USA v. Glenn

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
v. 	) 	No. 3:24-CR-107-KAC-JEM
)
ANTHONY GLENN, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
All pretrial motions in this case have been referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b) for disposition or recommendation as appropriate. The parties came before the
undersigned on January 20, 2026, for a scheduled pretrial conference and motion hearing on
Defendant’s Show Cause Motion to Consider Untimely Motion to Suppress [Doc. 34] and
Defendant’s Motion to Continue Trial Date [Doc. 38]. Assistant United States Attorney Miriam
Johnson appeared on behalf of the Government. Attorney Scott A. Lanzon represented Defendant
Glenn, who was also present.
The Court heard the parties’ arguments and for the reasons discussed below, permitted the
late suppression motion and continued the February 3, 2026 trial date to July 21, 2026.
Accordingly, Defendant’s motions [Docs. 34 & 38] are GRANTED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Defendant is charged with a single count of being a felon in possession of a firearm on
December 17, 2023, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and the Indictment alleges that
Defendant has at least three prior convictions qualifying under 18 U.S.C. § 934(e)(2), in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) [Doc. 3 p. 1]. Defendant first appeared on December 5, 2024, with
retained Attorney Douglas Nanney [See Doc. 5, Minutes].
Case 3:24-cr-00107-KAC-JEM Document 40 Filed 01/26/26 Page 1 of 9 PageID
#: <pageID>

2
On June 25, 2025, the undersigned denied Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for a Second
Amendment violation and to suppress evidence [Docs. 16 & 18] as untimely because Defendant
failed to show good cause for filing motions more than six months after the expiration of the
January 3, 2025 pretrial motion deadline [Doc. 22 p. 1]. In assessing prejudice, the Court observed
that Defendant’s claims “are not likely to meet with success” given that his prior convictions show
him to be a danger and information provided at the detention hearing shows law enforcement had
either probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant for speeding [Id. at 8–9].
The undersigned substituted retained counsel Attorney Scott Lanzon for Mr. Nanney on
August 6, 2025 [Doc. 29]. On August 28, 2025, Defendant moved to continue the then October
14, 2025 trial date, stating defense counsel recently received complete discovery and that the
parties needed time to discuss a possible resolution of the case [Doc. 30 p. 1]. On September 8,
2025, the undersigned granted the motion to continue and extended the trial date to February 3,
2026, and the plea deadline to January 6, 2026 [Doc. 31 pp. 1–2]. The Court did not reopen the
pretrial motion deadline [See id. at 1–3].
On December 2, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress all evidence gained from a
stop of Defendant’s vehicle on December 17, 2023, alleging officers subjected him to custodial
interrogation without advising him of his Miranda rights, searched his vehicle without his valid
consent, and unlawfully prolonged the stop to conduct a K-9 search [Doc. 32 pp. 1, 3–8]. On
December 5, 2025, the undersigned ordered Defendant to show cause why the Court should not
deny his suppression motion as untimely [Doc. 33].
On December 12, 2025, Defendant filed a Show Cause Motion to Consider Untimely
Motion to Suppress, alleging good cause supports the filing of the late motion [Doc. 34 p. 1]. As
grounds, Defendant asserts that current counsel joined the case after expiration of the pretrial
Case 3:24-cr-00107-KAC-JEM Document 40 Filed 01/26/26 Page 2 of 9 PageID
#: <pageID>

3
motion deadline; that counsel received supplemental discovery on September 29, 2025; that
counsel provided an advance copy of the suppression motion to the prosecutor on October 24,
2025; that counsel for both parties next discussed the matter on November 21, 2025; and that
Defendant filed the suppression motion thereafter on December 2, 2025 [Doc. 34 pp. 1–2].
Defendant contends that current counsel has worked “to quickly and efficient[ly] resolve all
outstanding matters without court intervention” [Id. at 2]. He asserts that the inability to litigate
his 	suppression 	motion would 	cause him 	“insurmountable unfair 	prejudice” because the
determination of the constitutional issues raised therein are “imperative to the outcome of this
action” [Id.]. Defendant alleges that the Court should have extended the pretrial motion deadline
with the September trial continuance because such extension also “serve[d] the ends of justice”
[Id. at 3].
The Government responded in opposition to Defendant’s request, asserting that Defendant
again failed to demonstrate good cause for the untimely suppression motion [Doc. 35 p. 1]. It
asserts that the recent motion to suppress is “similar in nature” to the prior motion to
dismiss/suppress with the exception that it also challenges Defendant’s statements [Id. at 3]. It
asserts that Defendant’s statements were provided in discovery before the original January 3, 2025
motion deadline, and Defendant’s failure to raise that issue by the motion deadline constitutes a
waiver of that issue [Id.]. The Government argues that the change in counsel itself is not a sufficient
basis to permit a waived motion [Id.]. It also contends that Defendant requested a trial continuance
in August to engage in plea negotiations, and the decision to forgo pretrial motions in order to
pursue plea negotiations “is a strategic choice that does not amount to good cause” [Id. at 4].
Finally, the Government maintains that Defendant’s new suppression motion lacks merit and, thus,
he will not be prejudiced by the Court’s disallowing this motion [Id. at 4–5]. It asserts that the
Case 3:24-cr-00107-KAC-JEM Document 40 Filed 01/26/26 Page 3 of 9 PageID
#: <pageID>

