Gordon v. Horton, et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
ROBERT GORDON, #65920,
Plaintiff,
v.
MATTHEW HORTON, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 3:25-cv-00521
Judge Richardson
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Robert Gordon who is currently in the custody of the Williamson County Jail in
Franklin, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint alleging violations of his civil rights. (Doc. No. 1).
For the reasons below, Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed as frivolous.
I. 	FILING FEE
Plaintiff 	has 	filed 	an 	Applications 	for 	Leave 	to 	Proceed 	In 	Forma 	Pauperis
(“IFP Application”) (Doc. No. 2). Under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a), a prisoner bringing a civil action may be permitted to file suit without prepaying the
filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). From a review of Plaintiff’s IFP Application and
supporting documentation,1 it appears that Plaintiff lacks sufficient financial resources from which
to pay the full filing fee in advance. Therefore, his original IFP Application (Doc. No. 2) will be
granted. Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend Time for IFP Trust Fund will be denied as moot. (Doc. No. 6).
1 Plaintiff’s does not include a copy of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account statement as required by Section
1915(a)(2). However, Plaintiff has submitted a “Certificate of Prisoner Institutional/Trust Fund Account
Activity.” (Doc. No. 7-1). This document, which appears to be signed by Plaintiff’s custodian, reports the
average monthly balance and average monthly deposit for Plaintiff’s trust fund account. (Id.). Moreover,
the custodian’s handwritten note indicates that Plaintiff properly requested the statement ordered by the
Court. (See Doc. No. 5). Based on Plaintiff’s submissions, the Court in its discretion deems the statutory
requirements met.
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Under § 1915(b), Plaintiff remains responsible for paying the full filing fee. The obligation
to pay the fee accrues at the time the case is filed, but the PLRA provides prisoner-plaintiffs the
opportunity to make a “down payment” of a partial filing fee and to pay the remainder in
installments. Accordingly, Plaintiff is hereby ASSESSED the full civil filing fee of $350, to be
paid as follows:
(1) The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust fund account at the institution where he now
resides is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of Court, as an initial payment, “20 percent of the
greater of – (a) the average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s account; or (b) the average monthly
balance in Plaintiff’s account for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the
complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
(2) After the initial filing fee is fully paid, the trust fund officer must withdraw from
Plaintiff’s account and pay to the Clerk of this Court monthly payments equal to 20% of all deposits
credited to Plaintiff’s account during the preceding month, but only when the amount in the
account exceeds $10. Such payments must continue until the entire filing fee is paid in full.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
(3) Each time the trust account officer makes a payment to this court as required by this
Order, he or she must print a copy of the prisoner’s account statement showing all activity in the
account since the last payment made in accordance with this Order and submit it to the Clerk along
with the payment. All submissions to the Court must clearly identify Plaintiff’s name and the case
number as indicated on the first page of this Order, and must be mailed to: Clerk, United States
District Court, Middle District of Tennessee, 719 Church Street, Nashville, TN 37203.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED send a copy of this Order to the administrator of inmate
trust fund accounts at the Williamson County Jail to ensure that the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate
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trust account complies with that portion of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 pertaining to the payment of the filing
fee. If Plaintiff is transferred from his present place of confinement, the custodian of his inmate
trust fund account MUST ensure that a copy of this Order follows Plaintiff to his new place of
confinement for continued compliance.
II. 	PLRA SCREENING STANDARD
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint
filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly
requires initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” id. § 1915A(a), and
summary dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in Section
1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).
The court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, United States v. Smotherman,
838 F.3d 736, 739 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), and accept
a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true unless they are entirely without credibility. See Thomas v.
Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)).
III. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND CLAIMS
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Matthew Horton and Erin Mishkin published false
statements about him, thereby damaging his reputation.2 (Doc. No. 1 at 3). He claims that Horton
and Mishkin are therefore both liable for defamation. (Id. at 3−5). He seeks $25 million in damages
and additional relief. (Id. at 7).
2 Plaintiff also makes several inflammatory allegations against Defendant Mishkin that are unrelated to his
claims. (Doc. No. 1 at 2−3). The Court herein does not recite these allegations.
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IV. ANALYSIS
The Complaint is subject to dismissal as frivolous. “A complaint is frivolous only if the
plaintiff fails to present a claim with an arguable basis either in law or in fact. The former occurs
when indisputably meritless legal theories underlie the complaint, and the latter when it relies on
fantastic or delusional allegations.” Brand v. Motley, 526 F.3d 921, 923 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations
and quotation marks omitted).
Here, the Complaint is legally frivolous. Plaintiff claims that Defendants are liable for
defamation, but there is no such cause of action under federal law. See Duncan v. Kuhr, No. 23-
3511, 2024 WL 5112648, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 21, 2024) (“[T]o the extent that [plaintiff] alleges
general claims of negligence and defamation, her complaint failed to assert a federal cause of
action.”). And there is no other arguable basis for a federal court exercising jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s complaint. Specifically, there is no basis for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332, as Plaintiff indicates that all parties are citizens of Tennessee. (Doc. No. 1-2 at 5)
(civil cover sheet). “[A] prisoner’s invocation of federal jurisdiction in and of itself may be
frivolous where there is no possible ground upon which a reasoned argument can be made to
sustain jurisdiction.” Cohen v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 439 F. App’x 489, 491−92 (6th Cir. 2011)
(citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiff’s invocation of federal-court
jurisdiction cannot possibly be supported by any reasoned argument. Therefore, the Complaint is
frivolous.
V. 	CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s IFP Application (Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED. His Motion for Extension of Time
(Doc. No. 6) is DENIED as moot.
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The Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice as frivolous.3
Plaintiff’s Motion to Join Cases (Doc. No. 8) is DENIED as moot.
This is the final order in this action. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment under Rule 58
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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ELI RICHARDSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
3 It is not clear whether a dismissal of a complaint as frivolous based on the lack of plausible invocation of
subject-matter jurisdiction can properly be deemed one with prejudice. The most the Court can say with
confidence is that a garden-variety dismissal of a case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction generally is
one without prejudice. See Revere v. Wilmington Fin., 406 F. App’x 936, 937 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Dismissal
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction should normally be without prejudice, since by definition the court
lacks power to reach the merits of the case.”). Even if dismissal with prejudice is permissible when the
assertion of subject-matter jurisdiction is frivolous, the Court exercises its discretion to dismiss this action
without prejudice.
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