Hood v. Lipscomb University

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
SHELBY HOOD,
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant,
v.
LIPSCOMB UNIVERSITY,
Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff.
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Case No. 3:24-cv-00690
Judge Aleta A. Trauger
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Shelby Hood has brought a Title IX retaliation claim against Lipscomb University
(“Lipscomb” or the “University”). Lipscomb has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No.
23), which, for the reasons set forth herein, will be granted.
I. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Hood alleges retaliation against the University under Title IX of the Education Act of 1972
(“Title IX”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq., and seeks damages of $2,500,000 and attorney’s fees.
(Complaint, Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 36–37; id. at 8–9.)1 The University has counterclaimed for $2,866 in
unpaid tuition, plus fees and interest.2 (Answer, Doc. No. 12 at 8–9.)
1 The plaintiff originally brought claims for hostile work environment and retaliation, each
under both Title IX and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”), Tenn. Code. Ann. § 4-21-
101 et seq. (Compl. ¶¶ 34–41.) The court has since granted the plaintiff’s Motion to Amend the
Complaint to strike the THRA claims. (Doc. No. 22.) And Hood has expressly abandoned her Title
IX hostile work environment claim. (Doc. No. 28 at 1–2 (“[Hood] has, therefore, chosen to proceed
solely on the retaliation claim[.]”).) Only the plaintiff’s Title IX retaliation claim remains.
2 The University filed and electronically served its Answer containing the counterclaim on
July 22, 2024. (Doc. No. 12.) Hood has not filed a responsive pleading, despite being required to
do so by Rule 12(a). The defendant has not moved for a default judgment and instead has given
notice that, if the court grants its Motion for Summary Judgment, it will either “dismiss its
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Lipscomb has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 23), accompanying
Memorandum (Doc. No. 24), a Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“DSUF”) (Doc. No. 25),
and exhibits (Doc. Nos. 26-1 through 26-14) with an Appendix (Doc. No. 26), to which the plaintiff
has filed a Response (Doc. No. 28), exhibits (Doc. Nos. 28-1 through 28-7, Doc. No. 34-13), and
a Response to the Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“RDSUF”) (Doc. No. 27).
The defendant has filed a Reply. (Doc. No. 33.)
II. 	FACTS4
This case stems from Hood’s allegation that Justin Briggs, then a professor at Lipscomb
University, sexually harassed her. Hood was a graduate student in Lipscomb’s Marriage and
Family Therapy Program (the “Program”) and, as part of the Program, saw clients at the affiliated
Lipscomb Family Therapy Center (the “Center”). (RDSUF ¶ 1; Compl. ¶¶ 10–11; Answer ¶¶ 10–
11.) The Program was run by Co-Directors Chris Gonzalez and Amber Kelley. (RDSUF ¶ 2.)
Briggs was Clinical Director of the Center and a tenured professor in the Program, where he taught
“Intimacy: Sexuality, Couple, & Sex Therapy.” (Id. ¶¶ 4, 20, 32.) In his capacities both as a
professor and as the Center’s Clinical Director, he reported to Program Co-Directors Gonzalez and
Kelley. (See Plan of Improvement Form, Doc. No. 26-6 at 100 (requiring Briggs to “[s]pecifically
acknowledge that the . . . Clinical Director reports directly to the Program Co-Directors”).) On
June 6, 2023, Hood went to Professor Briggs’ office after counseling a sexual trauma victim, and
counterclaim for unpaid tuition or move for stay pending interlocutory appeal.” (Doc. No. 33 at 5
n.7.)
3 The plaintiff filed the deposition of Natalie Hoyt (Doc. No. 28-4) but inadvertently
omitted exhibits to the deposition, which the plaintiff has since filed, with leave (Doc. No. 35), as
Doc. No. 34-1.
4 The court views the evidence in the light most favorable to Hood, as the non-movant. C.S.
v. McCrumb, 135 F.4th 1056, 1060 (6th Cir. 2025).
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during their conversation the two discussed Hood’s own experience with sexual trauma. (RDSUF
¶¶ 40, 44–49, 53–55.) Hood alleges that, during their conversation, Briggs “proceeded to ask
inappropriate, intrusive questions regarding intimate details of the incident as well as talk about
other sexually inappropriate topics with Plaintiff.” (Compl. ¶ 18; see also id. ¶ 19.) Furthermore,
Hood alleges, “Brigg’s actions subjected Plaintiff to a sexually charged, hostile environment by a
tenured professor who had direct influence over Plaintiff’s educational opportunities and future
professional endeavors.” (Id. ¶ 18.) On September 7, 2023, Hood filed a complaint of sexual
harassment against Briggs with Lipscomb’s Title IX Coordinator, Kathy Hargis (“Coordinator
Hargis”) (Compl. ¶ 22; Answer ¶ 22; Doc. No. 24 at 3; Doc. No. 28 at 12.) Lipscomb’s Title IX
office investigated the claim, held a hearing on March 6, 2024, and on April 10, 2024 issued a
Notice of Determination, finding that a preponderance of the evidence did not support that Briggs
had engaged in sexual harassment. (Notice of Determination, Doc. No. 26-1 at 185, 189–192.)
Relevant to this case is a complex dynamic that was at play among the Program’s faculty,
leadership, and graduate students, on the one hand, and Briggs and his therapy practice, on the
other, and the jobs pipeline that ran between them. Separate and apart from his teaching and clinical
duties at the University, Briggs is the President of the Briggs Institute, Inc. (the “Institute”), a
private therapy practice in Nashville. (Briggs Decl. ¶ 1, Doc. No. 26-5 at 1; see also Briggs Dep.
