USA v. Hardison

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	) 	No. 3:25-CR-48-TAV-DCP
v. 	)
)
BRYAN HARDISON, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
All pretrial motions are referred to the undersigned for disposition or recommendation as
appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). This case is before the Court on Defendant Bryan Hardison’s pro
se1 motions demanding a speedy trial: Motion to Demand a Fast and Speedy Trial [Doc. 76] and
Motion for Defendant to Assert His Statutory Right to the 90[-]day Rule [in] 18 U.S. C. § 3164(c)
[Doc. 88].2 Defendant unequivocally states that he is not requesting any relief at this juncture [See
Docs. 89 & 113]. For this reason and the reasons discussed herein, Defendant’s “motions” [Docs.
76 & 88] are DENIED as moot.
1 	On September 11, 2025, the undersigned permitted Defendant to represent himself, after
finding that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel [Doc. 51 p. 6]. At
Defendant’s request, the Court appointed Attorney Laura Davis as elbow counsel [Id. at 7]. On
November 19, 2025, the undersigned substituted Attorney Mark Brown as elbow counsel for
Defendant [Doc. 102 pp. 2–3].
2 	Defendant also filed three other documents relating to his right to a speedy trial: Notice of
(and) Request [Doc. 52], Notice of Defendant’s Assertion of Right to Speedy Trial Non-Consent
to Any Further Continuances and Objection to Continuances That Are on the Docket [Doc. 120],
and letter requesting the Clerk of Court provide Defendant a calculation of days elapsed from his
speedy trial clock [Doc. 144].
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I. 	BACKGROUND
On May 5, 2025, officers with the Knoxville Police Department’s (“KPD”) Organized
Crime Unit (“OCU”) executed a search warrant at Defendant’s residence [Doc. 1 p. 3]. On that
same day, the undersigned issued a Criminal Complaint charging Defendant with possession of
280 grams or more of cocaine base with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(A) [Id. at 1], based upon the affidavit of KPD Detective Brandon Stryker (“Detective
Stryker”), which lists controlled substances seized from Defendant’s residence. Defendant was
arrested on May 5, 2025. At Defendant’s May 6, 2025 initial appearance on the Criminal
Complaint, the undersigned appointed Assistant Federal Defender Jonathan Moffatt and the
Federal Defender Services of Eastern Tennessee as counsel [see Doc. 4, Minutes; see Doc. 14
(Order of appointment)].
On May 7, 2025, a Grand Jury charged Defendant by Indictment with possession with
intent to distribute 280 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing cocaine base in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) (Count One) and possession with intent to
distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing cocaine (Count Two) in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) [Doc. 8 p. 1]. On May 14, 2025, the Court held an initial
appearance and arraignment on the Indictment and set the case for trial on July 15, 2025 [Doc. 10,
Minutes]. On June 10, 2025, Attorney Moffatt moved to continue the trial and pretrial motion
deadline, stating as grounds that he needed time to meet with Defendant on supplemental discovery
and his research relating to pretrial motions [Doc. 17 ¶ 1]. The undersigned granted this motion,
continued the trial to September 23, 2025, and extended the June 10 pretrial motion deadline to
July 17, 2025 [Doc. 18 p. 2]. The Court found the time between the filing of the motion to continue
on June 10, 2025, and the new trial date was fully excludable under the Speedy Trial Act because
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“the ends of justice served by granting a continuance outweigh the interests of Defendant and the
public in a speedy trial” [Id.].
In mid-July 2025, Defendant retained Attorneys Gregory P. Isaacs and Ashlee B. Mathis,
of the Isaacs Law Firm, who filed a Notice of Appearance [Doc. 19], but they subsequently
withdrew their Motion for Substitution of Counsel due to their discovery of a potential conflict of
interest [Doc. 21]. Attorney Moffatt, who remained counsel of record [Doc. 24], moved to reopen
and extend the pretrial motion deadline for four weeks [Doc. 26 p. 1].3 The motion relates that the
pretrial motion deadline inadvertently expired during the time retained counsel entered an
appearance and then withdrew it [Id. at 1–2]. Attorney Moffatt stated that he and Defendant agree
that pretrial motions, specifically two motions to suppress evidence, should be filed but additional
time is needed to complete investigation of the issues, review pole camera video footage, and
confer with Defendant [Id.]. The Court granted this motion and reopened and extended the pretrial
motion deadline to August 14, 2025 [Doc. 27].
