Rajapakse v. Carter et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
SAMANTHA D. RAJAPAKSE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CLARENCE H. CARTER, 1
Commissioner of Tennessee Department
of Human Services, ET AL.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
NO. 3:25-cv-00188
JUDGE CAMPBELL
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Samantha Rajapakse, an East Ridge, Tennessee resident proceeding pro se, filed
a Complaint against the State of Tennessee Department of Human Services (DHS) and its
Commissioner, Clarence H. Carter, in his official capacity as head of both the DHS and its
subsidiary division, the Tennessee Disability Determination Services. (Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff also
file an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). (Doc. No. 2.)
I. PAUPER STATUS
Plaintiff’s IFP application reports no employment or income after a job loss on August 28,
2023 (Doc. No. 2 at 2), and no assets other than a 2005 Hyundai Santa Fe. (Id. at 3.) Though
Plaintiff apparently resides in a home, she reports no rent or mortgage obligations or utility bills,
but states that her son and daughter help care for her due to her “rare skin condition.” (Id. at 4–5.)
Construed in Plaintiff’s favor, these disclosures support an inference that her children provide her
housing. In addition, the Complaint alleges Plaintiff’s pursuit of disability benefits and vocational
rehabilitation. The Court thus finds that Plaintiff cannot pay the $405 civil filing fee “without
1 	Mr. Carter’s name is misspelled “Clearance” in the caption of the Complaint, and therefore on the
electronic docket of this case. The Clerk SHALL correct this misspelling on the docket.
Case 3:25-cv-00188 Document 12 Filed 01/16/26 Page 1 of 7 PageID #: <pageID>

2
undue hardship.” Foster v. Cuyahoga Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 21 F. App’x 239, 240
(6th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the IFP application (Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
II. INITIAL REVIEW
A. Legal Standard
Under the pauper statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must conduct an initial
review and dismiss the Complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See also Ongori v. Hawkins, No. 16-2781, 2017 WL 6759020, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 15, 2017)
(“[N]on-prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis are still subject to the screening requirements of
§ 1915(e).”). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, the Complaint must contain sufficient
factual allegations to render a right to relief “plausible on its face,” Small v. Brock, 963 F.3d 539,
540 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)), such that it would
survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hill v. Lappin, 630
F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010)
At this stage, “the Court assumes the truth of ‘well-pleaded factual allegations’ and
‘reasonable inference[s]’ therefrom,” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175, 181 (2024)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79), but is “not required to accept legal conclusions or unwarranted
factual inferences as true.” Inner City Contracting, LLC v. Charter Twp. of Northville, Michigan,
87 F.4th 743, 749 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). The Court must afford the pro se Complaint
a liberal construction, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), while viewing it in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff. Inner City, supra.
Case 3:25-cv-00188 Document 12 Filed 01/16/26 Page 2 of 7 PageID #: <pageID>

3
B. Facts
Plaintiff, “an African-American over the age of 40 with a known disability,” sues the DHS
and Commissioner Carter in his official capacity for violating her civil rights. (See Doc. No. 1 at
2 (asserting federal-question jurisdiction under “28 U.S.C. § 1343; Civil Rights”).) She was
terminated 	from 	her 	employment 	with 	the 	DHS 	on 	August 	28, 	2023, 	after 	requesting
accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act and reporting her concerns about how
claims for Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits were being handled.
Plaintiff filed a charge of disability discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), and that agency returned a determination of reasonable cause to believe that
Plaintiff’s termination was unlawful.
The EEOC investigation resulted in a proposed “Conciliation Agreement” on agency
letterhead (Doc. No. 1-1 at 2–7), which, if executed by the parties, would memorialize their
negotiated settlement (financial and otherwise) of the discrimination charge. Prior to the
publication of the Conciliation Agreement to Plaintiff and the DHS, Plaintiff had filed claims to
unemployment benefits and Social Security disability benefits. Her unemployment claim was
delayed by a different DHS division, and she objected in writing when her federal disability claim
was assigned for initial medical review by the DHS disability department. (Doc. No. 1 at 14–15.)
Plaintiff’s unemployment claim was eventually approved, but her disability claim was denied. (Id.)
There were delays in approving and executing the Conciliation Agreement at the
appropriate levels of state government, and despite the EEOC’s representation that the process
would be expected to take 30–45 days, the November 2024 Agreement had not been approved at
the time of the Complaint’s February 2025 filing. (Doc. No. 1 at 16.) The Office of the Tennessee
Attorney General declined to provide Plaintiff with an update on the progress of the Agreement’s
Case 3:25-cv-00188 Document 12 Filed 01/16/26 Page 3 of 7 PageID #: <pageID>

