USA v. Hollyfield, et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	3:24-CR-53-KAC-JEM-1
)
JASON LEE HOLLYFIELD, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
OVERRULING DEFENDANT’S OBJECTIONS
This case is before the Court on (1) United States Magistrate Judge Jill E. McCook’s
“Report and Recommendation” (“Report”) [Doc. 86] regarding Defendant Jason Lee Hollyfield’s
“Motion to Suppress” [Doc. 57] and (2) Defendant’s “Objections” to the Report [Doc. 108]. For
the reasons below, the Court overrules Defendant’s Objections, accepts and adopts the relevant
portions of the Report, and denies Defendant’s Motion to Suppress.
I. 	Background
Sometime during the day on October 14, 2023, law enforcement conducted a controlled
purchase of “one ounce” of “methamphetamine” at a “camper” where “Ashley Jones”
lived [Doc. 86 at 3-4]. The camper was located “directly behind [a] house” on “Inman Bend Road”
in Knoxville, Tennessee and could be “accessed from” the “driveway” of the house [Id.]. That
evening and into the early hours of October 15, Deputy Malone was “surveill[ing]” the area in an
“unmarked police car” from an adjacent street “approximately one hundred yards from” the
camper [Id.].
“[A]round midnight,” Deputy Malone saw a “truck enter the driveway of the house and
pull behind the house to the vicinity of” the camper [Id. at 4]. The truck’s “headlights were not
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illuminated” [Id.] Deputy Malone “could not see who was driving” the truck or “whether the
driver got out” [Id.]. The truck left “after three to five minutes” [Id.]. In Deputy Malone’s training
and experience, this was indicative of drug trafficking [See id.; see also Doc. 70 (Rough Transcript
of Audio-Recorded Suppression Hearing) at 10:19-11:10].
Deputy Malone began following the truck [See Doc. 83 at 4]. At some point, he “caught
up” to it and was close enough to read the license tag and “run [it] through dispatch” [Doc. 70 at
12:14-21]. “From the very first time” Deputy Malone was close enough to the truck for the driver
to see that he was driving an unmarked police car, the truck “did not miss a single turn” [See id. at
14:24-15:2]. “As soon as” Deputy Malone “got up behind” the truck, it “immediately” turned right
onto “Cameron Road” [Id. at 12:18-25, 15:1-3]. Then, while Deputy Malone was “still behind”
the truck, it traveled “probably a quarter of a mile down the road,” and Deputy Malone followed
“directly behind” it by twenty (20) to thirty (30) feet [Id. at 13:1-5, 48:7-18; Doc. 86 at 15; Doc. 70
at 48:7-18]. Deputy Malone then watched the truck “turn[] left onto Murrell Road,” [see id. at
13:7-10], a “divided road with double yellow lines,” [Doc. 86 at 4]. The truck “cut the corner very,
very shallow and was probably five or six feet into the oncoming lane” [Id. at 4-5]. The truck
“traveled fifty to one hundred feet while in the other lane” [Id. at 4-5]. That “constituted” at least
two traffic violations under Tennessee law: (1) “driving left of center” and (2) “failure to exercise
due care” [Id.].
Within “ten seconds” after turning onto Murrell Road, the truck made “another left” and
then “another” “immediately” onto “Dandelion Circle” before quickly “turn[ing] into [the]
driveway” of “the first house on the left” [Doc. 70 at 14:13-18, 16:19-22; see also Doc. 86 at 5].
In Deputy Malone’s experience, that kind of driving is consistent with someone attempting to
evade the police [Doc. 70 at 15:9-12]. Around that time, the “dispatcher reported” that the truck
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“belonged to” Defendant Jason Hollyfield [See Doc. 86 at 5]. Deputy Malone recognized
Defendant’s name and recalled that other individuals who had been stopped or arrested by law
enforcement had “previously identified” Defendant as their drug supplier [Id.].
