USA v. Haney, et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 3:24-CR-113-TAV-JEM
)
TIFFANY HANEY, ANNE WARREN, and 	)
TINA ROPER, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
All pretrial motions have been referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)
for disposition or recommendation as appropriate. Now before the Court is Defendant Tiffany
Haney’s Motion for a Bill of Particulars [Doc. 891 pp. 4, 6, 27–28] in which Defendants Anne
Warren [Doc. 96] and Tina Roper [Doc. 138] seek to join, and on Defendant Tina Roper’s Motion
for a Bill of Particulars [Doc. 159].
For the reasons set forth below, the Court permits Defendants Warren and Roper to join in
Defendant Haney’s motion and DENIES both motions for a bill of particulars. While a bill of
particulars 	is not required, the Court ORDERS the Government to 	provide Defendants
with copies of all prescriptions upon which it will rely in its case-in-chief on or before
November 17, 2025.
I. 	BACKGROUND
1 	Defendant Haney’s motion also includes a Motion and Memorandum to Suppress, which
the undersigned addresses in a separate Report and Recommendation.
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The Second Superseding Indictment charges Defendants Haney, Warren, and Roper with
conspiring to commit health care fraud from August 2018 to October 2024, by submitting claims
for “medicines not dispensed pursuant to a valid prescription, as well as altered and forged
prescriptions . . . for the purpose of executing a scheme and artifice to defraud health care benefit
programs” to obtain “millions of dollars” in payments by false and fraudulent representations
(Count One) [Doc. 127 pp. 1, 4–5]. Defendant Haney also faces charges for one count of making
false statements relating to health care matters (Count Three) [id. at 10] and two counts of
aggravated identity theft (Counts Five and Seven) [id. at 11]. Defendant Warren was likewise
charged with two counts of making false statements relating to health care matters (Counts Two
and Four) [id. at 10] and two counts of aggravated identity theft (Counts Six and Eight) [id. at 11].
Defendants Haney and Warren are charged with conspiring to commit money laundering from
August 2018 through October 2024 (Count Nine) [id. at 12] and each are charged with two counts
of money laundering (Counts Ten through Thirteen) [id. at 12–13].
These charges arise in part from the search of Rocky Hill Pharmacy (“RHP”) on April 16,
2024, 	pursuant 	to 	a search 	warrant. 	Defendants 	allege that 	the executing 	agents 	seized
approximately 70,000 prescriptions from RHP [Doc. 89 p. 6]. Defendant Haney, joined by
Defendants Warren and Roper, request a bill of particulars stating which of the prescriptions seized
from RHP the Government alleges were altered or forged [Doc. 89 p. 27]. Defendant Roper also
asks for a bill of particulars specifying the following as to Count One: (1) all overt acts that she
and the other Defendants allegedly undertook in furtherance of the conspiracy to include the dates,
times, and locations of these acts; (2) the identities of all witnesses and unindicted coconspirators;
and (3) the nature of the conduct constituting the crime [Doc. 159 p. 1]. The Government
responded in opposition to both motions, alleging that the detailed Second Superseding Indictment
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provides notice of the charges sufficient to allow Defendants to craft a defense, avoid surprise at
trial, and plead a bar to double jeopardy [Doc. 111 p. 16; Doc. 169 pp. 1–3]. The undersigned
heard oral argument on the motions on May 29, 2025, and August 12, 2025, and the matter is now
ripe for adjudication.
II. 	ANALYSIS
Defendants jointly ask the Court to order the Government to provide a bill of particulars
specifying which of the 70,0002 prescriptions seized from the pharmacy were allegedly altered or
forged in connection with the charges [Doc. 89 pp. 6, 27; Doc. 147 pp. 87–97]. Defendants argue
that this information is essential for them to understand the charges and to prepare for trial
[Doc. 89 p. 6; see also Doc. 159 p. 1; Doc. 165 p. 15 (Defendant Roper’s Motion to Suppress)].
In addition to identifying prescriptions, Defendant Roper asks for specification of all overt
acts that she (and the other Defendants) allegedly undertook in relation to Count One, the identities
of unindicted coconspirators, the monetary total of claims allegedly associated with her in relation
to Count One, and her property that is allegedly involved in or traceable to the charged offense
[Doc. 159 p. 1]. Specifically, she seeks particularization of the following parts of the Second
Superseding Indictment:
(1) 	for paragraph one, identify the prescriptions that were
“altered” and the prescriptions that were “forged” to obtain
“millions of dollars owned by or under the control of health
care benefit programs”;
(2) 	for paragraph 5, state the basis for the assertion that
Defendant Roper “was a pharmacy technician licensed to
practice in Tennessee”;
2 	Defendants state the number of prescriptions seized as 75,000 [Doc. 89 p. 6; Doc. 147
p. 96 (argument of Haney’s counsel)] and 70,000 [Doc. 195 p. 54 (testimony of Tiffany Haney at
Aug. 12, 2025 hearing); id. at 61–62 (Haney’s counsel at Aug. 12, 2025 hearing)]. The undersigned
uses the estimate of 70,000 prescriptions for purposes of this Memorandum and Order.
