Bivins v. Meta Platforms, Inc. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION
RUCHADD BIVINS,
Plaintiff,
v.
META PLATFORMS, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
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NO. 3:26-cv-00044
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
RuChadd Bivins, a resident of Jackson, Tennessee proceeding pro se, has filed an Amended
Complaint (Doc. No. 8) against Meta Platforms, Inc. and X Corp., invoking this Court’s diversity
jurisdiction. Plaintiff has also filed an updated application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
(IFP). (Doc. No. 9).
I. APPLICATION TO PROCEED IFP
Plaintiff’s IFP application sufficiently demonstrates that, with roughly one thousand
dollars’ difference between his gross monthly income and his monthly expenses, and with
insufficient funds on account at the time of filing, he is not able to pay the $405 filing fee in
advance “without undue hardship.” Foster v. Cuyahoga Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 21 F.
App’x 239, 240 (6th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the IFP application (Doc. No. 9) is GRANTED. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a).
II. INITIAL REVIEW
A. Legal Standard
The Court must conduct an initial review and dismiss the Amended Complaint if it is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
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relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also
Ongori v. Hawkins, No. 16-2781, 2017 WL 6759020, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 15, 2017) (“[N]on-
prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis are still subject to the screening requirements of
§ 1915(e).”). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, the Amended Complaint must contain
sufficient factual allegations to render a right to relief “plausible on its face,” Small v. Brock, 963
F.3d 539, 540 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)), such that it
would survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hill v. Lappin,
630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010).
At this stage, “the Court assumes the truth of ‘well-pleaded factual allegations’ and
‘reasonable inference[s]’ therefrom,” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175, 181 (2024)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79), but is “not required to accept legal conclusions or unwarranted
factual inferences as true.” Inner City Contracting, LLC v. Charter Twp. of Northville, Michigan,
87 F.4th 743, 749 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). The Court must also afford the pro se pleading
a liberal construction, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), while viewing it in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff. Inner City, supra.
B. Analysis of the Amended Complaint
According to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff is “seeking damages for injury to
reputation” and for “loss of employment[] and earning capacity” due to Defendants’ “continued
publication of Plaintiff’s arrest” on the internet, “although the charge was dismissed and
expunged.” (Doc. No. 8 at 5). Plaintiff states that he “has suffered threats, harm, lack of enjoyment
of life, and due process [deprivation]” because of the continued publication of his arrest record
after dismissal and expungement of his criminal charge. (Id.). The Amended Complaint, like the
original Complaint, invokes the Court’s diversity jurisdiction (see Doc. No. 8 at 3), and the Court
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therefore liberally construes it to continue to claim a right to relief under the state law of
defamation, invasion of privacy, and negligence based on Defendants’ continued publication of
Plaintiff’s mugshot to the online platforms they maintain. (Cf. Doc. No. 1 at 2–3). Those online
platforms include Facebook, Instagram, Twitter/X, and xAI. (See id. at 1; Doc. No. 8 at 4).
In a prior Order, the Court observed that the original Complaint suffered from an apparent
jurisdictional problem, since “diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 … requires ‘complete
diversity’ between Plaintiff and every Defendant,” and one of the original three defendants, Scoop
Nashville, was, like Plaintiff, a Tennessee resident. (Doc. No. 7 at 2–3) (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of
Am. v. City of White House, Tenn., 36 F.3d 540, 545 (6th Cir. 1994)). In the Amended Complaint,
Plaintiff cured the jurisdictional defect by removing Scoop Nashville as a Defendant. However,
with the removal of Scoop Nashville, this lawsuit no longer appears to have any connection to this
judicial district. An issue of the propriety of venue is therefore presented.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue is proper in: (1) a judicial district where any defendant
resides, if all defendants reside in the same state; (2) a district where a substantial part of the events
or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred or a substantial part of the property in question is
situated; or (3) if there is no other district in which the plaintiff may bring the action, a district
where any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action. 28
U.S.C. § 1391(b). When Scoop Nashville was a defendant, venue was pled under Section
1391(b)(2), “as a substantial part of the events occurred here.” (Doc. No. 1 at 2). But, as explained
below, it now appears that the only Tennessee district where the events or omissions giving rise to
Plaintiff’s claims can be said to have occurred is the district of Plaintiff’s residence, the Western
District of Tennessee.