Deputy Malone performed a traffic stop on the truck in the “driveway” of the home [Id.].
Deputy Malone’s body camera started recording [See Doc. 70-1]. When Deputy Malone
approached the truck, Defendant was in the driver’s seat and appeared calm [Doc. 86 at 16].
Jewelia Thompson was in the passenger seat [Id. at 5]. Deputy Malone told Defendant that “when
you [he] turned . . . on Murrell . . . [he was] way over in the oncoming lane” [Doc. 70-1 at 4:21:50-
4:22:04]. Defendant did not respond [Id. at 4:22:00-05]. Deputy Malone asked Defendant if he
“lived” at this house and Defendant replied no, it belonged to a friend [Id. at 4:22:06-11]. Deputy
Malone then asked for Defendant’s “driver’s license, insurance, and other paperwork” [Doc. 86
at 6]. Defendant provided his driver’s license and “used his cell phone to look for his insurance
information” [Id. at 7]. Defendant then showed Deputy Malone insurance information that “was
for a different vehicle,” not the truck [Id.].
Deputy Malone asked Defendant if he had ever been “in trouble” [Id. at 8]. Defendant
stated that he had been in trouble for “drugs” in “Hamblen County” “two years ago” and was
currently “on probation” [Id., Doc. 70-1 at 4:24:26-4:25:59]. Around that time, Deputy Malone
“was looking up Defendant’s driver’s license number on his cell phone” to check if “his license
was a fake” or had been “revoked” [Doc. 86 at 8]. Thompson then identified herself by name
[Doc. 70-1 at 4:25:05-15]. Deputy Malone recalled that Thompson was a passenger during another
traffic stop where law enforcement found her with drugs [Doc. 86 at 5]. Defendant then stated
that he “didn’t realize I [he] swung a little left,” to which Deputy Malone responded, “yeah . . . it
was way over” [Doc. 70-1 at 4:25:38-45].
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Around five (5) minutes into the stop, Deputy Malone asked Defendant for consent to
search the truck [Doc. 86 at 9]. Defendant declined, stating that there was no reason to search the
vehicle [Id.]. At that point, Deputy Malone observed Defendant’s “demeanor change[] from
cooperative to uncooperative” [See id.]. Defendant began to use “curse words” and complain
about prior experiences with law enforcement [See id. at 9-10]. Deputy Malone testified that in
his experience, this shift in behavior was “consistent” with someone who has contraband in his
vehicle [See Doc. 70 at 25:23-26:25]. Deputy Malone “radioed” K-9 Officer Barker [Doc. 86 at 9].
At around seven (7) minutes into the stop, Deputy Malone relayed Defendant’s information
to the dispatcher to run through NCIC [See Doc. 86 at 20; see also Doc. 70-1 at 4:29-03-30].
Deputy Malone then obtained information from Thompson. Upon providing Thompson’s name to
dispatch, Deputy Malone learned that she “could have” outstanding warrants in “Cocke or
Jefferson Counties” in Tennessee [Doc. 86 at 11; see also Doc. 70-1 at 4:29:42-4:31:36].
Thompson stated that she “got in trouble” six (6) years ago with Defendant in “Hamblen County”
and confirmed that she was “caught” a “couple of years ago” with “weed” [Doc. 70-1 at 4:32:08-
4:32:59]. A bit later, Deputy Malone asked Defendant where he and Thompson were “coming
from;” Defendant did not respond [Id. at 4:33:45-52]. Deputy Malone then asked Defendant if
they were “coming from Dove Street;” Defendant responded “no” [Id. at 4:33:50-4:34:05].
About twelve (12) minutes into the stop, the dispatcher confirmed that Thompson and
Defendant were both “clear” in NCIC [Doc. 86 at 12]. At this time, Deputy Malone was still
waiting to “write a citation” [Id. at 10]. He had “ran out of tickets earlier that day,” and another
officer was “on her way to bring him a ticket book” [Id.]. He testified that he “could not write a
citation without a ticket book and that he could not write a citation on his computer” [Id. at 10].
