USA v. Haney, et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 3:24-CR-113-TAV-JEM
)
TIFFANY HANEY, ANNE WARREN, and 	)
TINA ROPER, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
All pretrial motions are referred to the undersigned for disposition or recommendation as
appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). This case is before the undersigned on Defendant Tiffany
Haney’s Motion to Suppress [Doc. 89],1 which Defendants Anne Warren [Doc. 96] and Tina Roper
[Doc. 138] seek to join, and on Defendant Tina Roper’s Motion to Suppress [Doc. 165], which
Defendants Warren [Doc. 172] and Haney [Doc. 177] seek to join.2
The Second Superseding Indictment charges Defendants Haney, Warren, and Roper with
conspiring to commit health care fraud from August 2018 to October 2024, by submitting claims
for “medicines not dispensed pursuant to a valid prescription, as well as altered and forged
prescriptions . . . for the purpose of executing a scheme and artifice to defraud health care benefit
programs” to obtain “millions of dollars” in payments by false and fraudulent representations
1 	Defendant Haney’s motion also includes her Motion for a Bill of Particulars [Doc. 89
pp. 4, 6, 27]. The Court has addressed this nondispositive motion separately [Doc. 202].
2 	Defendant Haney also filed a Second Motion to Suppress on July 21, 2025 [Doc. 185]. At
the August 12, 2025 evidentiary hearing, the undersigned denied that motion as untimely
[Doc. 195 pp. 14–16]. In the interest of justice, however, the undersigned stated that it would
consider Defendant Haney’s arguments relating to data extracted from cell phones in conjunction
with her motion [Doc. 177] to join Defendant Roper’s suppression motion [See Doc. 195 p. 15].
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(Count One) [Doc. 127 pp. 1, 4–5]. Defendant Haney also faces charges for one count of making
false statements relating to health care matters (Count Three) [id. at 10] and two counts of
aggravated identity theft (Counts Five and Seven) [id. at 11]. Defendant Warren is likewise
charged with two counts of making false statements relating to health care matters (Counts Two
and Four) [id. at 10] and two counts of aggravated identity theft (Counts Six and Eight) [id. at 11].
Defendants Haney and Warren are charged with conspiring to commit money laundering from
August 2018 through October 2024 (Count Nine) [id. at 12] and each are charged with two counts
of money laundering (Counts Ten through Thirteen) [id. at 12–13].
These charges arise in part from the search of Rocky Hill Pharmacy (“RHP”)3 on April 16,
2024, pursuant to a search warrant. Defendants Haney and Warren, who are pharmacists, were the
co-owners of RHP [Doc. 127 p. 2]. Defendant Roper, who is a pharmacy technician, worked at
RHP [Id.]. During the execution of the search warrant at RHP, agents seized the Defendants’
personal cell phones and the personal cell phones of three other RHP employees [Doc. 185-3
pp. 2–8 (FBI Evidence Entry); Doc. 148-1 p. 2 (FBI Computer Analysis Response Team
(“CART”) Report)]. Agents extracted data from the cell phones on the premises of RHP and
returned the cell phones to their owners [Id. at 2; Doc. 195, Transcript, p. 35]. They also seized
computer records and boxes of documents, including prescriptions, during the execution of the
search warrant at RHP [Doc. 185-3 pp. 2–8; Doc. 148-1 p. 3; Doc. 195 pp. 38, 54]. On October
31, 2024, the Government seized bank accounts, investment accounts, vehicles, and personal
watercraft from Defendants pursuant to seizure warrants [Doc. 119-2].4
3 	Rocky Hill Pharmacy, LLC, was also a Defendant in this case, but the District Judge
dismissed RHP from the case on the motion of the Government [Doc. 186].
4 	The seizure warrants in the case numbers listed on the cover sheet of the supporting
affidavit are unsealed with redactions in each of those cases. The supporting affidavit of Agent
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Defendants seek suppression of all evidence seized during the April 16, 2024 search of
RHP, arguing the search warrant affidavit contains false statements and material omissions without
which the affidavit is bereft of probable cause [Doc. 89 pp. 4–5, 14–245]. Defendants also
challenge the seizure of data from six personal cell phones during the execution of the search
warrant at RHP, asserting that officers exceeded the scope of the search warrant in seizing this
data and that the affidavit provides no basis for seizing the personal cell phones of the owners and
employees [Doc. 165 p. 14; Doc. 195 pp. 73, 80, 97]. Defendants also summarily argue that paper
and electronic records seized from RHP exceeded the scope of the search warrant [Doc. 195
pp. 80–81, 97]. Finally, Defendants challenge the seizure of and seek return of their assets, arguing
that the affidavit in support of the seizure warrants contains false statements and material
omissions necessary to probable cause [Doc. 89 pp. 24–27]. Defendants also argue that the
affidavit supporting the seizure warrants does not provide probable cause to seize all assets
purportedly flowing from five categories of claims or show that all seized assets are traceable to
the alleged offenses [Id. at 5–6, 25–26].
After reviewing the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the relevant law, the
undersigned recommends that the District Judge permit Defendant Warren to join both suppression
motions and permit Defendant Haney to join Defendant Roper’s suppression motion to the extent
that each Defendant may challenge the seizure of data from her own cell phone. The undersigned
recommends that the District Judge deny Defendant Roper’s motion to join in Defendant Haney’s
suppression motion because she lacks standing to challenge the general search of RHP or the
Emily Celeste is filed in the record in this case [Doc. 91 (sealed); Doc. 119-2 (redacted and
unsealed)].
5 	The page numbers for Defendant Haney’s suppression motion begin after a title page and
table of contents. The Court cites to the page numbers imposed by the Court’s electronic filing
system, which begin with the title page as page 1, rather than to Defendant’s internal page numbers.
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seizure of assets belonging to her codefendants. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that
the District Judge GRANT Defendant Warren’s [Docs. 96 & 172] and Defendant Haney’s
[Doc. 177] motions to join and DENY Defendant Roper’s [Doc. 138] motion to join.
The undersigned finds Defendants fail to make a sufficient preliminary showing to warrant
a Franks hearing for either affidavit. The undersigned also finds that the affidavit in support of the
search warrant for RHP fails to provide a nexus between the personal cell phones of RHP’s owners
and employees and the alleged health care fraud. Nevertheless, suppression of the data extracted
from the cell phones is not warranted because the agents acted in good faith reliance on the search
warrant for RHP. Finally, the undersigned finds the affidavit in support of the seizure warrants
provides probable cause to issue the seizure warrants and that Defendants may not seek the return
of their seized assets at this juncture. Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the
District Judge DENY both motions to suppress evidence [Docs. 89 & 165].
I. 	BACKGROUND AND EVIDENCE
On October 16, 2024, the Grand Jury indicted Defendants Haney, Warren, and Rocky Hill
Pharmacy, LLC, with conspiring to commit health care fraud from August 2018 to July 2024, by
submitting altered and forged prescriptions to obtain $8,778,736 in payments from health care
benefit programs by false and fraudulent representations (Count One) [Doc. 3 pp. 1, 4]. The
Indictment also charged Defendant Haney with one count of making false statements relating to
health care matters (Count Three) [id. at 8–9] and two counts of aggravated identity theft (Counts
Five and Seven) [id. at 9–10]. Defendant Warren was likewise charged with two counts of making
false statements relating to health care matters (Counts Two and Four) [id. at 8–9] and two counts
of aggravated identity theft (Counts Six and Eight) [id. at 9–10]. Defendants Haney and Warren
first appeared on November 1, 2024, and were arraigned on November 12, 2024.
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On March 5, 2025, the Grand Jury returned a Superseding Indictment, extending the time
frame of Count One, conspiracy to commit health care fraud, from August 2018 to October 2024
(rather than July 2024), and increasing the amount of money obtained by false pretenses in
connection with the delivery of health care benefits to $14 million [Doc. 73 pp. 1, 4]. The
Superseding Indictment also added five new charges: a money-laundering conspiracy from August
2018 through October 2024 against Defendants Haney and Warren (Count Nine) [id. at 11], two
counts of money laundering against Defendant Haney (Counts Ten and Twelve) [id. at 11–12],
and two counts of money laundering against Defendant Warren (Counts Eleven and Thirteen) [id.].
On March 20, 2025, Defendant Haney filed a notice of intent to pursue three pretrial
motions under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: (1) a motion to suppress pursuant to
Rule 12, (2) a motion for return of property pursuant to Rule 41, and (3) a motion for a bill of
particulars pursuant to Rule 7 [Doc. 82 p. 1]. Defendant simultaneously filed twenty-six sealed
exhibits [Doc. 83, Exhs. 2–27, SEALED], and requested oral argument on her motions
[Doc. 82 p. 1].
Pursuant to the Court’s Order [Doc. 86], Defendant Haney refiled her motions in
compliance with Local Rule 7.1(b) on March 31, 2025 [Doc. 89]. Defendant Haney filed the three
motions in a single document [id.],6 attached twelve unsealed exhibits [Doc. 89-1 to 89-12], and
filed twelve proposed, sealed exhibits [Docs. 91-1 to 91-12].7 Defendants RHP [Doc. 94] and
6 	This Report and Recommendation does not address Defendant Haney’s request for a bill
of particulars [Doc. 89 pp. 27–28]. The Court has entered a separate Memorandum and Order
addressing this motion [Doc. 202].
7 	The undersigned permitted the Defendant’s proposed, sealed exhibits [Docs. 91-1 to 91-
12] to remain under seal and granted the Government’s request to file redacted versions of the
exhibits [Doc. 106 pp. 3–4]. The Government filed the redacted exhibits on May 7, 2025
[Docs. 119-1 to 119-14 (adding the affidavits of Agent Valero and Agent Celeste as redacted
exhibits)]. The undersigned references the unredacted exhibits [Doc. 89-1 to 89-12] and the
redacted exhibits [Docs. 119-1 to 119-14] herein.
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Warren [Doc. 96] moved to join in Defendant Haney’s motions. Following the Government’s
response [Doc. 111] and Defendant Haney’s reply [Doc. 115], the Court scheduled a motion
hearing on Defendant Haney’s pending motions for May 29, 2025 [Doc. 122].
On May 21, 2025, the Grand Jury returned a Second Superseding Indictment adding
Codefendant Tina Roper to the conspiracy to commit health care fraud in Count One and changing
the amount of money obtained by false pretenses in connection with the delivery of health care
benefits from $14 million to “millions of dollars” [Doc. 127 pp. 1, 4–5]. The Second Superseding
Indictment added overt acts allegedly committed by Defendant Roper [id. ¶¶ 50–51] and added
Defendant Roper to the forfeiture allegations [id. ¶¶ 70–74]. Defendant Roper had an initial
appearance and arraignment on the following day [Doc. 130, Minutes], and on May 28, 2025,
Defendant Roper moved to join in Defendant Haney’s motions to suppress and for a bill of
particulars [Doc. 138].
On May 29, 2025, the Court heard argument on Defendant Haney’s pending motions to
suppress and for a bill of particulars, and all codefendants’ requests to join [Doc. 144, Minutes].8
Assistant United States Attorneys Jeremy Dykes and Anne-Marie Svolto appeared on behalf of
the Government. Attorneys Anthony Mahajan and Diana Yastrovskaya represented Defendant
Haney. Attorney Aaron Wiley represented Defendant Warren, and Attorney Keith Stewart
represented Defendant Roper. All three individual Defendants were also present. At the conclusion
of the hearing, the Court permitted post-hearing briefing on Defendant Haney’s suppression
motions and set a pretrial motion deadline for Defendant Roper.
8 	At the May 29, 2025 motion hearing, the Court also arraigned Defendants Haney and RHP,
which was represented by Attorney Robert Webster, on the Superseding Indictment and arraigned
Defendants Haney, Warren, and RHP on the Second Superseding Indictment [Doc. 114, Minutes].
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Defendant Haney filed a post-hearing brief in support of her suppression motions on
June 3, 2025 [Doc. 148]. The Government responded in opposition on June 16, 2025 [Doc. 164].
On June 11, 2025, Defendant Roper filed a Supplemental Brief on Standing, arguing that
she has standing to challenge the search of RHP because her personal cell phone was seized and
searched pursuant to the search warrant for the pharmacy [Doc. 158]. The undersigned found
Defendant Roper raised new bases for suppression of evidence in this supplemental brief and
ordered that she raise any new suppression issues, not raised in Codefendant Haney’s suppression
motion, in a separate motion [Doc. 163].
On June 19, 2025, Defendant Roper filed a Motion to Suppress all evidence seized during
the search of RHP and from her personal cell phone and for the return of assets seized on
October 31, 2024 [Doc. 165]. Defendants RHP [Doc. 166] and Warren [Doc. 172] joined in
Defendant Roper’s new suppression motion. The Government responded in opposition to
Defendant Roper’s suppression motion [Doc. 175]. Pursuant to the Court’s Order requesting
clarification, Defendant Haney stated that she also joined in Defendant Roper’s new suppression
motion [Doc. 177]. The Court set the motion and evidentiary hearing on Defendant Roper’s
motions for the date of the pretrial conference, August 12, 2025, as no sooner time was available
to all parties and the undersigned [Doc. 180].
On July 21, 2025, Defendant Haney filed a Second Motion to Suppress [Doc. 185], to
which the Government objected as untimely [Doc. 189]. At the motion hearing, the Court found
this motion to be untimely and further found that Defendant failed to state good cause for the late
filing [Doc. 195, Transcript, pp. 14–16]. Nevertheless, the undersigned held that Defendant Haney
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could raise the arguments therein related to the seizure and search of cell phones as a part of joining
Defendant Roper’s suppression motion [Id.].9
The parties appeared for a motion hearing on Defendant Roper’s motions on August 12,
2025 [Doc. 193, Minutes]. Assistant United States Attorneys Jeremy Dykes and Brian Samuelson
appeared on behalf of the Government. Attorney Anthony Mahajan represented Defendant Haney.
Attorney Aaron Wiley represented Defendant Warren. Attorney Keith Stewart represented
Defendant Roper. All three Defendants were also present. Defendants Roper and Haney testified
regarding the April 16, 2024 search of RHP and the seizure of their cell phones. The Government
introduced Attachment B to the search warrant for the search of RHP. The parties presented
argument on the suppression motion. At the end of the hearing, the Court permitted the parties to
file post-hearing briefs by August 26, 2025, on any additional argument regarding the pending
suppression issues. No additional briefing relating to the suppression motion was filed10 and the
time for doing so has expired. The suppression issues are now ripe for adjudication.
A. 	Agent Valero’s Affidavit
Special Agent Joseph Valero of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) submitted a
forty-page affidavit in support of a search warrant to search the premises of Rocky Hill Pharmacy
in Knoxville, Tennessee, for records relating to health care fraud and conspiracy to commit
9 	After the Court announced the ruling at the August 12, 2025 hearing, Defendant Haney
argued that her initial suppression motion, while focusing on a Franks argument, actually alleges
that the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant for RHP is overbroad [Doc. 195 p. 18].
Defendant Haney argued that she “reserve[s] the right to submit additional briefing once the Court
determines the preliminary question [of] whether [after] excising the false statements that
[Defendant Haney] alleges and ha[s] proven in this record, there exists probable cause for seizure,
and then the determination as to what was seized and is it consistent with that scope” [Id. at 18].
Defendant’s suggested serial approach to filing motions is not permitted by the Court’s schedule,
nor is it compatible with her request for a speedy trial [See Doc. 199 pp. 1, 13 n.7].
10 	Defendant Roper filed a supplemental brief in support her Motion to Dismiss the
Indictment, which the Court will address by separate report and recommendation.
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healthcare fraud, false statements in relation to health care, conspiracy to pay and receive health
care kickbacks, and violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute [Doc. 119-1 ¶ 4]. Agent Valero alleges
that through a “multifaceted and complex” fraudulent scheme, RHP and its owners and employees
[id. ¶¶ 4–5] “engaged in an unlawful scheme to alter, fabricate, and/or forge prescriptions for high-
reimbursed compounded topical pain creams and gels, topical anti-itch creams, rectal kits, and
muscle relaxers, resulting in substantial fraudulent billings submitted to, and payments received
from, government and private insurance payors” [id. ¶ 5]. Also, he alleges that “RHP engaged in
an unlawful scheme to waive patient co-pays in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute” [Id. ¶ 6].
Agent Valero states that two pharmacists, Tiffany Haney and Anne Warren, own RHP, and
that two of Haney’s sisters, Tina Roper and Tabitha Roper, work at RHP as pharmacy technicians
[Id. ¶ 10]. RHP also employs Luther Little as a “pharmacy rep,” whose duties include “delivering
pre-printed prescription pads to provider offices” [Id.]. Agent Valero states that from his
experience in investigating healthcare fraud, the use of pre-printed prescription forms “are not
common-place in legitimate medicine” [Id. ¶ 51].
He also states that RHP uses Pioneer RX as its provider for electronic health records
[Id. ¶ 10]. Through Pioneer RX, RHP submits electronic claims for reimbursement for
prescriptions to Pharmacy Benefit Managers (“PBMs”), such as Humana and OptumRx, and the
PBM’s coordinate payments from government and private health benefit payors, such as Medicare
Part D, Medicaid (also known as TennCare), and the Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) Energy
Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program (“EEOICP”) [Id.; see also id. ¶¶ 29, 36].
He states that some PBMs routinely audit pharmacies and ask the pharmacies to produce copies of
prescriptions filled at the pharmacy to “detect and prevent waste, fraud, and abuse of PBM funds”
[Id. ¶ 13].
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The agent explains that pharmacists can prepare “compound drugs,” which require a
prescription, by mixing drug ingredients to prepare a medication customized to a patient’s
particular needs [Id. ¶ 14]. Agent Valero states based upon his experience in investigating
healthcare fraud and pharmacies, “compounded creams are not always a first line choice for
treatment, but rather are meant to be individualized to a particular patient” [Id.]. Thus, he observes
it “can be unusual for providers to prescribe standardized compounded creams in abundance” [Id.].
Moreover, Agent Valero states that “when pharmacies make substitutions of ingredients in a
compound outside of the doctor’s original prescription and without the doctor’s input or
knowledge, it can expose a patient to potential harm or risk” [Id.]. Agent Valero also states that,
based upon his training and experience, he knows that pharmacies can gain “a significant financial
benefit by forging or altering prescriptions to substitute higher-cost drugs or to included
unneeded/unwanted prescriptions or refills[, ]especially . . . for high-cost prescriptions like topical
compound creams and Lidocaine-Hydrocortizone (HC) Rectal Kits” [Id. ¶ 46].
According to Agent Valero, RHP signed provider agreements with various Medicare
Part D drug plans and PBMs “to dispense prescription[] drugs in accordance with federal and state
rules and regulations” [Id. ¶ 22]. Medicare requires pharmacies to collect copayments from patients
to ensure that the patient needs the medication, and the routine waiver of copayments “absent
specific exceptions” is a felony [Id. ¶¶ 27–28]. RHP also signed a Pharmacy Network Agreement
with TennCare, administered by OptumRx and other PBMs, agreeing to comply with all laws and
regulations pertaining to the provision of prescription services [Id. ¶¶ 31–32].
Agent Valero states that in March 2021, state law enforcement officers along with Health
and Human Services–Office of Inspector General (“HHS-OIG”) investigators [id. ¶ 3] began
investigating RHP when they learned, following a routine audit by PBM OptumRx, that RHP was
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an outlier in claims submitted for Lidocaine-HC Rectal Kits [Id. ¶ 47]. The FBI joined the
investigation in May 2021 [Id.]. He explains that as of April 2024, the investigation revealed that
RHP and “individuals associated with RHP, have engaged in an unlawful scheme to alter,
fabricate, and/or forge prescriptions for high-reimbursed topical pain creams, topical anti-itch
creams, and muscle relaxers resulting in substantial fraudulent billings submitted to and payments
received from Medicare Part D, TennCare, and [the DOL ]EEOICP” [Id. ¶ 48].
Agent Valero states that on February 20, 2024, agents interviewed Ashley Manning, a
nurse practitioner (“NP”) who prescribed topical pain creams and whose prescriptions were
submitted to RHP [Id. ¶ 49]. Agents showed NP Manning a prescription for a pain cream on RHP’s
pre-printed form and bearing her signature [Id.]. A copy of the prescription is reproduced in the
affidavit [Id.]. NP Manning agreed that she wrote the prescription and selected certain ingredients
for the cream but stated that the prescription contains “add-on’s” and “substitutions” that she did
not make and that are not in her handwriting [Id.]. NP Manning stated that her typical practice is
to write a prescription for a pain cream on RHP’s pre-printed form and have her medical assistant
fax it to RHP [Id. ¶ 50]. She did not recall ever receiving calls from RHP asking to modify
prescriptions that she sent to RHP [Id.].
Agent Valero relates that OptumRx performed an audit on RHP regarding Medicaid or
TennCare prescription claims between January 1 and May 29, 2020 [Id. ¶ 52]. OptumRx’s audit
revealed that of 598 claims by RHP during that period, seven were for oral medications, 338 were
for Lidocaine-HC rectal kits (representing $218,930.51 in paid claims), 249 were for Diclofenac
1% gel (representing $15,702.12 in paid claims), two for other compounds, and one for Lidocaine
cream [Id.]. According to the affidavit, most Medicaid patients (52%) seeking compounded
medications at RHP, filled prescriptions at other pharmacies [Id. ¶ 53]. OptumRx mailed surveys
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to prescribers to confirm whether the prescriber wrote the prescriptions filled at RHP [Id. ¶ 54].