4:13–20, Doc. No. 28-6 at 2.) According to the plaintiff, Briggs had “exaggerated influence over
both the [University’s] academic program and its personnel,” at least in part because many of the
Program’s staff have worked at the Institute. (Doc. No. 28 at 4.) Indeed, Program Co-Director
Kelley reports that “[m]ost of the faculty at some point worked at the Briggs Institute.” (Kelley
Dep. 32: 7–8, Doc. No. 26-4 at 9.) At a minimum, the Institute has employed both of the Program’s
Co-Directors, Gonzalez and Kelley (Gonzalez Dep. 13:2–8, Doc. No. 26-2 at 4; Kelley Dep. 8:13–
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20); the Center’s Assistant Director of Clinical Operations, Natalie Hoyt (Hoyt Dep. 5:20–22,
7:16–22, Doc. No. 28-4 at 5, 7); and, according to Co-Director Gonzalez, Professors Hunter
Stanfield, Dave Morgan, and Meghan Lacks (Gonzalez Dep. 13:2–14:11, 18:18–24). According
to Co-Director Gonzalez, Briggs hired Program alumni exclusively. (Id. at 16:16–17:16.) In
addition, according to Natalie Hoyt, who worked concurrently at Lipscomb and the Institute,
Briggs also routinely hired Lipscomb alumni during their post-graduation, pre-licensure period, as
they accumulated mandatory counseling hours for state licensure. (Hoyt Dep. 5:20–22, 18:9–16,
18:23–19:8, 20:19–22.)
The University acknowledges that it had responded to student complaints about Briggs
involving “issues of personality conflict, interpersonal disrespect, [and] abrasiveness.” (Doc. No.
24 at 9; see also RDSUF ¶¶ 19–28.) And Co-Directors Gonzalez and Kelley “counseled” Briggs
in April 2023 to “immediately soften his approach to teaching . . . and to be more sensitive to
student concerns.” (RDSUF ¶ 35; see also id. ¶ 36 (“Gonzalez considered the verbal counseling as
an ‘admonishment.’”).) The Co-Directors met with Briggs in June 2023 “to further admonish
Briggs that students were complaining that he was talking with them about the anonymous Fall
2022 course evaluations,” instructed him to “cease any such communications immediately,” and
informed him that he would no longer teach his “Intimacy” course. (Id. ¶¶ 37–39.)
In August 2023, the Co-Directors placed Briggs on a Performance Improvement Plan
(“PIP”) documenting interpersonal and pedagogical deficiencies and requiring him to take
corrective actions. (Doc. No. 26-6 at 99–102.) The PIP and the Draft PIP from July 2023 (id. at
91–98) describe the Co-Directors’ issues with Briggs at length, including insubordination toward
Program 	leadership, 	insensitivity 	to 	students, 	and 	unwillingness 	to 	incorporate 	feedback.
Moreover, the PIP itself and the Co-Directors’ testimony together reveal their strained relationship
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with Briggs, who needed to be constantly reminded that, at the University, Gonzalez and Kelley
were his bosses, and not the other way around. For example, the PIP requires Briggs to
“[a]cknowledge and honor the chain of command,” including by “specifically acknowledg[ing]”
that he “reports directly to the Program Co-Directors.” (PIP, Doc. No. 26-6 at 99–100). Further,
the PIP required him to “[b]ecome more sensitive in both content and process when engaging with
students . . . and refrain from engaging in inappropriate conversations with students.” (Id. at 100.)
It required him to take ten hours of “sensitivity training on topics related to sexual assault, sexual
trauma, rape, and consent . . . and [Briggs] will learn which topics are inappropriate to talk about
with students.” (Id.) Further, the PIP stated, “[g]iven that a percentage of students have
experienced sexual trauma, sexual assault, and/or rape and given that there have been multiple
complaints regarding pedagogical content and process regarding these topics,” he was required to
write a response essay on improving his discussions with students on these issues. (Id. at 101.)
Briggs resigned shortly after he was issued the PIP. (Doc. No. 26-2 at 121 (August 31, 2023 email
from Briggs to dozens of Program students and faculty informing them of his resignation, effective
May 2024).)
Hood states that, after she reported Briggs’ conduct to the University’s Title IX
Coordinator, “Dr. Briggs retaliated.” (Doc. No. 28 at 5.) Hood describes a retaliatory campaign
against her led by Briggs and his allies in the Program who worked for him at the Institute. For
example, Hood alleges that, several weeks after she filed her complaint with the University, Hoyt
sent Briggs an email with incendiary information about Hood meant to bolster Briggs’ defense in
the University’s Title IX investigation. (Doc. No. 28 at 5 (first citing Oct. 2, 2023 Email, Doc. No.
34-1 at 1–2; and then citing Hoyt Dep. 35, 40).) Months later, on the same day that Lipscomb’s
Title IX office sent the parties to the Title IX complaint copies of its Investigative Report, January
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12, 2024, Hoyt sent Professor Morgan, by email, a letter she wrote about Hood, for him to read at
a faculty meeting. (Jan. 12, 2024 Email from Hoyt to Morgan, Doc. No. 34-1 at 4–5.) The letter
registers a number of Hoyt’s perceived issues with Hood and offers her “clinical opinion that she
is not in a good state of mind to be seeing clients, and should be reevaluated for her standing in
the program.” (Id. at 5.) While it is undisputed that Professor Morgan read this letter aloud, the
parties dispute the Co-Directors’ reaction. (Contrast Doc. No. 28 at 6 (“Neither co-director
reprimanded Dr. Morgan nor Hoyt for this blatant act of retaliation.” (citing Kelley Dep. 66–68)),
with Doc. No. 33 at 2 (“When Dr. Dave Morgan read Hoyt’s letter raising concerns about Hood to
[Program] faculty, Gonzalez shut down any further discussion of the letter.” (citing Kelley Dep.
