USA v. Watkins

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	)
) 	Case No: 1:24-CR-81
v. 	)
) 	Judge Curtis L. Collier
ANTONIO DEWAYNE WATKINS 	)
M E M O R A N D U M
Before the Court is a motion for a new trial by Defendant, Antonio Dewayne Watkins,
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.1 (Doc. 152.) The United States (the “Government”)
has responded. (Doc. 161.)
I. 	BACKGROUND
Defendant was tried before a jury on a seven-count superseding indictment.2 (Docs. 26,
80.) 	As relevant here, Count Three charged Defendant with possessing a firearm in furtherance
of a drug-trafficking crime (Doc. 26 at 1–2), Count Four charged him with possessing a firearm as
a felon (id. at 1–2), and Counts Five and Six charged him with distributing fifty grams or more of
methamphetamine on July 17 and July 31, 2024, respectively (id. at 2–3). The jury was seated on
the morning of August 11, 2025, and opening statements began on the afternoon of August 12,
2025. (Docs. 80, 81.)
In support of the firearm charges in Counts Three and Four, the Government introduced
dash-camera and body-camera footage and the testimony two law-enforcement officers regarding
1 Defendant has represented himself in this case since April 8, 2025, with appointed
standby counsel available. (Docs. 36, 37.)
2 Certain counts contained enhancement allegations under 21 U.S.C. § 851. 	These
allegations were bifurcated from the first phase of Defendant’s trial.
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the day in question. The evidence at trial indicated, among other things, that Defendant arrived in
a mall parking lot in a vehicle with three other men; that after all four men left the vehicle, there
was no firearm visible in the front passenger floorboard of the car; that Defendant returned to the
vehicle alone and got into the front passenger seat of the vehicle; and that after Defendant left the
vehicle for a second time in the presence of the testifying officers, a firearm was visible in the front
passenger floorboard.
In support of the methamphetamine charges in Counts Five and Six, the Government
introduced testimony by Drug Enforcement Administration Task Force Officer Justin Headden.
Officer Headden testified to his investigation of Defendant, including by using a confidential
informant to perform two controlled buys from Defendant. 	Defendant cross-examined Officer
Headden on, among other things, the criminal history of the confidential informant. Neither the
Government nor Defendant called the confidential informant to testify.
The jury found Defendant guilty on all counts on August 15, 2025.3 (Doc. 93.) On June
24, 2026, the Court sentenced Defendant to 432 months of imprisonment and ten years of
supervised release. (Docs. 157, 158.) The Court issued the judgment on June 26, 2026. (Doc.
158.) Defendant filed a notice of appeal on July 3, 2026. (Doc. 161.)
On June 24, 2026, shortly before his sentencing hearing began, Defendant filed a motion
for a new trial under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.4 (Doc. 152.) Among
3 The Court did not discharge the jury until September 15, 2025, after Defendant admitted
the facts underlying the then-remaining enhancement allegations. (Doc. 110.)
4 Defendant previously included a request for a new trial under Rule 33 in a brief on an
evidentiary issue during trial. (Doc. 103.) The Court denied the motion and denied Defendant’s
subsequent motion to reconsider. (Docs. 121, 154.) A successive motion for a new trial may be
precluded if it is based on the same allegedly “new” evidence as an earlier motion. United States
v. Lanier, 238 F.3d 425, *3–4 (6th Cir. 2000) (Table). 	This rule does not apply here because
Defendant’s previous Rule 33 motion did not assert that he had discovered new evidence.
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other grounds, the motion asserts that Defendant has discovered new evidence regarding the
confidential informant about whom Officer Headden testified as to Counts Five and Six, and that
one of the three men who were in the vehicle with Defendant on the date relevant to Counts Three
and Four is newly available to testify that he owned the gun Defendant was convicted of
possessing. (Id. at 3–5.)