Most of those prescribers who responded to the survey stated that they did not authorize a
prescription for a Lidocaine-HC rectal kit [Id.]. Reproduced in the affidavit are survey forms from
three providers—Courtney Travis, Lindsey Smith, and Courtney Carroll—all of whom denied
prescribing Lidocaine-HC rectal kits, either to specific patients or, in the case of Courtney Carroll,
at all [Id.]. According to the agent, on September 2, 2021, HHS–OIG investigators and state law
enforcement officers interviewed Lindsay Smith, a nurse practitioner for whose pain cream
prescriptions RHP submitted claims [Id. ¶ 55]. NP Smith denied prescribing any Lidocaine-HC
rectal kits, Diclofenac gel, or Lidocaine to her patients [Id.]. She acknowledged that she may have
prescribed a pain cream, but would not prescribe “a compound cream that needed another pain
cream applied on top of that” [Id.].
Agent Valero states that Humana also audited RHP regarding claims for prescriptions that
RHP submitted over the one-year period between July 22, 2019, and July 21, 2020 [Id. ¶ 56].
Humana’s summary relates that nearly 90% of RHP’s paid claims were for Diflorasone, amounting
to $258,000 for 213 paid claims [Id.]. The affidavit relates that most prescribers responding to
“prescribing verification forms” denied prescribing Diflorasone and Calciptriene creams [Id. ¶ 57].
Three prescribing verification forms from Nurse Practitioners Courtney Travis, Alicia Armstrong,
and Felicia Bertram are reproduced in the affidavit [Id. ¶ 58]. All three deny prescribing
Diflorasone ointment [Id.]. Nurse Practitioner Travis noted that the Diflorasone ointment and
Calciptriene cream “are for psoriasis, and [she] d[id no]t treat that” [Id. ¶¶ 57–58]. Nurse
Practitioner Armstrong stated that three of the claims were for patients she is no longer treating
[Id. ¶¶ 57–58].
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According to Agent Valero, a review of the files for two patients of Dr. Jack Scariano,
which files were produced “in relation to another case and in response to compulsory service,”
reveals that RHP submitted claims for prescriptions for these patients when the provider’s files do
not contain “corresponding prescriptions or office visits for many of the pharmacy claims”
[Id. ¶ 59]. The patient file for M.U. reveals that Dr. Scariano treated M.U. from February 28, 2018,
through December 16, 2021, and notes a cancelled appointment on August 23, 2022, and that M.U.
was a “no show” for an appointment on January 10, 2023 [Id. ¶ 60]. RHP submitted claims for six
prescriptions for M.U. when the doctor’s file contained only two prescriptions, and three of RHP’s
claims are for prescriptions and refills more than three months to more than a year after M.U.’s
last attended appointment with Dr. Scariano [Id. ¶¶ 60–62]. FBI agents interviewed M.U. on
January 23, 2024, and M.U. said Dr. Scariano prescribed a topical pain cream, but M.U. did not
receive a paper prescription [Id. ¶ 65]. M.U. reported receiving two to three bottles of pain cream
from RHP in the mail every thirty days through sometime in 2023 but not having an appointment
with Dr. Scariano in two to three years [Id.].
Agent Valero states that the second patient file for patient R.D. reveals that Dr. Scariano
treated R.D. from October 25, 2021, through May 16, 2022, and notes a canceled appointment on
November 14, 2022 [Id. ¶ 66]. The file also contains one signed “RHP prescription sheet”
authorizing six refills and dated October 25, 2021 [Id. ¶ 67]. He states RHP submitted claims to
the DOL EEOICP for three prescriptions, each with refills, listing Dr. Scariano as the prescriber,
for patient R.D., on October 25, 2021; April 25, 2022; and August 18, 2022 [Id. ¶ 68].
Agent Valero states that a review of RHP’s claims on the Pioneer RX software, shows that
from November 2017 to December 2023, RHP billed 99% of its claims for a topical pain cream
containing ketoprofen, amitriptyline, and diclofenac to Medicare through the PBM Secure
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Horizons and was reimbursed $5.2 million, which is an average of $1,500 per claim [Id. ¶¶ 70–
71]. In contrast, RHP sought payment for this same pain cream from other payors forty-two times
during that same time frame and received $4,600 in reimbursement [Id. ¶ 71]. Agent Valero states
that a claims analysis of RHP’s TennCare/Medicaid claims shows that from April 2019 to March
2020, 98% of RHP’s claims for Lidocaine-HC rectal kits were to a Medicaid plan [Id. ¶ 72].
According to Agent Valero, when Medicaid began to reject claims for the rectal kits, RHP switched
to billing for Diclofenac Sodium 1% gel, which continued through mid-July 2021 [Id.].
According to Agent Valero, HHS-OIG investigators and state law enforcement officers
interviewed former RHP pharmacy technician Sydney Goodson on September 2, 2021 [Id. ¶ 73].
Ms. Goodson testified that Tiffany Haney, Anne Warren, and Tina Roper were “masterminds” at
submitting “test claims” to payors to see how much the payor would reimburse the pharmacy for
various ingredients to insure that RHP received the maximum reimbursement for prescriptions
[Id. ¶¶ 73–74]. Ms. Goodson stated that Luther Little, RHP’s sales representative, visited doctor’s
offices to pass out prescription pads containing five different formulas for pain creams, gels, or
kits [Id. ¶ 75]. She said that the provider would check the box for the formula that was the best fit
for the patient and then send the prescription to RHP by fax [Id.]. According to Ms. Goodson,
Little would arrange lunch meetings with doctors in Knoxville to talk about “pain contracts” and
the services available from RHP [Id.]. She stated that “the doctors were on board with the pain
contracts no matter what prescription was written to the patient” [Id.]. She said even if the doctor
only told the patient to take Ibuprofen, the doctor still prescribed a pain cream [Id.]. Regarding the
pain contracts and the pre-printed RHP prescription forms, Ms. Goodson stated that even patients
who filled prescriptions at other pharmacies filled their pain cream prescriptions at RHP [Id. ¶ 76].
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The affidavit relates that Ms. Goodson opined that RHP pharmacists were living more
expensive lifestyles than a typical pharmacist [Id. ¶ 77]. Agent Valero stated that agents learned
that between December 2022 and October 2023, Haney chartered private jets for family trips to
Florida, Ohio, and South Carolina. Agents also learned that both Haney and Warren purchased
“luxury lake houses” [Id.].
Agent Valero states that Ms. Goodson told agents that Tina Roper called patients to check
on whether they wanted a refill of their prescription, and if the patient did not answer the call,
Roper placed the patient on automatic refills for pain creams [Id. ¶ 78]. Agent Valero stated that
patients told agents that they received numerous unwanted pain cream refills by mail [Id. ¶ 79].
Agent Valero also states that RHP’s website permits providers to book “lunch and learn”
meetings at which RHP will cater a meal at the provider’s office [Id. ¶ 80]. During these meetings,
RHP states it will explain the services it provides and how RHP and the provider can work together
to benefit the patients and providers [Id.].
Agent Valero states that on February 2, 2024, HHS-OIG investigators and state law
enforcement officers interviewed G.T., a patient of Dr. Scariano [Id. ¶ 82]. G.T. stated that he told
Dr. Scariano he did not want to receive pain cream by mail anymore, and he stopped receiving it
[Id. ¶ 80]. G.T. said despite this, he continued regularly to receive text messages about refills from
RHP for several years [Id.]. G.T. reported that he responded to the messages that he did not want
a refill [Id.]. Agent Valero relates that on the day of the interview, G.T. received a text message
from RHP asking if he wanted a refill on a 2020 prescription for Gabapentin pain cream [Id. ¶ 83].
G.T. said he received this refill message from RHP monthly for several years [Id.]. G.T. gave the
agents a screenshot of this text message, which is reproduced in the affidavit [Id. ¶ 84].
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According to Agent Valero, Medicare generally requires copayments (“copays”) from its
patients and requires pharmacies to collect these copayments [Id. ¶ 85]. He states that between
August 27, 2019, and December 29, 2023, RHP did not collect a copay on 2,191 of 3,533 claims
for a specific pain cream. During this time, Medicare, through PBM Secure Horizons, paid RHP
$3,274,400.34 for the 2,191 claims on which RHP collected no copay [Id. ¶ 87]. He gives two
examples of patients who told agents that RHP did not collect copays from them [Id. ¶ 88].
Agent Valero states that on December 6, 2023, investigating agents received a suspicious
activity report from Truist Bank regarding RHP owners Tiffany Haney and Anne Warren
[Id. ¶ 89]. The bank identified large transfers for “management fees” and unusual activity between
RHP’s account and Haney’s and Warren’s accounts at other financial institutions [Id.]. The bank
stated that these types of transfers by a pharmacy are “highly unusual, indicative of fraud,” and
could cause the bank to close the account [Id.].
Agent Valero states that he was seeking to seize records from the premises of RHP whether
in paper format or on computers or other electronic storage media [Id. ¶ 90]. He states that where
possible, agents will copy data, rather than seizing the digital devices to avoid disrupting the
business [Id. ¶¶ 91, 94]. According to Agent Valero and based upon his review of other evidence
related to this investigation, he knows that computers were used “to generate, store, and print
documents used in the health care fraud scheme” [Id. ¶ 92(e)]. He asks to seize and copy “storage
media that reasonably appear to contain some or all of the evidence described in the warrant” and
asks that the warrant “authorize a later review of the media or information” [Id. ¶ 95].
Based upon Agent Valero’s affidavit, United States Magistrate Judge Debra Poplin issued
a search warrant for RHP on April 12, 2024 [See Doc. 119-1 (search warrant affidavit and
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attachments)].11 Agents searched RHP on April 16, 2024, and seized prescriptions, paper records
and notebooks, computer data, and copies of data extracted from the cell phones of both owners
and four employees present at the time of the search [Doc. 185-3 pp. 2–8 (FBI Evidence Entry);
Doc. 148-1 p. 2; see also Doc. 151, Transcript of May 29, 2025 hearing, p. 28].
B. 	Agent Celeste’s Affidavit
FBI Special Agent Emily Celeste submitted a one-hundred-forty-one-page affidavit in
support of nineteen seizure warrants to seize bank accounts, investment accounts, vehicles, and
watercraft, “which contain funds that consist of proceeds from health care fraud offenses or are
traceable to such proceeds[,]” from Tiffany Haney and Anne Warren, the owners of RHP, who are
under investigation for healthcare fraud [Doc. 119-2 ¶¶ 2, 4].12 RHP is a “full-service pharmacy
that can fill any prescription and also offers custom pharmaceutical compounding” [Id. ¶ 34].
Agent Celeste alleges that probable cause exists to believe “that funds in each of the Subject
Bank and Investment accounts . . . were derived from proceeds traceable to violations of specific
unlawful activities as defined in 18 U.S.C. §[]1956(c)(7)(F), specifically conspiracy to commit
health care fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1349,” and, thus, “the traceable portions of the funds in”
11 	The returned search warrant for the search of RHP remains sealed in case number
3:24-MJ-1095. In that case, United States Magistrate Judge Debra C. Poplin granted the
Government’s motion for a limited unsealing of the supporting affidavit and attachments, which
were provided to defense counsel. A sealed [Doc. 89-1] and a redacted [Doc. 119-1] version of the
affidavit and attachments are filed in this case.
12 	Defendant Haney filed an unredacted, sealed version of Agent Celeste’s affidavit as an
exhibit to her suppression motion [Doc. 91, SEALED]. The Government subsequently filed a
redacted version of the Affidavit [Doc. 119-2]. Upon review by the Court, the redacted version of
the affidavit contains numerous missing pages and is seventy pages shorter than the unredacted
affidavit. Accordingly, the Court cites to the affidavit (guided by the paragraph numbering in the
unredacted 	affidavit) 	but 	has 	ordered 	the 	Government 	to 	replace 	the 	redacted 	affidavit
[Doc. 119-2] with a complete redacted version [Doc. 201].
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Haney’s and Warren’s bank accounts, investment accounts, vehicles, and real properties13 are
subject to seizure and forfeiture [Doc. 119-2 ¶ 5]. Agent Celeste also alleges probable cause exists
to believe that “the entirety of the Subject Bank Accounts, Subject Investment Accounts, Subject
Vehicles and Real Property are involved in [and forfeitable as a result of ]money laundering
activity” [id. ¶ 7] and implicate the Spending Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1957 [id. ¶ 6].
Agent Celeste alleges that the investigation provides probable cause to believe Defendants
Haney and Warren and others conspired “to create and submit for reimbursement to health care
benefit programs altered and forged prescriptions for pharmaceutical drugs, including pain creams,
. . . for the purpose of executing a scheme and artifice to defraud health care benefit programs, and
to obtain by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, at least
$32,925,969 owned by or under the control of health care benefit programs” [Id. ¶ 8]. Agent
Celeste states that insurance companies paid RHP a total of $32,925,969 for engaging in five
schemes: (1) a fraudulent rectal cream scheme ($972,060), (2) false billing for family and friends
($722,198), (3) false billing for altered and forged prescriptions for a compound cream
(“Keto10/Amit2/Diclo1”) known as “Option 2” or “Option 3” ($5,097,670), (4) false billing for
altered and forged prescriptions for steroid “[a]dd-ons” ($3,233,728), and (5) a DOL EEOIC
scheme ($22,900,313) [Id. ¶¶ 9–10]. Agent Celeste states that based upon claims in Pioneer RX,
financial records, records seized from RHP in April 2024, and witness interviews, payments from
PMBs into RHP’s operating accounts occurred from September 2018 through July 2024 [Id. ¶16].
13 	Although discussed in the affidavit, Defendants’ real properties were not seized pursuant
to seizure warrants [See Doc. 119-2 ¶ 33]. Instead, the Government filed a Bill of Particulars for
Forfeiture of Property on November 8, 2024, listing six real properties of Defendants Haney and
Warren, Defendant Tina Roper, and RHP employee Tabitha Roper [Doc. 18 pp. 3–6]. That same
day, the Government also filed five Notices of Lis Pendens for five of the properties [Docs. 19–
23]. On November 11, 2024, it filed a Notice of Lis Pendens for the sixth property [Doc. 27].
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Agent Celeste states that between August 10, 2018, and September 30, 2024, PMBs, acting
on behalf of insurance companies, deposited $3,432,070 into RHP’s operating account FCP 2730
and $30,569,501 into RHP’s operating account Truist 5152, for a total of $34,001,571 paid to
RHP’s two main operating accounts by PMBs [Id. ¶¶ 14, 20(a)–(b)].14 Of this total, $32,925,969
was paid to RHP from the PMBs for the five schemes [Id. ¶ 15]. From RHP’s operating accounts,
Defendants Haney and Warren paid themselves and then purchased property and created
investment accounts using the money paid to them from the five schemes [Id. ¶ 17]. Between
August 2018 and October 2, 2024, Defendant Warren paid herself $10,606,585 from the RHP
operating accounts to her personal bank accounts (primarily into her account for Warren
Management, LLC, in the form of “management fees” [id. ¶ 23]), and Defendant Haney paid
herself $10,518,562 from the RHP operating accounts to her personal banking accounts (primarily
into her account for Haney Consulting, LLC, in the form of “management fees” [id. ¶ 22])
[Id. ¶ 18]. These payments amounted to 54% of RHP’s gross revenue [Id.]. According to Agent
Celeste, funds from the five health care fraud schemes were paid to the two RHP operating
accounts and, from there, Defendants Haney and Warren paid the funds into their personal bank
accounts [Id. ¶ 20]. She alleges that Defendants Haney and Warren then used the funds from the
fraudulent schemes, now located in their personal bank accounts, to purchase property, to make
loan payments on existing property, and to fund investment accounts [Id.].
Agent Celeste states that the Government seeks seizure warrants for all funds from eight
bank accounts of Defendant Warren [id. ¶ 28(i)–(viii)]; all funds from three bank accounts for
Defendant Haney [id. ¶ 29(i)–(iii)]; all funds from two investment accounts belonging to
14 	Payments from patients and “pharmaceutical rebates” comprised another $5,350,204
deposited into RHP’s two main operating accounts [Doc. 119-2 ¶ 15].
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Defendant Warren [id. ¶30(i)–(ii)]; all funds from two investment accounts belonging to Defendant
Haney [id. ¶30(iii)–(iv)]; two vehicles (a Denali and an Escalade) titled to Haney Consulting, LLC,
[id. ¶ 31(i)–(ii)]; one boat in the name of Vanden Warren [id. ¶ 31(iii)]; and one pontoon boat in
the name of Defendant Haney [id. ¶ 31(iv)]. Based upon information from her investigation and
set out in the affidavit, Agent Celeste alleges that probable cause exists to believe the nineteen
listed bank accounts, investment accounts, vehicles, and watercraft “are property or are property
traceable to property (or funds) that constitutes proceeds resulting from health care fraud offenses”
and are thus subject to civil and criminal forfeiture and also subject to forfeiture as property
involved in money laundering offenses [Id. ¶¶ 32–33].
1. 	Rectal Kit Scheme
Agent Celeste relates that in May 2021, the FBI, Tennessee Bureau of Investigation
(“TBI”), and HHS-OIG investigators began an investigation of RHP based upon an investigation
by TennCare’s Officer of Program Integrity (“OPI”) that concluded in February 2021 and which
was based on the OptumRx audit of RHP [Id. ¶ 36]. According to Agent Celeste, the OptumRx
audit identified RHP as an outlier in billing for certain medications [Id.]. She states that the OPI
investigation focused on prescriptions for Diclofenac gel 1%, Lidocaine-HC rectal kits 3–.05%,
and Lidocaine rectal kits 3–1% [Id. ¶ 38]. Agent Celeste relates that OptumRx reviewed a sample
of medical and pharmacy records and interviewed prescribers [Id. ¶ 39]. She asserts that seven
prescribers, both in interviews and written verification forms, denied prescribing the medications
dispensed by RHP [Id. ¶ 40]. Agent Celeste further states that in addition to OptumRx’s findings,
OPI found that RHP lacked documentation for its claims and had discrepancies in its prescription
origin codes (“POCs”), which show whether the pharmacy received the prescription by phone or
fax [Id. ¶ 40].
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According to Agent Celeste, agents searched RHP in April 2024 and seized prescriptions
related to the OptumRx audit and RHP’s claims data through July 2024 from RHP’s Pioneer RX
system [Id. ¶ 40]. She states that the data from Pioneer RX revealed that RHP billed TennCare for
rectal kits under the names of forty-eight prescribers and was reimbursed $972,060 [Id. ¶ 44]. The
agent says that financial records show the payments from TennCare were deposited into RHP’s
operating accounts [Id. ¶ 45]. Agent Celeste relates that TBI and HHS-OIG investigators
interviewed about one-half of the forty-eight prescribers, and none had prescribed a kit to treat the
patient’s rectal area [Id. ¶ 46]. She states that FBI and TBI agents interviewed prescriber C.T.,
whose prescriptions were associated with the most paid claims for rectal kits by RHP [Id. ¶ 47].
According to Agent Celeste, C.T. denied ever prescribing rectal kits to her patients [Id. ¶ 48].
Agent Celeste states that when patients told C.T. that they were receiving eight to ten creams for
rectal use, C.T. told the patients to tell RHP they no longer wanted refills of the creams [Id.].
Agent Celeste states that during the search of RHP, agents interviewed RHP pharmacy
technician Tina Roper, who stated that TennCare sent RHP a list of national drug codes for the
drugs covered by TennCare [Id. ¶ 49]. Agent Celeste said, based upon her training and experience,
that Lidocaine, which RHP commonly used “as a secondary cream,” can be purchased as an over-
the-counter cream and, thus, would not be covered by TennCare [Id. ¶¶ 50–51]. Agent Celeste
states that submitting a claim for the kits was the only way to get TennCare to cover the Lidocaine
cream because TennCare covered the rectal kits [Id. ¶ 51]. According to Agent Celeste, Defendant
Roper said she explained to the providers that they needed to prescribe the rectal kits so the cream
would be covered [Id. ¶ 53]. Agent Celeste further states that between September 2018 and March
2020, TennCare paid RHP $972,060 for rectal kits, which payments were deposited into the RHP
operating accounts [Id. ¶ 54].
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2. 	Prescriptions for Family and Friends
According to Agent Celeste, shortly after opening, RHP began filling prescriptions for
medications with high reimbursement rates for the owners, the owner’s spouses, two pharmacy
technicians, one technician’s husband, a former RHP pharmacist, and the former pharmacist’s
child [Id. ¶ 56]. Agent Celeste states that from August 23, 2018, through July 25, 2024, insurance
companies paid RHP’s operating accounts $722,198.64 for these prescriptions [Id.].
Agent Celeste further states that provider J.C. told investigators that she “authorized only
one formulary prescription” for J.H., but records show that RHP submitted claims for eighteen
medications prescribed by J.C. for J.H. [Id. ¶ 60]. Agent Celeste relates that provider J.C. also
denied 	authorizing 	any 	prescriptions 	for 	T.H., 	but 	RHP 	submitted 	claims 	for 	seventeen
medications prescribed by J.C. for T.H. [Id. ¶ 61]. The combined prescriptions for J.H. and T.H.
resulted in a total reimbursement of $169,113 into RHP’s operating accounts [Id. at 59]. Agent
Celeste stated the FBI interviewed provider J.C. on June 27, 2024, and J.C. reported meeting T.H.
once and treating J.H. once or twice, when she might have prescribed a pain cream J.H. requested
[Id. ¶¶ 62–63].