On July 23, 2025, Defendant filed a pro se motion requesting substitute counsel,
contending that defense counsel has not met with him on discovery, defense strategy, or the case
law in support of pretrial motions [Doc. 28 p. 1]. Defendant also sent a letter to the court reiterating
these points [Doc. 29 p. 1]. Defense counsel filed a Motion to Review Attorney/Client Relationship
[Doc. 31] on July 29, 2025. On August 6, 2025, Attorneys Wade V. Davies and Georgia A. Miller
of the Davies Law Firm, PLLC, entered a Notice of Appearance as counsel of record for Defendant,
3 	Defendant also filed a pro se “Notice and Request” asking to extend the pretrial motion
deadline to allow him to file a suppression motion alleging a Fourth Amendment violation [Doc.
22 p. 2]. The undersigned denied this motion because “Defendant is not permitted to file motions
in his own behalf while represented by counsel. E.D. Tenn. L.R. 83.4(c)” [Doc. 25]. The Court
directed counsel to review the pro se filing, confer with Defendant, and file a motion if appropriate
[Id.].
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stating he retained them after the filing of Attorney Moffatt’s Motion to Review Attorney/Client
Relationship [Doc. 32]. Attorney Davies simultaneously filed a Motion to continue the trial and
the pretrial motion deadline “to provide new counsel the adequate time to obtain and review
discovery, discuss the case with the client, and provide effective assistance of counsel in the
preparation of any pretrial motions” [Doc. 33 p. 1].
On August 7, 2025, the Court substituted Attorneys Davies and Miller as Defendant’s
counsel of record [Doc. 34]. Just days later, on August 11, 2025, Defendant filed a pro se motion
seeking a Franks hearing and suppression of evidence obtained during the execution of the search
warrant at his residence [Doc. 35]. The Court denied the motion, instructing Defendant that he
must file all motions through counsel and directing counsel to confer with Defendant about his pro
se filing [Doc. 36 pp. 1–2]. The Court also granted a trial continuance to November 4, 2025, and
extended the pretrial motion deadline to September 15, 2025 [Doc. 37 pp. 2–3]. The Court again
found that the ends of justice furthered by granting the continuance outweighed the interest of
Defendant and the public in a speedy trial and excluded all time between the filing of the motion
to continue on August 6, 2025, and the new trial date of November 4, 2025 [Id. at 2–3].
On August 17, 2025, Attorneys Davies and Miller filed a motion to withdraw as counsel
[Doc. 38], which the Court granted after hearing on August 25, 2026 [Doc. 39]. At the August 25
hearing, Defendant initially expressed his desire to represent himself, but the Court asked that he
accept appointed counsel to further discuss his case and take time for thoughtful consideration of
his request to proceed pro se [Doc. 51 p. 2 n.4]. The Court appointed Criminal Justice Act (“CJA”)
panel attorney Laura Davis as counsel of record for Defendant [Doc. 42 p. 2].
Shortly after this substitution, Attorney Davis filed an Unopposed Motion to Continue Trial
and All Associated Deadlines and a Motion for Faretta Hearing [Doc. 48, 49]. Following a Faretta
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hearing on September 11, 2025, the undersigned found Defendant knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right to counsel and permitted Defendant to represent himself [Doc. 51 pp. 3–4, 6]. The
Court also continued the trial to April 21, 2026, observing Defendant, who now represents himself,
needs time to review and evaluate discovery, consider pretrial motions, and otherwise prepare for
trial [Id. at 6]. The Court also extended the pretrial motion deadline to October 9, 2026 [Id. at 7].4
In granting this ends-of-justice continuance, the undersigned found all time between prior
counsel’s and Defendant’s motions filed on August 29, 2025, and the new trial date of April 21,
2026, was fully excludable under the Speedy Trial Act [Id. at 6–7].5
On September 15, 2025, Defendant filed a pro se Notice of (and) Request, which states
only that “I would like to assert my right to a speedy trial under the 6th Amendment” [Doc. 52].
On October 1, 2025, Defendant moved to again extend his pretrial motion deadline to allow
him to complete review of discovery with his investigator and to prepare pretrial motions [Doc. 61
p. 1]. The Court found a short extension of the pretrial motion deadline was appropriate and
extended the deadline to October 23, 2025 [Doc. 62 p. 2]. On October 16, 2026, Defendant moved
for a sixty-day extension of his pretrial motion deadline to complete review of the pole camera
video footage, to review “digital copies of content of four cell phones,” and to prepare pretrial
4 	On August 29, 2025, Defendant filed a pro se motion to extend the pretrial motion deadline
to allow him to “investigate a [Fourth] Amendment violation to file a motion to suppress” [Doc.
45 p. 1].
5 	“The Court gave the parties two trial dates in April 2026 from which to choose, and the
April 21 date was selected. After making the selection, Defendant asked the Court if the trial date
could be set within the next 90 days. The Court explained that he expressed the desire to consider
and file pretrial motions, and due to limitations in doing so under self-representation as expressed
in Defendant’s Unopposed Motion to Continue Trial and All Associated Deadlines [see Doc. 48 p.