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(3) 	for paragraph 19, identify all unindicted coconspirators, the
amount of money unlawfully obtained from a health care
benefit program, and the “false and fraudulent pretenses,
representations, and promises” made by Defendant Roper;
(4) 	for paragraph 26, identify all “formularies” Defendant Roper
allegedly altered “by checking boxes next to unprescribed
medications and writing additional refills not prescribed”;
(5) 	for 	paragraph 	27, 	identify 	“all 	formularies 	and 	other
documents” that Defendant Roper allegedly “forged”;
(6) 	for 	paragraph 	28, 	identify 	all 	“formularies 	and 	other
prescription documents” that Defendant Roper “forged [by]
handwriting a patient name at the top of the document,
marking boxes next to medications, writing in refills, and
falsely signing the provider’s name”;
(7) 	for paragraph 29, identify all “notations” made by Ms. Roper
“implying that a forged prescription was phoned in to the
pharmacy 	and/or 	verbally 	authorized 	by 	a 	provider’s
representative”;
(8) 	for paragraph 30, identify all alleged altered and forged
formularies “submitted, or caused to be submitted to drug
plans, PBM’s, and other health care benefit programs for
reimbursement, knowing that the formularies and other
documents had been altered and forged” and identify all drug
plans, PBM’s and other health care benefit programs to
which Defendant Roper submitted the altered or forged
formularies;
(9) 	for paragraph 31, identify all additional reimbursement
claims that Defendant Roper submitted through RHP’s
electronic 	prescription 	management 	platform 	for
medications that were not selected on formularies and had
not been prescribed by medical providers;
(10) 	for paragraph 32, identify all claims Defendant Roper
submitted 	for 	medications 	that 	were 	“not 	medically
necessary and/or were not dispensed pursuant to a valid
prescription, and therefore not eligible for reimbursement”;
(11) 	for paragraph 33, identify all altered or forged prescriptions
or formularies and other documents and/or medications not
prescribed by the providers that Defendant Roper caused to
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be filled, including refills, from August 2018 to October
2024, 	identify 	the 	associated 	“patients,” 	identify 	the
“patients’ drug plans,” and identify the millions of dollars in
reimbursements;
(12) 	for 	paragraph 	71, 	identify 	Defendant 	Roper’s 	real 	or
personal property that is derived, directly or indirectly, from
gross proceeds traceable to the offense; and
(13) 	for paragraph 72, identify Defendant Roper’s property, real
or personal property that “was involved in any alleged
offense” or “traceable.”
[Doc. 159 pp. 2–5 (quoting the Second Superseding Indictment [Doc. 127])]. Defendant Roper
maintains that identification of these details is necessary to clarify the charges, for preparation of
a full defense, and to prevent surprise at trial [Doc. 159 p. 1].
The Government responds that the detailed indictment in combination with discovery
amply puts Defendants on notice of the charges, informs them of their roles in the offenses, and
permits them to prepare for trial [Doc. 111 p. 16; Doc. 169 pp. 1–2]. It argues that Defendants’
requests amount to a quest for its theories of the case and for “general discovery,” neither of which
the case law allows [Doc. 111 p. 16; Doc. 169 pp. 2–3].
At the May 29, 2025 motion hearing, counsel for Defendant Haney argued that requiring
Defendants to proceed to trial without knowing which documents are false or forged would be
“fundamentally unfair” [Doc. 147 p. 87]. Counsel asserted that this is “an extremely broad case”
involving 70,000 prescriptions and that the Government has added new theories of liability with
each new indictment [Id. at 89–95]. Thus, defense counsel stated whether by a bill of particulars
“or telling the[] [D]efendants [the nature of] the charges against them, [Defendants] need further
detail” [Id. at 89].