Agent Celeste states that provider J.C. provided medical records showing that J.C. treated
J.H. on March 3, 2018, and referred J.H. for an injection for pain on May 9, 2019 [Id. ¶ 64].
According to Agent Celeste, the medical records show that J.C. wrote a formulary prescription for
J.H. on RHP’s form on May 28, 2019 [Id. ¶ 65]. The agent states that this prescription was seized
during the search of RHP, and the copy of the prescription seized from RHP shows that
Fluocinonide cream and Lidocaine/Tetracine were added to it [Id. ¶ 66]. She relates that agents
also seized three additional prescriptions by J.C. for J.H. that J.C. denied writing [Id. ¶¶ 68–71].
Agent Celeste states that J.C.’s medical records reflect that T.H. had one appointment with J.C. on
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April 17, 2018, but J.C. did not prescribe any medication for T.H. [Id. ¶ 72]. According to Agent
Celeste, the search of RHP revealed five prescriptions for T.H. prescribed by J.C., which J.C.
denied authorizing [Id. ¶¶ 73–74].
Agent Celeste states that claims data from Pioneer RX showed that between January 21,
2019, and August 9, 2021, RHP’s operating accounts were reimbursed $130,340 for prescriptions
from provider D.E. for seventeen medications for T.H. and sixteen medications for T.R.
[Id. ¶¶ 76–78]. Agent Celeste states that the FBI interviewed D.E. on July 2, 2024, and D.E. told
the agents that he did not think he prescribed the medications for which T.H. received prescriptions
or, if he did, he would have done so only if T.H. requested them by name [Id. ¶ 79]. Agent Celeste
says D.E. recalled T.H. requesting and him prescribing two highly reimbursed medications that he
had never prescribed before [Id. ¶¶ 80–81]. She states that D.E. also denied prescribing two
medications for T.R. on January 2, 2020 [Id. ¶ 82].
According to Agent Celeste, data from Pioneer RX shows that between August 24, 2018,
and January 18, 2023, insurance companies reimbursed RHP for prescriptions by provider M.M.
for T.H., J.H., T.R., J.P., A.W., and V.W. in the total amount of $138,867.34, which was deposited
into RHP’s operating accounts [Id. ¶ 83]. The FBI interviewed M.M. on June 27, 2024, and M.M.,
a neighbor of Defendant Warren, denied ever treating any of the individuals and only twice calling
in a prescription to RHP [Id. ¶¶ 84–85, 87]. Agent Celeste stated text messages between Defendant
Warren and a former RHP pharmacist show Warren instructing the pharmacist “not to write any
scripts under” M.M.’s name because M.M. did not “authoriz[e] blanket script writing,” and
Defendant Warren did not want to get her neighbor into trouble [Id. ¶ 89].
Agent Celeste further states that RHP was paid $119,236 into its operating accounts for
nine prescriptions by provider K.T. for J.H. between January 11, 2019, and December 29, 2023
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[Id. ¶¶ 90–91]. She says FBI agents and HHS-OIG investigators interviewed K.T. on June 27,
2024, and K.T. denied that J.H. had appointments with K.T. between December 13, 2018, and
September 11, 2019, and also denied knowing the purpose of the six medications resulting in
claims by RHP during that time [Id. ¶ 92].
Agent Celeste stated that RHP was reimbursed $50,792 for prescriptions from provider
A.S. for T.H. between April 18, 2018, and March 5, 2019 [Id. ¶ 97]. According to Agent Celeste,
an interview of A.S. revealed that T.H. had one appointment with A.S. on April 18, 2018, at which
A.S. prescribed two medications for T.H. [Id. ¶ 99]. Agent Celeste states that RHP was paid for
prescriptions for five other medications for T.H. prescribed by provider A.S., including fifteen
prescriptions for Fenoprophen for which RHP was reimbursed $3,245 each [Id. ¶ 100]. Agent
Celeste states that similarly, insurers reimbursed RHP $30,460 for prescriptions by provider A.D.
for twenty-four prescriptions for T.C. between June 24, 2021, and May 3, 2024 [Id. ¶¶ 101–102].
Agent Celeste relates that the FBI interviewed A.D. on August 29, 2024 [Id. ¶ 103]. According to
Agent Celeste, A.D. said she and T.C. worked together at Walgreen’s Pharmacy fifteen years ago
[Id.]. The agent says A.D. reported calling in a single prescription to RHP for T.C. on June 24,
2021, for two medications A.D. did not typically prescribe [Id.]. Agent Celeste states that A.D. did
not recall writing the other prescriptions, including a prescription for T.C.’s child, and A.D. stated
that she typically writes e-scripts and the prescriptions shown to her by investigators were
handwritten and some misspelled A.D.’s name [Id. ¶¶ 103–04].
3. 	Prescription Formularies
Agent Celeste states that between August 2018 and July 2024, Defendants Haney and
Warren distributed a prescription formulary listing compounded and other pain creams to medical
practices in East Tennessee [Id. ¶ 106]. She relates that representatives from RHP brought lunch
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to the providers and gave them the formulary pads [Id. ¶ 110]. She also states that the formulary
contained options for compounded medications and “add-ons/substitutions” [Id. ¶ 107]. Agent
Celste states that the FBI seized all formularies it could locate from RHP during the execution of
a search warrant [Id. ¶ 108]. According to Agent Celeste, the formulary prescriptions seized from
RHP had “original pen marks on faxed formularies indicating the potential that additions were
being made to the prescriptions at the pharmacy after they were faxed from the medical clinics”
[Id. ¶ 109]. Agent Celeste also states that “formularies and refill requests that were signed in the
name of medical providers but had no fax markings, indicat[e] the potential that” RHP employees
forged the provider’s names at RHP [Id.]. According to Agent Celeste, during the search of RHP,
agents seized prescriptions written on a prescription pad located at the pharmacy on which the
provider’s name was added [Id. ¶¶ 71, 109].
Agent Celeste stated that after the search of RHP, agents and investigators from the FBI,
TBI, and HHS-OIG interviewed nearly sixty providers who prescribed medications on the
formulary prescription forms seized from RHP, showing the providers copies of the prescriptions
[Id. ¶ 110]. Agent Celeste stated the providers identified three problems: (1) the providers nearly
always chose Option 1 on the formulary, but another option was filled instead [id. ¶¶ 111–17];
(2) add-ons or steroids were added to the compounds the provider prescribed [id. ¶¶ 111,
119–30];15 and (3) prescriptions existed that the provider did not write [Id. ¶ 111, 131–76].16 The
15 	Like Agent Valero’s affidavit, Agent Celeste’s affidavit also describes the 2020 Humana
audit and states that three providers denied prescribing a compound that added Diflorasone and/or
Calcipotriene [Doc. 119-2 ¶¶ 123–24]. Agent Celeste’s affidavit states that RHP “was able to
mitigate with two of the prescriber denials, but provider C.T. denied four claims for Diflorasone
and three claims for Calciprotriene” [Id. ¶ 124].
16 	This category includes the missing prescriptions from Dr. Scariano’s file for patients M.U.
and R.D. [Doc. 119-2 ¶¶ 145–51], which were also discussed in Agent Valero’s affidavit.
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affidavit reproduces numerous prescriptions that Agent Celeste states were altered or forged in
these ways [Id. ¶¶ 117, 122, 159–60, 171, 173]. Agent Celeste relates that according to data from
Pioneer RX, between August 26, 2019, and November 7, 2024, RHP submitted claims for the
formularies with altered options and the insurers paid $5,097,670, which was deposited into RHP’s
operating accounts [Id. ¶ 118]. She states that Pioneer RX data also shows that between August
15, 2018, and August 1, 2024, payors paid $3,233,728 to RHP for “add-ons” to prescriptions,
which funds were deposited into RHP’s operating accounts [Id. ¶ 130]. Agent Celeste states that
between August 2019 and July 30, 2024, the DOL EEOIC benefit plan paid RHP $22,900,
313 from prescriptions attributed to Dr. Jack Scariano and a provider at his office M.F., which
funds were deposited into RHP’s Truist 5152 operating account [Id. ¶ 176].
Agent Celeste summarizes the losses from the five schemes. She states that between
September 2018 and March 2020, TennCare paid RHP approximately $972,060 for the rectal kits
[Id. ¶ 177]. Between September 2018 and July 2024, health benefit plans paid RHP $722,198 for
prescriptions for RHP’s owners and employees and their family members [Id. ¶ 178]. From August
2018 to July 2024, PMB Secure Horizons17 paid RHP $5,097,670 for prescriptions written for
Option 1 but filled for Options 2 or 3 on the formulary [Id. ¶ 179]. From August 2018 to July 2024,
health benefit plans paid RHP $3,233,728 for steroid add-ons to the formularies [Id. ¶ 180].
Between August 2019 and July 2024, DOL EEOIC paid RHP $22,900,313, into Truist account
5155, for prescriptions written in the names of Dr. Scariano and provider M.F. in his office
[Id. ¶ 181].18 According to Agent Celeste, the total paid to RHP for the five schemes is $32,925,969
17 	Agent Celeste states Secure Horizons paid 99% of these claims [Doc. 119-2 ¶ 179].
18 	Agent Celeste states that law enforcement continues to investigate the prescriptions filled
in Dr. Scariano’s and M.F.’s names [Id. ¶ 181].
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and probable cause exists to believe that this amount is based on fraudulent prescriptions submitted
by RHP [Id. ¶ 182].
4. 	Tracing Proceeds
The remainder of Agent Celeste’s affidavit documents that funds from RHP’s two primary
operating accounts were deposited into eight of Defendant Warren’s bank accounts and three of
Defendant Haney’s bank accounts and from there used by Defendants to pay for or make payments
toward real property and improvements thereto,19 investment accounts, vehicles, and watercraft
[Id.¶¶ 183–84, 192–95, 197–214 (Haney properties, investment accounts, vehicles, and pontoon
boat), & 215–22 (Warren properties, investment accounts, and boat)]. Agent Celeste states that
based upon the information provided in support of the five schemes, probable cause exists to find
that funds from the schemes are proceeds of healthcare fraud and that Defendants Haney and
Warren “knew those proceeds were criminally derived” [Id. ¶ 185].
Agent Celeste avers that Defendants Haney and Warren conducted financial transactions,
in amounts exceeding $10,000, with funds that they knew were the proceeds of healthcare fraud
“for the purpose of concealing the nature, source, location, ownership, or control of those proceeds,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957” [Id. ¶¶ 186–187]. Agent Celeste provides charts identifying
example transactions from the enumerated bank accounts of Defendants Warren and Haney, which
Agent Celeste states show how “each identified account and forfeitable asset was involved in
money laundering transactions in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957” [Id. ¶ 189].
Agent Celeste states that probable cause exists to believe the eight bank accounts of
Defendant Warren and the three bank accounts of Defendant Haney contain proceeds of the target
19 	Agent Celeste states that the Government is not seeking seizure warrants for real property
but will file a bill of particulars including the real properties and will also file lis pendens on the
real properties, which are subject to forfeiture [Doc. 119-2 ¶ 187].
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offenses and that these bank accounts along with Defendant Haney’s and Warren’s investment
accounts and vehicles were involved in money laundering transactions [Id. ¶ 223]. According to
Agent Celeste, on October 16, 2024, the Grand Jury indicted Defendants Haney and Warren for
conspiracy to commit health care fraud, false statements relating to health care matters, aggravated
identity theft [Id.]. She states that the indictment includes general forfeiture allegations seeking
forfeiture of the proceeds of the charged offenses [Id.].20 According to Agent Celeste, the
Government seeks seizure warrants for seizure of the enumerated bank accounts and investment
accounts, “which contain funds constituting . . . traceable proceeds of a conspiracy to commit
health care fraud” [Id. ¶ 227]. She states the Government also seeks seizure of the subject vehicles
and watercraft and all funds in the subject bank accounts and investment accounts as the “‘involved
in property’ or money laundering transactions in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957” [Id.].21
C. 	Testimony from the August 12, 2025 Motion Hearing
Roper Testimony. At the August 12, 2025 evidentiary hearing, Defendant Tina Marie Roper
acknowledged that she understood her right not to testify and agreed that she was choosing to
testify with full knowledge of her rights and at the advice of counsel [Doc. 195, Transcript, p. 22].
Defendant Roper testified that she previously worked at RHP as a pharmacy technician and
pharmacy educator [Id. at 22–23]. She stated that her role as a pharmacy educator involved
speaking at luncheons at doctor’s offices on the compounds available from RHP and the benefits
of those compounds for their patients [Id. at 23]. Defendant Roper stated that RHP was a “full
20 	Agent Celeste states that the Government intends to file a bill of particulars specifically
listing the real property, accounts, and vehicles subject to forfeiture [Doc. 119-2 ¶ 223].
21 	Agent Celeste states that seizure warrants, rather than a protective order, are necessary for
the bank accounts because electronically-stored funds are easily transferred [Doc. 119-2 ¶ 224].
She also states that the seizure warrants are necessary for the subject vehicles and watercraft
because these assets are easily moved, hidden, or sold [Id.].
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pharmacy” but specialized in making topical creams and hormones that were specific for patients
[Id.].
Defendant Roper stated she previously worked in traditional pharmacies and for the last
ten years has worked in compounding pharmacies [Id.]. She said compounding involves mixing
components, such as powders and creams, to make topical lotions, sublingual troches, or capsules
[Id. at 24]. According to Defendant Roper, she previously worked in the compounding laboratory
at RHP and, before that, at Volunteer Pharmacy [Id. at 23–25]. She stated that before working for
the compounding pharmacies, she worked as a pharmacy technician at Walmart [Id. at 25].
Defendant Roper stated that a pharmacy technician has several duties such as entering
prescriptions in the computer system, counting out medications, checking out patients at the
register, and making phone calls to patients for refills [Id.]. She agreed that a pharmacy technician
is the pharmacist’s assistant [Id.]. Defendant Roper said pharmacy technicians do not interact with
medical providers, but they do interact with patients [Id. at 25–26]. Defendant Roper said when a
provider sent a prescription to RHP, they primarily did so by fax or “e-script” through the computer
system [Id. at 26].
Defendant Roper testified that on April 16, 2024, she was working at RHP when the FBI
came into the pharmacy wearing full tactical gear [Id.]. She said she was standing behind the
computer closest to the pharmacy’s office when the FBI entered, identified themselves, and stated
that they had a warrant [Id. at 26–27]. She said the agents told her to step back from the computer,
which she did [Id. at 27]. Defendant Roper said an agent asked her to show the agent how to
operate the computer system [Id.]. Defendant Roper stated that she showed the agent how to do
simple tasks on Pioneer, which is RHP’s pharmacy management system, and which was already
pulled up on the computer [Id.].
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Defendant Roper said she had access to RHP’s Pioneer system [Id.]. She explained that the
system allowed her to search for patients and review their profiles [Id. at 28]. She said when RHP
received a prescription, the Pioneer system would “walk you through” processing them [Id.]. She
said when RHP received a prescription, she or another employee would “drop them in” and enter
the information on the prescription into the computer system [Id.]. Then, a pharmacist would check
the information [Id.]. She agreed that if the prescription was for a new patient, she would set up
the new patient in the system [Id. at 28–29]. Defendant Roper said once the prescription was sent
to the pharmacist, she did not work on it again [Id. at 29]. She denied ever filling out prescriptions
or writing things on prescriptions and stated that was the pharmacist’s job [Id.]. She agreed this
was also the medical provider’s job [Id.].
Defendant Roper said when the FBI agents entered RHP, they turned off the pharmacy’s
security cameras [Id. at 29–30]. She said after she showed the agent how to work the computer,
she was asked to move to a table in the front of the pharmacy [Id. at 29–30]. Defendant Roper said
at least twenty agents were present during the search [Id. at 30]. She said five people were working
at RHP that day, and no customers were present when the FBI arrived [Id.]. She said the agents
carried side arms and wore bulletproof vests and cargo pants [Id. at 31].
Defendant Roper stated that the agents did not show her a warrant that morning [Id.]. She
said she was questioned, but none of the agents advised her of her rights [Id.]. Defendant Roper
did not know the name of the agent who questioned her but stated that Agent Emily Celeste sat
beside her taking notes while she was questioned [Id.].
Defendant Roper testified that after showing the agent how to operate the Pioneer system,
she was taken to a table in the front [Id. at 32]. She said one agent commented that the employees
still had their cell phones and that their cell phones needed to be taken [Id.]. She said an agent then
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asked for their cell phones [Id. at 33]. Defendant Roper said her boss, Anne Warren, asked to see
the warrant because they were taking the employees’ cell phones [Id. at 32]. She said an agent
showed Defendant Warren the warrant, pointed out a section that supposedly authorized the agents
to take the cell phones, and then took the warrant back [Id.]. Defendant Roper stated that she did
not review the warrant and felt she had to give the agents her cell phone [Id. at 32–33].
Defendant Roper stated that the agents took cell phones from the five employees who were
present: Anne Warren, Tabitha Roper, Carina Brabson, Jeannette Porterfield, and herself
[Id. at 33]. She said these were the employees’ personal cell phones, not work phones [Id.].
Defendant Roper stated that the agents asked anyone whose cell phone had a code to write it down
[Id. at 34]. She said her cell phone did not have a code [Id.]. She stated that the agents did not tell
the employees that their phones would be searched [Id.]. Defendant Roper said, instead, the agent
said that they would have technicians download all the information from their cell phones
[Id. at 35]. She said after the agents took the employee’s cell phones, she saw the cell phones on a
table and “connected for hours” [Id.]. Defendant Roper said the agents did not return their cell
phones until the end of the search [Id.].
Defendant Roper said the agents never said the employees were free to leave, nor did they
tell her that she was not required to talk to them [Id.]. According to Defendant Roper, the agents
did not say that she did not have to talk to them, nor did they advise her of her rights [Id.]. She said
she did not recall that any of the employees had other personal electronic devices such as iPads
with them that day, but they all had their cell phones [Id.]. Defendant Roper said that she felt like
she was detained and not free to leave [Id. at 36]. She said none of the employees tried to leave
[Id.]. She agreed that she felt intimidated [Id.].
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Defendant Roper testified that the agents did not ask her to access a list of providers on the
computer [Id.]. She said once she went to the table in the front of the business, she did not go back
to her computer [Id.]. She said the agents did not remove computers from RHP, and she did not
know if they downloaded information from the computers [Id. at 36, 38]. Defendant Roper said
she and other employees used the RHP computers to check their personal email [Id. at 36]. She
said she did not check Facebook, social media, or text messages on the work computers [Id. at 36–
37]. She said other than checking her email, she did not have personal photographs or other
information on the work computers [Id. at 37]. She did not know if other employees had personal
information on the work computers [Id.].
Defendant Roper stated that the agents took her personal cell phone [Id.]. She said RHP
did not pay the bill for her cell phone, and she was not required to use it for any part of her job at
RHP [Id.]. She agreed that she cooperated with the agents and did not question their actions [Id.].
She agreed that she answered all their questions [Id. at 37–38].
Defendant Roper said she saw the agents take ten or more banker boxes of prescriptions
out of RHP [Id. at 38]. She said one of the agents said they had a warrant to seize “all things” [Id.].
She agreed that the agent said “we’ve got a warrant, and we’re taking everything” [Id. at 39].
On cross-examination, Defendant Roper testified that when the agents arrived, she stood
beside the computer closest to the office with the Pioneer program open on that computer in
preparation for her work that day [Id. at 39–40]. She said that computer was her workstation for
that day, but she switched computers depending on who was working each day [Id. at 40].
Defendant Roper said that she could access Pioneer on all the computers [Id.].
Defendant Roper stated that providers faxed prescriptions electronically and sent e-scripts
through Pioneer [Id.]. She agreed that if a provider wrote a paper prescription, it came to the
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pharmacy through “SRFax,” whereas an e-script was completely digital [Id. at 40–41]. She
confirmed that she would not expect to see writing on an e-script [Id. at 41]. Defendant Roper said
when a prescription came to the pharmacy by SRFax, it first came to an email in-box as a “pdf”
file, and then the employee who noticed it would print it [Id.]. Defendant Roper said after she
printed a prescription, she would scan the printed prescription into the Pioneer system using a
scanner [Id. at 43–44]. She said next, she would type the information on the prescription into the
patient’s profile [Id. at 44–45]. She said she then submitted the prescription electronically to the
pharmacist who checked all the information and made any corrections [Id. at 44–45].
Defendant Roper stated that she was inside RHP when the agents arrived [Id. at 45]. She
agreed that no one said she could not leave [Id.]. She stated that no one locked the doors but that
a “big guy” stood in front of the front door [Id.]. She said RHP had a front and a back door
[Id. at 46]. She did not know if an agent stood in front of the back door [Id.].
Defendant Roper said she worked at Walmart from 2004 to 2008 [Id.]. She said after that,
she worked at other jobs and had children before working at another pharmacy [Id.]. Defendant
Roper agreed that she is licensed by the State of Tennessee and took online continuing education
while at RHP [Id. at 47].
On redirect examination, Defendant Roper testified that she is licensed as a pharmacy
technician [Id. at 47–48]. She stated that she registered with the state of Tennessee, and the state
sent her a license [Id. at 48]. She said she is not certified as a pharmacy technician [Id.].