70–74)).)
At the Center, Hoyt’s job involved both administrative responsibilities, like assigning
clients to student clinicians, and supervising students. (Hoyt Dep. 7:20–8:2.) For reasons the
parties dispute, during January 2024, for the most part Hood did not schedule counseling
appointments with clients herself, but would instead email Hoyt to add appointments to the
Center’s calendar.5 At 9:08 P.M. Sunday, January 14, 2024, Hood emailed Hoyt to ask that she
schedule an appointment for one of Hood’s patients. (Doc. No. 26-6 at 103.) Having not heard
back,6 at 12:14 PM Tuesday, January 16, 2025, Hood wrote again, in the same email thread, to
5 In a January 19, 2024 email to Title IX Coordinator Hargis, Hood stated that, on January
8, 2024, Hoyt emailed Hood telling her that she was “no longer allowed to schedule [her] own
client sessions” and that Hoyt would instead schedule them for her. (Doc. No. 26-4 at 94.) Hoyt
has testified, to the contrary, that Hood was having technological issues, and so Hoyt began
scheduling appointments for her, a decision in which the Co-Directors were involved. (Hoyt Dep.
86:11–87:7.) Hood states that the Co-Directors assigned Hoyt the task of scheduling Hood’s
appointments, “[d]espite the obvious conflict due to Hoyt’s animosity.” (Doc. No. 28 at 6.) Hood’s
own emails, however, support Hoyt’s testimony: in emails following up with Hoyt, Hood reported
that she had been able to schedule appointments herself. (Doc. No. 26-6 at 104–05.)
6 The plaintiff describes Hoyt’s nonresponse as a “refus[al] to schedule” her sessions. (Doc.
No. 28 at 6.) The Center was closed Monday, January 15, 2024 through Wednesday, January 17,
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seek confirmation that Hoyt had received her original email, this time including on the email (the
“Email”) her then-attorney, Lanie Bandell. (RDSUF ¶ 69; Doc. No. 26-6 at 103.) The text of the
original January 14 email, included in the January 16 Email to Hoyt and Bandell, sought to
schedule a session on a particular day and at a particular time, for a client identified only by a
seven-digit Client ID number, not by name. (RDSUF ¶ 69; Doc. No. 26-6 at 103.)7
The University imposes client confidentiality rules on its student clinicians, both to protect
its clients’ privacy 	and 	to train its students in confidentiality practices. (RDSUF ¶ 75.)
Accordingly, the Lipscomb University Marriage and Family Therapy Program & Lipscomb
Family Therapy Center Policies & Procedures Manual (the “Manual”) (Doc. No. 26-5 at 6–119)
sets forth various policies regarding confidentiality. (See, e.g., Manual at 55–63, 84–88.)8 In
pertinent part, the Manual provides: “To protect client confidentiality, at no time is any identifiable
client information, including but not limited to, client names, contact information, geographic
identifiers (e.g., zip codes), dates of service, and ID numbers to be saved anywhere other than on
the cloud storage associated with the Lipscomb University’s Google Apps account and the hard
drives of approved LFTC computers.” (RDSUF ¶ 6 (quoting Manual at 55) (emphasis added).)
first in observance of Martin Luther King, Jr. Day and then because of inclement weather. (Kelley
Decl. Ex. 1, Student Incident Timeline, Doc. No. 26-13 at 7.) Moreover, as part of the University’s
Title IX investigation, Coordinator Hargis testifies that she “had a detailed analysis done by
Lipscomb’s IT department of Natalie Hoyt’s email practices in relation to Miss Hood’s
communications which found her emails were not singled out or ignored as compared to other
students.” (Hargis Decl. ¶ 17, Doc. No. 26-7 at 6.)
7 The University has filed this unredacted email on the public docket, available to any
interested person, even though it disciplined Hood for sending the same email to her attorney. This
is especially noteworthy because the parties filed a joint motion, which the court granted (Doc.
No. 30), to seal another part of the record containing “highly confidential personal and medical
treatment [information.]” (Doc. No. 29 at 1.)
8 The court refers to the Manual’s pagination, rather than that assigned by the court’s
electronic filing system.
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According to the Manual, such “personally identifiable information” can be stored only in on-site
paper files, on University-owned electronic devices, and on “Lipscomb’s secured Google Apps
cloud storage.” (Manual at 63.) Before a clinician can share “a client’s confidential information”
with anyone outside of the Center, the clinician must complete an “Account of Shared
Information” and receive a signed “Release of Information Form” from the client. (Id. at 76–77;
see also id. at 86 (“Anytime you wish to communicate with anyone other than the client, you must
obtain a Release of Information Form. Clients have the right to know and approve the release of
any information related to their treatment, including the fact that they are in therapy.”). And “even
with a signed Release of Information, only the minimum necessary information is to be released to
individuals or organizations outside of the [Center].” (Id. at 77 (emphasis in original).) Further,
the Manual provides:
Severe consequences may occur in the event that anyone (e.g, administrators,
supervisors, clinicians, etc.) fails to adhere to policies, procedures, and state and
federal law designed to protect clients’ personally identifiable information.
Depending on the nature of the offense, consequences could include, but are not
limited to, suspension, termination, or legal action.
(Manual at 63; see also RDSUF ¶ 7.)