The Government responded to the motion for a new trial on July 8, 2026. (Doc. 161.) The
response argues that all of Defendant’s grounds for a new trial are untimely except those based on
the allegedly newly discovered evidence and witness. (Id. at 1 n.1.) As to the merits of the timely
parts of the motion, the Government argues that neither the evidence nor the witness on which
Defendant relies qualify as “new” under Rule 33. (Id. at 2–4.)
Defendant did not file a reply, and the motion is ripe.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court may vacate a judgment and grant a defendant a new trial on the defendant’s motion
“if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). The decision to order a new trial is
committed to a court’s sound discretion. 	United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989, 1002 (6th Cir.
1999); United States v. Davis, 15 F.3d 526, 531 (6th Cir. 1994). In deciding whether a new trial
is warranted, a court should primarily concern itself with whether the prior proceedings were fair
for the accused. Talley, 164 F.3d at 1002. Motions for new trials are not favored and should only
be granted with great caution and in extraordinary circumstances. United States v. Garner, 529
F.2d 962, 969 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hoffa, 382 F.2d 856, 862 (6th Cir. 1967). 	A
defendant bears the burden of proving a new trial should be granted. United States v. Seago, 930
F.2d 482, 488 (6th Cir. 1991).
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III. 	DISCUSSION
As a threshold matter, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure place limits on when a
motion for a new trial may be filed. “Any motion for a new trial grounded on newly discovered
evidence must be filed within 3 years after the verdict or finding of guilty.” 	Fed. R. Crim. P.
33(b)(1). 	In addition, “[a]ny motion for a new trial grounded on any reason other than newly
discovered evidence must be filed within 14 days after the verdict or finding of guilty.” 	Id.
33(b)(2). 	These deadlines are mandatory claim-processing rules a Court must enforce if the
Government raises them. Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005).
Defendant filed his motion on June 24, 2026, over ten months after the jury’s August 15,
2025, verdict. (Docs. 93, 152.) His claims as to newly discovered evidence are timely because
they were filed within three years of the verdict. 	See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(1). 	However, the
motion was filed almost ten months after the fourteen-day deadline for other types of grounds. See
id. 33(b)(2). The motion is therefore not timely as to any grounds other than newly discovered
evidence. The United States has raised the defense of untimeliness, and the Court must apply this
mandatory claim-processing rule. Therefore, the Court will only consider Defendant’s arguments
as to newly discovered evidence.5
To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, “the defendant must show that
the evidence (1) was discovered only after trial, (2) could not have been discovered earlier with
5 The Rules also limit a trial court’s ability to grant a motion for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence if an appeal is pending. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(1). That limitation would
not apply here even if the Court were to find the motion to have merit. 	Defendant’s notice of
appeal will not become effective until after the Court disposes of the pending motion for new trial.
See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(3)(B) (“A notice of appeal filed after the court announces a . . . sentence
. . . but before it disposes of [a timely Rule 33 motion] becomes effective upon the later of . . . (i)
the entry of the order disposing of the last such remaining motion; or (ii) the entry of the judgment
of conviction.”).
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due diligence, (3) is material and not merely cumulative or impeaching, and (4) would likely
produce an acquittal if the case were retried.” United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 966 (6th Cir.
1982) (citing United States v. Hedman, 655 F.2d 813, 814 (7th Cir. 1981)). “Motions for a new
trial based upon newly discovered evidence are disfavored and should be granted with caution.”
United States v. Turns, 198 F.3d 584, 586 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Seago, 930 F.2d
482, 488 (6th Cir. 1991)).
A. 	Information About the Confidential Informant
Defendant represents that he discovered after trial “that the Government’s confidential
informant . . . had undisclosed criminal exposure, including criminal impersonation and drug
related conduct prior to and during cooperation with law enforcement.” (Doc. 152 at 3.) He asserts
that neither this information nor a “written agreement” with the confidential informant “was . . .
disclosed to the defense before or during trial.” (Id.)