Haney Testimony. Tiffany Haney acknowledged that counsel advised her of her rights
under the Fifth Amendment and knowing those rights, she voluntarily chose to testify [Id. at 49–
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50]. Defendant Haney testified that on the day of the search of RHP,22 she and her husband were
driving to Sevierville when she received a telephone call from either Anne Warren or Tabitha
Roper that the FBI was entering the pharmacy [Id. at 50]. Defendant Haney said she and her
husband turned around and drove to RHP, arriving one hour after the search began [Id.]. She said
she entered through the back door and asked Agent Valero if she could see the search warrant [Id.].
Defendant Haney stated that she began reading the warrant but was confused about what was
happening [Id.]. She stated that while still reviewing the warrant, Agent Valero asked for her cell
phone [Id.]. She said she walked away from him and to the front of the pharmacy, where she may
have talked to Defendant Warren [Id.].
Defendant Haney stated that she then walked into the compounding laboratory, and Agent
Valero again asked for her cell phone [Id.]. She said the other employees had already provided
their cell phones to the FBI, so she felt as though she did not have a choice and had to give them
her cell phone, too [Id. at 50–51]. She said Agent Valero asked if her cell phone had a code, and
she gave him the code [Id.]. Defendant Haney said after giving her cell phone to the agent, she
remained outside the pharmacy for most of the day [Id. at 51].
Defendant Haney said in his first request, Agent Valero said, “I’m going to need your
phone” [Id.]. She asked to read in the search warrant where it permitted that, and Agent Valero
stood next to her while she read through the warrant [Id.]. She stated that she then walked to the
front of the pharmacy and asked the staff what was happening [Id.]. Defendant Haney said she
could not recall if she spoke to Defendant Warren or Defendant Roper because that day remains
22 	Defense counsel incorrectly stated the date as March 16, 2024, in his question to Defendant
Haney [Doc. 195 p. 50]. Defendant Haney later corrected him confirming that the date was
April 16, 2024 [Id. at 53].
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“fuzzy” to her [Id.]. She recalled the agents saying, “We have a warrant to take your phones”
[Id. at 51–52]. She testified that Defendant Warren said, “Yes, I gave it to them” [Id. at 52].23
Defendant Haney stated that when she returned to the back, Agent Valero said he needed
her cell phone and asked for the lock code to open it [Id.]. She said that Agent Valero asked if her
phone had a lock code, and she gave him her code [Id.]. She stated that after the FBI had her cell
phone for thirty to forty minutes, a male agent again asked for the code to her phone [Id.].
Defendant Haney testified that for the rest of that day, April 16, 2024, she stood outside,
confused and shocked about what was happening [Id. at 53]. She said the FBI seized all the “hard
copy prescriptions,” notebooks containing formulations, and RHP’s USB compounding manual
with the guidelines that RHP is required to keep onsite [Id.]. She said they took all loose papers
with notes on them [Id.]. Defendant Haney stated that a pharmacy is required to keep all
prescriptions it fills for a certain number of years [Id. at 54]. She said the FBI took approximately
70,000 prescriptions, which were stored in eight to ten boxes in the back of the pharmacy [Id.].
She agreed the boxes contained prescriptions other than those from APS, Dr. Scariano, or Better
Health Wellness [Id.].
On cross-examination, Defendant Haney stated that when Agent Valero asked for her cell
phone the second time, he was still in the compounding laboratory, and she returned to the room
23 	Defendant Anne Warren provided, through counsel for Defendant Haney, a signed
statement regarding the seizure of her cell phone [Doc. 185-2]. Defendant Warren states that
around 9:00 a.m., on “March 16, 2024,” FBI agents entered the building where she was working
and “directed all employees to move to the front corner of the store” [Id. at 2]. Defendant Warren
relates that the agents said they would be taking all cell phones to copy them [Id.]. She said she
asked to see the search warrant permitting this, and upon reviewing the warrant, she did not find a
mention of cell phones [Id.]. When she mentioned this to an agent, he showed her a reference to
“electronic media,” which the agent claimed authorized the seizure and copying of employees’ cell
phones [Id.]. Defendant Warren said she felt she had no choice and gave her cell phone to the agent
[Id.]. She said she also gave her passcode upon the agent’s request, and he wrote it down [Id.]. She
said her cell phone was returned four to six hours later [Id.].
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where he was [Id. at 54–55]. She agreed that the compounding laboratory was in the same building
as the rest of the pharmacy [Id. at 55]. She said the FBI took the cell phones of Ann Warren, Tina
Roper, Tabitha Roper, Carina Brabson, and Jeanette Porterfield [Id.]. She agreed that when she
arrived at the pharmacy all those people were inside the building [Id.]. She said that she and
Defendant Warren went outside because they had called an attorney who represents RHP to come
to the pharmacy, and that attorney told them to stay outside [Id. at 56]. She said the rest of the
employees went back and forth between the pharmacy and the back parking lot [Id.].
Defendant Haney agreed that RHP is no longer in business but stated that she was the
owner and that RHP was founded in 2018 [Id. at 57].
II. 	ANALYSIS
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches or seizures of
“their persons, houses, papers, and effects[.]” U.S. Const. amend IV. It requires that law
enforcement have probable cause and obtain a search warrant before searching a residence or a
cellular telephone. Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. 586, 593 (2018) (“At the [Fourth] Amendment’s
very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion.” (citation omitted & modified)); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 400
(2014) (holding the search of a cell phone requires a search warrant). Here, in addition to
challenging the seizure of personal assets and the seizure and search of their cell phones,
Defendants seek to suppress evidence seized from a business.
The Fourth Amendment protection against warrantless searches extends to “commercial
premises,” Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 367 (1968), but “[a]n expectation of privacy in
commercial premises . . . is different from, and indeed less than, a similar expectation in an
individual’s home,” New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987) (citation omitted). An
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individual enjoys the protection of the Fourth Amendment in his or her place of business if “the
area was one in which there was a reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental
intrusion.” DeForte, 392 U.S. at 368 (citation omitted). “The business[wo]man, like the occupant
of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about h[er] business free from unreasonable official
entries upon h[er] private commercial property.” See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967); see also
Burger, 482 U.S. at 699 (holding that the owner of a business in a closely-regulated industry has
a reduced expectation of privacy); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236 (1986)
(observing “Dow plainly has a reasonable, legitimate, and objective expectation of privacy within
the interior of its covered buildings”); c.f., Autoworld Specialty Cars, Inc. v. United States,
815 F.2d 385, 388–89 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding a defendant had no expectation of privacy in an
auto showroom open to the public to browse and make purchases).
Whether the search is for a personal residence or property or a commercial premises, an
issuing judge’s determination that probable cause for a search warrant exists is entitled to “great
deference.” United States v. Allen, 211 F.3d 970, 973 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983)). This deferential standard promotes the preference for the use of search
warrants as opposed to warrantless searches. Id. “The task of the issuing [judge] is simply to make
a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit
before him, . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. The “duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that
the [judge] had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” Id. at 238–39. In
reviewing the sufficiency of probable cause for a search warrant, the Court considers only the
information that was before the issuing judge—that is, the information contained within the four
corners of the supporting affidavit. United States v. Brooks, 594 F.3d 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2010).
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The sworn information in the supporting affidavit carries a presumption of validity. United States
v. Bowman, No. 24-5835, 2025 WL 1721155, at *2 (6th Cir. June 20, 2025) (citing Franks v.
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978)).
Here, Defendants challenge the search of RHP and the seizure and search of employees’
cell phones pursuant to the search warrant for the pharmacy [Doc. 89 pp. 4–5; Doc. 165 pp. 10,
12–13]. They argue that Agent Valero’s affidavit fails to provide probable cause to search RHP
because it contains false statements and material omissions necessary to the probable cause finding
[Doc. 89 pp. 4–5, 14–24]. They also maintain that the seizure and search of cell phones exceeds
the scope of the search warrant [Doc. 165 pp. 10, 12–13; Doc. 177 p. 3]. Finally, they argue that
the affidavit fails to establish a nexus between the personal cell phones of the employees and health
care fraud [Doc. 195 pp. 73, 80, 97].
Defendants also challenge the seizure of their assets pursuant to seizure warrants [Doc. 89
pp. 24–27; Doc. 165 p. 14]. They argue that Agent Celeste’s affidavit also contains falsehoods and
omissions material to probable cause [Doc. 89 pp. 24–25, 27]. As a part of their Franks challenge,
they argue that Agent Celeste’s affidavit lacks probable cause because it fails to demonstrate that
the seized assets are the proceeds of health care fraud [Doc. 89 pp. 25–26; 165 p. 14].
For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned finds that as co-owners, Defendants Haney
and Warren have standing to challenge the search of the premises of RHP, but Defendant Roper
does not. Defendants each have standing to challenge the seizure and search of her personal cell
phone but may not challenge the search of anyone else’s cell phone. Finally, Defendants Haney
and Warren each have standing to challenge the seizure of her personal assets seized pursuant to
the seizure warrants, but Defendant Roper lacks standing to challenge the seizure warrants because
her assets were not seized. Turning to the substance of Defendants’ arguments, the undersigned
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concludes that Defendants fail to make a substantial preliminary showing to warrant a Franks
hearing for either affidavit, agents searched the Defendants’ personal cell phones in good faith and
properly seized other business records, and even if Defendants could seek return of property seized
pursuant to the seizure warrants, the seizure warrants are supported by probable cause.
A. 	Standing
A claimant alleging a Fourth Amendment violation must have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the place searched or the thing seized. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
“[S]tanding is ‘an element’ of a Fourth Amendment suppression claim[,]” and the person raising
the Fourth Amendment challenge shoulders the “burden” of demonstrating his or her standing.
United States v. Russell, 26 F.4th 371, 375 (6th Cir. 2022). The term “standing” has become
“shorthand” for the requirement that a defendant must show that a search or seizure infringed upon
his or her own rights. Id. at 374. Accordingly, Defendants must show that the searches of RHP and
of the cell phones and the seizure of assets infringed upon their personal rights or legitimate
expectation of privacy. Id. at 375; United States v. Talley, 275 F.3d 560, 563 (6th Cir. 2001)
(holding that a defendant challenging a search has the burden of demonstrating his or her legitimate
expectation of privacy in the location).
In assessing the reasonableness of a defendant’s expectation of privacy, a court examines
the person’s proprietary or possessory interest in the place to be
searched or item to be seized[;] whether the defendant has the right
to exclude others from the place in question; whether he had taken
normal 	precautions 	to 	maintain 	his 	privacy; 	whether 	he 	has
exhibited a subjective expectation that the area would remain free
from governmental intrusion; and whether he was legitimately on
the premises.
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United States v. Waller, 426 F.3d 838, 844 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. King,
227 F.3d 732, 744 (6th Cir. 2000)) (alteration in original). Here, the Court examines Defendants’
standing to challenge the search of RHP, the cell phones seized at RHP, and the seizure warrants.
1. 	Standing to Challenge Search of RHP
Defendants Haney and Warren argue that as the co-owners of RHP, they have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the business’s records [Doc. 115 p. 3 (arguing that Defendant Haney has
standing to challenge the “search of a business she owned and whose business records are being
offered against her”); Doc. 96 p. 1]. At the May 29 motion hearing, Defendants Haney and Warren
argued that that they worked as pharmacists at RHP; they kept controlled substances in a locked
vault; the patient information was protected by HIPPA and passcodes for the computers; and the
business was open to the public only during certain hours [Doc. 147 pp. 23–25 (adopting
arguments of Defendant RHP)]. Accordingly, Defendants Haney and Warren maintain that their
subjective expectation of privacy in the business they own, operate, and work in daily, is
reasonable [Id. at 25].
Defendant Roper argues that she “has standing to challenge the search of RHP because her
personal cell phone was seized and searched under color of the warrant” [Doc. 158 p. 1; see also
Doc. 147 pp. 31–32 (arguing that if Defendant Roper’s cell phone was seized, that alone confers
standing)].24 She also asserts standing to challenge her personal workspace, her work computer,
and her personal items including her personal cell phone [Doc. 158 p. 4]. Defendant Roper
24 	At the May 29 hearing, Defendant Roper also argued that she has standing because the
Second Superseding Indictment charges her as if she were an owner or operator of RHP [Doc. 147
p. 27]. Defendant Roper did not develop this argument, so the undersigned does not consider it.
Moreover, the Second Superseding Indictment identifies Defendant Roper as an employee of RHP
and not an owner [Doc. 127 ¶¶ 3–5].
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contends that her subjective expectation of privacy in her workspace, work computer, and personal
cell phone is objectively reasonable and permits her to challenge the search of RHP [Id. at 10].
That an individual is an owner or sole shareholder of a business does not automatically
confer standing. United States v. Mohney, 949 F.2d 1397, 1403 (6th Cir. 1991). Instead, “an officer
of a corporation may be a ‘person aggrieved’ by a corporate search and seizure and thus have
standing to challenge the search” when the circumstances show that he or she had “a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the seized materials.” Id. Circumstances demonstrating a reasonable
expectation of privacy include that the individual worked daily or regularly in the premises
searched and personally prepared the corporate records seized from his or her office. Id. Other
“[p]ertinent factors” are the individual’s
possessory interest in the thing seized or the place searched, whether he has
the right to exclude others from that place, whether he has exhibited a
subjective expectation that it would remain free from governmental
invasion, whether he took normal precautions to maintain his privacy and
whether he was legitimately on the premises.
United States v. Bli, 147 F. Supp. 2d 734, 740 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (quoting United States v. Haydel,
649 F.2d 1152, 1155 (5th Cir. 1981) (other citations omitted)) (finding a defendant’s subjective
interest in the business records of the family farm, which were stored in a trailer on his property
and not open to non-family members, was reasonable).
The Government argues that the records seized from RHP (i.e., the prescriptions)25 are “the
property of non-parties” in which Defendants have no legitimate expectation of privacy [Doc. 111
pp. 10–11]. The record reveals, however, that Defendants Haney and Warren owned RHP, and
25 	At the May 29, 2025 motion hearing, the Government agreed that Defendants Haney and
Warren can likely demonstrate standing to contest the seizure of the prescriptions from RHP but
argued that they had yet to state a sufficient factual basis to demonstrate standing [Doc. 147
pp. 28–29]. Following Ms. Haney’s testimony at the August 12, 2025 evidentiary hearing, many
of the facts proffered at the May 29 hearing are now in the record.
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that they worked as pharmacists at RHP, they were involved in compounding the creams for the
prescriptions, and they were required to maintain copies of filled prescriptions. Defendants stored
the boxes of filled prescriptions in the back room of RHP. Moreover, RHP used the Pioneer
prescription management system to process prescriptions [Doc. 195 pp. 27–28]. Defendant
Haney’s and Defendant Warren’s expectation of privacy in RHP is reasonable. See Burger,
482 U.S. at 699 (“An owner or operator of a business . . . has an expectation of privacy in
commercial property, which society is prepared to consider to be reasonable.” (citation omitted));
United States v. Pompy, No. 18-cr-20454, 2021 WL 978797, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 16, 2021)
(finding that a physician had standing to challenge search of his office and seizure of patient
medical files when he prepared and maintained the files using a password-protected, “encrypted
EMR 	system 	that 	only 	he 	and 	his 	staff 	have 	access 	to”); 	United 	States 	v. 	Newman,
No. 3:19-CR-59, 2020 WL 7384864, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 8, 2020) (finding that a medical
director and majority owner of physical building and clinic, who controlled access to and managed
the patient files, had standing to challenge search premises of clinic), report and recommendation
adopted, 	2020 	WL 	6938815 	(E.D. 	Tenn. 	Nov. 	25, 	2020); 	United 	States 	v. 	Ferguson,
No. 10-20535, 2012 WL 628509, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2012) (holding that co-owners of
construction business had standing to challenge search of business records, which were stored in
a secure location and some of which were prepared by the co-owners).
Defendant Roper, however, is differently situated. As the Government points out [Doc. 168
p. 2], Defendant Roper fails to show that she had a private workspace or work computer that was
not shared or could not be monitored by others. Although Defendant Roper states that she viewed
her personal email, photographs, and “other personal matters” on her work computer [Doc. 158-1,
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Roper Declaration, p. 2], she does not show that she expected those actions would remain private
from other RHP employees.
Defendant Roper argues that she is similar in standing to the medical director in the
Newman case [Doc. 158 p. 5 (citing Newman, 2020 WL 7384864, at *5)]. The undersigned
disagrees. In Newman, the defendant was the majority owner of both the physical building and the
pain clinic, managed the employees, and controlled access/had “administrator rights” to the
electronic files. Id. at 6–7. In contrast, Defendant Roper was an employee, rather than an owner or
manager. Although she worked on patient accounts and input data into the computer system, the
undersigned has no evidence that she administered the Pioneer system, rather than merely used it.
Nor did she demonstrate that she had a particular workspace at RHP from which she could exclude
other employees. Instead, she testified that she was at a particular computer on the day of the search
but that she could have been at a different computer based upon the day of the week and who was
working. The undersigned finds that Defendant Roper’s subjective expectation of privacy in RHP
is not one that society would recognize as reasonable.26
In sum, Defendants Haney and Warren have standing to challenge the search of RHP, but
Defendant Roper cannot challenge the search of the business as a whole, nor the search of any
“work space” or computer on the premises.
26 	Defendant Roper argues the Government cannot oppose her standing to challenge her
workspace or work computer because it previously argued in another case that the medical director
of a pain clinic “could potentially challenge the search warrant [for the clinic] but only as to his
workspace or personal computer” [Doc. 158 pp. 1–2 & n.1 (citing United States v. Newman,
No. 3:19-CR-59, 2020 WL 7384864, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 8, 2020), report and recommendation
adopted, 2020 WL 6938815 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 25, 2020))]. As discussed above, the circumstances
of Defendant Roper and those of the medical director in the Newman case are materially different.
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2. 	Standing to Challenge Search of Cell Phones
The Government concedes that Defendants Haney, Warren, and Roper each had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in her own personal cell phone [Doc. 147 pp. 28–29; Doc. 168
p. 2]. Indeed, “[o]ne does not lose expectations of privacy in one’s personal effects merely because
they are stored on another’s property[,]” including the property of one’s employer. United States
v. Williams, 347 F. Supp. 3d 312, 316 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (concluding that a defendant had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in her zipped backpack, although it was in her employer’s
vehicle (citing cases)). It argues, however, that none of the Defendants had an expectation of
privacy in anyone else’s cell phone [Doc. 147 pp. 28–29; Doc. 168 pp. 2–3]. The undersigned
agrees that Defendants have not made this showing. For example, Defendants have provided no
evidence that employees were required to use their personal cell phones to conduct business at
RHP. Nor do they show that RHP paid for their cell phones or the other employees’ cell phones.
Finally, Defendants do not demonstrate that they had a right to access or to exclude others from
any employee’s cell phone other than their own. United States v. Simpson, 706 F. Supp. 3d 722,
731 	(E.D. 	Ky. 	2023) (holding 	that 	a defendant 	lacked 	standing 	to challenge search 	of
coconspirator’s 	cell 	phone) 	(appeal 	filed 	June 	5, 	2024); 	United 	States 	v. 	Molina,
569 F. Supp. 3d 596, 608 (E.D. Ky. 2021) (finding that a defendant lacked standing to challenge
codefendant’s cell phone).
Defendants Haney and Warren argue the fact that they potentially face criminal liability
from the information extracted from their employee’s cell phones gives them standing to challenge
law enforcement’s seizure of the cell phones [See Doc. 151 p. 23]. A defendant’s standing,
however, is not evaluated from the standpoint of whether the evidence seized creates criminal
liability. United States v. Powell, 847 F.3d 760, 768 (6th Cir. 2017) (explaining that only those
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whose constitutional rights are violated can move to suppress evidence, “‘not [] those who are
aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence’” (quoting United States v. Padilla,
508 U.S. 77, 81–82 (1993))); see also United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 95 (1980) (rejecting
“automatic standing” doctrine for possession offenses because it “serves only to afford a windfall
to defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have not been violated”). Instead, the Court
examines whether the individual challenging the search has a subjective expectation of privacy in
the item or area and whether society recognizes that expectation as reasonable. Here, the answer
is “yes” to both questions regarding each Defendant’s own personal cell phone, but “no” as to
anyone else’s cell phone.
3. 	Standing to Challenge Seizure Warrants
To demonstrate standing, a defendant must show “a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the area searched or the items seized.” United States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 345, 359–60
(6th Cir. 2005). An expectation of privacy may derive from either a property interest or a
possessory interest. Id. (citation omitted); see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012)
(affirming the right to be free from governmental intrusion in one’s own physical property). Here,
Defendants Haney and Warren have a property and/or possessory interest in one or more of the
bank accounts, investment accounts, vehicles, and watercraft seized pursuant to the seizure
warrants. See United States v. King, 227 F.3d 732, 744 (6th Cir. 2000) (observing that one’s
property and possessory interest is an “obvious” factor conferring standing). Accordingly,
Defendants Haney and Warren each have standing to challenge the seizure of her own assets, i.e.,
the assets in which she has a property or a possessory interest. Defendant Roper, however, does
not demonstrate that she has a property or possessory interest in any of the accounts or property
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seized pursuant to the seizure warrants [See Doc. 165 pp. 4–6 (addressing only Defendant Roper’s
cell phone, computer, and workstation)]. As such, she lacks standing to challenge the warrants.
