Arete Wealth, Inc. v. Thacker, Jr.

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
In re
JACK ROBERT THACKER JR., 	No. 2:25-bk-50237-RRM
Chapter 11 Subchapter V
Debtor.
__________________________________________
ARETE WEALTH, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs. 	No. 2:25-ap-05009-RRM
Adversary Proceeding
JACK ROBERT THACKER JR.,
Defendant.
M E M O R A N D U M
APPEARANCES:
Jason S. Shade, Esq. 	Maurice K. Guinn, Esq.
801F Sunset Drive, Suite 2 	Post Office Box 1990
Johnson City, Tennessee 37604 	Knoxville, Tennessee 37901
Attorney for Plaintiff 	Attorney for Defendant
SIGNED this 29th day of September, 2026
_____________________________________________________________
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Rachel Ralston Mancl, United States Bankruptcy Judge. 	Plaintiff Arete Wealth, Inc.,
asserts that its claim against defendant Jack Robert Thacker Jr. should be excepted from discharge
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) and (6). 	Mr. Thacker contends that Arete Wealth’s complaint must
be dismissed because it was not “filed within 60 days after the first date set for the § 341(a) meeting
of creditors” as required by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(c). 	Arete Wealth admits not filing its
complaint by the Rule 4007(c) deadline but insists it enjoys the extension that Mr. Thacker
consented to provide for other creditors. 	Arete Wealth posits that by entering the agreed order
between Mr. Thacker and those other creditors “this Court unequivocally extended the deadline
for creditors like Arete to submit dischargeability complaints.” 	The court did not. 	The complaint
will be summarily dismissed. 	This is a core proceeding. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I).
I.
Mr. Thacker filed his voluntary petition commencing the underlying chapter 11 case on
March 6, 2025. 	Schedule E/F lists Arete Wealth as an unsecured creditor having an unliquidated
and disputed claim in the amount of $5 million. 	The Notice of Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Case issued
by the clerk of court that same day sets forth deadlines for filing certain complaints, proofs of
claim, and objections to exemptions. 	Specially, as required by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002(f)(1)(F)
and 4007(c), the Notice informed all creditors of the deadline for filing a complaint to except a
debt from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6). 	In this regard the pertinent part of
Section 8 of the Notice states:
Deadline to file a complaint objecting to discharge or to challenge whether
certain debts are dischargeable (see line 11 for more information):
• if you assert that the debtor is not entitled to receive a discharge of any debts under
11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3), the deadline is the first date set for hearing on confirmation
of the plan. The court or its designee will send you notice of that date later.
• if you want to have a debt excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(2), (4),
or (6), the deadline is: 6/9/25.
Section 11 of the Notice titled “Discharge of debts” reiterates that “[i]f you believe that a particular
debt owed to you should be excepted from the discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6),
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you must file a complaint and pay the filing fee in the bankruptcy clerk’s office by the deadline.”
The certificate from the Bankruptcy Noticing Center evidences the Notice was sent to Arete Wealth
by first class mail on March 9, 2025.
The only contested matters in the bankruptcy case involved Mr. Thacker and creditors
represented by attorney Anthony Steele. 	Mr. Steele filed notices of appearance on behalf of Terry
and Sharon Vaughn, Don and Marla Lair, Kent and Nancy Crow, Thomas and Diann Elliott, and
Darrell and Joan Vincent. 	Mr. Steele’s clients were then or had been engaged in arbitration before
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) with Mr. Thacker, his former investment
company, and other individuals associated therewith. 	Mr. Steele appeared for the Vaughns and
the Lairs on March 21, 2025, and thereafter filed motions for relief from the automatic stay on
their behalf on April 2, 2025. 	The motions requested that the Vaughns be permitted to confirm
their FINRA arbitration award and that the Lairs be permitted to move forward with their FINRA
arbitration. 	Mr. Thacker, though his attorney Maurice Guinn, opposed the motions. 	Mr. Guinn
stated in the responses filed on behalf of Mr. Thacker that “[c]entralization of the claims
resolutions in this Court is in the best economic interest of the bankruptcy estate, creditors and the
Debtor,” and “estate funds will be greatly reduced, if not exhausted, if the estate must hire attorneys
to defend the 14 remaining FINRA proceedings.” 	A preliminary hearing on those two contested
matters was held on April 29, 2025, at which time the parties agreed to a final evidentiary hearing
on June 5, 2025. 	The order setting the hearing recited Mr. Steele’s announcement that only Mr.
Lair would be pursuing the motion the Lairs had jointly filed.
On May 8, 2025, Mr. Steele appeared on behalf of the Crows, the Elliotts, and the Vincents.
On May 14, 2025, Mr. Steele filed proof of claims for the Vaughns, the Crows, the Elliotts, the
Vincents, and Mr. Lair totaling more than $2.6 million. 	On May 19, 2025, Mr. Guinn and Mr.
Steele each filed motions for entry of agreed orders. 	Mr. Guinn’s motion sought approval of an
agreement between him and Mr. Steele to reschedule the evidentiary hearing on the Vaughns’ and
Mr. Lair’s motions from June 5 to July 24, 2025. 	Mr. Steele’s motion sought approval of an
agreed order between his clients and Mr. Thacker extending the June 9 deadline for filing §
523(a)(2), (4), and (6) complaints to August 8, 2025. 	Both agreed orders were entered on May
20, 2025. 	The timing and the substance of the agreed orders indicated that Mr. Guinn and Mr.
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Steele were working to settle the outstanding issues between their clients without incurring the
expenses of litigating them. 	Mr. Guinn said in this motion that “the attorneys for the parties
believe it may be in the parties’ best economic interest and in the interest of judicial economy …
to see if any agreement can be reached about the allowable amounts of the claims ….”