4
Court has already deemed the stop of Defendant’s vehicle to be constitutional and that the Court
and the Government are prejudiced by Defendant’s untimely motions [Id. at 5].
In reply, Defendant contends “that his latest suppression motion and the one filed by his
previous attorney are not similar in nature, denies that his suppression claims are not likely to be
successful, and asserts that neither argument is sufficient to refute the good cause shown by the
Defendant” [Doc. 37 p. 1]. He argues that unlike the motion by prior counsel, which only
challenged the traffic stop, the new suppression motion challenges the basis for the stop, statements
given on the scene, the search of the vehicle, and the prolongation of the stop [Id. at 3–4].
Moreover, unlike the prior motion, the new motion is supported by citation to case law and the
Constitution [Id. at 4]. Defendant also denies that the prior suppression motions were unsuccessful
because they were never heard or decided on their merits [Id. at 5]. Defendant points out that
defense counsel did not receive body camera and dash camera recordings of the stop until
September 29, 2025 [Id. at 5–6]. He argues that it was reasonable for defense counsel to file the
new suppression motion a little over two months after receiving complete discovery [Id. at 6].
Finally, Defendant argues that whether a defensive motion is likely to be successful is not an
appropriate standard for good cause, and the Court’s prior comments on the likely merits of the
former motion are apt to change following further development of the record [Id. at 7].
Defendant also filed a motion to continue the February 3 trial date, asserting “several
outstanding issues need to be resolved prior to trial” [Doc. 38 p. 1]. The motion also states that the
Government has no objection to the requested continuance.
At the pretrial conference and motion hearing, Mr. Lanzon asserted that he received an
incomplete file from prior counsel when he entered the case. He stated Government’s counsel
worked with him to fill the holes in the discovery, ultimately providing the body and dash camera
Case 3:24-cr-00107-KAC-JEM Document 40 Filed 01/26/26 Page 4 of 9 PageID
#: <pageID>

5
videos. Mr. Lanzon asserted that he could not assess the need for or prepare a pretrial suppression
motion without this information. He reiterated the ways in which the new suppression motion
differs from the motion filed by prior counsel. He asked that the Court convert the trial date into
an evidentiary hearing on the new suppression motion and continue the trial to allow litigation of
the motion. After conferring with Defendant, Mr. Lanzon stated that Defendant agreed with the
trial continuance and had “no issue” with the impact on his speedy trial rights.
AUSA Johnson agreed that Mr. Lanzon contacted her about the incomplete file and stated
that she recopied discovery and provided it to him. She stated that Mr. Lanzon subsequently
requested any videos relating to the stop. She said in late September, she gave Mr. Lanzon two
body camera videos and two dash camera videos. She argues that these additional videos did not
benefit Defendant but, instead, corroborate the officer on the propriety of the stop. AUSA Johnson
asserted that the traffic stop in this case turned into a Terry stop. She agreed that the prior
suppression motion did not address a Terry stop. She stated Defendant fails to show good cause
for the new motion because it was filed four months after the substitution of counsel and is
frivolous.
Mr. Lanzon responded that he could not assess whether a pretrial motion was appropriate
until he had the complete file. He also stated that the Government’s argument at this hearing was
the first he had heard about a Terry stop.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court found good cause for the untimely suppression
motion and continued the trial. The undersigned set a deadline of February 3, 2026, for the
Government to respond to the merits of the suppression motion. The parties agreed to an
evidentiary hearing on March 5, 2026, at 9:00 a.m., and to a July 21, 2026 trial date. The Court set
a new pretrial conference on July 7, at 1:30 p.m.
Case 3:24-cr-00107-KAC-JEM Document 40 Filed 01/26/26 Page 5 of 9 PageID
#: <pageID>

6
II. 	ANALYSIS
Defendant asks to litigate a late suppression motion and to continue his February 3 trial
date. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned grants both requests.
A. 	Late Suppression Motion
Motions seeking suppression of evidence must be made before trial. Fed. R. Crim.
P. 12(b)(3)(C). The Court has discretion to permit an untimely motion upon a showing of “good
cause.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3). “Good cause is a ‘flexible standard’ requiring an explanation
for both the delay and the potential prejudice.” United States v. Trujillo-Molina, 678 F. App’x 335,
337 (6th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted)). “At a minimum, a party must ‘articulate some legitimate
explanation for the failure to timely file.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Walden, 625 F.3d 961, 965
(6th Cir. 2010)). When determining the potential prejudice from a late-filed motion, the Court
considers “all interests in the particular case” including those of the Court and the public.
Id. at 339 (quoting Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3)). In assessing good
cause, the Court reviews and analyzes the facts of each case. United States v. Soto, 794 F.3d 635,
655 (6th Cir. 2015).
The Government argues that Defendant waived his suppression issues because his prior
counsel did not assert them timely. But “under the current version of Rule 12(c)(3), [the Court
does] not treat the failure to file a motion as a waiver unless the circumstances of the case indicate
that the defendant intentionally relinquished a known right.” Id. Under the unique facts of this
case, the undersigned finds good cause for the belated suppression motion because defense counsel
did not have the complete discovery, including the body and dash camera videos, until late
September 2025, nearly nine months after the expiration of the motion deadline. While counsel
should have moved for leave to file the suppression motion out of time, he filed the motion within
Case 3:24-cr-00107-KAC-JEM Document 40 Filed 01/26/26 Page 6 of 9 PageID
#: <pageID>