In sum, the undersigned finds that Defendants Haney and Warren have standing to
challenge the search of the premises of RHP, but Defendant Roper does not. Defendants Haney,
Warren, and Roper each have standing to challenge the seizure and search of her own personal cell
phone but lack standing to challenge the search of anyone else’s cell phone. Finally, Defendants
Haney and Roper each have standing to challenge the seizure of her own assets seized pursuant to
seizure warrants. Defendant Roper lacks standing to challenge the seizure warrants because she
fails to show that she has a property or possessory interest in any of the seized accounts or assets.
B. 	Franks Challenge
Defendants27 request a Franks hearing to challenge false statements and material omissions
in Agent Valero’s and Agent Celeste’s affidavits [Doc. 89 pp. 1–2, 14–27].
“In a Franks hearing, a court determines whether to suppress the fruits of an executed
search warrant, where the warrant was the result of a false statement.” United States v. Crawford,
943 F.3d 297, 309 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978)). In the
first instance, an affidavit supporting a search warrant is presumed to be valid. United States v.
Bowman, No. 24-5835, 2025 WL 1721155, at *2 (6th Cir. June 20, 2025) (citing Franks,
438 U.S. at 171)). “A defendant challenging the validity of a search warrant’s affidavit bears a
heavy burden.” United States v. Bateman, 945 F.3d 997, 1008 (6th Cir. 2019); see also United
27 	The undersigned finds that Defendants Haney and Warren have standing to challenge the
search of RHP, but Defendant Roper does not. Nevertheless, Defendant Roper adopts and realleges
Defendant Haney’s arguments regarding false statements and material misrepresentations in Agent
Valero’s affidavit [See Doc. 151 p. 67; Doc. 158 pp. 3–4, 6–7, 10; Doc. 165 pp. 1–9, 11]. The
Court 	notes 	Defendant 	Roper’s 	additional 	Franks 	arguments 	made 	in 	her 	Motion 	and
Memorandum to Suppress [Doc. 165].
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States v. Sanders, 106 F.4th 455, 470–71 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 603 (2024).
To warrant a Franks hearing, a defendant “must make a ‘substantial preliminary showing that a
false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included
by the affiant in the warrant affidavit.’” Crawford, 943 F.3d at 309 (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at
171). “‘The allegedly false statement,’ moreover, must be ‘necessary to the finding of probable
cause.’” Id. (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 171). A defendant challenging the veracity of statements
in the affidavit cannot rely on “‘conclusory’” assertions but, instead, must identify “‘specific false
statements’” that are accompanied by an offer of proof. Bowman, 2025 WL 1721155, at *2
(quoting Sanders, 106 F.4th at 471 & United States v. Green, 572 F. App’x 438, 442
(6th Cir. 2014)).
Omissions, too, can form the basis for a Franks challenge, but “an affidavit which omits
potentially exculpatory information is less likely to present a question of impermissible official
conduct than one which affirmatively includes false information.” United States v. Adkins,
107 F.3d 1213, 1217 (6th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). This is because an affidavit need not
include all facts gathered over the course of an investigation. Id. Thus, “except in the very rare
case where the defendant makes a strong preliminary showing that the affiant with an intention to
mislead excluded critical information from the affidavit, and the omission is critical to the finding
of probable cause, Franks is inapplicable to the omission of disputed facts.” Mays v. City of
Dayton, 134 F.3d 809, 816 (6th Cir. 1998).
A heightened standard is necessary for omissions to foreclose “‘endless conjecture about
investigative leads, fragments of information, or other matter that might, if included, have
redounded to defendant’s benefit.’” United States v. Martin, 920 F.2d 393, 398 (6th Cir. 1990)
(quoting United States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 301 (4th Cir. 1990)); see also United States v.
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Hanna, 661 F.3d 271, 285 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming the district judge’s observation that when
omissions are at issue, “‘additional hurdles must be met’”). “If the defendant does succeed in
making a preliminary showing that the government affiant engaged in ‘deliberate falsehood’ or
‘reckless disregard for the truth’ in omitting information from the affidavit, the court must then
consider the affidavit including the omitted portions and determine whether probable cause still
exists.” Adkins, 107 F.3d at 1217 (citation omitted).
Whether because of an alleged false statement or material omission, a defendant seeking a
Franks hearing must make a substantial showing that the affiant intentionally or recklessly
included or omitted the statement from the affidavit. Butler v. City of Detroit, 936 F.3d 410, 418
(6th Cir. 2019). A statement in the affidavit “is only considered to be issued with ‘reckless
disregard for the truth’ if the defendant shows the affiant subjectively ‘entertained serious doubts
as to the truth of his allegations.’” Bateman, 945 F.3d at 1008 (6th Cir. 2019) (citation modified)
(quoting United States v. Cican, 63 F. App’x 832, 836 (6th Cir. 2003)). “‘Allegations of an
officer’s negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient.’” Id. (citation modified) (quoting Franks,
438 U.S. at 171).
The “well-settled framework for Franks hearings requires a defendant to ‘point to specific
false statements,’” in the affidavit that he claims are false or state the alleged omission. United
States v. Green, 572 F. App’x 438, 442 (6th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Here, Defendants argue
that 	both 	affidavits 	contain 	three 	categories 	of 	false 	statements 	or 	material 	omissions:
(1) the affidavits contain alleged “prescriber denials”28 that the affiants knew were later retracted;
28 	A “prescriber denial” is where a prescriber, when presented with either information a
prescription filled by RHP or a copy of the prescription itself, denied that he or she wrote that
prescription or alleged that the prescription was modified or changed from what the prescriber
wrote [See Doc. 119-1 ¶¶ 49, 54, 57; see also Doc. 89 pp. 6–7].
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(2) the affidavits state that RHP filled prescriptions that Dr. Jack Scariano did not prescribe but
those prescriptions were faxed to RHP by Dr. Scariano’s practice; and (3) the affidavits state that
the FBI seeks evidence of illegal “kickbacks” in the form of copayment waivers, when RHP
collected copays and non-collection is permissible in some situations and the FBI actually sought
evidence of bribes by RHP to medical providers [Id. at 4–5; Doc. 115 pp. 3–11]. Defendants allege
that Agent Celeste’s affidavit similarly relies on false statements and material omissions and does
not state probable cause for seizing all assets [Doc. 89 pp. 2, 24–27]. The undersigned examines
each of the categories in turn with respect to Agent Valero’s affidavit. After considering each of
the categories individually, the undersigned examines the impact of all alleged omissions in Agent
Valero’s affidavit collectively. Finally, the undersigned turns to alleged false statements and
omissions in Agent Celeste’s affidavit supporting the seizure warrants and to Defendants’
argument on probable cause.
1. 	Prescriber Denials
Defendants challenge prescriber denials from three sources: the OptumRx audit, the
Humana audit, and the interview of NP Manning. Specifically, Defendants assert that Agent
Valero’s affidavit contains alleged prescriber denials made during the OptumRx and Humana
audits in 2020 that Agent Valero knew were later retracted and contradicted by other evidence in
the same audit files [Doc. 89 pp. 4, 15]. They also argue that the affiant makes a false statement
about the prescription issued by NP Ashley Manning because in reproducing the prescription in
the affidavit, the affiant cuts off the fax transmission heading, which shows the prescription was
faxed to RHP [Doc. 115 pp. 6–7]. The Government responds that Agent Valero’s affidavit contains
no false representations and the alleged omission of investigations of APS and Dr. Scariano are
not material to probable cause [Doc. 111 pp. 10–15].
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a. 	OptumRx Audit
Regarding the OptumRx audit, Defendants argue that Agent Valero misled the issuing
judge by presenting only the prescriber denials and not the information known from the
investigation of Associated Pain Specialists (“APS”) “that contradicted those denials” [Doc. 89
p. 16]. Defendants contend that investigators knew that the prescribers involved in the OptumRx
audit worked for APS, which was the subject of an investigation since 2017 [Doc. 89 pp. 7–8].
Prescribers at APS told investigators that office staff were altering or writing prescriptions for
medications, including pain creams, without the prescribers’ knowledge [Doc. 89 pp. 8–11, 15].
Defendants allege that OptumRx’s audit file contains two prescriptions that providers Courtney
Carroll and Courtney Travis denied writing, and those prescriptions show that they were faxed to
RHP [Doc. 89 p. 16].29 Defendants assert that contributing to this misimpression, Agent Valero
did not state that OptumRx only sought explanation of a sample of the 338 prescriptions for
Lidocaine-HC rectal kits and that seven of the twenty-three prescriptions in the sample were faxed
to RHP by the medical practices [Doc. 89 p. 17]. They also point out that of the sixteen remaining
prescriptions in the sample, thirteen contained notations that they were “phoned-in” per “Felicia”
at APS [Doc. 89 p. 17].30 Defendants argue that Tennessee law authorizes “phone-in prescriptions”
29 	Citing to Agent Celeste’s affidavit in support of the seizure warrants, Defendants also argue
that Agent Valero omitted that APS prescriber Lindsey Smith verified a prescription sent to RHP
[Doc. 89 p. 16]. Agent Celeste’s affidavit, however, reproduced the OptumRx form for prescriber
Lindsay Dixon, who affirmed writing a prescription on a different date for a different strength of
Lidocaine-HC rectal kit than prescriber Smith [See 119-2 ¶ 42]. Prescriber Dixon also denied
prescribing Lidocaine-HC kit 3%-1% on March 2, 2020 [Id.].
30 	Defendant Roper points out that “Felicia Livezey,” an APS employee, received a bonus of
$100 per pain cream prescription [Doc. 165 pp. 3–4 (citing Doc. 89-8 p. 3 (Nov. 21, 2022 HHS-
OIG Interview of Felisha Livezey)), 15].
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[Id. (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 53-11-308(b)–(c)31 & Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1140-03-.03(1)32)].
Defendants argue that by omitting that APS prescribers suspected APS office staff or management
to be at fault for the denied prescriptions, Agent Valero left out facts that would have negated
probable cause [Doc. 89 pp. 15–17; Doc. 115 p. 5 & n.2].
Defendants also argue that Agent Valero deliberately created the misimpression of the
OptumRx audit [Doc. 89 pp. 5, 19]. They contend that Agent Valero’s affidavit references earlier
documents in the OptumRx audit and omits later documents from the audit [Doc. 89 pp. 18–19].
They also cite to an April 20, 2022 memorandum in which Agent Valero stated that an insufficient
“criminal federal nexus” existed to proceed with criminal charges [Doc. 89 p. 5, Doc. 89-2 p. 1].
Defendants argue that two years later, Agent Valero sought a search warrant based upon the same
evidence that he deemed insufficient in 2022, which shows his misrepresentations about the
OptumRx audit are intentional or reckless [Doc. 89 p. 5].
The Government disputes Defendant’s evidence of misrepresentations of the OptumRx
audit and of Agent Valero’s culpability [Doc. 111 pp. 3, 11–14]. It states that “Agent Valero, with
little or no commentary, simply recited the facts outlined in Optum’s report and included
screenshots of the prescriber responses” [Id. at 11]. It argues that Defendants’ various evidence of
bad acts at APS or by its management do not contradict the reliability of the providers who denied
31 	Under Tennessee law, Schedule II drugs may be dispensed upon a “health care
presciber[’s]” oral prescription in an “emergency situation[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-11-308(b).
Schedule III and IV drugs “shall not be dispensed without the written or oral prescription of a
practitioner.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-11-308(c).
32 	“To the extent that a medical order contains an order for the compounding, dispensing or
administration of a prescription drug or device or related material, the medical order shall be
treated as a prescription order. Written medical and prescription orders must be signed by the
prescriber. Verbal medical and prescription orders must be immediately reduced to writing (by
hand or other means), dated, and initialed by the authorized individual accepting the medical and
prescription orders.” Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1140-03-.03(1).
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providing prescriptions [Id. at 12]. Moreover, the Government argues that, as Agent Valero points
out, RHP received the financial gain from the altered or forged prescriptions, which “bolster[s]”
the likelihood that RHP’s premises contains evidence of the subject crimes [Id.]. Finally, it argues
that the fact that the prescriptions that are the subject of the prescriber denials were faxed to RHP
does not mean that the prescriptions were not altered by RHP, in the same manner as the
prescription by NP Manning [Id. at 12].
Regarding Defendants’ assertion that Agent Valero intentionally or deliberately sought to
deceive the issuing judge, the Government argues that although Agent Valero questioned probable
cause and was faced with administrative delays33 in April 2022, he subsequently obtained
additional evidence, specifically the information from NP Manning, and a new federal prosecutor
was assigned to the case [Id. at 3]. Thus, the Government contends that Defendants cannot show
that Agent Valero created a false impression of provider denials knowingly, intentionally, or with
reckless disregard for the truth [Id. at 3–4].
As the Government contends [Doc. 111 p. 11], none of the statements in Agent Valero’s
affidavit regarding the OptumRx audit are false. After review of the exhibits and the party’s
arguments, the undersigned finds Defendants’ allegations instead amount to an omission that
investigators and providers suspected that APS staff, particularly Felisha Livesay, were altering or
forging prescriptions.34 Agent Valero also had evidence that RHP was involved in altering or
33 	Agent Valero’s April 20, 2022 memorandum stating they had insufficient “criminal
federal nexus to proceed,” also states that no new federal prosecutor has been assigned to this case
since the former prosecutor’s withdrawal in March 2022 [Doc. 111 p. 3 (quoting April 20, 2022
memorandum by FBI Special Agent Joseph Valero and TBI Special Agent Chris Trice)].
34 	At the May 29, 2025 motion hearing, the Government argued that the affidavit is not devoid
of evidence that “the false claims could have been on the providers’ side . . . , not just at the
pharmacy” [Doc. 151 p. 39]. It points out that former RHP employee Sydney Goodson made
statements that the providers may have been prescribing medications not medically necessary [Id.;
see also Doc. 119-1 ¶ 75]. Also, Agent Valero suggests that Dr. Scariano was the subject of an
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forging prescriptions, specifically as noted by the Government, from NP Manning, who was not
an APS provider and who told agents a prescription that she wrote and that her office faxed to
RHP was changed and the changes are not in her handwriting. Agent Valero also had information
linking RHP to Felisha Livesay.35
As discussed above, the bar is higher for a defendant to make a substantial preliminary
showing for an omission than for a false statement. Martin, 920 F.2d at 398. “[T]o to require that
all potentially exculpatory evidence be included in an affidavit, places an extraordinary burden on
investigation in stating that Dr. Scariano produced patient files through his counsel and “[i]n
relation to another case and in response to compulsory service” [Id. ¶ 59].
35 	At the time he submitted the affidavit to search RHP, Agent Valero had information linking
RHP to the improprieties at APS. Defendant Haney provided as an exhibit to her motion an HHS-
OIG memorandum summarizing a November 11, 2021 interview of Felisha Livesay, who was
originally a “third-party employee” of Clarity Research/Synergymed stationed at APS and later
worked for APS [Doc. 89-8 p. 1]. This exhibit reflects that Ms. Livesay said she was “good friends”
with Tina, “the pharmacy rep” from RHP [Id. at 4]. Although Ms. Livesay denied receiving any
incentives for sending pain cream prescriptions to RHP, she observed that patients had complained
to her about RHP sending “different prescriptions” for the separate, uncombined ingredients for a
pain cream, and she stated that billing for medications separately, rather than as a compound,
resulted in higher charges to the insurance company [Id.]. Ms. Livesay also stated that “Tina” from
RHP had talked with Jimmy Cowden, who despite not being an APS employee, had regular
meetings with APS owners and leadership [Id. at 4–5].
Defendants point out that thirteen of the sixteen prescriptions in the OptumRx audit sample
that were not faxed to RHP contained notations that they were “phoned-in” per “Felicia” at APS
[Doc. 89 p. 17]. Defendants also point out that RHP explained the remaining denied prescription
by NP Travis as verbally authorized by “Felicia,” whom RHP assumed was acting under the
authority of NP Travis [Doc. 89 p. 12].
Also included in Defendant Haney’s exhibits is an FBI report of FBI Agent Emily Celeste’s
September 9, 2023 interview of Jimmy Cowden, who works for APS as a business consultant
[Doc. 89-11 p. 1]. Mr. Cowden stated that while RHP was being audited by Humana, Tiffany
Haney met with him and another manager at APS and asked them to tell an APS provider Courtney
Travis to back date some prescriptions and sign them [Id. at 2]. Around the time of this meeting,
Ms. Travis told Mr. Cowden that “she felt something wasn’t right with how RHP was operating”
[Id.]. Following this meeting with Tiffany Haney, APS dropped all business with RHP [Id.].
Mr. Cowden stated that APS also fired “Felicia,” whose role at APS included assisting with the
RHP prescriptions [Id. at 3]. Mr. Cowden stated that Felicia did not have the ability to authorize
prescription refills [Id.].
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law enforcement officers, compelling them to follow up and include in a warrant affidavit every
hunch and detail of an investigation in the futile attempt to prove the negative proposition that no
potentially exculpatory evidence had been excluded.” Mays, 134 F.3d at 816. Thus, an affiant need
not include “all potentially exculpatory information . . . in the search warrant affidavit.” United
States v. Sample, No. 11–20386, 2012 WL 715880, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 6, 2012).36
This principle that an affidavit need not include every explanation for criminal activity
does not “condone deliberate misrepresentations in the warrant application process.” Mays,
134 F.3d at 816. “Franks recognizes that information an affiant reports may not ultimately be
accurate, and is willing to tolerate such a result at that early stage of the process, so long as the
affiant believed the accuracy of the statement at the time it was made.” Id. (citing Franks,
438 U.S. at 165).
Here, Defendants arguably show that Agent Valero was uncertain of RHP’s involvement
or the extent of RHP’s involvement in healthcare fraud early in the investigation, which began in
March 2021 [Doc. 119-1 ¶ 47]. Later in the investigation, however, Agent Valero had additional
evidence beyond the two audits, particularly the information from NP Manning, who did not work
for APS [See Doc. 123-1 (FBI Report of March 2024 Manning Interview)]. Defendants fail to
show Agent Valero acted with intent to mislead the issuing judge in omitting the investigation into
APS or the providers’ suspicions about who was involved in altering or forging prescriptions.
36 	In United States v. Sample, the affiant did not include in the affidavit for a search warrant
for a residence that another individual made a statement that the drugs and weapons found during
a previous search of a separate residence belonged to him. 2012 WL 715880, at *5. Law
enforcement concluded that other evidence at the first residence (identification, mail, large size
clothing consistent with defendant but not the other individual) was linked to the defendant, not
the other individual. “The purpose of a search warrant affidavit is to set forth the facts that the
affiant believes support a finding of probable cause.” Id. Thus, the affiant’s failure to include the
other individual’s admission was neither false, nor material to probable cause. Id. (also finding no
evidence that the omission was made with the intent to mislead).
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b. 	Humana Audit
Defendants argue that Agent Valero also misrepresented the results of the Humana audit
by relating that most providers responding to the audit denied writing prescriptions and by
highlighting denials by NPs Armstrong, Bertram, and Travis [Doc. 89 p. 12]. Defendants explain
that the Humana audit states that NP Armstrong and NP Bertram later verified their prescriptions
filled by RHP [Doc. 89 pp. 12, 18].
Defendants contend that the Humana audit reveals that in August 2020, Humana began an
audit of RHP based upon “spikes” in prescriptions for three pain creams [Doc. 89 p. 12 (citing
Doc. 89-9 (Humana Summary and Recommendation))]. Humana spoke with nine patients, all of
whom “verified services” were as prescribed [Doc. 89 p. 12]. Humana also reached out to thirteen
prescribers, and eight did not respond, two verified services, and three denied services [Id.]. Of the
three prescribers who initially denied the prescriptions, two (Alicia Armstrong and Felicia
Bertram) subsequently “verified and re-wrote the prescriptions,” and only Courtney Travis, an
APS provider, persisted in denying the prescription [Id.]. RHP explained to Humana that it
received verbal authorization for the Travis prescription from a member of NP Travis’s office staff,
“Felicia,” and assumed that Felicia was working under NP Travis’s direction [Id.]. Humana
ultimately imposed no sanctions on RHP save for “education” [Id.].
Defendants argue that Agent Valero included only selected “snippets” from the Humana
audit file, including only the initial denials by NPs Travis, Armstrong, and Bertram and not
NP Armstrong’s and NP Bertram’s later retractions of those denials [Id. at 12, 18]. They assert
Agent Valero’s statement that the majority of responding prescribers marked the “Not Prescribed”
box is false because when NP Armstrong’s and NP Bertram’s retractions are considered, only one
of five prescribers (NP Travis) denied prescribing the pain creams filled by RHP [Id. at 12–13,
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18]. Defendants also maintain that even NP Travis’s denial is contradicted by the data from the
patient K.P., per notes in Humana audit file [Id. at 13, 18]. They state that Humana’s audit file
shows K.P. told Humana that K.P. “has been using the ointment for a while [and ]is familiar with
the pharmacy, medication, and the prescriber” [Id. at 18 (quoting Doc. 119-8 p. 2)]. As with the
OptumRx audit, Defendants argue Agent Valero deliberately included only parts of the Humana
audit to mislead the issuing judge [Id. at 18–19]. They contend this conclusion is supported by
Agent Valero’s provision of information from earlier audit documents that are contradicted by
later audit documents and his 2022 conclusion that the OptumRx and Humana audits did not
provide sufficient evidence to proceed federally [Id. at 18–19].