On June 3, 2025, Mr. Thacker filed a subchapter V plan prompting the court to enter an
order setting a confirmation hearing on July 29, 2025, and fixing deadlines for returning ballots
and filing objections to the plan. 	Mr. Guinn’s certificate shows that he served all creditors,
including Arete Wealth, with the plan, a ballot, and the court’s order setting the confirmation
hearing and related deadlines. 	On June 25, 2025, Mr. Guinn filed a motion stating that “[t]he
attorneys for the parties believe it is in the parties’ best economic interest and in the interest of
judicial economy for the hearing [on the motions for relief from stay] to be continued a second
time, until a date after the July 29, 2025 initial confirmation hearing.” 	Accordingly, that same
day the court entered the agreed order approved by Mr. Guinn and Mr. Steele rescheduling the
evidentiary hearing on the motions to August 28, 2025. 	Ultimately Mr. Guinn and Mr. Steele
reached a settlement on behalf of their clients. 	On July 17, 2025, Mr. Guinn filed a summary of
ballots reporting that the only impaired class under the plan, Class 3 of the unsecured creditors,
accepted the plan. 	The following day Mr. Steele withdrew the Vaughns’ and the Lairs’ motions
for relief from stay. 	At the hearing on July 29, 2025, Mr. Thacker obtained confirmation of a
consensually approved plan. 	From commencement of the case through plan confirmation, Arete
Wealth never participated, not even to file a proof of claim.
On August 7, 2025, Arete Wealth filed the complaint commencing this adversary
proceeding requesting that a judgment “in excess of $5 million” be entered against Mr. Thacker
and that the judgment be excepted from discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) and (6).
Arete Wealth’s claim arises from the sale by Mr. Thacker of his wholly owned company Center
Street Holdings, Inc., to Old Growth Capital, LLC, the predecessor of Arete Wealth. 	The alleged
basis of the claim is that Mr. Thacker fraudulently induced Old Growth Capital to purchase Center
Street Holdings by representing that the company and its subsidiary Center Street Securities, Inc.,
an investment company like Old Growth and Arete Wealth, “‘ha[d] no Liabilities except’ those
‘reflected or reserved against in the Balance Sheet’ and those ‘incurred in the ordinary course of
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business’ since the Balance Sheet’s date.” 	Arete alleges:
… Mr. Thacker’s representation was never true. 	Instead, when the parties
executed the contract, he knew that CS Securities had massive undisclosed
liabilities, including an underlying culture of non-compliance with internal policies,
FINRA rules, and other regulations and guidelines. That non-compliant culture
included selling customers unsuitable investments, letting accounts languish
unmonitored, failing to report product-issuer misconduct, and concealing the
downfall of its best investment product. CS Securities was, in short, a ticking
timebomb that Old Growth never could have suspected without truthful disclosures.
Mr. Thacker moved to dismiss the complaint because it was filed after the deadline of June
9, 2025. 	Arete Wealth responded that it had until August 8, 2025, to file its complaint. 	Because
Mr. Thacker did not identify the rule on which his motion was premised, the court construed the
motion to dismiss as being made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 	See Blake v. Traster (In re
Traster), No. 12-34042, 2014 WL 1276397, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 2014) (following
lead of other courts in assuming that debtor’s motion to dismiss a § 523(a)(2) complaint for not
being filed within time required by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(c) is made under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6)).
In support of his motion to dismiss, Mr. Thacker submitted an affidavit from Mr. Steele.
Doing so invoked subsection (d) of Rule 12, incorporated by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012(b), stating:
If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for
summary judgment under Rule 56. 	All parties must be given a reasonable
opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). 	Accordingly, the court entered orders on October 3 and 28, 2025, that
respectively informed the parties that it would treat the motion as one for summary judgment under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, incorporated by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056, and that they would have until
December 31, 2025, to supplement the record with any material pertinent to the motion.
The record was supplemented by affidavits from Mr. Thacker and Unbo Chung, the
compliance officer and general counsel for Arete Wealth. 	Mr. Thacker’s affidavit primarily
addresses the merits of Arete Wealth’s claim which is not pertinent to the timeliness of the filing
of the complaint. 	Mr. Chung’s affidavit likewise largely focuses on the claim, with the only
relevant portion to the timeliness of the complaint’s filing coming at the end in numbered
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paragraphs 10 and 11 wherein Mr. Chung states:
Arete was aware that Bankruptcy did not allow Thacker to avoid liability
for his fraudulent actions, but it was also unclear if Thacker had sufficient assets to
justify further litigation, especially in light of the significant costs of starting a
separate adversarial proceeding in Tennessee. 	Although Arete had until June 9,
2025 to file their complaints to determine the dischargeability of debt, prior to that
deadline, this Court entered an Order extending that deadline. 	Specifically, the
May 20, 2025 Order (Bnkcy Docket No. 110) stated that “the deadline to file a
complaint for determination of dischargeability of debt pursuant to 1 l U.S.C. § 523
in this case, originally set for June 9, 2025 shall be extended for sixty (60) days
through and including August 8, 2025.”
There was nothing in the Order that limited the relief granted to any specific
creditors or otherwise alerted Arete that it could not justifiably rely on that Order.
In reliance on that Order, Arete retained bankruptcy counsel in Tennessee and
timely filed its Complaint for dischargeability on August 7, 2025. (Docket No. 1).
Docket event no. 110 that Mr. Chung addresses is entry of the agreed order. 	Mr. Chung
does not mention docket event no. 108 that is linked to no. 110 wherein Mr. Steele dockets and
identifies the motion for entry of the agreed order as a “Motion For Agreed Order Extending
Deadline to File Complaints to Determine Dischargeability of Debt Filed by Anthony R. Steele on
behalf of [his named clients].” 	The linking of the two docket events reinforces that the motion
was filed on behalf of Mr. Steele’s clients only. 	Mr. Steele confirms this in his affidavit wherein
he states:
(3) 	I have appeared in the case of Jack Robert Thacker, Jr. (“Debtor”)
on behalf of Terry Vaughn and Sharon Vaughn, Kent Crow and Nancy Crow,
Darrell Vincent and Joan Vincent, Thomas Elliott and Diann Elliott, and Don Lair.