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The K-9 Officer arrived roughly ten (10) minutes later, around twenty-two (22) minutes
into the stop [Id. at 20]. The dog alerted on the truck [Id. at 21]. Upon searching the truck, law
enforcement located (1) “a small bag of a ‘white crystal-like substance’” consistent with
methamphetamine, (2) a “small bag containing a ‘green plant substance’ suspected to be
marijuana,” (3) “a gallon-size Ziplock bag containing white residue,” (4) “a digital scale,” and
(5) “multiple empty baggies” [Id. at 14]. Law enforcement searched Defendant and found “three
large bags of a crystal substance . . . believed to be methamphetamine” [Id.].
A federal grand jury indicted Defendant, Co-Defendant Ashley Jones, and others with
conspiring to distribute fifty (50) grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A) [See Doc. 3 at 1]. The Indictment further charged Defendant
with possessing with intent to distribute methamphetamine on or about October 15, 2023, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A) [See id. at 4-6].
Defendant subsequently filed a “Motion to Suppress” [Doc. 57], seeking to suppress “all
evidence obtained from the search of his vehicle and person” on October 15 [Doc. 57 at 1].
In support, he argues that (1) the initial stop was unconstitutional because Deputy Malone had “no
reason to stop” Defendant, [see id. at 3-4], and (2) Deputy Malone “illegally prolonged the stop
while awaiting” the K-9 Officer’s “arrival,” [see id. at 4-5]. The United States opposed, arguing
that (1) the initial stop was supported by probable cause and reasonable suspicion and (2) Deputy
Malone had “reasonable suspicion” that Defendant was “engaged in illegal drug activity” to extend
the stop until the K-9 Officer arrived [Doc. 61 at 4-7].
Judge McCook held a hearing on Defendant’s Motion, [see Doc. 70], and thereafter issued
the Report [Doc. 86]. The Report concluded that Deputy Malone lawfully initiated the traffic stop
because he (1) “had probable cause to stop Defendant after observing him commit traffic
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violations,” [see Doc. 86 at 22-25], and alternatively (2) had “reasonable suspicion of a drug
offense” leading up to the stop, [see id. at 25-27]. The Report further concluded that the stop was
lawful in duration because Deputy Malone had “reasonable suspicion” that “Defendant was
engaged in drug offenses while conducting the activities necessary to a traffic stop” [Id. at 22-31].
Defendant objected to both conclusions [See Docs. 108, 108-1 at 1-2]. First, Defendant
“denies that Deputy Malone offered credible testimony that [Defendant] made an illegal turn onto
Murrell” Road because (1) there is no video footage leading up to the stop and (2) Deputy Malone
offered “contradictory testimony” regarding the turn [Doc. 108-1 at 6-7]. So, Defendant objects
to the Report’s conclusion that Deputy Malone had probable cause that Defendant committed a
traffic violation justifying the stop [Id. at 5-7]. And Defendant objects that Deputy Malone did not
have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity either [Id. at 1-2]. Second, Defendant objects to the
Report’s conclusion that the approximately twenty-two (22) minute stop was lawful in duration,
arguing that “a run-of-the-mill driving infraction . . . would take no more than a few minutes” to
investigate and Defendant was compliant [See id. at 1-2, 8-10].
The United States responded to Defendant’s objections and raised no objections of its
own [Doc. 113]. In response, the United States argued that (1) corroborating evidence supports a
finding of probable cause for the initial stop, and alternatively, Deputy Malone had reasonable
suspicion of “criminal activity” to justify the initial stop; and (2) reasonable suspicion justified
continuing the stop until the K-9 Officer arrived [Doc. 113 at 2-4].