4
approval, but “later contacted the EEOC, stating the conciliation agreement would be an additional
several months before it could be closed if it is approved.” (Id. at 18.) In light of this delay, “the
Plaintiff requests she [be allowed to] seek relief through the court,” and asks that the Conciliation
Agreement be voided and that the Court award her monetary damages, reinstatement to state
employment for purposes of medical insurance, and expungement of all negative remarks from
her personnel file. (Id. at 18–19, 20–22.)
In a Motion to Supplement Complaint (Doc. No. 11), Plaintiff alleges that, “[i]n March
2025, after repeated requests to the state to provide a date for the conciliation to be finalized, the
EEOC, Phil Bornfield, contacted [Plaintiff], informing her that the state could not provide [a
date].” (Id. at 12.) The remainder of the Motion to Supplement concerns (1) Plaintiff’s failed bid
for Social Security disability benefits, which were denied at the initial level of review by DHS,
allegedly “because it will further show she was terminated due to her disability” (id. at 19); and
(2) Plaintiff’s pursuit of vocational rehabilitation services through July 2025, during which a state
contractor, Access Project, initially coordinated a job search and informed Plaintiff of other state
resources before later encouraging Plaintiff to withdraw from the program due to her concurrent
claim for federal disability benefits. (Id. at 19–23.) Plaintiff claims that these incidents demonstrate
the ways in which DHS has continued to retaliate against her for her initial charge of workplace
discrimination and retaliation. (Id. at 24–25.)
C. Analysis
The Court construes the Complaint and Supplement2 to assert federal claims of
discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C.
2 	“On motion and reasonable notice, the court may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a
supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the
pleading to be supplemented.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement Complaint is proper
under Rule 15(d) and will be granted.
Case 3:25-cv-00188 Document 12 Filed 01/16/26 Page 4 of 7 PageID #: <pageID>

5
§§ 12101 et seq., 12203, with regard to (1) Plaintiff’s termination from DHS and DHS’s delay in
executing the proposed Conciliation Agreement, and (2) DHS’s denial of her disability claim and
interference with her participation in vocational rehabilitation.
The EEOC’s process for enforcing Title VII’s provisions––which applies equally to its
enforcement of the ADA’s provisions, see 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a)––has been described by the Sixth
Circuit as follows:
Upon receipt of a charge, the EEOC investigates its allegations. The EEOC has
exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the charge for 180 days. EEOC v.
Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 456 (6th Cir. 1999); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(l). The EEOC will issue the complaining employee a right-to-sue
letter if the agency makes one of the following four determinations: (1) where the
EEOC determines that “there is not reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful
employment practice has occurred,” (2) where the EEOC determines that a
violation has occurred, and that the employer refuses to enter into a conciliation
agreement, and the EEOC decides not to pursue a civil action against the employer,
(3) where the EEOC has entered into a conciliation agreement but the complaining
employee has not entered into the conciliation agreement, or (4) where the charge
is dismissed. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.19(a), 1601.28(b). Once the EEOC issues a right-
to-sue letter, the employee has ninety days to sue the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(f)(1).
Logan v. MGM Grand Detroit Casino, 939 F.3d 824, 828 (6th Cir. 2019). Where, as here, the
respondent “is a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, if the Commission
has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the
Commission, the Commission shall take no further action and shall refer the case to the Attorney
General who may bring a civil action against such respondent in the appropriate United States
district court.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see 29 C.F.R. § 1601.29. If no civil action is brought by
the Attorney General within 180 days of the charge filing, the Attorney General “shall so notify
the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be
brought against the respondent named in the charge . . . by the person claiming to be aggrieved.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
Case 3:25-cv-00188 Document 12 Filed 01/16/26 Page 5 of 7 PageID #: <pageID>