(4) 	Attached hereto as Exhibit A is the Motion for Entry of Agreed
Order Extending Deadline to File Complaints to Determine Dischargeability of
Debt (Doc 108), which I prepared and filed in the Debtor’s case on May 19, 2025.
(5) 	Attached hereto as Exhibit B is the Agreed Order Extending
Deadline to File Complaints to Determine Dischargeability of Debt (Doc 110),
entered on May 20, 2025.
(6) 	I prepared and filed the Agreed Order. 	My clients are identified as
the “Unsecured Creditors” in the Motion and the Agreed Order.
(7) 	The Motion and the Agreed Order were filed to obtain an extension
of time for my clients to file complaints to determine dischargeability of my clients’
claims pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523.
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(8) 	I did not at the time of the Motion and do not currently represent or
advocate for any parties other than the parties specifically listed in the Motion For
Entry of Agreed Order Extending Deadline to File Complaints to Determine
Dischargeability of Debt and the attendant Agreed Order Extending Deadline To
File Complaints to Determine Dischargeability of Debt.
The document prepared and filed by Mr. Steele titled “MOTION FOR ENTRY OF
AGREED ORDER EXTENDING DEADLINE TO FILE COMPLAINTS TO DETERMINE
DISCHARGEABILITY OF DEBT” recites:
COMES TERRY VAUGHN and SHARON VAUGHN, KENT CROW
AND 	NANCY 	CROW, 	DARRELL 	VINCENT 	AND 	JOAN 	VINCENT,
THOMAS ELLIOTT AND DIANN ELLIOTT, AND DON LAIR, by and
through counsel, (collectively, the “Unsecured Creditors”), pursuant to Local Rule
9072-1 and say as follows:
That the Unsecured Creditors and the Debtor, JACK ROBERT THACKER,
JR., by and through counsel, have agreed to the entry of an Agreed Order Extending
Deadline to File Complaints to Determine Dischargeability of Debt. A copy of the
proposed Agreed Order is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
WHEREFORE, these premises considered, the Unsecured Creditors request
the Court enter the Agreed Order Extending Deadline to File Complaints to
Determine Dischargeability of Debt attached hereto and submitted herewith.
The agreed order approved for entry by Mr. Steele and Mr. Guinn and prepared by Mr. Steele
extending the deadline by an agreement between his clients and Mr. Thacker provides:
COME JACK ROBERT THACKER, JR. (the “Debtor”) and TERRY
VAUGHN and SHARON VAUGHN, KENT CROW AND NANCY CROW,
DARRELL VINCENT AND JOAN VINCENT, THOMAS ELLIOTT AND
DIANN ELLIOTT, AND DON LAIR, (collectively, the “Unsecured Creditors”),
by and through their respective legal counsel, and hereby jointly announce to the
Court that the parties have reached an agreement to extend the deadlines for the
filing of a complaint for determination of dischargeability of debt pursuant to 11
U.S.C. §523 and are in agreement that the deadline to file such complaints in this
case, originally set for June 9, 2025, should be extended for sixty (60) days to
August 8, 2025. Accordingly, upon agreement of the parties and for good cause
shown, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the deadline to file a
complaint for determination of dischargeability of debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523
in this case, originally set for June 9, 2025 shall be extended for sixty (60) days
through and including August 8, 2025.
The language in the motion and order does not bear out Mr. Chung’s statement that “[t]here
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was nothing in the Order that limited the relief granted to any specific creditors.” 	Both documents
expressly state that the agreement to extend the deadline is between Mr. Thacker and the nine
creditors identified by name in both the motion and agreed order. 	And while Mr. Chung also
states that nothing in the agreed order “otherwise alerted Arete that it could not justifiably rely on
the order,” he does not specifically state that Arete Wealth relied on the agreed order in allowing
the deadline to pass. 	In fact, there is no evidence concerning how or when Arete Wealth even
became aware of the existence of the agreed order. 	Because it was not a party to the agreed order,
the court never notified Arete Wealth that an agreed order extending the deadline for the nine
creditors represented by Mr. Steele had been entered. 	Mr. Steele did not serve Arete Wealth with
his motion for entry of the agreed order when he filed it. 	The Bankruptcy Noticing Center did
not serve Arete Wealth with the agreed order when it was entered. 	And having never made an
appearance in the bankruptcy case, Arete Wealth did not receive an electronic notice from the
court’s ECF/CM system of either the filing of the motion or entry of the agreed order.
II.
There are two general routes for a creditor to request an extension of the deadline for filing
complaints to determine the dischargeability of debts under § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6). 	The most
common requires the filing of a motion “before the time expires,” which in such event “the court
may, after notice and a hearing and for cause, extend the time to file.” 	Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(c).