II. 	Analysis
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), “[a] judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole
or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). If a timely objection is made under Section 636(b)(1)(C) and that objection is not
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“frivolous, conclusive[,] or general,” Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986), “the
court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed
findings or recommendations to which [the] objection is made,” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R.
Crim P. 59(b)(3) (“district judge must consider de novo any objection to the magistrate judge’s
recommendation”). However, the Court need not engage in de novo review of undisputed portions
of the Report. See Mira, 806 F.2d at 637; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
“When reviewing a magistrate judge’s credibility determinations on a motion to suppress,
the district court may accept or reject the magistrate judge’s determinations, while recognizing a
magistrate judge is in the better position to assess the credibility of witnesses [s]he sees and hears.”
United States v. Johnson, No. 10-20176, 2011 WL 3844194, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 30, 2011); see
also Moss v. Hofbauer, 286 F.3d 851, 868 (6th Cir. 2002). A magistrate judge’s assessment of
witness testimony is entitled to deference unless it appears the findings are clearly erroneous or
irreconcilably inconsistent with the established record. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S.
667, 684 (1980); United States v. Irorere, 69 F. App’x 231, 236 (6th Cir. 2003); see also United
States v. Navarro-Camacho, 186 F.3d 701, 705 (6th Cir. 1999).
The Court addresses Defendant’s objections temporally, beginning with the initial stop.
No objection is availing.
A. The Initial Stop Was Supported By Probable Cause Of A Traffic Violation.
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens “against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
U.S. Const. amend IV. “A vehicle stop constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.” United States v. Calvetti, 836 F.3d 654, 665 (6th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation
omitted). A vehicle stop generally comports with the Fourth Amendment when it is supported by
“probable cause that an occupant of the [vehicle] has committed a traffic offense,” even if the
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officer stopped the vehicle “for a different reason.” United States v. Brooks, 987 F.3d 593, 599
(6th Cir. 2021) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811-16 (1996)). “Probable cause ‘is
not a high bar.’” D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018) (quoting Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S.
320, 338 (2014)). As relevant here, it requires “only a fair probability” of a traffic violation under
the “totality of the circumstances,” as viewed through the “common-sense lens of ordinary
people.” United States v. Sheckles, 996 F.3d 330, 337 (6th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).
Here, Deputy Malone had probable cause to believe Defendant committed a traffic offense,
thus justifying the initial stop of the truck. See Brooks, 987 F.3d at 599. Tennessee law requires
drivers to drive on the right half of the roadway, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8-115(a), and to drive
“as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane,” see Tenn. Code Ann. § 55- 8- 136. At the
suppression hearing, Deputy Malone testified that he observed Defendant make a “shallow” left
turn onto Murrell Road, crossing the double yellow lines and driving “five or six feet” into the
oncoming lane for “fifty to one hundred feet” [See Doc. 86 at 4-5; see also Doc. 70 at 13:7-10]. If
true, this constitutes at least one traffic violation, and the Report properly concluded that Deputy
Malone had probable cause to initiate the traffic stop.
Defendant argues that Deputy Malone’s testimony was not credible [See Doc. 108-1 at 6].
First, Defendant argues that Deputy Malone offered “contradictory testimony”— “first indicating
that he was about a one-quarter of a mile away from” Defendant when Defendant turned onto
Murrell Road and “later” testifying that “he was just a few feet” behind Defendant at the time
[Doc. 108-1 at 6]. And Defendant argues that Deputy Malone “would not have been in a position
to see” Defendant turn onto Murrell Road from “one-quarter of a mile away” [Id. at 6-7]. But this
mischaracterizes the testimony. Deputy Malone testified that Defendant first turned onto
“Cameron Road” and then Deputy Malone followed “behind” Defendant “probably a quarter of
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a mile down the road,” before Defendant turned onto Murrell [Doc. 70 at 12:23-13:6]. This is not
at odds with Deputy Malone’s later testimony that he was “directly behind” and twenty (20) or
thirty (30) feet from the truck when it turned onto Murrell—a distance from which Deputy Malone
could credibly observe the turn [See id. at 48:7-18].