1], sufficient time would be needed to fully litigate such motions. The Court noted, however, that
if he did not wish to file pretrial motions, an earlier trial date could be considered. Defendant then
stated that he agreed to have the trial reset to April 21, 2026” [Doc. 51 p. 6 n.7].
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motions [Doc. 68 pp. 1–3]. The undersigned denied this sixth request to extend the motion
deadline, finding “Defendant has had ample time to file a pretrial suppression motion, particularly
a motion based upon the search of his residence pursuant to a search warrant” [Doc. 96 p. 4]. The
Court observed that Defendant does not allege continued review of the pole camera footage relates
to an intended suppression motion but, nevertheless, held that “if Defendant subsequently
discovers a pretrial motion that he could not have previously filed by the deadline, he may move
for leave to file the motion” demonstrating good cause [Id.]. Throughout the proceedings, the Court
extended the pretrial motion deadline five times at Defendant’s request [Docs. 18, 27, 37, 51, &
62]. The last deadline for pretrial motions expired on October 23, 2025 [Doc. 62].
On October 23, 2025, Defendant timely filed several pro se motions including a dispositive
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction arguing his case is improperly before this
Court [Doc. 73]. Also on October 23, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion to Demand a Fast and Speedy
Trial, asserting his rights under the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment [Doc. 76 p. 2].
Defendant states that he has a right to trial within seventy (70) days of indictment or his first
appearance, whichever is first [Id.]. Observing “[t]he remedy for a 6th Amendment speedy trial
violation is dismissal with prejudice[,]” Defendant concludes by stating that he “assert[s] and
demand[s] a fast and speedy trial” under both the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment [Id.
at 3].
The Government responded to Defendant’s motion, arguing that to the extent Defendant’s
Motion to Demand a Fast and Speedy Trial [Doc. 76] is a motion to dismiss the charges for
violation of his statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights, it should be denied [Doc. 80 p. 1].
The Government maintains that the Speedy trial act permits exclusions from the seventy-day
requirement for time related to filing pretrial motions and to further the ends of justice [Id. at 2].
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It argues that given the appropriate and documented exclusions in this case, only twenty-seven
days have elapsed from Defendant’s speedy trial clock since his arraignment on May 14, 2025,
and only thirty-six days have elapsed from his arrest on May 5, 2025 [Id. & n.2]. The Government
also argues that no violation of Defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights has occurred
because the total delay between his arrest and his April 21 trial date is less than one year and all
the factors from Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972), weigh against Defendant [Id. at 2–3].
In reply, Defendant states his motion is not a request to dismiss the case for a speedy trial
violation and that he “has never filed and never requested for this [case] to be dismissed for a
violation of speedy trial rights” [Doc. 89 pp. 1–2]. Instead, Defendant says he is merely “asserting
his right to a speedy trial, under the 70[-]day statutory right and the Sixth Amendment
constitutional right to a speedy trial” [Id. at 2].
On November 5, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion for Defendant to Assert his Statutory
Right to the 90[-]day Rule [in] 18 U.S.C. § 3164(c) [Doc. 88]. This motion states only that
Defendant, who represents himself, “is exercising his statutory right to the 90[-]day rule’s elapse”
[Id.].
On November 19, 2025, the Government responded that Defendant “seemingly asserts that
he should be released under 18 U.S.C. § 3164(c) because, according to [Defendant], the 90-day
speedy trial clock for detained defendants has expired” [Doc. 101 p. 1]. It argues that the ninety-
day rule has not expired because it is subject to the same exclusions of time for the seventy-day
clock set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) [Id.]. The Government contends that Defendant is not
entitled to relief under § 3164 because no more than thirty-six (36) days have elapsed from the
ninety-day clock [Id.].
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Again, Defendant filed a reply, asserting that his motion under § 3164(c) did not request
any relief or remedy from the Court [Doc. 113 p. 2]. He states that he “is only exercising this
statutory right to the 90[-]day rule under 18 U.S.C. [§] 3164(c)” [Id.]. He asks the Court to take
judicial notice that the Government is “misconstruing [his] arguments” [Id.].
On December 11, 2025, Defendant filed a Notice of Defendant’s Assertion of Right to
Speedy Trial [and] Non-consent To Any Further Continuances and Objection to Continuances that
are on the Docket [Doc. 120]. Defendant contends that he reasserts his right to a speedy trial and
that he “has never waived this right” [Id. at 2]. He states that he “do[es] not consent to any further
continuances” and that he “objects/disputes to continuances already on his docket and will raise
these objections” in future motions [Id.]. Defendant contends that he is entitled to be free from
“arbitrary[,] vexatious or oppressive delays” [Id. at 3].