The court’s pertinent local rule requires that the movant either set the motion for hearing in
accordance with E.D. Tenn. LBR 9013-1(f)(1) or utilize the other method provided by subsection
(h)(1)(xii) of the rule, that being a “passive notice procedure whereby no hearing is set or held
unless a party in interest objects to the relief requested in the motion.” 	Under either method a
movant must present cause in requesting the extension from the court. 	Establishing cause is not
an unusually high bar to clear. 	However:
In Brady, the Sixth Circuit indicated that a party in interest requesting an
extension under Rule 4007(c) “must demonstrate some minimally sufficient
showing of cause for the extension.” 	In re Brady, 101 F.3d at 1171; see also In re
Sheppard, 532 B.R. at 676 (“In the Sixth Circuit, discretion is given to the
bankruptcy courts to determine the definition of ‘cause’ on a case-by-case basis,
but there is precedent that suggests the threshold for granting such motions should
be set low.”)…. 	Consequently, when “a creditor fails to use diligence in gathering
information pertinent and necessary to filing a complaint, the Bankruptcy Court
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acts within its discretion in denying a motion for an extension of time.” 	In re
Mendelsohn, 202 B.R. 831, 832 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
In re Riggs, No. 22-30575, 2023 WL 1998547, at *7 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Feb. 14, 2023). 	If Arete
Wealth had chosen to request an extension it would have had to file a motion by the deadline of
June 9, 2025, and presented cause to obtain one. 	The only reason Arete Wealth provides for not
filing its complaint by the June 9 deadline is Mr. Chung’s statement that “it was … unclear if
Thacker had sufficient assets to justify further litigation, especially in light of the significant costs
of starting a separate adversarial proceeding in Tennessee.” 	Mr. Thacker states in his affidavit
that he disclosed all his assets when he filed the case on March 6, 2025, reflecting “a total real
estate value in my case of $1,405,000.00 and total personal property is $1,363,110.00, for a total
of all property on Schedule A/B of $2,768,110.00.” 	Arete Wealth had almost three months to
consider Mr. Thacker’s financial information in the bankruptcy filings and decide whether there
were “sufficient assets to justify further litigation.” 	No reason is offered why any more time was
needed to make that decision. 	With no reason for needing additional time, no cause would have
existed to grant Arete Wealth an extension of the deadline. 	Having no cause, any motion by Arete
Wealth for an extension of the deadline certainly would not have been granted over Mr. Thacker’s
objection. 	See, e.g., In re Vinson, 509 B.R. 128, 133-34 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2013) (creditor that
had monitored but not actively participated in the bankruptcy case denied extension of deadlines
for failing to meet its responsibility to pursue its rights diligently).
The other route for extending the deadline is to obtain the debtor’s consent and submit an
agreed order extending the deadline before it expires, the one taken by Mr. Steele’s clients. 	In
traveling this route the court’s local rule requires that “[e]very agreed order (whether in connection
with a case, contested matter, or adversary proceeding) must be accompanied by an appropriate
motion requesting entry of the order ….” 	E.D. Tenn. LBR 9072-1(a). 	Mr. Steele did this by
utilizing E.D. Tenn. LBR 9013-1(g)(1)(xvii) that permits the filing of an ex parte motion “in which
the movant certifies that all affected parties have consented to the requested relief.” 	Paragraph 3
of the rule states that “a movant utilizing the ex parte procedure must file a certificate evidencing
service of the motion and proposed order on all parties affected by the relief sought.” 	Mr. Steele
complied by serving the ex parte motion and the agreed order by mail on Mr. Thacker and
electronically through the court’s CM/ECF system on Mr. Guinn, the subchapter V and United
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States trustees, and two attorneys that had appeared on behalf of secured creditors. 	After the
agreed order was entered, the Bankruptcy Noticing Center served those same parties with the
signed agreed order. 	Mr. Steele did not serve Arete Wealth with the motion and agreed order
because it was not “affected by the relief sought” and had not made an appearance in the
bankruptcy case. 	For the latter reason, the Bankruptcy Noticing Center likewise did not serve
Arete Wealth with the agreed order after it was entered by the court.
An agreed order is a contract between the parties which has judicial approbation—one to
which the court, as ultimate arbiter, has been made a signatory. 	See In re Fam. Invs., Inc., 8 B.R.
572, 577 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981) (“Agreed orders are no less binding because they are based on
compromise of the parties instead of a unilateral judicial act.”). 	“Understanding agreed orders
approved by a court as being essentially contractual in nature is a widely shared conventional
understanding.” 	J.E.T., Inc. v. Hasty, No. M2023-00253-COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 1156558, at *4
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2024). 	Because an agreed order is in the nature of a contract,
interpretation of its terms presents a question of contract interpretation. 	See City of Covington v.
Covington Landing Ltd. P’ship, 71 F.3d 1221, 1227 (6th Cir. 1995) (agreed order entered by
bankruptcy court properly considered as a contract made between the parties). 	In interpreting an
agreed cash collateral order, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that “[t]he principles of
contract interpretation as recognized by this court first require looking to the explicit language of,
in this case, the cash collateral order for ‘clear manifestations of intent.’” 	In re Hughes-Bechtol,
Inc., 225 F.3d 659 (6th Cir. 2000) (table) (citing Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 654
(6th Cir. 1996), quoting UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1479 (6th Cir. 1983)). 	“The
court may interpret the order in light of its own understanding of the history of the case and the
intention of the parties when they presented the agreed order.” 	In re Great Lakes Comnet, Inc.,
569 B.R. 693, 698 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2017).
As the agreement embodied in the agreed order between Mr. Thacker and the named
creditors was made in Tennessee, the general principles of contract interpretation under Tennessee
law are also applicable. 	Id. (applying Michigan law of contracts to agreed bankruptcy sale order).
In Tennessee, “[t]he law presumes that a contract is executed for the benefit of the parties thereto
and not third persons, and a third person claiming benefits thereunder has the burden of proving
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that the contract was made for his benefit.” 	Rutherford Cnty. v. City of Murfreesboro, 304 S.W.2d
635, 637 (Tenn. 1957). 	Arete Wealth seeks the benefit of the extension of the deadline that Mr.
Thacker agreed to provide to nine other creditors. 	Accordingly, Arete Wealth has the burden to
prove “from the terms of the [agreed order] or the circumstances surrounding its execution, that,
at the time of contracting, [it] was an intended third-party beneficiary of the [agreed order].” 	Elvis
Presley Enters., Inc. v. City of Memphis, No. W2019-00299-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 854860, at
*9 (Tenn. App. Mar. 23, 2022) (quoting Wallis v. Brainerd Baptist Church, 509 S.W.3d 886, 899
(Tenn. 2016)). 	“The evidence to confer a benefit must be clear and direct.” 	Owner-Operator
Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. Concord EFS, Inc., 59 S.W.3d 63, 69 (Tenn. 2001). 	Arete Wealth
presents no evidence of any nature that it is an intended beneficiary of the agreed order.
Not only has it not been established that Mr. Thacker and the creditors represented by Mr.