After Hood emailed Hoyt, as Hood puts it, “[p]redictably, Hoyt refused to schedule” her
client session, as retaliation for filing the harassment claim against Briggs. (Doc. No. 28 at 6, 11–
12.) Emails between Hoyt and the Co-Directors show that, when Hoyt received Hood’s second
Email—the one that included Hood’s attorney—Hoyt asked Co-Directors Gonzalez and Kelley
for advice. (Doc. No. 34-1 at 6–7.) In her email to Gonzalez and Kelley, Hoyt notes that Hood’s
Email “includes a third party,” and that therefore Hood “has shared confidential client information
including ID number and date[] of service, with this third party.” (Id. at 7.) Given what Hoyt
identified as a breach in confidentiality, along with Hoyt’s belief that Hood was not “competent
and should not be seeing clients,” she informed the Co-Directors that she could not ethically
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schedule the appointment. (Id.) Kelley responded to say that she and Gonzalez would look into the
situation and that, in the meantime, Hoyt should not respond. (Id. at 7–9.)
Gonzalez reviewed Hood’s email and determined that Hood had included Bandell on an
email with a client’s ID number and date of service. (RDSUF ¶ 57.) Thereafter, on January 18,
2024, the Co-Directors notified Hood by email about the breach of policy and asked to meet on
January 22, 2024. (Doc. No. 26-4 at 89.) On January 22, Co-Directors Gonzalez and Kelley placed
Hood on a Clinical Practice Improvement Plan (“CIP”) (Doc. No. 26-1 at 152–53). (RDSUF
¶ 61.)9 The CIP required Hood to suspend her clinical work—but not her academic classes—for
the spring semester, to allow for “slow, highly supervised re-entry to clinical practice . . . in
Summer 2024;” to complete ten hours of specified continuing education courses on ethics, data
privacy, and confidentiality, at the Program’s expense; and to write a pass/fail 1,000-word essay
about what she learned. (CIP, Doc. No. 26-1 at 152–53.) Hood withdrew from the Program the
next day. (RDSUF ¶ 65.)
III. 	LEGAL STANDARDS – RULE 56(a)
The party bringing the summary judgment motion has the initial burden of identifying
portions of the record—including “depositions, documents, electronically stored information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
9 As in the case of paragraph 61 of the University’s Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts, the plaintiff has indicated that several of the defendant’s proposed facts are “disputed,”
while the plaintiff’s response and the record make clear that only a possible implication or subtext
is disputed. In these situations, the court treats the fact as undisputed. In the case of paragraph 61,
for example, the defendant states that, after making various consultations, the Program Co-
Directors placed Hood on a CIP. The plaintiff disputes this fact on the grounds that the decision
was made in retaliation for her protected activity—the implication being, the court surmises, that
the Co-Directors’ consultations with others did not affect their decision. However, the plaintiff
does not dispute that, on January 22, 2024, the Co-Directors placed her on a CIP—indeed, it forms
the entire basis for this lawsuit.
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materials”—that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material facts. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Then the burden shifts to the non-movant to “set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Pittman v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 901 F.3d 619,
628 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)).
Credibility judgments and the weighing of evidence are improper. Huang v. Ohio State Univ., 116
F.4th 541, 555 (6th Cir. 2024) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is “no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). But a
defendant is not entitled to judgment “if there is evidence in the record ‘on which the jury could
reasonably find for the plaintiff.’” Huang, 116 F.4th at 555 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).
“By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment;
the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48
(emphasis in original). “[A] fact is ‘material’ within the meaning of Rule 56(a) if the dispute over
it might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the governing law.” O’Donnell v. City of
Cleveland, 838 F.3d 718, 725 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). A dispute is
genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving
party.” Peeples v. City of Detroit, 891 F.3d 622, 630 (6th Cir. 2018). In other words, even if
genuine, a factual dispute that is irrelevant under applicable law is of no value in defeating a motion
for summary judgment. On the other hand, “summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a
material fact is ‘genuine.’” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
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IV. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Title IX framework
Title IX provides: “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). If a
funding recipient10 retaliates against someone who complained of sex discrimination, that is itself
sex discrimination under Title IX. Bose v. Bea, 947 F.3d 983, 988 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Jackson
v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 174 (2005)). Courts review Title IX retaliation claims
under Title VII’s analogous test. Goldblum v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 62 F.4th 244, 251 (6th Cir.
2023). Because Hood relies on indirect evidence, the court applies the burden-shifting framework
set forth in McDonnel Douglass Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Id. Under that
framework, the plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case of retaliation. Doe v. Univ. of Ky.,
111 F.4th 705, 716 (6th Cir. 2024). To do so, the plaintiff must show that: “(1) she engaged in
‘protected activity,’ (2) the University ‘knew of the protected activity,’ (3) she suffered an ‘adverse
school-related action,’ and (4) a ‘causal connection exists’ between the cited protected activity and
the alleged adverse action.” Id. (quoting Bose, 947 F.3d at 988). If the plaintiff meets this “eas[y]”
burden, then “it becomes the University’s burden to articulate a ‘legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its action.’” Id. (first quoting Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir.
2000); and then quoting Gordon v. Traverse City Area Pub. Schs., 686 F. App’x 315, 320 (6th Cir.
2017)). If the University succeeds, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered
10 Lipscomb concedes that it receives federal funding for the purposes of Title IX. (Doc.
No. 24 at 1 n.2.)
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reason is “really a pretext for unlawful retaliation.” Goldblum, 62 F.4th at 251 (citing Flowers v.
WestRock Servs., Inc., 979 F.3d 1127, 1132–33 (6th Cir. 2020)).