The 	Government 	asserts 	that 	Defendants 	wrongly 	interpret 	the 	“retractions” 	by
NP Armstrong and NP Bertram [Doc. 111 p. 14]. It argues that they did not retract their prior
denials but, instead, their rewriting and back dating of new prescriptions show that they did not
originally prescribe the medications, or the prescriptions would not need to be rewritten [Id.]. Thus,
it contends that NP Armstrong’s and NP Bertram’s actions further corroborate, rather than
undermine, their initial denials [Id.].
The undersigned finds that Agent Valero did not provide any false statements in his
affidavit regarding the Humana audit. Agent Valero did, however, omit the subsequent mitigation
of two denials by prescribers NP Armstrong and NP Bertram. Regarding NP Armstrong’s and
NP Bertram’s actions, Humana’s summary of the audit states that the “[p]harmacy was able to
mitigate with 2 of the prescriber denials leaving only denials from [provider] Courtney Travis . . .
for four claims of Diflorasone and 3 claims of Calcipotriene” [Doc. 89-9 p. 3]. Included in the
record are ten prescriptions for Diflorasone signed by NP Armstrong [Doc. 119-5]. Each
prescription contains the statement that the Diflorasone is to be used with a compound cream [Id.].
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Each also contains an added date of “10/27/2020” under the signature [Id.]. Also included in the
record are seven prescriptions for Diflorasone, also stating that it is to be used with a compound
cream, and which contain the date “10/27/2020” under what is presumably NP Bertram’s signature
[Doc. 119-6]. All seventeen prescriptions are on a prescription pad from Omega Pain Management
and Igor Smelyansky, M.D. [Docs 119-5 & 119-6]. That NP Armstrong and NP Bertram
“mitigated” these prescriptions by signing and dating them was included in the audit summary.
Unlike with the APS information and the OptumRx audit, Agent Valero’s omission of
NP Armstrong’s and NP Bertram’s subsequent mitigation does not go merely to a different theory
of liability, nor is it information merely countering an innocent explanation for suspicious facts.
See United States v. Tagg, 886 F.3d 579, 586 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[P]robable cause does not require
officers to rule out a suspect’s innocent explanation for suspicious facts.” (citation modified and
omitted)). Instead, as argued by Defendants [Doc. 115 p. 5 n.3], this omission deprives the issuing
judge of the complete import of the denials by these two prescribers. See United States v. Stanert,
762 F.2d 775, 781 (9th Cir. 1985) (“By reporting less than the total story, an affiant can manipulate
the inferences a magistrate will draw.”), amended by 769 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1985) (adding
footnote with standard of review). Moreover, the prescribers’ mitigation is included in the Humana
audit along with the information of their initial denials, which is at least circumstantial evidence
that Agent Valero intentionally left their later mitigation out of his affidavit. See United States v.
Stewart, 3:19-CR-151, 2021 WL 1922934, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. May 13, 2021) (observing that a court
often must consider “circumstantial evidence in the search warrant affidavit and surrounding
circumstances to establish [the affiant’s intent]”).
But even if Agent Valero intentionally or recklessly excluded the subsequent mitigation by
NPs Armstrong and Bertrand with an intent to mislead, the omission is not material to probable
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cause. To determine the materiality of an omission, the Court evaluates whether the affidavit still
provides probable cause considering the omitted information. Adkins, 107 F.3d at 1217 (citation
omitted). Here, Agent Valero’s affidavit still contains information on prescriber denials—from the
OptumRX audit, NP Travis, and as explained below, NP Manning’s assertion that a prescription
she wrote was altered—to support probable cause.
c. 	Ashley Manning Prescription
Defendants also argue that Agent Valero deliberately deleted the fax transmission line from
the prescription from Nurse Practitioner Ashley Manning that is reproduced in the affidavit
[Doc. 115 p. 6; Doc. 151 pp. 51–52]. They allege that this prescription “contains a facsimile
transmission line from Dr. Scariano’s practice” stating the date and time of transmission and that
it was from “Better Health,” which Defendants allege is Dr. Scariano’s practice [Doc. 115 p. 6;
Doc. 123-1 p. 5 (prescription with fax transmission line)]. Defendants argue that Agent Valero
“falsif[ied]” this prescription by not including the fax transmission line nor mentioning in his
affidavit that the prescription was faxed to RHP by Better Health [Doc. 115 p. 6]. They argue that
this omission is material to probable cause because the affiant alleges that RHP was forging
prescriptions, and the fax transmission line demonstrates that RHP received NP Manning’s
prescription by fax from the provider [Doc. 151 p. 55].
The undersigned finds that despite the omission of the fax transmission line, Agent
Valero’s affidavit makes clear that the prescription was faxed from NP Manning’s place of
business to RHP by a member of NP Manning’s staff. The affidavit states that NP Manning stated
she would choose a pain cream option from RHP’s pre-printed form, as in the example (the
reproduced prescription) and that “her medical assistant (MA) would then fax the prescription over
to RHP” [Doc. 119-1 ¶ 50]. Moreover, the affidavit states the reproduced prescription was sent to
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RHP because Manning pointed out the alterations to the prescription and stated that she did not
recall anyone from RHP calling to request modifications to a prescription [Id. at ¶¶ 49–50]. Thus,
Agent Valero did not falsely represent that the prescription by NP Manning did not exist/was
forged by RHP. Nor is the omission of the fax transmission line material to probable cause when
the affidavit states that NP Manning’s prescriptions were faxed to RHP by her medical assistant.
2. 	Scariano Prescriptions
Defendants argue that Agent Valero’s statement that RHP billed for medications not
prescribed by Dr. Jack Scariano for patients M.U. and R.D. is false [Doc. 89 p. 13]. Defendants
state that Dr. Scariano is the target of a separate investigation for claims submitted to the EEOICP
[Id. at 4, 13, 19]. They assert that the alleged missing prescriptions were faxed by Dr. Scariano’s
practice to RHP [Id. at 4, 19; Docs. 119-937 & 119-1038]. Defendants maintain that Agent Valero
had access to “data [showing] whether Dr. Scariano submitted E&M and CPT codes on the
patients’ medical benefit[s] on the dates Agent Valero claims are not reflected” in the patients’
files [Doc. 89 p. 19].
37 	The redacted version of the prescriptions/refill authorization forms provided as Defendant
Haney’s Exhibit R states the patient as M.W., rather than patient M.U. referenced in the affidavit
[See Doc. 119-9]. The sealed, unredacted Exhibit R provided by Defendant Haney, however,
reveals the patient is M.U. [See Doc. 91-7, SEALED]. The dates the prescriptions/refill
authorizations in Exhibit R were faxed [Doc. 119-9] corresponds to the dates the affidavit alleges
RHP submitted claims [Doc. 119-1 ¶ 62].
38 	The fax dates of the original prescription and one refill authorization form for patient R.D.
[Doc. 119-10 pp. 2, 4] correspond to the claim dates alleged in the affidavit [Doc. 119-1 ¶ 68]. The
affidavit alleges that RHP submitted a claim for a prescription with three refills allowed on April
25, 2022 [Id.]. Defendant Haney’s Exhibit S shows an authorization form for three refills for the
prescription originally written on October 25, 2021, and the authorization form was faxed on
April 5, 2022, not April 25, 2022, from Dr. Scariano [Doc. 119-10 p. 3].
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The Government states that the attached prescriptions were in RHP’s possession and Agent
Valero did not have them prior to the search [Doc. 111 p. 15]. It argues that Agent Valero could
not have made a misrepresentation about faxed prescriptions of which he was unaware [Id.].
The prescriptions/refill authorization forms with fax transmission lines from Dr. Scariano’s
office demonstrate that RHP received prescriptions or refill authorizations on the dates it submitted
claims. Nevertheless, Defendants do not show that Agent Valero had access to or knew about these
prescriptions. Thus, Defendants fail to carry their burden of showing that Agent Valero
deliberately or recklessly included false information in his affidavit. Moreover, the faxed
prescriptions do not contradict the agent’s assertion that patient M.U. continued to receive pain
cream from RHP every thirty days long after M.U. stopped seeing Dr. Scariano [See Doc. 119-1
¶¶ 60, 65]. Accordingly, the omission of the faxed prescriptions would be of limited materiality to
probable cause if they were known to Agent Valero.
3. 	Kickbacks/Copay Collection Data
Defendants contend that Agent Valero’s affidavit falsely states that RHP violated the Anti-
Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b, by unlawfully waiving patient copays [Doc. 89 pp. 4–5,
13, 19–22]. They argue, however, that Agent Valero’s affidavit provides no evidence of copay
waivers and, instead, merely alleges that RHP did not collect some copayments [Doc. 89 p. 14;
see also Doc. 151 p. 57]. Defendants argue that a waiver is an affirmative act, and the failure to
collect a copay, as alleged by Agent Valero, is not an affirmative act [Id.].
Defendants also assert that RHP’s payment system demonstrates that no copayments were
due for the 62% of claims for which RHP did not collect them [Doc. 89 p. 20]. In support of this
argument, Defendants point out that the two example patients noted in the affidavit each paid
copays [Doc. 89 p. 21; Doc. 115 pp. 3–4]. Patient A.B. paid copays one-third of the time over a
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one-year period, and patient D.N. paid copays for nine out of sixteen prescriptions over a fourteen-
month period [Doc. 89 p. 21; see also Doc. 115 p. 4].39 Defendants opine that Agent Valero
misrepresented the information about copays to search for evidence that RHP was bribing
providers [Doc. 89 pp. 4–5].
Defendants fail to demonstrate that the information in Agent Valero’s affidavit regarding
copays is false. Agent Valero’s affidavit acknowledges that RHP collected some copays.
Regarding example patient D.N., he states that D.N. recalls paying copays for some of her
medication but not for the compounded pain creams [Doc. 119-1 ¶ 88(b)]. The chart provided by
Defendants shows that patient D.N. paid a copay for pain cream a little more than one-half the
time and not for the last six months in 2020 [Doc. 89 p. 21; see also Doc. 115 p. 4]. Agent Valero
also states that patient A.B. did not recall paying a copay for pain cream [Doc. 119-1 ¶ 88(a)].
Defendants’ citation to some copays paid by patients A.B. and D.N., does not negate Agent
Valero’s assertion that “[w]itnesses told agents that RHP did not collect copays from them”
[Doc. 119-1 ¶ 88]. Thus, Defendants fail to show Agent Valero’s information about RHP not
collecting copays is false.
More importantly, the data provided by Defendants regarding copays collected from A.B.
and D.N. supports Agent Valero’s assertion that a review of RHP’s payment system shows that
RHP did not collect copays for two-thirds of the prescriptions and refills for a pain cream (“keto
10/1mit2/diclo1%”) for patients with Medicare. Defendants’ chart shows that A.B. did not pay a
39 	Defendant Roper states that NP Manning told agents that some patients did not want to pay
the $40 copay charged by RHP, which Roper argues contradicts Agent Valero’s statement in the
affidavit that RHP failed to collect copays [Doc. 165 p. 6, 8 (citing 165-1 (Mar. 20, 2024 FBI
Interview of Ashley Manning))]. Defendant Roper also points out that the Humana audit stated
that all patients with a copay paid it [Id. at 8 (citing Doc. 89-9 p. 4 (analyzing sample of
30 prescriptions))].
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copay two-thirds of the time and that D.N. did not pay a copay a little less than one-half of the
time. In other words, this data shows RHP did not occasionally waive copays for this pain cream.
It shows it did so regularly.
Defendants also assert that Agent Valero’s affidavit misrepresents the law regarding
copays because, while Medicare requires pharmacies to collect copays, the OIG permits providers
to waive copays based upon an assessment of the individual’s financial circumstances so long as
those waivers are not routine, are not advertised, and are made after a good-faith, individualized
assessment [Doc. 89 p. 20 (citing HHS-OIG website)]. But Agent Valero alleged that RHP waived
copays on approximately two-thirds of all claims for one type of pain cream for which it sought
reimbursement from Medicare [Doc. 119-1 ¶ 86]. Thus, Agent Valero is alleging routine waiver
of copays, and the exception raised by Defendants would not apply. Moreover, as argued by the
Government [Doc. 111 p. 15], a reviewing court is obliged to evaluate the issuing judge’s probable
cause finding in a “commonsense,” rather than “hypertechnical” manner and to “resol[ve] doubtful
or marginal cases [in line with] the preference to be accorded to warrants.” United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965) (citation omitted). Here, Defendants’ citation to an exception
permitting providers to waive copays does not persuade the undersigned that Agent Valero’s
statements regarding copays are false, much less deliberately or recklessly so. Defendants
therefore fail to show that Agent Valero’s affidavit contains any false statements or material
omissions regarding RHP’s failure to collect copays.
Finally, Defendants argue that the mere failure to collect copays, as opposed to the
affirmative act of waiving them, does not amount to probable cause that RHP violated the Anti-
Kickback Statute [Doc. 148 pp. 4–5]. The Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b establishes
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criminal penalties for acts involving federal health care programs. The Act prohibits, in pertinent
part, “illegal remunerations”:
(1) Whoever 	knowingly 	and 	willfully 	solicits 	or 	receives 	any
remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or
indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind—
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the
furnishing or arranging for the furnishing of any item or service
for which payment may be made in whole or in part under a
Federal health care program, or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or
recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good,
facility, service, or item for which payment may be made in
whole or in part under a Federal health care program,
shall be guilty of a felony[.]
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)(A)–(B). The statute expressly excepts “the waiver or reduction by
pharmacies . . . of any cost-sharing imposed under part D of subchapter XVIII, if the conditions
described in clauses (i) through (iii) of section 1320a-7a(i)(6)(A) of this title are met with respect
to the waiver or reduction” or for a “a subsidy eligible individual . . . without regard to clauses (ii)
and (iii) of that section)[.]” Id. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(G). Clauses (i) through (iii) exclude from the
definition of “remuneration” the waiver of a copay if (1) “the waiver is not offered as part of any
advertisement of solicitation;” (2) the entity “does not routinely waive” copays; and (3) the entity
only waives the copay “after determining in good faith that the individual is in financial need; or .
. 	. 	fails 	to 	collect 	[the 	copay] 	after 	making 	reasonable 	collection 	efforts[.]”
Id. § 1320a-7a(i)(6)(A)(i)–(iii).
Here, Agent Valero’s affidavit provides probable cause for a violation of the Anti-
Kickback Statute by showing that RHP routinely (approximately two-thirds of the time over a
four-years-and-four-month period for a specific pain cream) did not collect copays for Medicare
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patients [Doc. 119-1 ¶¶ 85–86; see also id. ¶¶ 27–28 (Medicare requires a pharmacy to collect
copays)]. He alleges that Medicare paid RHP $3,274,400.34 for the 2,191 claims for this pain
cream on which RHP collected no co-pay [Id. ¶87]. Defendants argue that the affidavit fails to
show that RHP affirmatively waived these copays. But the Anti-Kickback Statute expressly states
that actual knowledge or specific intent by the entity is not required. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(h)
(“With respect to violations of this section, a person need not have actual knowledge of this section
or specific intent to commit a violation of this section.”). Finally, the agent states that RHP keeps
records and receipts from the prescriptions it fills at his premises [Doc. 119-1 ¶¶ 16, 35].
Accordingly, the affidavit provides probable cause to believe that evidence of Defendants’
violations of the Anti-kickback Statute would be found on the premises of RHP.
Accordingly, Agent Valero’s affidavit contains no false statements or material omissions
regarding RHP’s failure to collect copays and it provides probable cause to search for evidence of
the violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute.
4. 	Impact of Multiple Omissions
Defendants argue that setting aside the false statements and omissions, the remaining
information in Agent Valero’s affidavit “appl[ies] equally to law-abiding businesses and people”
and does not provide probable cause to search RHP [Doc. 115 p. 7]. According to Defendants, the
prescriber denials show nothing more than the providers did not prescribe the medications for
which RHP billed but do not show that RHP was at fault [Id. at 7–8]. They contend that Agent
Valero omitted material information that “APS was under government monitorship for years [and
that n]umerous witnesses had told the government about APS’[s] noncompliance” [Id. at 8].
Defendants contend the information that prescriptions were missing from Dr. Scariano’s patient
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files is of no import considering the omitted fact that RHP received faxed copies of these
prescriptions from Dr. Scariano’s practice [Id. at 9].
Defendants also assert that the Medicare and Medicaid data, considered in isolation, is
“meaningless” because anomalies in data are frequently explained by innocent facts, such as a
pharmacy’s location or the types of patients served [Id.]. Here, they argue the fact that RHP billed
Medicare for a certain product only shows that Medicare covered that product, and that RHP
switched to a different product when Medicare stopped reimbursing for the first is the same
business practice that any pharmacy would employ [Id.]. Defendants also argue that Sydney
Goodson, a former cashier at RHP, does not state that RHP did anything wrong [Id. at 9–10]. They
assert that “test claims” are routine and necessary to determine whether a medication is covered
by a patient’s plan, and, additionally, Agent Valero did nothing “to refresh” the three-year-old
information from Ms. Goodson [Id. at 10].
Finally, Defendants allege RHP’s marketing efforts are permissible, and a patient’s
annoyance with text messages for refills is unremarkable [Id.]. They maintain that neither support
probable cause [Id.]. They state the Government conceded that the suspicious activity report does
not alone subject RHP to a search [Id. at 11; see Doc. 111 p. 10 n.3 (“The Government concedes
for the purpose of this case that the submission of a Suspicious Activity Report is not a proper
basis for evaluating probable cause.”)]. Thus, Defendants argue that setting aside the false
statements and factoring in the critical omissions, the affidavit fails to establish probable cause for
healthcare fraud or a violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute [Doc. 148 pp. 2–4].
To start, Defendants fail to make a substantial preliminary showing that Agent Valero’s
affidavit contains any false statements. The undersigned finds only one omission—the mitigation
by NP Armstrong and NP Bertram of their prior denials in connection with the Humana audit—
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but also finds Defendants fail to carry their burden of showing this omission is material when
considered along with the other provider denials in the affidavit.
Even if the Court were to consider collectively the suspicions regarding APS staff and
management altering or forging prescriptions, the mitigation by NPs Armstrong and Bertram, the
omitted fax submission line on the NP Manning prescription, and the faxed prescriptions from
Dr. 	Scariano’s 	patients—none of 	which 	the 	undersigned 	finds 	to 	be material 	omissions
individually—Defendants still fail to make the requisite showing to warrant a Franks hearing.
Specifically, even considering these omissions, Agent Valero’s affidavit still shows that
multiple 	providers 	from 	multiple 	practices 	denied 	writing 	prescriptions 	for 	compounded
medications filled at RHP. NP Manning stated that a prescription her practice faxed to RHP was
altered in someone else’s handwriting, and she did not authorize RHP to modify her prescriptions.
Dr. Scariano’s patient M.U. continued to receive monthly refills of a pain cream from RHP years
after M.U.’s last appointment with Dr. Scariano. Agent Valero, based on his training and
experience, stated that pharmacies benefit financially from submitting forged prescriptions or
altering prescriptions to substitute higher-reimbursed drugs or to include refills.
The affidavit also shows that former RHP employee Sydney Goodson stated Defendants
Haney, Warren, and Roper submitted test claims to discover which ingredients afforded the
maximum reimbursement. She also described RHP’s marketing lunches with providers to promote
their “pain contracts,” and providers with pain contracts prescribed RHP’s pain creams regardless
of medical necessity. RHP’s website promoted “Lunch & Learn” opportunities for providers.
Ms. Goodson said RHP also used pre-printed prescription forms to encourage physicians to send
patients to RHP for pain creams. Agent Valero stated that in his experience, pre-printed
prescription forms are not common in legitimate medicine. According to Ms. Goodson, Defendant
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Roper would place patients on automatic refills for pain creams even if not requested. Patient G.T.
received monthly text messages from RHP for refills for several years after Dr. Scariano stopped
prescribing the pain cream at his request and after he repeatedly declined the refills.
In addition, data analysis of RHP’s claims for Medicare reimbursement show a large
number of claims for a high-reimbursement pain creams for patients with Medicare and only
minimal claims for other payors for this same pain cream. Similarly, RHP sought reimbursement
from Medicaid/TennCare for high-reimbursement rectal kits until Medicaid began rejecting those
claims, and then RHP began submitting claims for a different high-reimbursement pain cream.
RHP failed to collect patient copays for two-thirds of the prescriptions and refills for a pain cream
for which it made Medicare claims over a four years and four months.
In sum, Agent Valero’s affidavit provides probable cause for the search of RHP even
considering Defendants’ alleged omissions. Accordingly, Defendants fail to make the requisite
substantial preliminary showing required for a Franks hearing as to Agent Valero’s affidavit.