Steele intended for Arete Wealth to receive the benefit their agreed upon extension, Arete Wealth’s
interpretation of the language in the agreed order that it “broadly extended the deadline for
dischargeability complaints” is unreasonable. 	Mr. Chung states “[t]here was nothing in the Order
that limited the relief granted to any specific creditors,” but quotes only the second sentence
reciting that “the deadline to file a complaint for determination of dischargeability of debt pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. §523 in this case, originally set for June 9, 2025 shall be extended for sixty (60) days
through and including August 8, 2025.” 	Isolating the second sentence from the first, Arete
Wealth submits that the “inclusion of the term ‘in this case’ serves no other purpose other than to
unambiguously expand the scope of the extension to all creditors, not just the movants” and
therefore “this language created a plain and unambiguous extension for all creditors intending to
file dischargeability complaints in the Thacker bankruptcy.” 	The logic which Arete Wealth
engages to arrive at this conclusion is that “there was no other pending bankruptcy or other ‘case’
that the proposed order needed to carve out.” 	However, inclusion of the descriptive phrase “in
this case” no more expands the scope of an extension than elimination of the phase reduces it. 	For
example, in the two cases touted by Arete Wealth, Donegal Mutual Insurance Companies v.
Watkins (In re Watkins), 365 B.R. 574 (Bankr. W.D. Penn. 2007), and Marshall v. Demos (In re
Demos), 57 F.3d 1037 (11th Cir. 1995), neither order by the courts granting an extension employed
the language “in this case.” 	Cf. In re Watkins, 365 B.R. at 577 (“It is ORDERED that the time to
file objection to discharge or dischargeability is extended until further order of Court.”); 	In re
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Demos, 57 F.3d at 1039 (“That the deadline for filing ‘Complaints to Determine Dischargeability
and Objecting to Discharge’ be, and the same is hereby, extended be, up to and including March
15, 1993.”). 	Yet, both orders were interpreted as granting an extension not just for the movants
but for all creditors. 	Id. 	Applying the logic of Arete Wealth, both the Watkins and Demos courts
erroneously interpreted the language of the orders as extending to all creditors.
Arete Wealth states that “if Thacker or Steele wanted to extend the deadline for only
Steele’s clients, they could have easily done so by … language extending the deadline for those
creditors alone,” termed by Arete Wealth as a “carve out.” 	But including a “carve out” would
have been superfluous in light of the preceding sentence reciting that the parties “jointly announce
to the Court that the parties have reached an agreement to extend” and that they “are in agreement
to extend the deadline to file such complaints in this case.” 	Arete Wealth’s isolated focus on the
second sentence, while ignoring the preceding one, evades consideration of the context of the
agreed order in its entirety and thereby violates a long-standing rule of construction. 	See, e.g., In
re Great Lakes Comnet, Inc., 569 B.R. at 698 ([E]ach provision [of the agreed order] should be
construed consistently with the entire document ….”) (quoting Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v. Hughes–
Bechtol, Inc. (In re Hughes Bechtol, Inc.), 225 F.3d 659, 2000 WL 1091509, at *8 (6th Cir. July
27, 2000)); Wilson v. Moore, 929 S.W.2d 367, 373 (Tenn. App. 1996) (“[C]ourts must examine
the text of the contract in the context of the entire agreement.”). 	Instead of a “focus” only on the
“plain language” in the second sentence as Arete Wealth urges, the court must consider the entirety
of the agreed order “in light of [the court’s] own understanding of the history of the case and the
intention of the parties when they presented the agreed order.” 	In re Great Lakes Comnet, Inc.,
569 B.R. at 698.
Mr. Steele states that he prepared both the motion and the agreed order and that they
“were filed to obtain an extension of time for my clients to file complaints to determine
dischargeability of my clients’ claims pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523.” 	Arete Wealth responds that
“Steele’s intent … is beside the point because the plain unambiguous language of the Order
governs.” 	However, Mr. Steele’s intent is manifested in and is entirely consistent with the
language of both the motion and agreed order. 	The motion that specifically names each of the
nine creditors represented by Mr. Steele (referenced collectively as the “Unsecured Creditors”)
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recites that “the Unsecured Creditors and the Debtor, JACK ROBERT THACKER, JR., by and
through counsel, have agreed to the entry of an Agreed Order Extending Deadline to File
Complaints to Determine Dischargeability of Debt. 	A copy of the proposed Agreed Order is
attached hereto as Exhibit A.” (Emphasis supplied.) 	The motion concludes by stating “the
Unsecured Creditors request the Court enter the Agreed Order Extending Deadline to File
Complaints to Determine Dischargeability of Debt attached hereto and submitted herewith.” 	The
agreed order introduces both Mr. Thacker and each of nine creditors represented by Mr. Steele
before stating that they “by and through their respective legal counsel … hereby jointly announce
to the Court that the parties have reached an agreement to extend the deadlines for the filing of a
complaint for determination of dischargeability of debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §523 and are in
agreement that the deadline to file such complaints in this case, originally set for June 9, 2025,
should be extended for sixty (60) days to August 8, 2025.” 	(Emphasis supplied.)
The joint announcement in the agreed order that Mr. Thacker, Terry and Sharon Vaughn,
Kent and Nancy Crow, Darrell and Joan Vincent, Thomas and Diann Elliott, and Don Lair have
reached an agreement to extend the deadline is unambiguous. 	The agreement whereby Mr.
Thacker consented to an extension for the named creditors was made for the named creditors only.
When the motion for entry of the agreed order was filed the court understood that cause existed
for an extension of the deadline for Mr. Steele’s clients because Mr. Steele and Mr. Guinn needed
more time to negotiate a settlement of the outstanding issues between their clients without the
necessity of those nine creditors having to file complaints by the June 9 deadline and the debtor
having to answer them. 	On entering the agreed order the court also understood that the parties to
the agreement contemplated an extension of the deadline only for the creditors to whom Mr.