Second, Defendant argues that the absence of “video” evidence of Deputy Malone’s
“efforts” leading to the stop shows that Deputy Malone lacks credibility [See Doc. 101-1 at 6].
But video evidence is not required to credit Deputy Malone’s testimony. In fact, the Report’s
credibility assessment is entitled to deference under the law because it is not clearly erroneous or
inconsistent with the broader record. See Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 684; see also Navarro-Camacho,
186 F.3d at 705. The record confirms the propriety of crediting Deputy Malone’s testimony.
Shortly before Defendant turned onto Murrell Road, Deputy Malone had “caught up” to the truck
and was close enough to read the license plate number and relay it to dispatch [Doc. 70 at 12:14-
21]. He was also close enough to see the truck make two immediate left turns only “ten seconds”
after turning on Murell Road [Doc. 86 at 4-5]. Additionally, Defendant did not deny that he made
an illegal turn; he simply insists on putting the United State through its constitutional pace, as is
his right [See Doc. 70-1 at 4:22:00-05; see e.g., Doc. 108-1 at 5 (“Indeed, Mr. Hollyfield was
charged with failing to exercise due care”)]. Accordingly, the Report properly assessed Deputy
Malone credible on these key points establishing probable cause for the initial stop.
B. Deputy Malone Had Reasonable Suspicion Of Criminal Activity Sufficient To
Lawfully Continue The Stop Until The K-9 Officer Arrived.
Next, Defendant challenges the Report’s conclusion that the duration of the stop was
constitutional [See Doc. 108-1 at 7-10]. The permissible duration of a seizure or stop is generally
“determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’”—here, “‘to address the traffic violation that warranted the
stop and attend to related safety concerns.’” See United States v. Peake-Wright, 126 F.4th 432,
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436-37 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015)). An officer
may make “ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop” without unconstitutionally prolonging
the stop. See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 135 (cleaned up). That includes “checking the driver’s
license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the
[vehicle’s] registration and proof of insurance.” See id. An officer’s “[a]uthority” for a stop
generally “ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—
completed.” Peake-Wright, 126 F.4th at 437 (quotation and citation omitted).
But an officer may continue a traffic stop “beyond what was reasonably necessary to
investigate the original cause for the stop” where he has “independent reasonable suspicion” of
criminal activity. See id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 68 F.4th 304, 309 (6th Cir. 2023)).
Reasonable suspicion requires more than a “mere hunch,” but it “need not rise to the level required
for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence
standard.” United States v. Calvetti, 836 F.3d 654, 666 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v.
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). The key query is whether law enforcement had “a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting” the “person stopped” of criminal activity. Peake-
Wright, 126 F.4th at 437 (cleaned up).
Courts look to the “totality of the circumstances” to determine whether reasonable
suspicion existed. United States v. Townsend, 305 F. 3d 537, 542 (6th Cir. 2002). The totality of
the circumstances includes “the officer’s own observations” at the time and “information” he
received from “dispatch[] and fellow officers.” See United States v. McCallister, 39 F.4th 368,
374 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). The Court also considers “commonsense judgments” and
“inferences the officer may draw based on his experience and specialized training.” Id. (cleaned
up). The Court looks at the “entire picture” through an “objective lens, asking whether there was
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a moderate chance, arising from articulable facts and inferences, that the person stopped was
engaged in criminal activity.” Id. at 374-75.
Here, roughly twenty-two (22) minutes elapsed from the time Deputy Malone stopped
Defendant to the time the K-9 Officer arrived [See Doc. 86 at 20]. After stopping Defendant,
Deputy Malone performed permissible checks incident to the stop, including checking Defendant’s
license and checking NCIC for outstanding warrants on Defendant and Thompson based on the
information they provided. See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 135. Roughly twelve (12) minutes into the
stop, Defendant and Thompson were “clear[ed]” through an NCIC check[Doc. 86 at 11-12]. Even
assuming, that Deputy Malone should have reasonably completed the “mission” of the traffic stop
by this time,1 see Peake-Wright, 126 F.4th at 436-37, Deputy Malone had reasonable suspicion to
extend the stop roughly ten (10) minutes until the K9 Officer arrived.