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“The legally relevant ‘occurrence’ in a defamation action is where the publication
occurred, i.e. where third persons were exposed to the material that would tend to damage the
plaintiff’s reputation.” Seidel v. Kirby, 296 F. Supp. 3d 745, 753 (D. Md. 2017); see also, e.g.,
Trump v. New York Times Co., 838 F. Supp. 3d 1181, 1189 (M.D. Fla. 2026) (“Because
publication directly results in a claim for defamation, venue is proper in a district in which
substantial publication occurred, particularly if the plaintiff suffered injury there.”). The court in
Seidel explained as follows:
This rule, that an act of defamation “occurs” where it is publicized such that it may
harm a plaintiff’s reputation, is of little help when the publication is effectively
world-wide. See Capital Corp Merchant Banking, Inc. v. Corp. Colocation, Inc.,
No. 6:07-CV-1626-ORL-19KRS, 2008 WL 4058014 *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2008)
(“[B]ecause the harm from an online defamatory statement can occur in any place
where the website or forum is viewed, no one forum should be expected to stand
out as a particularly strong candidate for venue.”). It would seem that, in the context
of defamation publicized over the Internet, such a rule would make venue proper
in any district in the United States. The venue statute, however, does not authorize
venue in any district where any events that gave rise to the action occurred, but
rather where a substantial part of those actions occurred. Therefore, while it may
not always be the case, the district in which a plaintiff resides is often going to be
where the substantial part of the harmful publication occurred, i.e. where people are
exposed to the material who may actually know the plaintiff or interact with him in
a way that could be affected by the information. The Court therefore agrees with
other courts that have held that “venue under section 1391(a)(2) is proper in the
district where the injured party resides and the defamatory statements were
published.” Id. (citing cases); see also Chambers v. Chambers, Civ. No. RWT-11-
765, 2011 WL 3512140 *6 (D. Md. Aug. 8, 2011) (“Plaintiff’s injury is likely to be
felt in Maryland. Therefore, a substantial part of the events that give rise to
Plaintiff’s claims occurred within this Court’s jurisdiction.”); Hawbecker v. Hall,
88 F. Supp. 3d 723, 731 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (citing 14D Charles A. Wright & Arthur
R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3806 (4th ed.)); Wieland v. John Rigby & Co.,
Inc., No. 4:09CV2100 JCH, 2010 WL 1528527 *1 (E.D. Mo. April 15, 2010)
(finding that online defamatory statements “occurred” in the district because the
website was accessible in that district and plaintiff resided there and was therefore
harmed there).
Id. (emphases in original). In the case at bar, Plaintiff claims injury to reputation, loss of
employment, and loss of earning capacity, as well as threats and loss of enjoyment of life––all of
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which would appear to have been suffered by Plaintiff in the district where he resides, which at all
times during the life of this lawsuit has been the Western District of Tennessee. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 123(c)(1) (stating that Madison County, where Jackson, Tennessee is located, sits in the Eastern
Division of the Western District).
Under Section 1391(b)(1), venue may also be proper in a district where Defendants reside,
and the statute states that a defendant corporation resides “in any judicial district in which such
defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.”
28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2). But even assuming that jurisdiction over both Defendants––and thus
venue––is proper in this district with respect to this action, the Court in its discretion may still
dismiss or transfer the case in the interest of justice and for the sake of convenience of parties and
witnesses under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), “a codification of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.”
Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Texas, 571 U.S. 49, 60 (2013).
“As to the convenience of the parties, this Court should consider the parties’ respective
residences and their ability to bear the costs of litigating in a particular forum.” Forcillo v. LeMond
Fitness, Inc., 220 F.R.D. 550, 553 (S.D. Ill. 2004). As explained above, the Western District of
Tennessee is the forum of the indigent Plaintiff’s residence. It would also appear to be the forum
most convenient for any witnesses who might testify to his claimed injuries. Although Plaintiff
chose to pursue his Amended Complaint in this district, that choice “weighs minimally” because
“the cause of action has little connection with the chosen forum[.]” Tanyike v. United States, 603
F. Supp. 3d 572, 581 (S.D. Ohio 2022) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Meanwhile, 	Defendants 	Meta 	Platforms, 	Inc. 	and 	X 	Corp.––both 	multi-billion-dollar
corporations––are clearly able to bear the costs of litigating in the Western District. Accordingly,
in the interest of justice, this case will be transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
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III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Clerk is DIRECTED to TRANSFER this action to
the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, Eastern Division. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a). All future filings in this matter must be directed to the Western District.
This Court’s file in this matter is closed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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WAVERLY D. CRENSHAW, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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