B. 	Prima facie case
It is undisputed that Hood engaged in a protected activity that the University knew about
by filing a Title IX complaint. (Doc. No. 24 at 17.) The defendant argues that no reasonable jury
would find that Hood could make out a prima facie case because there is insufficient record
evidence to support either that she suffered an adverse action or that her protected activity was the
reason for the adverse action.
1. 	Adverse action
A purported retaliatory action is “adverse” if “the action would dissuade a reasonable
person from engaging in the protected activity.” Univ. of Ky., 111 F.4th at 716 (citing Gordon, 686
F. App’x at 320).11 This standard “is not onerous.” Id. (quoting Henry v. Abbott Lab’ys, 651 F.
App’x 494, 504 (6th Cir. 2016)). The University argues that putting Hood on the CIP was not an
adverse action because it “allowed Hood to remain on track to graduate, albeit a semester later
than she may have planned,” in addition to requiring her to take continuing education courses.
(Doc. No. 24 at 17–18; see also id. at 18 (“The only adverse action Hood suffered was her self-
imposed withdrawal from Lipscomb prior to graduation.”).) Further, the University contends that
Hood “offers [only] speculative allegations as to the hardship the CIP may have caused,” and in
any case withdrew before attempting to comply with it. (Doc. No. 33 at 4.) Hood responds that the
CIP removed her from clinical work for a semester and, she contends, rested the discretionary
decision to determine whether she met the CIP’s requirements with Co-Directors aligned against
11 This standard is the same as Title VII’s, except that an adverse action under Title IX
“must be ‘school related.’” Univ. of Ky., 111 F.4th at 716. The University does not contend that
the allegedly adverse action is not school-related.
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her, putting the possibility of graduating, at all, in doubt—all adverse actions. (Doc. No. 28 at 14–
15.)
To begin, whether an action would dissuade a reasonable person from engaging in
protected activity is typically a question of fact for the jury. Thompson v. Ohio State Univ., 990 F.
Supp. 2d 801, 809 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (citing Wurzelbacher v. Jones–Kelley, 675 F.3d 580, 583–84
(6th Cir. 2012)). The University has not cited record evidence supporting its contention that no
reasonable jury could find that Hood suffered an adverse action under these circumstances. As the
Supreme Court has stated in the Title VII context, “the significance of any given act of retaliation
will often depend upon the particular circumstances. Context matters.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe
Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 69 (2006). The court easily finds that a reasonable jury could find
that putting a student on a CIP like the one at issue would dissuade a person of ordinary firmness
from filing or pursuing a Title IX claim against a professor. Accord, e.g., Yap v. Nw. Univ., 119 F.
Supp. 3d 841, 851–52 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (“Failing to graduate on time, exclusion from educational
events, and reputational harm within the department, taken together, are sufficiently adverse to
deter a reasonable student from filing a sexual harassment claim.”); Doe 1 v. Howard Univ., 396
F. Supp. 3d 126, 146–47 (D.D.C. 2019) (denying the university-defendant’s motion to dismiss
where a plaintiff pled that it had “delayed clearing her to graduate” and applying Burlington’s
“broad interpretation of the adverse action element of a retaliation claim . . . to Title IX”).
2. 	Causal connection
Next, the court must determine whether Hood has met her “minimal” burden to present
“evidence sufficient to raise the inference that her protected activity was the likely reason for the
adverse action.” Univ. of Ky., 111 F.4th at 722 (first quoting EEOC v. Avery Dennison Corp., 104
F.3d 858, 861 (6th Cir. 1997); and then quoting Fuhr v. Hazel Park Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 668, 675
(6th Cir. 2013)).
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Hood contends that, after she filed the Title IX complaint with the University on September
7, 2023, “Dr. Briggs mobilized his faculty allies” against her. (Doc. No. 28 at 16 (describing
various actions, some described by the court, above, by Briggs, Hoyt, and Morgan); see also id. at
11 (describing further efforts by faculty members to pressure the Co-Directors).) Hood further
contends that Program Co-Directors Gonzalez and Kelley “did nothing to stop this coordinated
effort” and “failed to shield Plaintiff from continued interaction with Hoyt.” (Id. at 17.) The
plaintiff describes the Co-Directors’ decision to impose the CIP as “aligned precisely with what
Dr. Briggs, Dr. Morgan, and Ms. Hoyt had . . . advocated,” concluding, without citation, that the
“evidence strongly supports the conclusion that the co-directors implemented the CIP to appease
faculty who were seeking retaliation and were upset about the Title IX complaint filed against Dr.
Briggs.” (Id.) As the plaintiff puts it, “a minor technical issue was weaponized by individuals hell-
bent on retaliating against Plaintiff.” (Id. at 7.)
The defendant argues that too much time passed between Hood’s filing the Title IX
complaint and the adverse action to constitute sufficient evidence of retaliation. (Doc. No. 24 at
18; Doc. 33 at 4–5.) Further, the University argues that the Co-Directors implemented the CIP free
from faculty influence, such that the record contains no evidence of retaliation. (Doc. No. 33 at 1.)
And in any case, the University argues, Hood’s confidentiality lapse was an intervening reason for
implementing the CIP, which negates any inference of causation. (Doc. No. 33 at 4–5.)