On January 8, 2026, the undersigned held a detention hearing, pursuant to Defendant’s
motion for detention hearing, and ordered that Defendant be detained pending his trial [Doc. 143].
On February 23, 2026, Defendant filed a Motion and Reply to Doc[.] #143 again requesting release
on conditions [Doc. 152 p. 9].
On January 23, 2026, the Court received a letter from Defendant asking the Clerk of Court
to “provide the Court’s calculation of elapsed days for 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (speedy trial) and 18
U.S.C. § 3164(c) (90[-]day detention review) for [this] case; or direct me to the docket entries used
to compute them” [Doc. 144 p. 1].
II. 	ANALYSIS
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial[.]” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Speedy Trial Act requires that a criminal defendant be brought
to trial within seventy (70) days of the later of the filing of the indictment or the date of the
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defendant’s initial appearance. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). The Act, however, excludes from the
speedy trial calculus certain enumerated periods of delay, such as delay relating to pretrial motions,
§ 3161(h)(1)(D); up to thirty days during which the court has a motion under advisement, §
3161(h)(1)(H); and delay resulting from a continuance when “the ends of justice served by taking
such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial,” §
3161(h)(7)(A).
“The Speedy Trial Act provides that the trial of a defendant detained pending trial ‘shall
commence not later than ninety days following the beginning of such continuous detention.’”
United States v. Monk, 12 F. App’x 325, 326 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3164(b)). “No
detainee . . . shall be held in custody pending trial after the expiration of such ninety-day period
required for the commencement of his trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3164(c). But like with the seventy-day
speedy trial clock, this ninety-day period is also subject to the periods of excludable delay in §
3161(h). 18 U.S.C. § 3164(b); United States v. Roush, No. 21-3820, 2021 WL 6689969, at *1 (6th
Cir. Dec. 7, 2021).
The precise amount of delay that violates the Sixth Amendment in any given case is not
easily calculated. United States v. Allen, 86 F.4th 295, 304 (6th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct.
2621 (2024). Courts must engage in a case-by-case “balancing test” evaluating four factors from
Barker v. Wingo (“the Barker factors”): the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, whether
the defendant timely asserted his speedy trial rights, and whether the defendant was prejudiced by
the delay. Id. (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 533 (1972)). When the length of delay
exceeds one-year, an evaluation of the remaining three Barker factors is triggered. Id. (citing
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 (1992)) (other citations omitted).
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Here, Defendant Hardison states that he is not seeking any remedy or relief from the Court
in relation to his motions asserting his statutory and constitutional speedy trial rights. Nor does the
record reflect any violations of those rights. Applying the Speedy Trial Act, approximately thirty-
four days elapsed between the filing of the Indictment on May 7, 2025, and Defendant’s first
motion to continue the trial on June 10, 2025 [See Doc. 17]. Counting from the time of Defendant’s
May 5 arrest for purposes of § 3164 adds only two days. See 18 U.S.C. § 3164(b). From that point
forward, all time was excluded in a series of ends-of-justice continuances, each granted at
Defendant’s request [Docs. 18, 37, & 51]. Defendant’s recent filing [Doc. 120] seemingly revoking
his prior agreement to these continuances is unavailing.
Moreover, while representing himself, Defendant has filed more than thirty motions,
including dispositive motions, some of which are still under advisement. The resolution of these
motions provides another reason to exclude the delay until his April 21, 2026 trial date. See 18
U.S.C. § 3261(h)(1)(D) & (H).
Regarding Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, “‘it will be an unusual
case in which the time limits of the Speedy Trial Act have been met but the Sixth Amendment
right to speedy trial has been violated.’” United States v. O’Dell, 247 F.3d 655, 667 (6th Cir. 2001)
(quoting United States v. DeJesus, 887 F.2d 114, 116 (6th Cir. 1989)). Here, an analysis of
Defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights is not warranted because Defendant will not have been
detained for the one-year threshold by the time of his April 21, 2026 trial date. See Allen, 86 F.4th
at 304.
For these reasons, no basis for this Court to find a speedy trial violation exists.
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III. CONCLUSION
The Court ORDERS as follows:
(1) 	Defendant’s Motion to Demand a Fast and Speedy Trial [Doc. 76]
and Motion for Defendant to Assert His Statutory Right to the 90[-
]day Rule [in] 18 U.S. C. § 3164(c) [Doc. 88] are DENIED as moot;
and
(2) 	The Clerk of Court is 	DIRECTED to mail a copy of this
Memorandum and Order to Defendant at his place of detention.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTER:
____________________________
Debra C. Poplin
United States Magistrate Judge
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