6
It is not apparent from Plaintiff’s pleadings that EEOC proceedings have terminated, or
that she has requested or received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC or an equivalent notice from
the Attorney General. At this early stage, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to support a
reasonable inference that she was terminated by the DHS for reasons that included her disability,
her protected complaints, and/or her requests for ADA accommodations. See Diggs v. Potter, 700
F. Supp. 2d 20, 39–40 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Under Title VII [and related anti-discrimination statutes],
the two essential elements of a discrimination claim are that (i) the plaintiff suffered an adverse
employment action (ii) because of the plaintiff’s race, sex, age, or disability. … To prove
retaliation under these statutes, the plaintiff generally must establish that he suffered (i) a
materially adverse action (ii) because he or she had brought or threatened to bring a discrimination
claim.”). For purposes of initial review, her allegations are also sufficient to support her claim that
the DHS’s retaliation extended to its denial of her claim to be disabled for purposes of Social
Security benefits and its handling of her vocational rehabilitation, and that she is therefore entitled
to damages. See Kostic v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 532 F. Supp. 3d 513, 542 (M.D. Tenn. 2021)
(holding that, “in the retaliation context, an employer’s materially adverse action need not be an
employment action (as opposed to an action post-dating employment or otherwise unrelated to
employment)[,]” so “the evidence of Defendant’s post-employment activity . . . can be considered
as part of the alleged retaliation by Defendant”). These claims will be allowed to proceed for
further development of the record, including clarification of the status of enforcement proceedings
before the EEOC and/or the Attorney General since the filing of the Complaint and Supplement.
Case 3:25-cv-00188 Document 12 Filed 01/16/26 Page 6 of 7 PageID #: <pageID>

7
III. CONCLUSION
As explained above, Plaintiff’s case is sufficiently pled to survive initial review. Her
Motion to Supplement Complaint (Doc. No. 11), which also seeks “to expedite proceedings” and
to be awarded “partial summary judgment” (id. at 1), is GRANTED insofar as it seeks to
supplement the Complaint and otherwise DENIED given the early stage of these proceedings.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff a service packet (a blank summons (AO 440)
and USM 285 form) for each defendant. Plaintiff MUST complete the service packet(s) and return
them to the Clerk’s Office within 30 DAYS of the entry of this Order. Failure to do so may result
in the dismissal of this case. Upon return of any properly completed service packet, the Clerk is
DIRECTED to issue summons to the U.S. Marshals Service for service on the defendant. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 4(b) and (c)(3).
This action is REFERRED to the Magistrate Judge to oversee service of process, to enter
a scheduling order for the management of the case, to dispose or recommend disposition of any
pretrial motions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), and to conduct further proceedings, if
necessary, under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Court.
Plaintiff is cautioned that she must keep the Court informed of her current address at all
times, or risk dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); Local Rule
41.01(b). Additional resources for pro se litigants, including forms, handbooks, and information
sheets, are available on the court’s website. See https://www.tnmd.uscourts.gov/representing-
yourself-federal-court.
It is so ORDERED.
____________________________________
WILLIAM L. CAMPBELL, JR.
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 3:25-cv-00188 Document 12 Filed 01/16/26 Page 7 of 7 PageID #: <pageID>