5. 	Seizure Warrants
Defendants allege the same false statements and material omissions require a Franks
hearing regarding the seizure warrants [Doc. 89 pp. 5, 24–25, 27]. They argue that the evidence of
misrepresentations on provider denials and Dr. Scariano’s patient files is even stronger in Agent
Celeste’s affidavit [Id. at 24–25]. Regarding provider denials, Defendants contend that following
the search of RHP, law enforcement interviewed APS provider Miranda Day on August 27, 2024,
and she stated that APS management assigned the responsibility of signing patients up for pain
creams to Felisha Livesay, a “‘helper’” at APS with no medical training, and some of the APS
providers thought this was odd [Id. at 24 (quoting Doc. 119-13 p. 3)]. Defendants also point to a
second interview of Felisha Livesay on August 20, 2024, in which Livesay stated that once the
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providers signed the blank RHP formulary sheets, she circled the ingredients that the providers
wanted on the formulary sheet based on instant messages from the providers and then faxed it to
RHP using SRfax [Doc. 89 p. 24 (citing Doc. 119-14 p. 5)]. Defendants contrast Livezey’s
statement with a statement by APS consultant Jimmy Cowden, who said APS did not have an
instant messaging system [Id. at 25 (citing 89-11 p. 3)]. Defendants point out that Agent Celeste’s
affidavit contains prescriptions from OptumRx’s 2020 audit file that were faxed to RHP, which
shows that the prescriber denials in Agent Valero’s affidavit are false [Doc. 89 p. 25; see 119-2
¶ 42]. They also contend that Agent Celeste’s affidavits relies on the same information regarding
Dr. Scariano’s patients M.U. and R.D. but omits that Dr. Scariano’s office faxed prescriptions for
those two patients to RHP [Doc. 89 p. 27 (citing the faxed prescriptions in 119-9 & 119-10)].
As with Agent Valero’s affidavit, Defendants fail to demonstrate that Agent Celeste made
any false statements. Defendants acknowledge that Agent Celeste’s affidavit contains the faxed
prescriptions for the OptumRx prescriber denials. Agent Celeste’s affidavit also states that two
providers from the Humana audit mitigated their denials [Doc. 119-2 ¶ 124]. But, even considering
Defendants’ remaining alleged omissions (that providers suspected the APS staff and management
were altering prescriptions and that that Manning’s prescription and the prescriptions for M.U. and
R.D. were faxed to RHP), Agent Celeste’s affidavit contains ample probable cause that proceeds
of health care fraud from the five categories were deposited in RHP’s operating accounts
[Doc. 119-2 ¶¶ 36–182].
Specifically, Agent Celeste alleges that RHP filled prescriptions for Lidocaine-HC rectal
kits when all the providers interviewed (approximately half of the forty-eight providers for whom
RHP filled prescriptions for rectal kits between September 2018 and March 2020) denied
prescribing the rectal kits [Id. ¶¶ 44–48]. Agent Celeste documented numerous prescriptions for
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RHP owners, employees, and their family members, which the providers denied prescribing or, in
some cases, the providers denied even ever treating the individuals [Id. ¶¶ 55–105]. Regarding the
RHP pre-printed formulary prescriptions, Agent Celeste demonstrated the ingredients or types of
compounded medications (the “options”) selected by the providers were changed [id. ¶¶ 109–118]
and that steroids and other medications were added to the pain creams when the providers did not
authorize the additions [id. ¶¶ 109–111, 119–130]. Finally, Agent Celeste provided information
that individuals at RHP forged prescriptions for Dr. Scariano and provider M.F., who worked at
his office [Id. ¶¶ 131–76].
Hence, Defendants fail to carry their burden of demonstrating that Agent Celeste omitted
material information from her affidavit that would impact probable cause. The undersigned
therefore finds that Defendants fail to make a substantial preliminary showing to warrant a Franks
hearing on Agent Celeste’s affidavit.
Defendants also assert that, setting aside any false statements and material omissions,
Agent Celeste’s affidavit does not provide probable cause that all funds seized were traceable to
the five categories of alleged fraud and that the Government has “‘extrapolate[d]’ from discrete,
allegedly fraudulent prescriptions to seize ‘buckets’ of all claims around five different categories
of purportedly ‘altered or forged’ prescriptions” [Doc. 89 pp. 25–26; Doc. 165 p. 14]. They argue
that although Agent Celeste claims that providers denied authorizing an alternative formulary
option or adding a steroid, she fails to recognize that in “nearly all” of the prescriptions relating to
prescriber denials permitted substitutions [Doc. 89 p. 26]. Defendants contend that Agent Celeste’s
assertions that the various prescriptions were not “authorized” does not amount to probable cause
that specific prescriptions were not authorized or forged [Id. at 26–27]. As an example, Defendants
assert that Agent Celeste acknowledges that Dr. Scariano’s office manager, C.S., authorized
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prescriptions in writing and orally [Doc. 89 p. 27; see Doc. 119-2 ¶¶ 138, 139, 144]. They contend
Agent Celeste’s remaining “limited arguments” [see Doc. 119-2 ¶¶ 165 (RHP filled prescription
for patient on day he died), 172 (RHP photocopied an earlier prescription for later use)] for the
DOL EEOIC claims do not permit the FBI to seize all funds paid to RHP by the DOL EEOIC
[Doc. 89 p. 27].
The undersigned disagrees that Agent Celeste’s affidavit lacks probable cause for seizing
all funds from Defendants’ bank accounts and investment accounts and their vehicles and
watercraft. Agent Celeste’s affidavit states Defendants’ assets are properly seized because they
were purchased or funded in whole or in part by moneys “involved in” money laundering activity
under 18 U.S.C. § 1957 [Doc. 119-2 ¶¶ 7 (stating that, “in addition to the directly traceable portion
of health care proceeds to the [seized property] there is also probable cause to believe that the
entirety of the [seized property] are involved in money laundering activity in violation of 1957 and
as such are subject to seizure pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(b) and 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) and (f) by
18 U.S.C. § 982(b)(1); and forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 982(a)(1), 981(a)(1)(A), and
981(a)(1)(C)”), 188–191 (discussing § 1957 and transactions allegedly in violation thereof),
226–228 (citing criminal forfeiture statutes and basis for seizure, including that property was
“involved in” money laundering transactions in violation of § 1957)]. Money laundering under
§ 1957 “criminalizes moving around at least $10,000 in criminal proceeds for any purpose through
a financial institution.” United States v. Kratt, 579 F.3d 558, 561 (6th Cir. 2009). “Money
laundering forfeiture is required for all property ‘involved in’ the crime, which can include clean
or legitimate money that is comingled with tainted money derived from illicit sources.” United
States v. Coffman, 859 F. Supp. 2d 871, 875–76 (E.D. Ky. 2012)) (explaining two ways that “clean
money can be involved in a money laundering offense and subject to forfeiture”), aff’d,
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574 F. App’x 541 (6th Cir. 2014). Here, Agent Celeste’s affidavit shows that Defendants moved
funds from RHP’s operating accounts, which contained the proceeds of the five alleged schemes,
into their bank accounts, and from there, into investment accounts, vehicles, and watercraft [See,
e.g., Doc. 119-2 pp. 115–116 (showing diagrams of financial transfers)]. Accordingly, Agent
Celeste’s affidavit provides probable cause to support the seizure of all funds from Defendants’
bank accounts and investment accounts and their vehicles and watercraft.
C. 	Search of Cell Phones and Seizure of Documents from RHP
During the execution of the search warrant at RHP, agents seized the personal cell phones
of Defendants Haney, Warren, and Roper, and extracted the data from their phones on site.
Defendants argue that the data seized from their cell phones must be suppressed because (1) the
cell phones were improperly seized outside the scope of the search warrant [Doc. 165 p. 10;
Doc. 177 p. 2; Doc. 179 pp. 1–2]. Alternatively, they contend that Agent Valero’s affidavit does
not provide probable cause to seize or search employees’ cell phones because it fails to provide
facts about the use of cell phones to further the alleged crimes [Doc. 177 pp. 2–3; see also
Doc. 165 p. 10]. Finally, at the August 12, 2025 hearing, Defendants Roper and Haney argued that
the agents’ seizure of all prescriptions from RHP was overly broad because Agent Valero’s
affidavit only shows some prescriptions were altered or forged [Doc. 195 pp. 80–81, 97].
The Government responds that the search warrant for RHP expressly permits the seizure
of mobile phones and that the agents seized and extracted data from Defendants’ cell phones in
good faith [Doc. 175]. It contends that Defendants’ new allegation that documents seized from
RHP are also outside the scope of the search warrant was not raised in their suppression motion or
request to join [Doc. 195 p. 94]. Nevertheless, it responds that Agent Valero’s affidavit clearly
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establishes fraud at RHP and that evidence of that fraud would be found in electronic and paper
records on the premises [Id. at 95].
The undersigned finds the seizure and search of Defendants’ cell phones was within the
scope of the search warrant for RHP, but that Agent Valero’s affidavit lacks a probable cause
nexus that evidence of the alleged crimes would be located on the personal cell phones of the
owners and employees. Despite this Fourth Amendment violation, suppression of the data
extracted from the cell phones is not warranted because the agents executed the search warrant in
good faith. As for whether the search warrant permitted the seizure of all prescriptions stored at
RHP, the undersigned finds that it does.
1. 	Cell Phones
Defendants argue that the search warrant for RHP did not permit the seizure of their
personal cell phones [Doc. 165 pp. 10, 12–13; Doc. 177 p. 3; Doc. 179 p. 2]. They assert that the
search of the contents of a cell phone, including text messages, requires a search warrant because
cell phones contain the “‘privacies of life’” [Doc. 165 pp. 10–11 (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 403),
13]. They maintain that even if agents permissibly seized the cell phones, a search warrant was
required to search them [Doc. 165 p. 12]. Defendants assert that the executing agents exceeded the
scope of the search warrant when they searched the personal cell phones of the owners and
employees [Id. at 14].
a. 	Particularity
Officers seeking to search the contents of a cell phone must have a search warrant. Riley,
573 U.S. at 400. The Fourth Amendment requires that a search warrant describe the items to be
seized “with particularity to prevent the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another[.]”
United States v. Richards, 659 F.3d 527, 536–37 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). “‘The chief
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purpose of the particularity requirement [is] to prevent general searches by requiring a neutral
judicial officer to cabin the scope of the search to those areas and items for which there exists
probable cause that a crime has been committed.’” United States v. Chaney, 921 F.3d 572, 581
(6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Richards, 659 F.3d at 537 (alteration in original)). Search warrants can be
insufficiently particular in two ways: (1) by failing to be specific enough to guide the officer in
what to seize or (2) by “overbreadth,” i.e., including items that should not be seized. Id. (citing
Richards, 659 F.3d at 537). “[T]he crime involved and the types of items sought” dictate the
amount of specificity required in the warrant. Id. (citations omitted).
Defendants first contend that the search warrant for RHP does not permit the seizure of the
personal cell phones of owners and employees. As argued by the Government [Doc. 175 p. 3],
however, the search warrant for RHP expressly reaches mobile phones of the owners or employees
on the premises. Attachment A to the search warrant permits the search of the premises of RHP
[Doc. 119-1 p. 42]. Attachment B to the search warrant permits the seizure and search of “all
records” relating to violations of the target offenses (health care fraud, attempt and conspiracy to
commit healthcare fraud, false statements relating to healthcare matters, conspiracy to pay and
receive health care kickbacks, and violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute) involving RHP, its
owners, and its employees from August 1, 2018 through the present [Id. at 43]. Attachment B
specifies eleven categories of “[r]ecords and information” that agents can seize, including
“[r]ecords and information relating to the identity of persons who . . . communicated with [RHP]
and its owners and employees about matters related to the Target Offenses” and “[r]ecords and
information related to communications with patients regarding prescription refills” [Id. at 43–44].
Attachment B defines “records” and “information” to include “any form of computer or electronic
storage” and further defines “computer” to include “mobile phones” [Id. at 44]. These provisions
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show that the search warrant permits the search of Defendants’ cell phones for the eleven
categories of records.
Defendants protest that even if the search warrant permits seizure and search of cell phones,
it applies only to business phones and not the personal cell phones of the owners or employees
[Doc. 195 pp. 71–72]. They assert the agents could not reasonably believe that records from the
eleven categories would be on the personal cell phones of the employees [Id. at 72, 74].
The Government responded that the attachment includes mobile phones present at the
pharmacy and does not distinguish between business and personal phones [Id. at 85]. It denied that
the search warrant permitted the seizure of a customer’s cell phone, even if the customer was on
the premises at the time of the search, because “there’s no reason to think that customers would
have records of communications with the owners or employees [on their] phones” [Id.]. The
Government also asserted that as owners and employees, Defendants were closely tied to the
pharmacy and, thus, closely tied to the fraud at the pharmacy [Id.]. Moreover, noting that the
affidavit reflects that Defendant Haney, Defendant Roper, and employee Tabitha Roper are sisters,
the Government argued the agents could reasonably assume that as both coworkers and family,
communications about issues relating to the pharmacy would be on their phones [Id. at 91].
“Particularity is required to prevent ‘general order[s] to explore and rummage’ and avoid
‘the danger of unlimited discretion in the executing officer’s determination of what is subject to
seizure.’” United States v. Honeysucker, No. 21-2614, 2023 WL 142265, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 10,
2023) (quoting United States v. Greene, 250 F.3d 471, 476–77 (6th Cir. 2001)). Generally, a
“‘warrant that empowers police to search for something satisfies the particularity requirement if
its text constrains the search to evidence of a specific crime.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Castro,
881 F.3d 961, 965 (6th Cir. 2018)) (holding that a search warrant restricting law enforcement to
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search defendant’s cell phone for evidence of a specific crime during a specific time frame was
sufficiently specific to restrain the executing officer’s discretion).
Here, the search warrant limited the seizure of records both temporally (from August 1,
2018 to the present) and to records relating to violations of the target offenses [Doc. 119-1 p. 43].
Attachment B also expressly focuses on records of the involvement of the pharmacy and “its
owners and employees” in the target offenses [Id.]. Additionally, executing officers are directed
to search for “communications” between the owners or employees and other persons “about
matters related to the target offenses” [Id. at 43–44]. These limitations satisfy the particularity
requirement by constraining the search to the target offenses being investigated. Moreover,
because the officer is seeking the communications of the owners and employees, the search warrant
would not permit the seizure of the cell phone of anyone on the premises at the time of the search.
In other words, a customer’s cell phone would not fall within the ambit of the search warrant.40
Thus, the Defendant’s personal cell phones are within the scope of the search warrant.
Defendants next argue that if the search warrant permits the search of the owners’ and
employees’ personal cell phones, then the search warrant is overly broad [Doc. 195 pp. 78–79].
They deny that the search warrant is “narrowly tailored” [Doc. 165 p. 10] or that Attachment B is
40 	In evaluating the sufficiency of the search warrant’s particularity, the undersigned declines
to consider information set forth in only the affidavit, such as the fact that an owner and employees
were related, because here the affidavit was not incorporated in the search warrant. See United
States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1024 (6th Cir. 1991) (“A search warrant may be construed with
reference to a supporting affidavit if the affidavit accompanies the warrant and the warrant
incorporates 	the 	affidavit 	by 	reference.” 	(citation 	omitted)); 	see 	also 	Groh 	v. 	Ramirez,
540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004) (“The Fourth Amendment by its terms requires particularity in the
warrant, not in the supporting documents.”). As noted above, the search warrant for RHP remains
sealed [No. 3:24-MJ-1095, Doc. 6, SEALED]. The undersigned has reviewed the search warrant,
and it does not incorporate the affidavit in describing the items to be seized [Id.]. Instead, for the
description of the items to be seized, the search warrant states “Please see Attachment B which is
attached hereto and fully incorporated herein” [Id.].
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as specific as possible under the circumstances, contending that Agent Valero knew the owners
and employees and could have specified their cell phones in the attachment [Doc. 195 pp. 78–79].
“[T]he degree of specificity required [in a search warrant] is flexible and will vary
depending on the crime involved and the types of items sought.” United States v. Greene,
250 F.3d 471, 477 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Ables, 167 F.3d 1021, 1033
(6th Cir. 1999)). “[W]hen the scheme under investigation is complex, a warrant authorizing the
seizure of a lengthy list of records is sufficiently particular.” United States v. Ataya, No. 15-20351,
2016 WL 641343, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 18, 2016) (citations omitted) (upholding search warrant
for medical files and other listed documents and electronic records and devices for evidence of
conspiracy to commit health care fraud and to pay and receive illegal kickbacks); see also Chaney,
921 F.3d at 581 (6th Cir. 2019) (concluding that a search warrant for a medical clinic permitting
seizure of all patient files that were evidence of violations of the target offenses was sufficiently
particular). That is the case here: the scheme alleged is complex. And the description of the items
to be seized was “directed toward items likely to provide information concerning [Defendants’]
involvement in the alleged conspirac[y].” Ataya, 2016 WL 641343, at *7 (explaining that the
affiant “‘could not have known at the time he applied for the warrant what precise records and files
would contain information’ concerning the alleged health care fraud conspiracy and the alleged
conspiracy to pay and receive kickbacks” (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Bass,
785 F.3d 1043, 1049–50 (6th Cir. 2015) (affirming particularity of search warrant to search cell
phone for “records of communication” and other records that are evidence of identity theft because
at time of seizure, “officers could not have known where this information was located in the phone
or in what format”); United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645, 652 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding seizure of
the defendant’s home computer and digital media for off-site search is not overbroad if probable
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cause exists for “‘finding some needles [of evidence of the crimes] in the computer haystack’”
(quoting United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999))). Accordingly, the
undersigned finds Attachment B is sufficiently specific given the target offenses involved, and the
nature of the records sought.
Thus, the undersigned finds that the Defendants’ cell phones come within the scope of the
search warrant and the degree of specificity in Attachment B comports with the particularity
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
b. 	Nexus
Defendants argue that Agent Valero’s affidavit did not provide a basis to search the
personal cell phones of the owners or employees [Doc. 195 pp. 73, 80, 97]. To satisfy the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment, a search warrant must be based on an affidavit containing
“particularized facts” that demonstrate “a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be located
on the premises of the proposed search.” United States v. McPhearson, 469 F.3d 518, 524
(6th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Frazier, 423 F.3d 526, 531 (6th Cir. 2005)). “To justify
a search, the circumstances must indicate why evidence of illegal activity will be found ‘in a
particular place.’” United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc). In other
words, probable cause requires a “nexus between the place to be searched and the evidence
sought.” Id. (quoting United States v. Van Shutters, 163 F.3d 331, 336–37 (6th Cir. 1998)). “The
connection between the [location] and the evidence of criminal activity must be specific and
concrete, not ‘vague’ or ‘generalized.’” United States v. Brown, 828 F.3d 375, 382 (6th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Carpenter, 360 F.3d at 595). Assessing whether an affidavit establishes a nexus turns
upon the facts of a particular case and requires examination of the totality of the circumstances.
Id. The court must determine “‘whether the [issuing judge] had a substantial basis for finding that
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the affidavit established probable cause to believe that the evidence would be found at the place
cited.’” United States v. Merriweather, 728 F. App’x 498, 504 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting United
States v. Davidson, 936 F.2d 856, 859 (6th Cir. 1991)).
To permit the search of a cell phone, the affidavit must generally provide some information
that 	the cell 	phone was 	used 	in 	connection 	with 	the crime. 	United 	States 	v. 	Ramirez,
180 F. Supp. 3d 491, 495–96 (W.D. Ky. 2016) (determining that nexus was insufficient when the
affidavit contained no information that the defendant used his cell phone as a tool of drug
trafficking); see, e.g., United States v. Tanzil, No. 23-20654, 2025 WL 18642, at *3 (E.D. Mich.
Jan. 2, 2025) (finding no nexus between the defendant’s cell phone and the alleged shooting where
“[t]he affidavits here did not contain any allegations stating the phone was used during the alleged
offenses or that it was used to store evidence of the offenses[, or ] . . . information regarding the
GPS ping data showing that the phone was in the area of the shooting”) (appeal filed on Jan. 31,
2025). Cf. Bass, 785 F.3d at 1049 (finding a nexus to drug trafficking when the affidavit alleged
that a defendant and his coconspirators frequently communicated by cell phone and that the
defendant was using his cell phone at the time he was arrested).
The undersigned finds the affidavit does not provide a nexus between Defendants’ cell
phones and healthcare fraud or violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute. The affidavit contains no
references to the owners or employees of RHP using their personal cell phones to conduct business
at RHP. The affidavit twice mentions communications by telephone call or text. Agent Valero
states that a former employee told agents Defendant Roper “call[ed] patients to see if they wanted
refills, and if they did not answer, she would place them on automatic refills for pain creams”
[Doc. 119-1 ¶ 78]. Agent Valero also states that Dr. Scariano’s patient G.T. received monthly text
messages from RHP about refills over several years after Dr. Scariano stopped prescribing the pain
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cream [Id. ¶ 82]. G.T. provided agents a screenshot of the refill text message that he had received
on February 2, 2024, just before the interview [Id. ¶ 82–84]. The text message states that it is from
RHP; contains a telephone number at the top of the message, ostensibly from the sender; provides
instructions for texting regarding receiving or declining a refill or for receiving “automatic refills
from now on”; and provides a different telephone number to call if the patient wants the refill
within 48–72 hours [Id. ¶ 84]. Agent Valero does not state that Defendant Roper used her personal
cell phone to call or text patients about refills, nor does it identify the two telephone numbers
appearing in the screen shot as the number for any employee’s cell phone. Accordingly, the
undersigned finds that the affidavit fails to provide a nexus between the personal cell phones of
RHP’s owners and employees and evidence of healthcare fraud or not collecting copayments.
Our appellate court “has not decided whether the requisite probable cause nexus for a
warrant to search a cell phone is only ‘a fair probability’ that ‘the phone’s data “will aid in a
particular” investigation and disclose evidence of criminal activity’ or if, instead, the affidavit must
make factual allegations that ‘the phone itself is being used “in connection with criminal
activity.”’” United States v. Rolling, No. 23-1045, 2024 WL 4512532, at *3 (6th Cir. Oct. 17,
2024) (quoting United States v. Sheckles, 996 F.3d 330, 338 (6th Cir. 2021)), cert. denied,
145 S. Ct. 2721 (2025). The nexus here is insufficient under either standard. As stated above, the
affiant does not allege that Defendants used their personal cell phones as part of their work at RHP.
