Rivers v. Williams

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA
LAKENDRA MARIE RIVERS, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 1:25-cv-288-TRM-MJD
)
LASHONDA WILLIAMS, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This case is filed pro se and without prepayment of fees by Plaintiff Lakendra Marie Rivers
(“Plaintiff”). Currently before the Court are Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP”) [Doc. 1], and Plaintiff’s complaint, which is subject to screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2). As set forth below, Plaintiff has failed to state a proper claim over which this Court
has jurisdiction. The Court will recommend this case be dismissed with prejudice and Plaintiff’s
IFP application be denied as moot with no filing fee assessed.
I. 	STANDARDS
A plaintiff may commence a civil action in federal court without prepaying the
administrative costs of the suit if the plaintiff demonstrates they are financially unable to do so. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a). However, a district court is required to dismiss the civil action, or portion
thereof, if the court determines the complaint is frivolous or fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, or if the IFP plaintiff seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii); see Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324
(1989).
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The standard required by § 1915(e)(2) to properly state a claim for which relief can be
granted is the same standard required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Brand v.
Motley, 526 F.3d 921, 924 (6th Cir. 2008); accord Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir.
2007). To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The
complaint need not state “detailed factual allegations.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007) (citations omitted). But it must contain more than mere “labels and conclusions, . . . a
formulaic recitation of the elements,” or “naked assertions . . . without further factual
enhancement.” Id. at 555, 557 (citations omitted). In other words, the complaint must contain
sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “The plausibility
standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). Stated differently, “the court must be able to draw a ‘reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” KSR Int’l Co. v. Delphi Auto. Sys., 523 F. App’x
357, 358–59 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
In applying these standards, the Court also considers that the pleadings of pro se litigants
are to be liberally construed and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
106 (1976)). Nevertheless, pro se plaintiffs must abide by “basic pleading standards,” and the role
of the court is not to “conjure allegations on a litigant’s behalf.” Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710,
714 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[P]ro se litigants are not
relieved of the duty to develop claims with an appropriate degree of specificity.” Kafele v. Lerner,
Sampson, Rothfuss, L.P.A, 161 F. App’x 487, 491 (6th Cir. 2005).
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Finally, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. When presented with a case,
federal courts “presume” they lack jurisdiction until the party asserting jurisdiction demonstrates
otherwise. Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 316 (1991) (citing Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch.
Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 (1986)). If at any time the Court determines it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, the Court “must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
II. 	ANALYSIS
This is the second lawsuit Plaintiff has filed in less than one month regarding her
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). See Lakendra Marie Rivers v. The Company Lab, 1:25-
cv-273-TRM-MJD (E.D. Tenn., filed Aug. 19, 2025) (“Rivers I”). In that case, Plaintiff appeared
to allege that an individual had used her social security number illegally to apply for a job and
work at the Company Lab. As a result, it at least appeared to the Social Security Administration
(“SSA”) that Plaintiff was receiving income in excess of the maximum amount allowed for SSI
eligibility. Plaintiff received notices from the SSA indicating her SSI benefits would be reduced
or eliminated because she was ineligible and, further, that she owed a substantial amount in
overpayments due to her unreported income. As in the instant case, Plaintiff sought leave to
proceed IFP in Rivers I, and so the undersigned screened the complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2),
ultimately recommending that the case be dismissed in its entirety because Plaintiff failed to state
a claim [Rivers I, Doc. 8]. Plaintiff did not object to the report and recommendation. On September
19, 2025, the presiding District Judge adopted the recommendation and dismissed Plaintiff’s case
with prejudice [Rivers I, Doc. 9].
On September 8, 2025, while the report and recommendation was pending, Plaintiff filed
the instant case, again complaining about the reduction or termination of her SSI payments This
time, the only defendant she identifies is a woman named Lashonda Williams (“Defendant”), who
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Plaintiffs claims works or worked at Child Protective Services (“CPS”) and, at some point had
control over a sum of Plaintiff’s money [Doc. 2 at Page ID # 11]. Plaintiff writes1:
Lashonda Williams is the one who owes this money back. Lakendra Rivers was 15
years old. She doesn’t know how to read so Lashonda Williams used my SSNumber
and put a business in my name and bought a brand new car.
How do I owe this money. I was a child, 15 years old, and I am 32 now and them
people have been using my SSN. How do I get help? . . . .