Thacker had consented to provide an extension, those being specifically identified in both the
motion and the agreed order as “TERRY VAUGHN and SHARON VAUGHN, KENT CROW
AND 	NANCY 	CROW, 	DARRELL 	VINCENT 	AND 	JOAN 	VINCENT, 	THOMAS
ELLIOTT 	AND 	DIANN 	ELLIOTT, 	AND 	DON 	LAIR, 	(collectively, 	the 	‘Unsecured
Creditors’)”. 	The court construes the agreed order no differently today than when it entered the
agreed order—the extension of the deadline was only for the “Unsecured Creditors” specifically
named in the agreed order. 	The agreed order embodies an agreement to extend the deadline made
between Mr. Thacker and the nine creditors represented by Mr. Steele. 	There is no evidence
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indicating that the agreed extension of the deadline was for the benefit of any creditor other than
those who were parties to the agreement, or that any cause existed for extending the deadline for
any creditors not named in the agreed order, including Arete Wealth.
The Watkins and Demos decisions provide no basis to interpret the agreed order any
differently. 	Arete Wealth offers the cases to support its statement that “[w]here courts in other
circuits have encountered orders that are not limited to the movant and where other creditors
reasonably rely on those orders, they have focused on the ‘plain language’ and applied extensions
to all creditors.” 	Reliance on the cases to show that the extension of the deadline here was
universal ignores the fact that Mr. Steele’s clients obtained their extension by consent of Mr.
Thacker, not by the court granting a motion for an extension for cause. 	In addition to this
important distinction, the issues and facts in the two decisions could not be more different from
those here. 	When the orders were entered to extend the deadlines in those cases, cause existed to
extend it for all creditors.
The issue in Watkins was “whether the bankruptcy court has discretion to extend the time
for all creditors to commence an adversary proceeding under § 523 or § 727 based on a motion by
a single creditor.” 	In re Watkins, 365 B.R. at 577. 	The decision was fact-specific. 	The plaintiff
in an adversary proceeding seeking the recovery of property from the debtor sought to amend its
complaint to include claims objecting to discharge and to determine the dischargeability of debt.
The plaintiff asserted that the additional claims should either relate back to the filing of the
complaint on the premise that the debtor had been on notice of the nature of the claims before the
passage of the deadlines or be considered timely filed based on an extension granted to another
creditor on its Rule 4007(c) motion. 	Id. at 576. 	Because the court had granted the motion ex
parte on its filing, a hearing was scheduled after the debtor objected to the extension. 	At the
hearing the debtor acknowledged that granting the motion was appropriate for the filing creditor,
but not for the plaintiff and two other creditors that had sought to “join in” the motion after the
deadline had passed. 	Id. 	The court continued the hearing as to the other creditors’ request for
an extension, indicating that the deadlines could be extended at that time, but then continued the
hearing again after the chapter 7 trustee announced that a Rule 2004 exam of the debtor was to be
conducted regarding potentially undisclosed assets. 	Id. 	After the second continuance the court
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entered an order stating: “It is ORDERED that the time to file objection to discharge or
dischargeability is extended until further order of Court.” 	Id. at 577. 	When called on later to
interpret the order, the court stated that “[t]he intent was to leave open the time for objections under
§ 727 or § 523 for all creditors pending the Trustee’s investigation of the relevant facts.” 	Id. 	The
court explained:
The Trustee’s indication that a Rule 2004 examination was going to be
conducted to investigate information about potentially undisclosed assets and that
all interested parties would be advised of the date and time of the Rule 2004
examination so that they might participate constitutes sufficient “cause” for an
order extending the time for all creditors.
As a result of the Trustee’s comments and the interest of creditors indicated
by their participation in the hearings on this matter, the order which was entered
that provides “the time to file objection to discharge or dischargeability is extended
until further order of Court.” 	The plain meaning of this language, especially in
light of the hearing, is that an extension of time was granted to all creditors.
Id. at 577-78. 	The holding by the court in Watkins that it had discretion based on cause to extend
the deadlines for all creditors on a single creditor’s timely filed Rule 4007(c) motion has no bearing
on the facts in this case.
The Demos decision does not involve an extension granted under Rule 4007(c). 	In a
“Motion to Extend the Times for Objections to Claimed Exemptions and Complaints to Determine
Dischargeability and Objecting to Discharge,” the chapter 7 trustee, after “[c]alling the court’s
attention to the problems created by the large numbers of ‘creditors’ involved in the bankruptcy
and the possibility that the Debtor’s attorney might not be able to attend the 2004 examination of
the Debtor,” asked that “the court exercise its equitable power to extend the time for filing
complaints.” 	In re Demos, 57 F.3d at 1039. 	Instead of a motion being made under either Fed.
R. Bankr. P 4004(b) or 4007(c) respectively to extend the deadlines for filing complaints objecting
to discharge or to determine the dischargeability of debt, the trustee’s motion joined by the debtor
was made pursuant to and granted by 11 U.S.C. § 105 which “authorizes the bankruptcy court to
‘issue any order that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of the bankruptcy
code.’” 	Id. 	(quoting 	11 	U.S.C. 	§ 	105 	with 	alterations). 	After 	a 	creditor 	filed 	a
nondischargeablity complaint by the extended deadline, the debtor through his new attorney
moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the creditor could not take advantage of the trustee’s
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extension of the deadlines because the creditor had not separately moved for one. 	Id. at 1038.
The bankruptcy court and the district court agreed. 	The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
stating that postponement of the Rule 2004 exam “might jeopardize creditors’ rights to file their
adversary complaints or compel them to file when the 2004 proceeding might have persuaded them
not to do so.” 	Id. 	Whether it was reasonable for the creditor to rely on the order, the court
determined:
Of course, the reliance of a party on an order must be reasonable. A party
may not rely on an order that clearly has nothing to do with him. 	In this case, it
was entirely reasonable for Marshall to rely on the bankruptcy court’s order. The
Trustee’s motion, joined by the Debtor, and served on Marshall, stated:
7. That there are numerous interested parties and attorneys who
wish to attend the 2004 Examination of the Debtor which would be
after the deadline for exemptions and the deadline for determining
dischargeability and objecting to discharge.