Nor does the affiant state that in his experience in investigating healthcare fraud, evidence would
be on personal cell phones. The affiant’s assertion that RHP stores records electronically does not
create a fair probability that the personal cell phones of RHP’s owners and employees will contain
evidence of the alleged crimes.
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For these reasons, the undersigned finds Agent Valero’s affidavit does not provide a nexus
between Defendants’ cell phones and the target offenses.
c. 	Good Faith
“[J]udicial suppression is inappropriate when an officer conducts a search in ‘objectively
reasonable reliance’ on a warrant later deemed to be invalid.” United States v. Neal, 106 F.4th 568,
572 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984)); see also United
States v. Herring, 555 U.S. 135, 141–42 (2009) (rejecting automatic exclusion of evidence and,
instead, asking whether exclusion will provide “appreciable deterrence”). This is because
“‘[p]enalizing the officer for the [judge’s] error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute
to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.’” United States v. White, 874 F.3d 490,
505–06 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 921); see also Neal, 106 F.4th at 572 (observing
that when the affidavit lacks probable cause, “the authorizing judge—not the officer—is the
blameworthy party”). “When the good-faith exception applies, courts will not suppress evidence
of a search if ‘officers act[ed] in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant that is
subsequently invalidated.’” United States v. Nobel, No. 24-5972, 2025 WL 1410331, at *2
(6th Cir. May 15, 2025) (quoting Laughton, 409 F.3d at 748).
The good-faith exception is limited in scope and “does not apply when an officer executing
a search warrant relies on a warrant affidavit ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’” Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923). Officers
cannot in good faith rely on a “bare bones” affidavit. Id. (citing White, 874 F.3d at 496). “[B]are
bones affidavits nakedly assume or vaguely conclude, without attempting to demonstrate why,
probable cause has been satisfied.” Sanders, 106 F.4th at 468. Bare bones affidavits contain no
facts in support of probable cause and provide only the affiant’s “mere guess” that contraband or
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evidence will be found in the location to be searched. Nobel, 2025 WL 1410331, at *2 (quoting
White, 874 F.3d at 496). In contrast, “[s]ome modicum of evidence, however slight[, ]between the
criminal activity at issue and the place to be searched” will support an officer’s good-faith belief
in the existence of probable cause. United States v. McCoy, 905 F.3d 409, 416 (6th Cir. 2018)
(quoting White, 874 F.3d at 496); see also Sanders, 106 F.4th at 469 (same).
Here, Agent Valero’s affidavit is not bare bones as to the search of the premises. As
discussed above, Agent Valero’s forty-page affidavit provides ample probable cause to believe
that evidence of health care fraud, making false statements in relation to health care matters, and
violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute would be in the records on RHP’s premises, which include
electronic records. Agent Valero’s affidavit asks to search for records on the premises “in whatever
form they are found” to include paper records and “data stored on a computer’s hard drive or other
storage media” [Doc. 119-1 ¶ 90]. In addition, he states that an RHP pharmacy technician called
patients to ask about refills and that a patient received monthly texts from RHP regarding refills
[Id. ¶¶ 78, 83–84].
The two references to the use of phones in procuring patient refills, including the
unauthorized refills for G.T., in combination with the affidavit’s request to search records on the
premises in whatever form including “other storage media” provide a slim “modicum” of evidence
linking the evidence sought and the Defendants’ cell phones on the premises. Thus, the executing
agents’ belief that the Defendants’ cell phones would contain evidence of the target offenses is
more than a mere guess. See United States v. Merriweather, 728 F. App’x 498, 506 (6th Cir. 2018)
(applying the good-faith exception to search of a cell phone where the affidavit stated cell phones
were used to arrange two drug purchases from the defendant and defendant’s cell phone was found
in a vehicle containing illegal drugs); Rolling, 2024 WL 4512532 at *4 (applying the good-faith
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exception to search of cell phone where the affidavit “contained factual allegations that [the
defendant’s] car and [the defendant] himself had been connected to several robberies committed
with another person and that the phone had been found in the car” (citation omitted)); United States
v. Levallis, 515 F. Supp. 3d 686, 693–94 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 27, 2021) (applying good-faith exception
to search of cell phone when affidavit contained a statement of the affiant’s training and experience
about the use of cell phones to facilitate drug trafficking and illegal possession of firearms and
stated defendant was present with others—all carrying cell phones—when they received a package
containing drugs and defendant possessed an illegal firearm while they transported the package).
Accordingly, the executing officers seized and searched Defendants’ cell phones in good faith.
Defendants argue the good faith exception does not apply because Agent Valero included
false statements and misrepresentations in his affidavit [Doc. 195 p. 95]. While Leon excludes
from the good faith exception cases in which the issuing judge “was misled by information in an
affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless
disregard of the truth,” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, here, the undersigned finds no false statements or
material misrepresentations occurred.
Similarly, Defendants contend that Agent Valero assisted in the execution of the search
warrant and therefore knew the affidavit did not authorize the search of personal cell phones
[Id. at 95, 103]. But the Court’s inquiry is an objective, not subjective, one. “‘Following Leon,
courts presented with a motion to suppress [challenging a warrant] must ask whether a reasonably
well[-]trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s
decision.’” United States v. Moorehead, 912 F.3d 963, 967–68 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting United
States v. White, 874 F.3d 490, 496 (6th Cir. 2017)). Moreover, the record is devoid of evidence
that Agent Valero did not believe the search warrant authorized him to search employee cell
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phones. Instead, he came with a CART unit prepared to extract data from cell phones and electronic
devices [See Doc. 148-1 p. 1 (stating Agent Valero requested CART assistance with the execution
of a warrant, specifically “to assist with on-scene imaging of computers and mobile devices”)].
At the August 12 evidentiary hearing, Defendant Haney argued that the Court should apply
the missing witness inference and infer the agents did not execute the search warrant in good faith
because the Government did not present the agents as witnesses at the evidentiary hearing
[Doc. 195 pp. 102–03]. The missing witness inference is a “permissive inference” that allows the
jury to infer a witness’s testimony would have been unfavorable “when it can be said with
reasonable assurance that it would have been rational for a party to have called the absent witness
but for some apprehension about his testimony[.]” State v. Eldridge, 749 S.W.2d 756, 758
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). Application of the missing witness inference is a two-prong inquiry:
“An adverse inference such as this is permitted from the failure of a party to call a witness if the
witness is (1) peculiarly within the party’s power to produce; and (2) if the testimony of that
witness would elucidate the transaction.” United States v. Russell, 142 F.3d 438 (table),
No. 96-2128, 1998 WL 136574, at * 4 (6th Cir. Mar. 19, 1998) (citing United States v. Blakemore,
489 F.2d 193, 195 n.4 (6th Cir. 1973)).
The undersigned declines to apply the inference here. First, the inference applies at trial.
See Russell, 1998 WL 136574, at *4 (requiring that before a party asks the jury to make a missing
witness inference, the party must seek and obtain the court’s ruling on whether it applies).41
Second, even if the inference could apply at a suppression hearing, the second prong is not met.
41 	Additionally, the Rules of Evidence do not apply at a suppression hearing. United States v.
Fitzmaurice, No. 3:22-CR-136, 2023 WL 3183313, at *4 (W.D. Ky. May 1, 2023) (citing United
States v. Stepp, 680 F.3d 651, 668 (6th Cir. 2012)).
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As stated, the good faith inquiry is an objective one. Moorehead, 912 F.3d at 967–68. Thus, the
executing agents’ testimony would not shed light on the matter of good faith.
Although the affidavit failed to provide a nexus between the evidence sought and
Defendants’ cell phones, the cell phone extractions are not subject to suppression because the
agents executed the search warrant in good faith.
2. 	Other Records Seized from RHP
The search warrant for RHP permitted seizure of “[a]ll records relating to violations of”
the target offenses and lists eleven categories of records tailored to reveal evidence of health care
fraud or health care kickbacks including “prescriptions sent to or dispensed by” RHP [Doc. 119-1
p. 43–44)]. At the August 12, 2025 hearing, Defendants Roper and Haney argued that agents seized
boxes of records and prescriptions from RHP without regard to whether the prescriptions were
altered or forged [Doc. 195 pp. 62, 80–81, 97].42 As an example, counsel for Defendant Haney
argued that agents seized all prescriptions by Dr. Scariano even though those prescriptions did not
fall within the scope of the search warrant [Id. at 18, 60]. Counsel asserted that agents seized
70,000 prescriptions from RHP when the affidavit only discusses a limited number of prescriptions
that were allegedly altered or forged [Id. at 62].
42 	Counsel for Defendant Haney argued that she raised this argument in her original
suppression motion [Doc. 195 pp. 59–60; see also Doc. 185 p. 3 (stating Defendant Haney “has
alleged in connection with her pending motion to suppress the RHP search . . . outrageous
government misconduct . . . including . . . the FBI’s seizure of extensive documentation that was
never mentioned in the warrant application, including all of Dr. Scariano’s prescriptions, and for
which probable cause was lacking”)]. In her original suppression motion, Defendant Haney asked
to argue the application of the exclusionary rule to the “fruits” of the search after a Franks hearing
affords “further development of the factual record” [Doc. 89 p. 23]. But Defendant’s argument
that the agents seized records outside the scope of the search warrant does not turn on the
determination of the Franks analysis and was available to Defendant at the time of her initial
motion deadline. Thus, the undersigned agrees with the Government that this argument is
untimely. The undersigned, nevertheless, addresses it briefly.
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In a business fraud case, the authorization to search for general business records is not
overbroad.” United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 575 (6th Cir. 2006). A search warrant
permitting the seizure of corporate records is sufficiently particular if it contains “‘subject-matter’
limitations” on the records agents are authorized to seize. United States v. Bartlett, 1:23-cr-20676,
2024 WL 4533554, at *15 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 21, 2024). Thus, a warrant is sufficiently particular
when it permits seizure of “records which would likely provide information ‘related’ to” the
alleged fraudulent scheme. Id.
Even when a business is not steeped in fraud, a large scheme will necessitate seizure of a
large quantity of files. Chaney, 921 F.3d at 587–588. Thus, in United States v. Chaney, the court
affirmed seizure of all patient files to search for evidence of illegitimate prescriptions and money
laundering even though the clinic could not be fairly characterized as a “pill mill.” Id. at 585–88.
There, the prior investigation of the clinic “revealed both specific instances in which patients were
illegitimately prescribed controlled substances and evidence suggesting a larger fraud (for
example, a pad of pre-signed prescriptions left for use while the doctor was away).” Id. at 588. The
court therefore rejected the defendant’s argument that the officers were restricted to searching for
the specific instances of criminal activity already identified because it “ignore[ed the] probable
cause to search for other instances of fraud.” Id. Instead, permitting seizure of patient files
containing evidence of illegitimate prescriptions “was as particular as was possible, in the
circumstances.” Id.
Here, like in Chaney, Agent Valero’s affidavit includes both specific instances of altered
or forged prescriptions in the prescriber denials [Doc. 119-1 ¶¶ 46–69] and also contains
allegations of wider fraud in the analysis of RHP’s claims data showing large numbers of
prescriptions for high-reimbursement medications to Medicare (3,575 claims) in contrast with few
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claims for the same drug to other payors (42 claims) [Id. ¶ 70–71]. Other indications of broader
fraudulent conduct include the use of pre-printed prescription forms [id.¶ 51], the TennCare claims
data analysis [id. ¶ 72], and the failure to collect copays [id. ¶¶ 85–88]. RHP’s legitimate
prescriptions are not easily separated from illegitimate ones as the affidavit shows prescriber
denials from more than one medical practice. Also, the bulk of RHP’s business and most, if not
all, of the altered and forged prescriptions involve compounded creams and gels. The undersigned
therefore finds that the broad seizure of records, including prescriptions, was appropriate.43
Thus, the undersigned finds the seizure of electronic and paper business records from RHP
including boxes of prescriptions for review for evidence of the target offenses conforms to the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
D. 	Return of Property
Defendant Haney and Warren44 also request the immediate return of their funds and assets
seized pursuant to seizure warrants under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) [Doc. 89
p. 27]. The undersigned has already addressed a motion for return of seized property by Defendant
Warren, who sought return of her assets because the government seized more than the amount to
be forfeited in the original Indictment and this over-seizure left her unable pay for retained counsel
[Doc. 150 p. 3]. The undersigned found and continues to find that Defendants cannot proceed
under Rule 41(g) [Id. at 12–15].
Rule 41(g) provides that “[a] person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of
property 	or 	by 	the 	deprivation 	of 	property 	may 	move 	for 	the 	property’s 	return.”
43 	Included in the circumstances are the facts that RHP is in a heavily regulated industry and
is required to provide prescriptions for inspection by the PMBs.
44 	Although Defendant Roper also argues the “seizure of assets must be limited to the
proceeds of specific false prescriptions alleged and must show a nexus to the criminality alleged”
[Doc. 165 p. 14], she lacks standing to challenge the seizure of her codefendants’ assets.
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Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g). But Rule 41(g) does not apply to property that is subject to federal
forfeiture. United States v. Sims, 376 F.3d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The proper office of a
Rule 41(g), motion is, before any forfeiture proceedings have been initiated, or before any criminal
charges have been filed, to seek the return of property seized without probable cause, or property
held an unreasonable length of time without the institution of proceedings that would justify the
seizure and retention of the property.”); see also United States v. Search of Music City Mktg., Inc.,
212 F.3d 920, 923 (6th Cir. 2000) (permitting a motion for return of property under Rule 41(e),
predecessor to Rule 41(g), under the court’s “equitable jurisdiction” when no criminal indictment
or proceeding was pending against the movant); United States v. Tahir, No. 15-20351,
2016 WL 641342, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 18, 2016) (“[W]hen there is either a civil or criminal
forfeiture procedure under way, a Rule 41(g) motion is not appropriate.” (citing Sims and footnote
omitted)); 	In 	re 	Search 	of 	Citizens 	Bank 	Checking 	Acct. 	of 	Drogueria 	Villa, 	Inc.,
No. 3:11-MC-07, 2012 WL 3764058, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 1, 2012) (citing Sims), report &
recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 3764424 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 29, 2012). Accord Brown v. United
States, 692 F.3d 550, 552 (6th Cir. 2012) (explaining that after civil forfeiture proceedings
commence, equitable relief under Rule 41(g) is no longer available); Shaw v. United States,
891 F.2d 602, 603–04 (6th Cir. 1989) (affirming dismissal of motion for return of property under
Rule 41(e), predecessor to Rule 41(g), after the government filed civil forfeiture proceedings).
At the time Defendant Haney filed her suppression motion on March 31, 2025, the Grand
Jury had returned a Superseding Indictment, which included a forfeiture provision [Doc. 73 ¶¶ 57–
61]. The Superseding Indictment seeks forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(C) and 982(a)(1)
and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) [Doc. 73 ¶¶ 57–59]. Section 982(a)(1) provides for forfeiture, upon
conviction of a “violation of section 1956, 1957, or 1960 [of Title 18] . . . of any property, real or
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personal, involved in such offense, or any property traceable to such property.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 982(a)(1). Defendants Haney and Warren are charged in the Superseding Indictment with
conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of § 1956(h) and money laundering in
violation of § 1957 [Doc. 73 ¶¶ 53–54, 56]. The Superseding Indictment seeks forfeiture of all
nineteen assets seized pursuant to the seizure warrants [Id. ¶ 60 (a)–(k) (bank accounts), (a)–(d)
(investment accounts), & (a)–(b) (vehicles), & (a)–(b) (watercraft)].45 The Second Superseding
Indictment, filed on May 21, 2025, makes the same forfeiture allegations as to Defendant Haney’s
and Defendant Warren’s assets seized pursuant to the seizure warrants [Doc. 127 ¶¶ 70–74].
The Government argues that forfeitability of the property, including the nexus of the
property to criminal activity, is a matter for sentencing and cannot be determined pretrial
[Doc. 111 p. 17; see also Doc. 175 p. 6]. The undersigned agrees. “[I]t is ‘well-settled that the
federal government may defeat a Rule 41[(g)] motion by demonstrating that the property is subject
to federal forfeiture.’” United States v. Zazueta-Hernandez, No. 1:19-cr-130, 2020 WL 5016940,
at *3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2020) (quoting United States v. Fitzen, 80 F.3d 387, 389 (9th Cir. 1996)
(other citations omitted); see also Music City Mktg., 212 F.3d at 923 (explaining that a court has
jurisdiction under Rule 41(e), the predecessor to Rule 41(g), when there are no criminal
proceedings pending)); see also Shaw, 891 F.2d at 604 (finding district court did not retain
jurisdiction over a Rule 41(g) motion after government filed civil forfeiture proceeding and
properly gave notice to the defendant).
Moreover, “Rule 41(g) provides an equitable remedy that is not available where there is an
adequate remedy at law.” Zazueta-Hernandez, 	2020 WL 5016940, at *3 (citing Brown,
45 	The Superseding Indictment also seeks forfeiture of real property, including the Finley
Ridge Lane residence of Defendant Roper [Doc. 73 ¶ 60 (a)–(f) (real property)]. Defendant
Roper’s Finley Ridge Lane residence is not included in Agent Celeste’s affidavit.
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692 F.3d at 552–53). “Civil equitable jurisdiction is discretionary; a court should exercise it with
‘caution and restraint.’” United States v. Kazkaz, No. 23-20022, 2023 WL 4237758, at *9
(E.D. Mich. June 28, 2023) (citation omitted). Courts consider four factors in making the
determination:
(1) whether the Government displayed a callous disregard for the
constitutional rights of the movant; (2) whether the movant has an
individual interest in and need for the property [they] want []
returned; (3) whether the movant would be irreparably injured by
denying return of the property; and (4) whether the movant has an
adequate remedy at law for the redress of [their] grievance.
Id. (citation omitted and alterations in original). If, however, “an adequate remedy at law exists,
the fourth factor is dispositive: a movant is not entitled to equitable relief, and a court must decline
to exercise jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Shaw, 891 F.2d at 203).
Here, an adequate remedy at law exists because, by returning an indictment, the Grand Jury
has now found probable cause to believe that the seized assets are subject to forfeiture. See Purbeck
v. Wilkinson, No. 1:21-cv-47, 2021 WL 1553810, at *1 n.2 (D. Idaho Apr. 20, 2021) (finding
adequate remedy at law existed when criminal proceedings have been initiated). The undersigned
thus recommends that the District Judge decline to exercise jurisdiction to entertain Defendants’
request under Rule 41(g).
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, the undersigned finds that:
1. 	Defendants Haney and Warren have standing to challenge the search
of RHP, but Defendant Roper does not;
2. 	all three Defendants have standing to challenge the search of her
own cell phone but not the cell phones of other employees;
3. 	Defendants Haney and Warren have standing to challenge the
seizure of her own accounts and assets pursuant to seizure warrants,
but Defendant Roper lacks standing to challenge the seizure
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warrants because none of her assets were seized pursuant to the
seizure warrants;
4. 	a Franks hearing is not warranted for the affidavit supporting the
search of RHP or the affidavit supporting the seizure warrants;
5. 	Agent Valero’s affidavit provides probable cause to search the RHP
premises for records of the target offenses;
6. 	Agent Celeste’s affidavit provides probable cause to support the
seizure of all funds from Defendants’ bank accounts and investment
accounts and their vehicles and watercraft;
7. 	Agent Valero’s affidavit does not provide probable cause to search
Defendants’ cell phones because it fails to show a nexus between
the cell phones and the target offenses;
8. 	the executing agents searched Defendants’ cell phones in good faith;
9. 	the executing agents properly seized all prescriptions from RHP;
and
10. Defendants may not challenge the seizure warrants under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) because the seized assets are
subject to forfeiture.
The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS46 that the District Judge GRANT Defendant
Warren’s motions [Docs. 96 & 172] to join in Defendant Haney’s and Defendant Roper’s
suppression motions; GRANT Defendant Haney’s request [Doc. 177] to join in Defendant Roper’s
suppression motion; DENY Defendant Roper’s motion [Doc. 138] to join in Defendant Haney’s
46 	Any objections to this report and recommendation must be served and filed within fourteen
(14) days after service of a copy of this recommended disposition on the objecting party.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(2) (as amended). Failure to file objections within the time specified waives
the right to review by the District Court. Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(2); see United States v. Branch,
537 F.3d 582, 587 (6th. Cir. 2008); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985) (providing
that failure to file objections in compliance with the required time period waives the right to appeal
the District Court’s order). The District Court need not provide de novo review where objections
to this report and recommendation are frivolous, conclusive, or general. Mira v. Marshall,
806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986). Only specific objections are reserved for appellate review. Smith
v. Detroit Fed. of Tchrs, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987).
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motion to suppress evidence from the search of RHP and in Defendant Haney’s motion for return
of property seized pursuant to seizure warrants; and DENY Defendants’ motions to suppress
evidence [Docs. 89 & 165].
The undersigned also DENIES Defendant Tiffany Haney’s Second Motion to Suppress
[Doc. 185] as untimely without a showing of good cause, but the undersigned has considered
Defendant’s pertinent arguments also raised at the evidentiary hearing herein.
Respectfully submitted,
____________________________
Jill E. McCook
United States Magistrate Judge
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