At the August 12, 2025 motion hearing, counsel for Defendant Roper requested additional
specification on Defendant Roper’s alleged role in the conspiracy because she is mentioned in only
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two paragraphs of the Second Superseding Indictment [Doc. 195 pp. 8–9]. Defense counsel
acknowledged receipt of “voluminous discovery” and that it is “searchable” [Id. at 8]. He also
maintained that Defendant Roper, who is a pharmacy technician, is charged alongside the two
owners who are both pharmacists, and the paragraphs referencing Defendant Roper state “that she
caused certain things to be done that aren’t part of her job” [Id.].
“The indictment . . . must be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential
facts constituting the offense charged[.]” Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1). As a general rule, an indictment
passes constitutional muster if it “first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly
informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, second, enables him to plead
an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.” Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974); see also United States v. Landham, 251 F.3d 1072, 1079
(6th Cir. 2001) (discussing the Hamling standard). An indictment may allege the charges using the
words of the statute itself if it gives all the elements of the offense “fully, directly, and expressly.”
Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117 (quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1882)). The statutory
language “must be accompanied with such a statement of the facts and circumstances as will
inform the accused of the specific offense, coming under the general description, with which he is
charged.” Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117–18 (quoting United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483, 487 (1888)).
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(f) provides that “[t]he court may direct the
government to file a bill of particulars” and that “[t]he government may amend a bill of particulars
subject to such conditions as justice requires.” “The function of a bill of particulars is to ‘to
minimize surprise and assist [the] defendant in obtaining the information needed to prepare a
defense and to preclude a second prosecution for the same crimes.’” United States v. Crayton,
357 F.3d 560, 568 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Salisbury, 983 F.2d 1369, 1375
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(6th Cir. 1993)). It is not intended to be “‘a tool for the defense to obtain detailed disclosure of all
evidence held by the government before trial.’” Id. (quoting Salisbury, 983 F.2d at 1375). Nor to
discover the Government’s theories of the case. United States v. Musick, 291 F. App’x 706, 724
(6th Cir. 2008) (“The bill of particulars is not intended as ‘a means of learning the government’s
evidence and theories.’” (citation omitted)).
The granting of a bill of particulars is within the Court’s discretion. United States v.
Salisbury, 983 F.2d at 1375 (citation omitted). The level of detail in the indictment can be a basis
for denying the motion for a bill of particulars. Id. (citation omitted). In addition, “‘a defendant is
not entitled to a bill of particulars with respect to information which is available through other
sources.’” United States v. Higdon, 68 F. Supp. 3d 807, 811 (E.D. Tenn. 2014) (quoting United
States v. Paulino, 935 F.2d 739, 750 (6th Cir. 1991), superseded on other gnds by stat., United
States v. Caseslorente, 220 F.3d 727 (6th Cir. 2000)).
Here, the Court finds the Second Superseding Indictment is sufficiently specific to inform
Defendants of the nature of the charges, to illuminate their alleged roles in the offenses, and to
permit them to prepare for trial. The nineteen-page indictment states the dates of the alleged
offenses and provides the object and “manner and means” of accomplishing that object for the
health care fraud conspiracy alleged in Count One [Doc. 127 pp. 5–6]. The indictment states the
object was for Defendants to enrich coconspirators “by fraudulently obtaining money from drug
plans, PBMs, and health care benefit programs, by submitting for reimbursement altered and
forged prescriptions for medications that were not prescribed by a licensed health care provider”
[Id. ¶ 20]. Seven of the twelve paragraphs on the manner and means of the conspiracy reference
all three Defendants [id. ¶¶ 26–32] and state that they altered formularies to include unprescribed
medications and refills [id. ¶ 26], created forged formularies [id. ¶¶ 27–28], and noted false
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authorizations on forged prescriptions [id. ¶ 29]. All three Defendants allegedly submitted claims
for altered and forged formularies, unprescribed medications, and medications not medically
necessary through the pharmacy’s electronic prescription-management platform [Id. ¶¶ 30–32].
The Indictment also includes thirty-two paragraphs detailing overt acts by Defendants and the
pharmacy in furtherance of the conspiracy [Id. ¶¶ 33–61].
“A bill of particulars is generally unnecessary where ‘indictment provides the general dates
of the falsifications, and the defendants have sufficient notice of their suspected roles in the
fraud.’” United States v. Glynn, No. 3:13–00059, 2015 WL 2125082, at *9 (M.D. Tenn. May 6,
2015) (quoting United States v. Younes, 194 F. App’x 302, 310 (6th Cir. 2006)) (citation modified).
Here, Defendants rely on United States v. Glynn and characterize it as “granting a bill of particulars
detailing specific instances of forgery where [the] government alleged [the] defendant forged
signatures on documents” [Doc. 89 p. 27]. But the holding in Glynn is more nuanced than
Defendants suggest.
