Mitchell v. l/n/u et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
MICHAEL KEITH MITCHELL #482740,
Plaintiff,
v.
f/n/u l/n/u Assistant Commissioner of
Prisons, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 3:24-cv-01352
JUDGE RICHARDSON
MAGISTRATE JUDGE FRENSLEY
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Michael Keith Mitchell, an inmate of the Riverbend Maximum Security Institution
(“RMSI”) in Nashville, Tennessee, filed a pro se, in forma pauperis complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his civil rights. (Doc. No. 1).
Mitchell also has filed three Motions to Ascertain Status of Case (Doc. Nos. 9, 10, 11).
Those motions are GRANTED insofar as the Court herein undertakes the screening of the
complaint required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).
I. PLRA SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT
The complaint is before the Court for an initial review pursuant to the PLRA, 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint
filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly
requires initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” id. § 1915A(a), and
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summary dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in Section
1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).
The court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, United States v. Smotherman, 838
F.3d 736, 739 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), and accept the
plaintiff’s factual allegations as true unless they are entirely without credibility. See Thomas v.
Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)).
Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991), the courts’ “duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not require us
to conjure up [unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation
omitted).
A. Section 1983 Standard
Plaintiff brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which creates a cause of action against
any person who, acting under color of state law, abridges “rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws . . . .” To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege
and show two elements: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state
law. Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sigley v. City of
Panama Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 2006)); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
B. Facts Alleged in the Amended Complaint
The allegations of the complaint are assumed true for purposes of the required PLRA
screening.
The complaint alleges that Plaintiff has suffered “astonishing weight loss” due to a lack of
nutritious meals or tampering with his food trays while incarcerated at RMSI. (Doc. No. 1 at 2).
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His weight has dropped from 210 pounds on December 27, 2023, to 147 pounds on September 9,
2024.
Plaintiff has been ordered to engage in weekly weight checks to monitor his weight loss,
but Plaintiff believes blood and urine tests should have been ordered as well as body
measurements, strength tests, therapeutic nutrition, and a diet consultation. Plaintiff has filed
numerous grievances regarding his concerns. He alleges that no weight checks have occurred, and
he “becomes short-winded from time-to-time showering or folding class [as well as] dizzy very
easily if moving very swiftly.” (Id. at 7). He also has “pains in arms.” (Id.)
On September 9, 2024, Plaintiff was told by Dr. Dwazo Madubueze that his diagnosis was
“what sounds like nerve trauma.” (Id. at 8).
C. Analysis
The complaint names three individuals as Defendants: f/n/u l/n/u Assistant Commissioner
of 	Prisons 	(“Assistant 	Commissioner”); 	RMSI 	Warden 	Kenneth 	Nelson; 	and 	Healthcare
Supervisor/Services Administrator Kyla Solomon. Plaintiff names these individuals in their
individual capacities and “official [capacities], as applies with law in accord with judges’
discretion.” (Doc. No. 1 at 1-2).
The Court will begin with the Assistant Commissioner of Prisons and the Warden.
Plaintiff’s claims against those Defendants appear to be based on two things: (1) Defendants’
responses or lack of responses to Plaintiff’s grievances and (2) John/Jane Doe’s role as Assistant
Commissioner of Prisons and Nelson’s role as Warden.
First, Plaintiff alleges that the Assistant Commissioner and Warden were aware of
Plaintiff’s need for medical care and ignored that need by failing to arrange Plaintiff’s desired
treatment after becoming aware of Plaintiff’s grievances. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 1 at 3) (“On 8-15-
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24, the Assistant Commissioner of Prisons . . . . signed TN Dept. of Corrections MEMO Page that
agrees with/concurs with current response, in which almost nothing is being done at all”) (On 7-
30-24 Warden Kenneth Nelson signed TDOC Inmate Grievance Response, agreeing with proposed
response and noting the ‘action taken’ as ‘weekly medical checks have already been ordered’ in
which again almost nothing is being done at all”). But “failure to take corrective action in response
to an inmate grievance or complaint does not supply the necessary personal involvement for
Section 1983 liability.” Fields v. Trinity Food Service, No. 17-1190-JDT-cgc, 2019 WL 5268565,
at *11 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 17, 2019); see also King v. Batts, No. 1:24-CV-00024, 2024 WL 2412289,
at *5 (M.D. Tenn. May 23, 2024) (citing George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609-10 (7th Cir. 2007)
(“Ruling against a prisoner on an administrative complaint does not cause or contribute to the
[constitutional] violation.”)).