8. That due to the large numbers of creditors involved in this
bankruptcy proceeding, the Debtor’s attorney and the Trustee have
no objection to the said extension.
Id. at 1039. 	The order granting the trustee’s motion stated “[t]hat the deadline for filing
‘Complaints to Determine Dischargeability and Objecting to Discharge’ be, and the same is
hereby, extended up to and including March 15, 1993.” 	Observing that only creditors—not a
chapter 7 trustee—may file complaints to determine the dischargeability of debts, the court held
that “[t]he plain meaning of this language is that an extension of time was granted to creditors—
all creditors.” 	Id. at 1039-40. 	Alternatively, the circuit court held that “[i]f the bankruptcy court
did not intend to grant creditors an extension of time—as the district court found—then the
bankruptcy court made a mistake, and it should have exercised its equitable powers under Section
105 to allow [the] complaint to stand.” 	Id. at 1040.
This court agrees that a bankruptcy court may extend the deadline for filing a complaint to
determine the dischargeability of debt for all creditors on a single creditor’s timely filed Rule
4007(c) motion, and recognizes the authority provided under 11 U.S.C. § 105 to exercise the
equitable power to extend such a deadline on behalf of all creditors. 	But doing so is proper only
if cause exists. 	See, e.g., In re Pizzuti, No. 6:10-BK-12098-ABB, 2011 WL 43530, at *2-3
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 2011) (court exercised equitable powers under § 105 to extend deadlines
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for all creditors on motions made under Rules 4004 and 4007 by chapter 7 trustee and seven
creditors for cause based on the complexity of the case involving a network of interrelated entities
and substantial unsecured debt, the significant number of general unsecured creditors, the debtors’
inability at the meeting of creditors to explain certain representations in their bankruptcy papers
and to answer almost any questions related to their various investment companies, the filing of
several motions to conduct Rule 2004 examinations of the debtors, many of the creditors appeared
to be unsophisticated in financial and bankruptcy matters and were unrepresented by counsel, and
the unrepresented creditors and parties in interest were looking to the trustee and the represented
parties for direction as to how to proceed in the case). 	Apart from the distinction that the extension
here was not granted on a Rule 4007(c) motion or one made pursuant to § 105, but was set forth
in an agreed order between Mr. Steele’s clients and Mr. Thacker, the principal difference between
the facts of the cases cited by Arete Wealth and those before this court is that cause existed for
courts in Watkins and Demos to extend the deadlines for all creditors at the time the orders were
entered. 	When the motion for entry of the agreed order in Mr. Thacker’s case was filed and the
proposed agreed order submitted, cause did not exist for this court to extend the deadline for all
creditors. 	In Mr. Thacker’s bankruptcy case, he consented to an extension of the deadline only
for Mr. Steele’s clients so the parties could work towards resolution of the named creditors’ claims
to achieve a consensual confirmation of a plan. 	As explained by the Vinson court when denying
for lack of cause a motion to extend the deadlines imposed by Rules 4004 and 4007 for filing
complaints:
[T]treatment of one creditor does not dictate the treatment appropriate for another.
As aptly pointed out by Debtors, to extend the deadlines for one creditor just
because a debtor agreed to an extension for another would emasculate the
requirement of cause in Rules 4004 and 4007. 	Further, it would chill a debtor’s
willingness to work in a cooperative fashion with creditors who diligently act to
pursue their rights, because that debtor could then be penalized by other creditors
jumping on the bandwagon even though they did not act diligently.
In re Vinson, 509 B.R. at 133-34.
III.
Alternatively, Arete Wealth states that “if this Court were to determine that the extension
order applies only to the movant unsecured creditors …, this Court should use its equitable powers
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to allow Arete’s adversary proceeding to continue.” 	Arete Wealth’s request asks the Court to
apply the doctrine of equitable tolling. 	“Equitable tolling is a rare remedy to be applied in unusual
circumstances, not a cure-all for an entirely common state of affairs.” 	Martin v. Thompson (In re
Thompson), No. 1:18-ap-1018-SDR, 2018 WL 4201752, at *5 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Aug. 15, 2018)
(quoting Hollis v. Ardahji (In re Ardahji), No. 14-30519, 2015 WL 1865634 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
Apr. 2, 2015)). 	“The doctrine is ‘intended to toll a statute of limitations when a litigant’s failure
to meet a legally-mandated deadline unavoidably arose from circumstances beyond that litigant’s
control.’” 	Id.
“In In re Maughan, the Sixth Circuit identified the following factors for a court to consider
when determining whether the doctrine of equitable tolling should be applied to excuse a plaintiff’s
missing the Rule 4007(c) deadline: ‘(1) lack of actual notice of filing requirement; (2) lack of
constructive knowledge of filing requirement; (3) diligence in pursuing one’s rights; (4) absence
of prejudice to the defendant; and (5) a plaintiff’s reasonableness in remaining ignorant of the
notice requirement.’” 	Id. at *9 (quoting Nardei v. Maughan (In re Maughan), 340 F.3d 337, 344
(6th Cir. 2003)). 	A couple of years after Maughan the United States Supreme Court stated that
“[g]enerally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1)
that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood
in his way.” 	Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, (2005) (discussing standard in the context
of the statute of limitations imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
for filing a federal habeas corpus petition). 	Because here, as in Thompson, notice of the deadline
is not an issue, “[w]hether the court considers the factors set out in In re Maughan or in
DiGuglielmo, the analysis is essentially the same ….” 	In re Thompson, 2018 WL 4201752, at *4.