Hood acknowledges the defendant’s argument that “the faculty pressure campaign had no
impact on their decision to implement the CIP” but responds only to say that the outcome
“accomplished exactly what Briggs and his colleagues had been urging.” (Doc. No. 28 at 12.) The
plaintiff puts forth no evidence that the faculty pressure campaign influenced the Co-Directors or
that they had ill will towards her. In fact, as the University argues, the record contains evidence to
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the contrary. While the plaintiff rightly points out the complicated power dynamics at play, by the
time the Co-Directors implemented the CIP, in January 2024, their relationship with Briggs was
strained, if not “effectively severed,” as the University states. (Doc. No. 33 at 1.) By that time,
neither was still employed by the Institute—both resigned months before Hood filed her Title IX
complaint with the University. (Gonzalez Dep. 21:2–7 (Gonzalez stopped working for Briggs in
June 2023); Kelley Dep. 8:13–20 (Kelley stopped working for Briggs in July 2023).) In fact,
Gonzalez testified that he quit the Briggs Institute, in “small part,” because of Hood’s experience
with Briggs. (Gonzalez Dep. 21:11–20.) And, as the plaintiff acknowledges, “[f]ollowing” her
unofficial 	complaint 	to 	the Co-Directors 	about 	Briggs, 	they 	put him 	on 	a Performance
Improvement Plan (“PIP”). (Doc. No. 28 at 4.) Moreover, as the plaintiff states, the “PIP explicitly
addresses Dr. Briggs’[] treatment of students, including Plaintiff.” (Doc. No. 28 at 4.) Hood has
simply adduced insufficient evidence that the Co-Directors, who implemented her CIP, were
influenced by the alleged faculty campaign against her or that they had any reason to retaliate
against her. The court therefore turns to temporal proximity.
“[A] four-month time gap [is], by itself, insufficient to satisfy causation.” Kovacs v. Univ.
of Toledo, No. 25-3035, 2025 WL 2630563, at *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 12, 2025) (first citing Kenney v.
Aspen 	Techs., 	Inc., 	965 	F.3d 	443, 	449 	(6th 	Cir. 	2020); 	and 	then
citing Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., 515 F.3d 531, 550 (6th Cir. 2008)). 	And 	“[t]emporal
proximity alone generally is not sufficient to establish causation.” Kenney, 965 F.3d at 448
(citations omitted) (noting that “[e]xceptions to this rule are ‘rare,’ even in instances involving
relatively short time periods” (quoting Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 525 (6th
Cir. 2008)) (other citations omitted)). Thus, in the absence of other evidence, temporal proximity
alone can show causation at the prima facie stage only if the adverse action “occurs very close in
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time” after the defendant learns of the protected activity.12 Mickey, 516 F.3d at 525; see also
Lemaster v. Lawrence Cnty., 65 F.4th 302, 310 (6th Cir. 2023) (“[I]f the act occurs within ‘days
or weeks’ . . . , the close proximity can sometimes (if rarely) permit an inference that the one
motivated the other.” (quoting George v. Youngstown State Univ., 966 F.3d 446, 460 (6th Cir.
2020))); see also Campbell-Jackson v. State Farm Ins., No. 23-1834, 2024 WL 4903807, at *7
(6th Cir. Nov. 27, 2024) (finding that two weeks was sufficient to “establish causality on this basis
alone”).
Hood filed her Title IX complaint on September 7, 2023 and was placed on the CIP on
January 22, 2024—more than four months later.13 Given the time between the protected activity
and the adverse action, the plaintiff cannot rely on temporal proximity alone to show causation at
the prima facie stage. Accord Lemaster, 65 F.4th at 310 (finding, in a First Amendment retaliation
case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that “about four and a half months” between the protected
activity and the adverse action “does not permit [the plaintiff] to rely on temporal proximity
alone”). The plaintiff has not presented “evidence sufficient to raise the inference that her protected
12 “[W]hen assessing temporal proximity, we consider whether the biased actor took the
first opportunity that he had to retaliate.” Gray v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 145 F.4th 630,
639 (6th Cir. 2025) (citing Kirilenko-Ison v. Bd. of Educ., 974 F.3d 652, 665 (6th Cir. 2020)). The
plaintiff does not argue that the University’s putting her on the CIP in January 2024 was its first
opportunity to retaliate against her, and the court does not infer it from the record construed in the
plaintiff’s favor.
13 The plaintiff states that the relevant dates are the date the Title IX Coordinator sent the
parties to the complaint her office’s Investigative Report—January 12, 2024—and the date Hood
was placed on the CIP, January 22. (Doc. No. 28 at 17–18 (“This ten-day period was directly on
top of the investigative period (protected activity timeframe) [sic] firmly supports a presumption
of causation.”).) But the plaintiff offers no explanation for why the date the Title IX office issued
its preliminary report would be the date by which the court measures temporal proximity.
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activity was the likely reason for the adverse action,” Univ. of Ky., 111 F4th at 722, and therefore
has not made out a prima facie case of retaliation.14
However, out of an abundance of caution, the court assumes that the plaintiff has made out
a prima facie showing and turns to the next steps in the burden-shifting framework.
C. 	Legitimate reason for adverse action
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant “must articulate a legitimate,
nonretaliatory reason” for the adverse action. Goldblum, 62 F.4th at 251. The University’s stated
reason for putting Hood on a CIP was her disclosure of confidential client information to a third
party. (Doc. No. 24 at 18; Doc. No. 33 at 2–3, 5.) As discussed above, Hood included her attorney
on an email with confidential information, as defined by University policy. The University has met
its burden of production, and the plaintiff does not argue to the contrary.