To the extent 	that Plaintiff is attempting to hold the Warden 	and 	the Assistant
Commissioner liable for the conduct of subordinates, “[g]overnment officials may not be held
liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-
official defendant, through the official’s own official actions, violated the Constitution.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 676. There must be a showing that the supervisor encouraged the specific instance of
misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it. At a minimum, a Section 1983 plaintiff
must show that a supervisory official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly
acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinates. See Bellamy v. Bradley,
729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). Here, the complaint does not allege that the
Warden or Assistant Commissioner encouraged any instance of misconduct related to Plaintiff or
was otherwise directly involved in it. Neither does the complaint allege that Warden or Assistant
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Commissioner “implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional
conduct” of a subordinate. Id. Because the complaint does not allege that the Warden or Assistant
Commissioner was directly responsible for any of the alleged violations of Plaintiff’s rights, the
claims against those Defendants in their individual capacities must be dismissed.
The Court moves now to Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against the Warden and
Assistant Commissioner. Such claims are equivalent to claims against the entity that employs the
Warden and Assistant Commissioner, in this case the Tennessee Department of Correction
(“TDOC”). See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978) (“[O]fficial-capacity
suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an
officer is an agent”). “TDOC is an arm of the state of Tennessee for purposes of Eleventh
Amendment immunity.” Primm v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., No. 3:15-cv-00230, 2017 WL 1210066,
at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2017) (citing Owens v. O’Toole, No. 3:14-cv-02040, 2014 WL
5846733, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 12, 2014)). Sovereign immunity therefore applies. See, e.g.,
Carter v. Bell, No. 3:10-0058, 2010 WL 3491160, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 1, 2010) (holding that
the Riverbend Warden “as an employee of [TDOC], represents the State of Tennessee”); Arauz v.
Bell, No. 3:06-0901, 2007 WL 2457474, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 24, 2007) (adopting report and
recommendation holding that Riverbend employees are “employees of [TDOC]”). Tennessee’s
sovereign immunity protects TDOC from official capacity claims for money damages. Jones v.
Mays, No. 3:19-cv-00795, 2020 WL 5106760, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 31, 2020). Thus, these
Defendants are immune from Plaintiff’s claims for money damages.
However, Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief from these Defendants. (Doc. No. 1 at 8).
“[D]emands for injunctive relief are properly brought against a TDOC official in his official
capacity.” Hall v. Trump, No. 3:19-cv-00628, 2020 WL 1061885, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 5, 2020)
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(citing Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10). The Court thus considers whether Plaintiff has properly stated
such a claim.
Under Section 1983, the state of Tennessee cannot be held liable for injunctive relief under
a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011).
Rather, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that he or she suffered a constitutional violation; and (2) that a
policy or custom of TDOC or the state of Tennessee directly caused the violation. Hadrick v. City
of Detroit, Mich., 876 F.3d 238, 243 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 690-92). Here,
Plaintiff does not attribute his alleged harms to any particular TDOC or Tennessee policy. The
complaint contains no allegations regarding any TDOC policy being a moving force behind any
alleged injury to Plaintiff. In fact, the factual allegations of the complaint do not mention TDOC
policies at all. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims for injunctive relief against the
Warden and the Assistant Commissioner, which are claims against the State of Tennessee, will be
dismissed for failure to state a Section 1983 claim upon which relief can be granted.
The 	Court 	now 	moves 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	Section 	1983 	claims 	against 	Healthcare
Supervisor/Services Administrator Kyla Solomon. The Eighth Amendment “forbids prison
officials from ‘unnecessarily and wantonly inflicting pain’ on an inmate by acting with ‘deliberate
indifference’ towards the inmate’s serious medical needs.” Berkshire v. Beauvais, 928 F.3d 520,
535 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004)).
An Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against an individual actor has objective and
subjective components. Farmer, 511 U.S. 825, 834; Blackmore, 390 F.3d 890, 895. The objective
component requires showing “the existence of a “sufficiently serious” medical need. Farmer, 511
U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. 294, 298). “[A] medical need is objectively serious if it is
one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that
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even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Blackmore, 390
F.3d at 897. Liberally construing the pro se complaint, Plaintiff alleges that his rapid weight loss
constitutes a sufficiently serious medical need.