In Glynn, as part of an interrogatory-style list of requested particulars, a defendant facing
charges of bank fraud sought, among other things, identification of “each signature or writing that
[the defendant] is alleged to have forged himself, in any claim, check, or in any document” or that
the government alleges that any coconspirator forged. Id. The court held the defendant’s requests
went “far beyond the scope of that which is properly the subject of a bill of particulars.” Id. at *10.
It said the indictment’s allegation that the defendant used another’s identification without lawful
authority was sufficient to explain the nature of the charge and to prevent surprise. Id. The court
opined that identification of who forged the signatures was both speculative, when the government
admitted it did not know, and unnecessary given the government’s theory that the defendant
unlawfully used another’s identification. Id. at *11. Nevertheless, the court ruled that “to the extent
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the [g]overnment is claiming, and intends to argue and prove at trial, that [the d]efendant forged
signatures on any specific documents . . . , it will be required to so notify [the d]efendant so that
he can marshal evidence to rebut any such contention.” Id.
Likewise, here, the Second Superseding Indictment sufficiently states nature of the charges
and describes Defendants’ alleged roles in the conspiracy. It gives the dates of the conspiracy,
alleges numerous specific acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, and lists several specific
medications and the initials of several providers. This is sufficient to permit Defendants to
understand the charged conspiracy. Moreover, some of the allegedly forged and altered
prescriptions are identified in the affidavits submitted in support of a search warrant and seizure
warrants. Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise discretion to order a bill of particulars
designating all altered, forged, or otherwise fraudulent prescriptions. Nevertheless, like in Glynn,
the Court finds knowing which of the thousands of prescriptions seized the Government seeks to
prove as forged, altered, or otherwise fraudulent at trial will allow Defendants to prepare a specific
defense. The parties have also generally agreed to early disclosure of trial exhibits [See Doc. 199
pp. 13–14 (“The parties also want to exchange trial exhibits after rulings on pending pretrial
motions and well in advance of trial.”)]. Thus, the Court will order that the Government provide
all prescriptions upon which it will rely at trial to Defendants on or before the deadline for
presenting its case-in-chief trial exhibits.
Defendant Roper’s remaining requested particulars for 	all overt acts, unidentified
coconspirators, and property subject to forfeiture are also denied. “A defendant is not entitled to a
bill of particulars if the purpose of the bill is to obtain a list of the Government’s witnesses or to
discover all of the overt acts that might be proven at trial.” Musick, 291 F. App’x at 724 (citations
omitted); see also Glynn, 2015 WL 2125082, at *10 (holding a defendant is not entitled to know
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all overt acts for bank fraud). “Nor is the Government required to furnish the names of all other
co-conspirators.” Musick, 291 F. App’x at 724 (citation omitted). The Second Superseding
Indictment lists the Defendants’ forfeitable property, including Defendant Roper’s Knoxville,
Tennessee residence [Doc. 127 ¶ 71]. Finally, as revealed by the numerous exhibits filed in support
of Defendants’ suppression motions, including summaries of interviews of health care providers
and two lengthy affidavits supporting a search warrant and seizure warrants, Defendants have a
wealth of evidence in discovery illuminating the allegations of health care fraud and money
laundering in this case.3 Higdon, 68 F. Supp. 3d at 811 (observing that a bill of particulars is not
necessary for information available from other sources (citation omitted)).
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. 	Defendants Warren and Roper are permitted to join in
Defendant Haney’s request for a bill of particulars;
2. 	Defendants’ joint motion for a bill of particulars designating
all altered, forged, and medically unnecessary prescriptions
is DENIED;4
3. 	Defendant 	Roper’s 	Motion 	for 	a 	Bill 	of 	Particulars
[Doc. 159] is also DENIED; and
3 	The Government also states that it “has discussed the allegations and facts in this case at
length with both counsel for Defendant Haney and Warren” [Doc. 111 p. 16]. Defendant Roper
entered the case after these discussions. The Court observes that counsel for the Government has
been willing to work with counsel for Defendant Roper as evidenced by discussions on discovery
in the hearings on May 29 and August 12.
4 	The remaining parts of Defendant Haney’s tri-part motion [Doc. 89] remain pending.
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4. 	the Government is ORDERED to provide all prescriptions
upon which it will rely at trial to Defendants on or before the
deadline for presenting its case-in-chief trial exhibits, which
is currently set for November 17, 2025.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTER:
_________________________
Jill E. McCook
United States Magistrate Judge
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