As previously discussed, Arete Wealth’s excuse for not filing its complaint by the June 9
deadline was that “it was … unclear if Thacker had sufficient assets to justify further litigation,
especially in light of the significant costs of starting a separate adversarial proceeding in
Tennessee.” 	Had Arete Wealth been diligent in pursuing its rights it would have timely filed its
complaint. 	No circumstance, extraordinary or not, stood in the way of Arete Wealth filing its
complaint by June 9, 2025. 	Arete Wealth, a legally sophisticated entity having a compliance
officer and general counsel on board, knew or should have known the consequences of not meeting
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a deadline to file a complaint. 	Mr. Chung’s affidavit does not factually establish that Arete
Wealth was even aware of the agreed order before the deadline passed. 	But if it was, Arete Wealth
decided to risk the consequences of letting the June 9 deadline pass.
Arete Wealth states in a footnote that “if Thacker is correct that the true intention of the
Order was to restrict it to the nine creditors who filed the May 19 motion, then the Order …
erroneously excluded language so cabining the extension,” which “in that case, Arete would be
entitled to rely on the plain language of the Court’s Order, just like the creditors in Isaacman,
Anwiler, and Themy.” 	In the preceding section of this opinion the court rejected Arete Wealth’s
interpretation 	that 	the 	agreed 	order 	“broadly 	extended 	the 	deadline 	for 	dischargeability
complaints.” 	The court determined that the agreed order embodied an agreement to extend the
deadline made between Mr. Thacker and the nine creditors represented by Mr. Steele, and therefore
the extension of the deadline was only for the creditors specifically identified in the agreed order.
Therefore, there was no “carve out” or “cabining” required to limit the extension for Mr. Steele’s
clients alone as Arete Wealth insists.
The cases cited by Arete Wealth, all inapposite, involve a court’s application of its
equitable power to overcome a mistake by the court. 	In Isaacman, the bankruptcy court clerk’s
office erroneously informed plaintiff’s attorney that a second bar date for filings complaints had
been set in a transferred case. 	The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded “that where a
bankruptcy court erroneously sets a second bar date for the filing of complaints to determine the
dischargeability of a debt before the first bar date has expired and where a creditor, reasonably
relying on that second date, files a complaint before the expiration of the second bar date, the
bankruptcy court abuses its discretion if it fails to exercise its equitable powers and permit the
complaint to proceed.” 	In re Nicholson v. Isaacman (In re Isaacman), 26 F.3d 629, 636 (6th Cir.
1994). 	In Anwiler, two notices setting conflicting deadlines for filing complaints were sent to the
parties by two separate courts. 	In re Anwiler, 958 F.2d 925, 926 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended on
denial of reh'g (Apr. 8, 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 882 (1992). 	The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals agreed that the bankruptcy court had the equitable power to permit the complaint to
proceed despite its untimely filing by the first deadline. 	Id. at 929. 	Themy likewise involved two
notices setting different deadlines for filing complaints. 	In re Themy, 6 F.3d 688, 689 (10th Cir.
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1993). 	The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the bankruptcy court acted
appropriately when it exercised its equitable power to permit the complaint filed by the second
deadline to proceed. 	Id. at 690. 	The common theme throughout the three cases is best summed
up in Themy in that “although the burden of protecting one’s rights is ordinarily placed on the
creditor, when the court’s act affirmatively misleads the creditor as to a deadline, the court bears
responsibility for correcting its error.” 	Id.
Arete Wealth was not informed by the bankruptcy court clerk’s office of conflicting
deadlines for filing its complaint. 	It was informed by the clerk’s office of one deadline, that being
June 9, 2025. 	Arete Wealth claims that it relied on a statement by the court of an extended
deadline. 	Arete Wealth was in no way misled by the court. 	The court did not serve the agreed
order on Arete Wealth. 	Arete Wealth’s decision not to file its complaint by the deadline had
consequences then. 	No basis exists for equitably permitting Arete Wealth to avoid those
consequences now. 	Allowing the untimely filed complaint to proceed would be inequitable to the
nine creditors that timely sought their extension and to Mr. Thacker who consented only for an
extension for those nine creditors. 	Allowing the untimely filed complaint to proceed would
undoubtedly cause the estate to incur greater costs, reduce the amount the estate will distribute to
creditors, and delay Mr. Thacker’s fresh start. 	Core policies of bankruptcy law include obtaining
a maximum equitable distribution for creditors and ensuring a “fresh start” for individual debtors.
See BFP v. Resol. Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 563 (1994). 	Neither law nor core bankruptcy policies
favor Arete Wealth’s position. 	Granting Arete Wealth’s request for equitable relief would
effectively punish the parties who worked together to confirm a reorganization plan, as well as any
creditors receiving distributions under the plan.
IV.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is made applicable to adversary
proceedings by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056. 	Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 	Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). 	There are no genuine issues at to any material fact. 	The Notice of Chapter 11
Bankruptcy Case issued by the clerk of court on the day Mr. Thacker filed his petition informed
all creditors that the deadline for filing a complaint to except a debt from discharge under 11 U.S.C.
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§ 523(a)(2), (4), or (6) was June 9, 2025. 	Arete Wealth let the deadline pass. 	The only
explanation offered by Arete Wealth for not filing its complaint by the deadline was because “it
was … unclear if Thacker had sufficient assets to justify further litigation, especially in light of
the significant costs of starting a separate adversarial proceeding in Tennessee.” 	Nine other
creditors obtained Mr. Thacker’s consent for an extension of the deadline. 	The agreement
between those creditors and Mr. Thacker is embodied in an agreed order. 	The only issue is the
legal one of whether the agreed order extended the deadline for all creditors, or just the creditors
that were parties to the agreed order. 	The deadline was extended for those nine creditors
specifically named in the agreed order. 	No equitable basis exists for permitting Arete Wealth to
proceed with its untimely filed complaint. 	Any liability of Mr. Thacker on Arete Wealth’s alleged
claim was discharged by Mr. Thacker’s plan confirmed under 11 U.S.C. § 1191(a). 	An order will
be entered contemporaneously with the filing of this opinion granting summary judgment to Mr.
Thacker and dismissing Arete Wealth’s complaint.
# # #
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