Even treating, for purposes of this screening, Plaintiff’s rapid weight loss as a sufficiently
serious medical need, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against Defendant Solomon in her individual
capacity nevertheless fails as a matter of law because the complaint does not allege that Solomon
acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical need. “The subjective component
requires a plaintiff to show that ‘each defendant subjectively perceived facts from which to infer
substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded
that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.’” Greene v. Crawford Cnty, Mich., 22
F.4th 593, 605-06 (6th Cir. Jan. 4, 2022) (quoting Griffith v. Franklin Cnty, Ky., 975 F.3d 554,
568 (6th Cir. Sept. 21, 2020)). This showing “entails something more than mere negligence,”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835, and is instead “equivalent to criminal recklessness[,]” Greene, 22 F.4th
at 606 (quoting Griffith, 975 F.3d at 568).
The complaint alleges that Solomon should have known from Plaintiff’s grievances
detailing his weight loss that he was in pain and needed medical care beyond the ordered weekly
weight checks. According to Plaintiff, he needed blood and urine tests as well as body
measurements, strength tests, therapeutic nutrition, and a diet consultation. On July 15, 2024,
Solomon responded to one of Plaintiff’s grievances, noting, “Mr. Mitchell, You have been ordered
weekly weight checks. Please complete those so we can monitor. Diet/supplementation can only
be considered with a nutritional consult. Weight checks are a part of that consult work up.” (Doc.
No. 1 at 3). Thus, the record shows that Solomon provided some treatment to Plaintiff.
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A prisoner’s difference of opinion regarding diagnosis or treatment does not rise to the
level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107. Further, where a prisoner has
received some medical attention, but disputes the adequacy of that treatment, the federal courts are
reluctant to second-guess the medical judgments of prison officials and constitutionalize claims
that sound in state tort law. Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976).
Although Plaintiff believes that he should have received different or additional treatment
beyond weekly weight checks in preparation for a nutrition consult, his belief does not state a
federal 	constitutional 	claim. 	Further, 	Plaintiff’s 	allegations 	of 	negligence 	and/or 	medical
malpractice do not support constitutional liability under Section 1983. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06.
Thus, the complaint does not state a colorable deliberate indifference claim under Section 1983
against Defendant Solomon in her individual capacity.
Finally, the Court considers Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against Defendant Solomon in
her official capacity. The complaint alleges that Solomon is an employee of “Health/SVC; Corizon
Healthcare; Centurion Medical Services.” (Doc. No. 1 at 2). For purposes of this screening, the
Court will refer to Solomon’s employer as “Corizon/Centurion” as the precise name of the entity
responsible for providing medical care to RMSI inmates is unclear from the complaint. Because
Corizon/Centurion performs a traditional state function in providing medical care to state inmates,
Corizon/Centurion acts under the color of state law. Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810,
814 (6th Cir.1996). For Corizon/Centurion to be liable under Section 1983, Plaintiff must allege
that there is a direct causal link between a policy or custom of Corizon/Centurion and the alleged
constitutional violation. See Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 691. In other words, Corizon/Centurion may
be liable under Section 1983 “if its official policies or customs resulted in injury to the plaintiff.”
O’Brien v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 592 F. App’x 338, 341 (6th Cir. 2014); see also Mason v. Doe,
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No. 3:12CV-P794-H, 2013 WL 4500107, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 21, 2013) (collecting cases) (“a
private corporation may be liable under § 1983 when an official policy or custom of the corporation
causes the alleged deprivation of a federal right”).
To hold Corizon/Centurion liable, the plaintiff cannot rely on the theory of respondeat
superior 	or 	vicarious 	liability. 	Street, 	102 	F.3d 	at 	818. 	Liability 	attaches 	only 	if
Corizon/Centurion’s policies are shown to be the “moving force” behind Plaintiff’s injuries. City
of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). Plaintiff must “identify the policy, connect the
policy to the [entity] itself and show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution
of that policy.” Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 353-64 (6th Cir. 1993).
Here, however, the complaint does not describe how a Corizon/Centurian policy is
responsible in full or in part for Plaintiff’s injury. Therefore, for purposes of the initial screening
of Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Defendant Solomon, which are claims against
Corizon/Centurion, the complaint fails to state Section 1983 claims upon which relief may be
granted.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having conducted the screening required by the PRLA, the Court finds that the allegations
of the complaint fail to state claims upon which relief can be granted via Section 1983 against all
Defendants. Accordingly, this action is therefore DISMISSED.
Because an appeal would not be taken in good faith, Plaintiff is not certified to pursue an
appeal from this judgment in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
This is the final Order denying all relief in this case. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b).
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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ELI RICHARDSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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