Start at the beginning of the evening. At around midnight, Deputy Malone watched the
truck Defendant was driving approach the vicinity of the “camper” where law enforcement had
conducted a controlled purchase of methamphetamine that day [Doc. 86 at 3-4]. The truck’s
headlights were not illuminated [Id. at 4]. The truck stayed for only “three to five minutes,” which,
in Deputy Malone’s experience, is consistent with drug trafficking [Id. at 4]. Then, upon learning
from dispatch that the truck belonged to “Jason Hollyfield,” Deputy Malone recalled that more
than one person previously identified Defendant as their drug dealer [Id. at 5]. As Deputy Malone
followed Defendant—and got close enough for Defendant to see that he was being followed by a
police officer—Defendant did not miss a turn [Doc. 70 at 14:24-15:2]. He made multiple turns,
1 At this time, Deputy Malone had not written a traffic citation because he was waiting on a “ticket
book” that he needed to write the citation [Doc. 86 at 10, 12].
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some in quick succession, which in Deputy Malone’s experience appeared to be evasive
maneuvers [Id. at 14:13-18, 15:9-12].
Deputy Malone’s observations and conversations with Defendant and Thompson during
the stop heightened his suspicion. Defendant revealed that he was “currently on probation” for a
drug offense two years ago [Doc. 86 at 8-10]. And when Deputy Malone asked to search the truck,
Defendant’s demeanor changed, becoming uncooperative [Doc. 86 at 9-10]. In Deputy Malone’s
experience, this shift in demeanor indicated that contraband was present in the truck [Doc. 70 at
25:25-26:25]. See United States v. Stepp, 680 F.3d 651, 666 (6th Cir. 2012) (“noticeable change”
in the occupant’s behavior when officer asked “relatively basic” questions contributed to
reasonable suspicion). As for Defendant’s passenger, Thompson, Deputy Malone recalled that
during a previous traffic stop, she was found with drugs. Thompson also admitted she was
previously “in trouble” with Defendant and had been “caught” with drugs [Doc. 86 at 11-12].
Those factors in the aggregate present “a particularized and objective basis” for Deputy
Malone’s belief that Defendant was engaged in a drug crime. See Peake-Wright, 126 F.4th at 437;
see also United States v. Keeling, 783 F. App’x 517, 522-23 (6th Cir. 2019) (reasonable suspicion
existed where officers observed defendant (1) drive to two different known “drug house[s],”
(2) “stay [at each] for approximately twenty minutes,” and (3) make an “erratic, abrupt turn” after
noticing “the unmarked patrol car,” and (4) Defendant had a “criminal history”). Defendant’s
overall compliance with Deputy Malone’s orders is not dispositive. Because the “entire picture”
presents at least a “moderate chance” that Defendant was engaged in criminal activity, the Report
properly concluded that Deputy Malone had reasonable suspicion to lawfully extend the stop
roughly ten (10) minutes until the K-9 Officer arrived. See McCallister, 39 F.4th at 374-75; see
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also United States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 345, 353 (6th Cir. 2005) (30-to-45-minute traffic stop was
reasonable to await K-9 officer based on reasonable suspicion).
III. Conclusion
For the above reasons, the Court OVERRULES Defendant’s “Objections” to the Report
and Recommendation [Doc. 108], ADOPTS the relevant portions of the “Report and
Recommendation” [Doc. 86] as set forth herein, and DENIES Defendant’s “Motion to
Suppress” [Doc. 57].
SO ORDERED.
KATHERINE A. CRYTZER
United States District Judge
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