14 The plaintiff is equivocal about what the alleged retaliation consisted of. In addition to
the Co-Directors’ decision to put Hood on the CIP, the Complaint also alleges that, after Hood
filed the Title IX complaint with the University, “Defendant, through Briggs, began to retaliate
against” her, including by referring to her as a “mentally unstable and a risk to her clients” during
the Title IX investigation. (Compl. ¶ 23 (emphasis added).) And, Hood alleges, “Briggs solicited
negative comments and false statements from other faculty members in an effort to remove
Plaintiff from the program.” (Id. ¶ 27.) Hood refers to the letter that Hoyt wrote, and Professor
Morgan read, as a “blatant act of retaliation.” (Doc. No. 28 at 6.) The plaintiff describes Hoyt’s
refusal to schedule her client’s appointment as “retaliation.” (Doc. No. 28 at 17.) Moreover, the
Complaint alleges that the “retaliation culminated when Defendant alleged that Plaintiff had
violated client confidentiality,” and the University relied on that allegation as a pretext to
implement the CIP. (Compl. ¶ 28 (emphasis added).)
Importantly, “Title IX does not provide for individual liability,” but instead, an institution
can be liable “only for its own misconduct.” Bose v. Bea, 947 F.3d 983 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting
David v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). As
the Sixth Circuit recently recognized, Title IX, unlike Title VII, does not authorize respondeat
superior liability. Childers v. Casey Cnty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 23-5713, 2024 WL 3623527,
at *3 n.2 (6th Cir. Aug. 1, 2024) (citing Bose, 947 F.3d at 989–90). “Instead, Title IX imposes
liability only for a funding recipient’s own official decisions and not for its employees’ independent
actions.” Id. (citation modified). The plaintiff’s contention that numerous faculty—other than the
Center’s Co-Directors acting on behalf of the University by issuing the CIP—retaliated against her
is not actionable under Title IX.
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D. 	Pretext
Assuming that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of retaliation, and the
defendant having produced a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse action, it then
becomes the plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that the proffered reason for the adverse action was
“really a pretext for unlawful retaliation.” Goldblum, 62 F.4th at 251. There is no prescribed way
to show pretext. Id. at 252. However, “[p]laintiffs typically show pretext by establishing one of
three things: ‘(1) that the proffered reasons had no basis in fact, (2) that the proffered reasons did
not actually motivate the employer’s action, or (3) that the proffered reasons were insufficient to
motivate the employer’s action.’” Id. (quoting Chen v. Dow Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394, 400 (6th
Cir. 2009)). Hood proceeds on each of these theories (Doc. No. 28 at 18.) The court finds that
Hood has not produced evidence from which a jury could reasonably reject the University’s stated
reason and find that the true reason was unlawful under Title IX.
1. 	No basis in fact
First, Hood argues that including her attorney on the Email did not violate University policy
because it is “factually untrue” that she sent a third party “personally identifiable information.”
(Doc. No. 28 at 18.) The plaintiff’s argument is not wholly unreasonable. The email she sent her
attorney included only a client’s Center-assigned numerical ID and the time of a proposed
appointment. That information, absent access to a corresponding, internal database, did not, in
layman’s speak, identify a client. (Id.; see also id. at 7 (noting that the client ID number “cannot
be used to identify the client by anyone who does not have access to the [Center’s] Client Data
spreadsheet” (quoting Manual at 71)).)
But the court cannot rely on commonsense notions about what constitutes identifiable
information. And the court is not persuaded by the plaintiff’s statement that the Manual “must be
read to mean that the ID number & date of service must be tied to the key or another piece of client
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information that identifies the client.” (RDSUF ¶ 59.) In a section regarding client confidentiality,
the Manual defines “identifiable client information” as “including but not limited to, client names,
contact information, geographic identifiers (e.g., zip codes), dates of service, and ID numbers.”
(RDSUF ¶ 6.) It is undisputed that the Manual allows “severe consequences,” including but not
limited to “suspension, termination, or legal action,” for the “unauthorized release of such
information by Lipscomb . . . clinicians.” (Id. ¶ 7.)15 Hood has not raised a genuine issue of
material fact regarding this method of showing pretext.
2. 	Not for the stated reasons
Hood argues that the University’s stated reasons for placing her on a CIP—that she emailed
her attorney confidential information16—did not actually motivate the Co-Directors’ decision to
that effect. (Doc. No. 28 at 13.)
First, the plaintiff argues that the stated reason is pretextual because the University never
found her counseling deficient. The plaintiff states that she had received “no complaints from
clients and no complaints from professors” and notes that Co-Director Gonzalez himself “admitted
that Plaintiff’s clinical skills were not a concern,” which “contradicts” the need for the CIP. (Doc.
No. 28 at 18–19.) But, as the University rightly points out, Hood was disciplined for breaching
confidentiality, not for a lack of clinical skills. (Doc. No. 33 at 5.) Hood may have sterling
counseling abilities, but that is not evidence against the University’s stated reason for disciplining
her.
15 The plaintiff purports to dispute paragraph 7, but only to point out that the Manual’s
statement regarding punishment also includes language indicating that the consequences for
infringement of confidentiality rules depends on the circumstances. (RDSUF ¶ 7.)
16 (See CIP, Doc. No. 26-1 at 152 (“Reason for Improvement Plan[:] Emailing confidential
client information to an individual outside of the [Center]; [v]iolation of the . . . Program standards
as outlined in the . . . Manual[.]”).)
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Second, Hood argues that the Co-Directors imposed the CIP “to help defend the Title IX
complaint,” as orchestrated by a faculty “campaign to ruin Plaintiff’s academic career and damage
her ability to pursue her profession,” which was “effectively handed to the co-directors after Dr.