I don’t owe any money. Them people owe because they know I don’t know and
play with my mind. . . . . I asking if you can stop them using my SSN.
I want my money back.
[Doc. 2 at Page ID # 11–13]. She attaches to her complaint nearly 60 pages of records from the
SSA, which span a number of years and show various times when Plaintiff’s SSI payments have
been reduced or terminated, as well as records from the Hamilton County Juvenile Court, and First
Tennessee Bank2 [Doc. 2-1].
Just as in Rivers I, the vague, disjointed sentence fragments in the instant case do not
amount to a claim over which this Court has jurisdiction. To the extent Plaintiff is asking the Court
to review the termination of her SSI, the Court observes that “its jurisdiction is limited to reviewing
final decisions of the Commissioner.” See Wood v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20-CV-323-TAV-CHS, 2023
WL 2664738, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 28, 2023) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)); see also Gray v.
Berryhill, No. 17-12433, 2017 WL 4778712, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 23, 2017) (discussing
1 In quoting Plaintiff’s filings, the Court has made some minor, non-substantive corrections and
alterations without the use of brackets.
2 The record reflects that Plaintiff received payment for a Criminal Injuries Compensation Claim
when she was a juvenile, which was held in trust for her at First Tennessee Bank [Doc. 2-1 at Page
ID # 50–51].
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requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted before an SSI recipient can challenge
reduction in benefits). As the Court explained in Gray:
To exhaust all available administrative remedies as required by § 405(h) (and its
implementing regulations), an SSI recipient must (1) receive an initial
determination from the agency, (2) petition for reconsideration, (3) request a
hearing before an administrative law judge, and (4) request review by the Appeals
Council. 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(a)(1)–(4). After completion of all four steps, “[the
agency] will have made [its] final decision.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(b). And only then
may an individual “request judicial review by filing an action in a Federal district
court.” Id.
Gray, 2017 WL 4778712, at *3. Plaintiff clearly has not completed the four required steps in this
case, nor has she stated any plausible facts to show that the Commissioner’s most recent decision
to reduce or terminate her SSI benefits was in error. To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to assert
a claim against Defendant for conversion or some other theft-related tort, she includes no
supporting facts whatsoever. Moreover, it appears the instant case may well be barred by
application of the doctrine of res judicata as a result of the dismissal in Rivers I.
As a result of these fatal defects in Plaintiff’s case, the Court finds justice would not be
served by granting Plaintiff an opportunity to amend her complaint at this stage. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 15. Furthermore, because the Court will recommend that Plaintiff’s case be dismissed in its
entirety, it is unnecessary to discuss the significant deficiencies in Plaintiff’s IFP application in
any detail or to require Plaintiff to submit a corrected IFP application. Rather, Plaintiff’s case
should be dismissed with no filing fee assessed, and her IFP application should be terminated as
moot.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court respectfully RECOMMENDS3 Plaintiff’s
claim(s) be dismissed and this case CLOSED. The Court further RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s IFP
application [Doc. 1] be DENIED AS MOOT with no filing fee assessed.
Plaintiff is hereby NOTIFIED that the Court will not consider any requests to amend her
complaint until after the presiding District Court Judge rules on the recommendations made herein.
Any such requests for relief are subject to being summarily denied.
Plaintiff is further FOREWARNED that if she continues to file cases that fail to pass §
1915 screening, she may be enjoined and required to seek the Court’s permission before filing any
future pleadings or lawsuits. See, e.g., Smith v. Akron City Council, Nos. 98-3389, 98-3465, 1999
WL 183409, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 16, 1999) (“A district court has the authority to issue an injunctive
order to prevent prolific litigants from filing pleadings without first obtaining court approval to do
so.” (citing Feathers v. Chevron USA, Inc., 141 F.3d 264, 269 (6th Cir. 1998))).
ENTER:
/s/
MIKE DUMITRU
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
3 Any objections to this report and recommendation must be served and filed within 14 days after
service of a copy of this recommended disposition on the objecting party. Such objections must
conform to the requirements of Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Failure to file
objections within the time specified waives the right to appeal the district court’s order. Thomas v.
Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 n.7 (1985). The district court need not provide de novo review where
objections to this report and recommendation are frivolous, conclusive, and general. Mira v.
Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986). Only specific objections are reserved for appellate
review. Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987).
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