7
two months of receiving the additional discovery. The parties acknowledge that litigation of the
suppression issue necessitates a trial continuance, but the Government does not object to
continuing the trial. On balance, the Court finds that permitting the untimely motion furthers the
interest of justice in this case.
Defendant has shown good cause for litigating a late suppression motion in this case, and
his motion to permit the late motion [Doc. 34] is GRANTED.
B. 	Trial Continuance
Defendant asks to continue his February 3, 2026 trial date to permit litigation of his
suppression motion [Doc. 38 p. 1]. While objecting to the late motion, the Government does not
oppose a trial continuance [Id.]. At the January 20 hearing, Defendant conferred with counsel and
stated that he agreed with the continuance despite its impact on his speedy trial rights. The parties
agreed on a new trial date of July 21, 2026.
Based upon the parties’ positions and because the Government does not oppose the
continuance, the Court finds the ends of justice served by granting a continuance outweigh the
interests of Defendant and the public in a speedy trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). In making
this determination, the Court has considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B).
Specifically, the Court concludes that failing to grant a continuance would both result in a
miscarriage of justice and deny counsel for Defendant the reasonable time necessary for effective
preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. See id. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i), (iv).
Defendant needs time to litigate his suppression motion. To this end, the undersigned set a response
deadline of February 3, 2026, and an evidentiary hearing on March 5, 2026. After the hearing, the
undersigned will need time to prepare a report and recommendation on the issues raised in the
suppression motion. See id. § 3161(h)(1)(H). Thereafter, the parties will need time to file
Case 3:24-cr-00107-KAC-JEM Document 40 Filed 01/26/26 Page 7 of 9 PageID
#: <pageID>

8
objections and responses, and the District Judge will need time to rule on the motion. Id. Once
Defendant receives a ruling on his motion, he may need time to evaluate a possible resolution of
the case and otherwise prepare for trial. The Court finds that all of this cannot occur before the
February 3, 2026 trial date.
The Court therefore GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Continue Trial Date [Doc. 38]. The
trial of this case is reset to July 21, 2026. A new trial schedule is included below. Because the
Court finds that the ends of justice served by granting a continuance outweigh the interests of
Defendant and the public in a speedy trial, all the time between the filing of the new suppression
motion on December 2, 2025, and the new trial date is fully excludable time under the Speedy
Trial Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D), (h)(1)(H), & (h)(7)(A)–(B).
Accordingly, the Court ORDERS as follows:
(1) 	Defendant’s Show Cause Motion to Consider Untimely Motion to
Suppress [Doc. 34] is GRANTED, and the Court permits Defendant
to proceed with his Motion to Suppress [Doc. 32];
(2) 	Defendant’s 	Motion 	to 	Continue 	Trial 	[Doc. 	38] 	is 	also
GRANTED;
(3) 	the trial of this matter is reset to commence on July 21, 2026,
at 	9:00 	a.m., 	before 	the 	Honorable 	Katherine 	A. 	Crytzer,
United States District Judge;
(4) 	all 	time 	between 	the 	filing 	of 	the 	suppression 	motion 	on
December 2, 2025, and the new trial date of July 21, 2026, is fully
excludable time under the Speedy Trial Act for the reasons set forth
herein;
(5) 	the Government shall file a response to the Motion to Suppress on
or before February 3, 2026, and Defendant may file a reply on or
before February 10, 2026;
(6) 	the parties shall appear before the undersigned for an evidentiary
hearing on the Motion to Suppress on March 5, 2026, at 9:00 a.m.;
Case 3:24-cr-00107-KAC-JEM Document 40 Filed 01/26/26 Page 8 of 9 PageID
#: <pageID>

9
(7) 	the deadline for filing a plea agreement in the record and providing
reciprocal discovery is June 22, 2026;
(8) 	the deadline for filing motions in limine is July 6, 2026, and
responses to motions in limine are due on or before July 14, 2026;
(9) 	the parties are to appear before the undersigned for a final pretrial
conference on July 7, 2026, at 1:30 p.m.; and
(10) requests for special jury instructions with appropriate citations to
authority pursuant to Local Rule 7.4 shall be filed on or before
July 10, 2026.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTER:
_________________________
Jill E. McCook
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 3:24-cr-00107-KAC-JEM Document 40 Filed 01/26/26 Page 9 of 9 PageID
#: <pageID>