother continued an amicable relationship with Campbell, a relationship he
exploited by volunteering to babysit her children whenever needed. This offer was
repeatedly taken up by Ms. Lee, leaving J.R.A. alone for further exploitation and
molestation.^
J.R.A. was 20-years-old when she disclosed her longstanding trauma, meaning the
defendant had free range and no impediment for many years following his repeated
molestation of the young girl. It would be an understatement to say the nature and
circumstances of this offense were horrid and undeniably tragic.
2. History and Characteristics ofDefendant Campbell
The defendant has only a limited criminal history, comprised of a 2011 conviction
for Theft by Insufficient Funds Check in Watertown. He also successfully finished high
school in Waubay, South Dakota. While Campbell enrolled at Sisseton-Wahpeton
College in Agency Village, he did not ultimately receive a degree for his studies. Finally,
Mr. Campbell was gainfully employed in Webster from 2014 until this proceeding as a
scale tech/general laborer, even receiving "Employee ofthe Year" for the scale division
^ While the defendant initially objected to the facts reported in the pre-sentence investigation, he subsequently
withdrew all his objections. Doc. 73.
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in 2018. The Court is properly taking into consideration the defendant's personal history
and characteristics.
3. Remaining $ 3553fa) Factors
Considering the remaining § 3553(a) factors, including the need to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, afford adequate deterrence, promote respect for the law,
provide just punishment, and deter criminal conduct and protect from further crimes of
the defendant, among others, all factors lean against early release. Mr. Campbell's years-
long sexual abuse of J.R.A. lasted for approximately four to five years, buttressed by
many years of him remaining free from consequences. In order to afford adequate
deterrence for such misconduct, as well as to promote respect for the law, § 3553(a)
demands this Court turn away from an early release. Further, the defendant already
received a reprieve from his guideline sentence. With a total offense level of38, and a
criminal history category off, Mr. Campbell's original guideline imprisonment range was
235-293 months. But, with a statutorily authorized maximum of 10 years, the advisory
range was reduced to 120 months. Ultimately, this Court sentenced Mr. Campbell below
this adjusted guideline range to a term of84 months, followed by a period of supervised
release of five years. This original sentence provides just punishment in this matter,
while deterring further criminal conduct and protecting the public from further crimes of
the defendant. Accordingly, the defendant's motion should be denied.
III. CONCLUSION
Mr. Campbell has already received a term of imprisonment 26 months below his
adjusted advisory guideline range. He has failed to present to this Court extraordinary
and compelling circumstances to warrant an early release from his confinement.
Additionally, the factors listed under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)lean against compassionate
release. The defendant does not even ask this Court for an immediate release, like most
motions for compassionate release. Rather, he requests a 21 month reduction fi-om the
end of his sentence because of the harsh conditions allegedly wrought upon him at FCI
Sandstone during the pandemic. All his reasons are unavailing. Mr. Campbell remained
free from consequence for years following his countless bouts of molesting J.R.A.,
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robbing her ofthe childhood she deserved. Because ofthe reasons explained above, Mr.
Desi Campbell's motion to reduce term of imprisonment should be denied.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Desi D. Campbell's motion to reduce
term ofimprisonment, doc. 79, is denied.
DATED this C(J> "dav of January, 2022
BY THE COURT:
CHARLES B. KORNMANN
United States District Judge
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