Briggs, Dr. Morgan, and Hoyt coordinated a plan.” (Doc. No. 28 at 18.) After Hood sent her
attorney confidential information, she says, the “co-directors seized on this harmless inclusion [of
information] . . . and used it as the basis to implement the . . . [CIP], as had been urged by faculty
allies of Dr. Briggs.” (Id.) Furthermore, the “co-directors knew this was a retaliatory action.” (Id.)
This argument suffers from the same infirmities as the plaintiff’s causation argument, discussed
above: Hood does not cite record evidence to support the contention that Co-Directors Gonzalez
and Kelley were motivated to place Hood on the CIP because she filed the sexual harassment
complaint against Professor Briggs.
3. 	Insufficient reasons
Last, the plaintiff argues that, even if she did violate the University’s confidentiality rules,
her conduct did not warrant being placed on the CIP. (Doc. No. 28 at 14.) Hood states that the Co-
Directors were not required, under the Manual, to discipline her, and that she was punished more
harshly than another student with a similar infraction. (Doc. No. 28 at 7.) In this case, as the court
has discussed, it is undisputed that the Manual provides for “severe consequences,” including
suspension, termination, or legal action for the unauthorized release of identifiable client
information, as defined by the Manual. (RDSUF ¶¶ 6–7.) And while “the failure to uniformly apply
a progressive discipline policy can be evidence of pretext,” for a comparator’s more lenient
punishment to be evidence of pretext, the plaintiff must show that she is similar to the comparator
“in all relevant respects.” Goldblum, 62 F.4th at 255 (emphasis in original) (citation modified). In
Goldblum, which concerned a Title IX retaliation claim brought by an employee, the court wrote:
“[t]o constitute similarly situated employees, the individuals with whom [the plaintiff] seeks to
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compare her treatment ‘must have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same
standards and have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating
circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them.’” Id.
(quoting Younis v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., 610 F.3d 359, 364 (6th Cir. 2010)).
Hood identifies “a similar student incident” in which a Program student left an iPad with
client information on it unattended in a hallway, but the student was not punished. (Doc. No. 28 at
8 (citing Kelley Dep. 127–130).) The plaintiff states that the facts of this case are similar because
“the laptop [sic] and the ID code [in the Email] were each locked with no ability to access the
underlying information.” (Id.) The cases are not similar in all relevant respects. In the incident the
plaintiff describes, the student did not share any client information; rather, if someone had taken
the iPad and managed to somehow unlock it, then they could have had access to client information.
In this case, Hood shared client information. Moreover, while the plaintiff describes the incident
as a “student leaving a laptop [sic] unattended in a hallway,” as Co-Director Kelley explains, “the
iPad was left in the upstairs of the [Center], which is not a very public area.” (Kelley Dep. 127:13–
16).) And, while Hood violated a University policy, Kelley testified that the other student did not.
(Id. at 129:19–23 (“I do not believe that having an iPad in the [Center] is a violation of our
policy.”); but see id. at 131:9–15, Doc. No. 26-4 at 34 (“[I]t is best practice for someone to take
their iPad with them.”).) Hood has not cited sufficient record evidence to show that the Co-
Directors had insufficient reason to implement the CIP.
The plaintiff makes two further claims in support of her pretextual argument, which the
court will briefly address. First, the plaintiff states, without providing citation to the record, that
the University “has been reluctant, if not deliberately evasive, in acknowledging that the entire
adverse action rested solely on the inclusion of a non-identifying code in an email sent to Plaintiff’s
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Title IX attorney.” (Doc. No. 28 at 19.) The plaintiff cites Sixth Circuit caselaw for the proposition
that “[s]uch inconsistency and evasiveness seem to be the epitome of pretext meant to mask
retaliatory discrimination[.]” (Id. quoting Mickey, 516 F.3d at 527). Not only does the plaintiff fail
to cite record evidence to support this claim, but the plaintiff cites evidence in contradiction. For
example, the plaintiff quotes a January 18, 2024 email from the Co-Directors notifying Hood that
they had reviewed the email Hood sent to her attorney with the at-issue client information, and
that, “[b]ecause of this violation, a plan of action must be put in place.” (Id. at 7 (quoting Doc. No.
26-4 at 89).) And the plaintiff cites the explanation the CIP itself provides: “Emailing confidential
client information to an individual outside of the [Center.]” (Id. at 9–10 (quoting CIP, Doc. No.
26-4 at 124).)
Second, apart from the Title IX complaint Hood filed against Briggs for sexual harassment,
Hood also “reported [to Coordinator Hargis] that Hoyt’s failure to schedule her client and the co-
directors’ decision to suspend her clinical privileges was retaliatory.” (Doc. No. 28 at 12 (citations
omitted); see also RDSUF ¶ 3 (describing Hood’s report to Hargis, in response to the defendant’s
proposed undisputed fact that Lipscomb prohibits harassment and discrimination).) Hood argues
that Hargis’ “failure to investigate the CIP as a retaliatory action further supports a finding of
discriminatory motive.” (Doc. No. 28 at 19.) Even if the court accepted the plaintiff’s
characterization as true, which the University contests (Doc. No. 33 at 4), the plaintiff does not
explain how Coordinator Hargis’ failure to investigate a report of retaliation is evidence that the
Co-Directors’ decision to place Hood on the CIP was retaliatory. Hood has not shown that the
University’s decision to place her on the CIP was pretextual and that the real reason was retaliatory.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that there is no genuine question of material fact
remaining, and Lipscomb is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court will
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grant Lipscomb’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 23), and the Complaint will be
dismissed with prejudice. Lipscomb’s counterclaim remains.
An appropriate Order is filed herewith.
ALETA A. TRAUGER
United States District Judge
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