The Government responds that it disclosed this information “on August 12, 2025, prior to
the start of the defendant’s trial . . . via email to defendant’s elbow counsel, and via hand-delivery
to the defendant in open court.” (Doc. 161 at 2.) In support, the Government attaches as an exhibit
a copy of an email to Defendant’s elbow counsel dated August 12, 2026, at 9:28 a.m., which states
as follows:
Brian,
The Government will make a trial disclosure to Mr. Watkins today—Jencks
Statements, Confidential Informant info, etc. 	I’ve attached a PDF copy of the
disclosure to memorialize its content. We will provide a hard copy in court.
-ktb
(Doc. 161-1 at 1.) 	The Government also attaches the disclosure’s exhibits, which include a
courtesy summary of the confidential informant’s publicly available criminal history (id. at 24), a
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statement that counsel for the Government would bring a printout of the entire history for
Defendant to use at trial as a further courtesy (id. at 23), a voucher for a $1,000 payment to the
confidential informant signed by the confidential informant6 (id. at 25), and a description of the
benefits Officer Headden obtained for the confidential informant in exchange for that individual’s
cooperation (id. at 23). The summary of the confidential informant’s criminal history lists both
criminal impersonation and solicitation convictions and a drug conviction. (Id. at 24.)
Defendant has not carried his burden to show that he discovered the information in question
only after the trial was over and that he could not with due diligence have discovered it sooner.
The Government disclosed the information on the morning of August 12, 2026, before the
afternoon’s start of opening statements and introduction of evidence. (Doc. 161-1 at 1, 23–27.)
Moreover, as to the confidential source’s criminal history, “[p]ublicly available information that
could have been discovered before or during trial with due diligence cannot provide the basis for
a Rule 33 motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.” United States v. Whyte,
No. 3:19-cr-64, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40465, at *7–8 (D. Conn. Mar. 10, 2023) (citing United
States v. Soblen, 301 F.2d 236, 241–42 (2d Cir. 1962)). Finally, Defendant’s cross-examination
of Officer Headden on the confidential source’s criminal impersonation and other convictions
undermines Defendant’s assertion that he did not learn this information until after the trial was
over. 	Defendant’s motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence about the
confidential informant does not have merit.
6 The Court concludes that this signed voucher is the “written agreement” to which
Defendant refers. (See Doc. 152 at 3.)
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B. 	Availability of Witness
Defendant also asserts that “[a]fter trial, the defense was able to locate a material witness
who was seated in the vehicle near the location where the firearm was recovered in Counts 1
through 4,” but “was unable to secure or locate the witness before trial due to the witness’s
incarceration and unavailability to locate.” (Doc. 152 at 4.) Defendant identifies this witness as
Lavontate Wasson and declares under oath that Defendant’s private investigator spoke with Mr.
Wasson in November of 2024, after which Defendant lost contact with Mr. Wasson. (Id. at 4–5.)
Defendant declares that he “learned a few days ago [Mr. Wasson] lost his phone and went to jail
in 2025.” (Id. at 5.)
As the Government points out, the existence of Mr. Wasson or his potential knowledge of
facts regarding Counts One through Four is not “newly discovered evidence” for Defendant.
Presumably, Defendant knew who was in his car with him on the date in question. Undoubtably,
Defendant’s investigator’s November 2024 interview of Mr. Wasson predated Defendant’s August
2025 trial. Nor does Defendant’s assertion that he could not locate Mr. Wasson to testify at his
trial but now may be able to do so meet the requirements of newly discovered evidence under Rule
33. 	See United States v. Glover, 21 F.3d 133, 138 (6th Cir. 1994) (denying new trial because
“[w]hile [the] testimony may have been newly available, it was not in fact ‘newly discovered
evidence’ within the meaning of Rule 33”) (internal citation omitted)). Defendant’s motion for a
new trial based on a newly discovered or newly available witness does not have merit.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Defendant has not shown that a new trial is warranted under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 33. Therefore, the Court will DENY Defendant’s motion (Doc. 152).
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AN APPROPRIATE ORDER WILL ENTER.
/s/
CURTIS L. COLLIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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