Stinson Sr. v. Brooks et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________________
MARK T. STINSON SR., 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. 2:25-cv-2292-SHL-atc
)
NATHAN P. BROOKS, DAMON KEITH 	)
GRIFFIN, D. MICHAEL DUNAVANT, 	)
EDWARD L. STANTON III, 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
______________________________________________________________________________
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL
AND FOR DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND
AND ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS
______________________________________________________________________________
On March 7, 2025, Plaintiff Mark T. Stinson, Sr. filed a pro se complaint in the Southern
District of Florida. (ECF No. 1.) The case was transferred to the Western District of Tennessee
on March 13, 2025. (ECF No. 6.) Pursuant to the Court’s July 11, 2025 Order directing Stinson
to submit a second in forma pauperis application, Stinson filed his motion to proceed in forma
pauperis on July 16, 2025, which was subsequently granted on August 4, 2025. (ECF Nos. 23,
24.)
On October 27, 2025, Stinson also filed a Motion to Amend Complaint to Add New
Defendant and for Leave to Transfer Case (“Motion to Amend”). (ECF No. 28.) In his Motion,
Stinson seeks to add claims against a new defendant, Comspark International, Inc.
(“Comspark”). (Id. at 2–3.) He also seeks to transfer this action back to the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida. (Id. at 5.)
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Also before the Court are Stinson’s Motion to Opt Out of Mediation, filed March 19,
2025 (ECF No. 12), and Motion for Status of Service, filed October 14, 2025 (ECF No. 27).
Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 2013-05, this case has been referred to the United
States Magistrate Judge for management and for all pretrial matters for determination and/or
report and recommendation as appropriate. (Admin. Order 2013-05, Apr. 29, 2013.) For the
reasons set forth below, it is recommended that Stinson’s claims be dismissed sua sponte,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, and that the Motion to Amend be denied. In light of these recommendations, Stinson’s
other pending Motions are DENIED without prejudice.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Proposed Findings of Fact
Stinson brings claims against Defendants Nathan P. Brooks, Damon Keith Griffin, D.
Michael Dunavant, and Edward L. Stanton under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for theft, conspiracy,
fraud, conversion, and concealment or fraud by suppression. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 9–11.) Specifically,
Stinson alleges that Defendants stole information regarding Stinson’s idea for an app called “VIP
Concession” during the investigation that led to his conviction for federal tax fraud in United
States v. Stinson, 2:16-cr-20247-JTF (W.D. Tenn. 2016) (the “Criminal Case”). (Id.) Stinson
further claims that Defendants “sent [him] to prison illegally and kept him in prison [dur]ing the
pandemic so that the idea would prosper, and [he] would not have a voice to complain.” (Id.)
He seeks damages of $250 million from each Defendant. (Id. ¶ 17.)
In his Motion to Amend, Stinson further alleges he contracted with Comspark “for the
purpose of preparing and filing a patent application” with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office for VIP Concession (the “Patent Application”). (ECF No. 28, at 2.) Stinson
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claims that, although he paid Comspark for these services, Comspark “failed to properly prepare
and/or file Plaintiff’s patent application.” (Id. at 3.) He intends to seek damages of one billion
dollars from Comspark for “breach of contract, negligence, and/or professional malpractice
related to the improper filing of the patent application.” (Id. at 5.)
II. 	Proposed Conclusions of Law
A. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
Under Local Rule 4.1(b)(2), the Clerk of the Court will only issue summonses in cases
with non-prisoner pro se plaintiffs who are proceeding in forma pauperis at the Court’s direction
after the Court conducts a screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under that provision, the
Court shall dismiss the case at any time of it determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or
malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” This Report and Recommendation
constitutes the Court’s screening.
B. 	Standard of Review for Failure to State a Claim
To determine whether Stinson’s Complaint states a claim for which relief may be
granted, the Court applies the standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as
articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007). “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The Court “construes the complaint in a light
most favorable to the plaintiff” and “accepts all factual allegations as true” to determine whether
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they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d 608,
611 (6th Cir. 2012).
Pleadings provide facial plausibility when they present “factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. However, “pleadings that . . . are no more than conclusions[] are not
entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket
assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to
see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature
of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”).
“[A] pleading filed pro se is to be liberally construed and held to less stringent standards
than a pleading filed by counsel.” Kondaur Cap. Corp. v. Smith, 802 F. App’x 938, 945 (6th Cir.
2020) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)); see also Vandiver v. Vasbinder, 416
F. App’x 560, 562 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding the less stringent standard applies to pro se
complaints, “however inartfully pleaded”). Nevertheless, pro se litigants “are not exempt from
the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Wright v. Penguin Random House,
783 F. App’x 578, 581 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Fox v. Mich. State Police Dep’t, 173 F. App’x 372,
376 (6th Cir. 2006)); see also Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011)
(“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause of action on behalf
of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it would transform the
courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While courts are
properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that responsibility does not
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encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should pursue.”); Brown v.
Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[A] court cannot ‘create a claim which a
plaintiff has not spelled out in his pleading.’”) (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co.,
518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)). “A pro se complaint must still ‘contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Shelby v.
Greystar Mgmt. Servs., L.P., No. 2:17-cv-02650-SHM-cgc, 2018 WL 386647, at *2 (W.D. Tenn.
Jan. 11, 2018) (quoting Barnett v. Luttrell, 414 F. App’x. 784, 786 (6th Cir. 2011)).
C. 	Res Judicata1
Res judicata or “claim preclusion prevents parties from raising issues that could have
been raised and decided in a prior action—even if they were not actually litigated.” Lucky Brand
Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., 590 U.S. 405, 412 (2020). Parties may not
“relitigat[e] the same ‘claim’ or ‘cause of action,’ even if certain issues were not litigated in the
prior action.” Brownback, 592 U.S. at 215 n.3; see also J.Z.G., 84 F.3d at 214 (“Claim
preclusion applies not only to bar the parties from relitigating issues that were actually litigated
but also to bar them from relitigating issues that could have been raised in an earlier action.”).
“Suits involve the same claim or cause of action if the later suit arises from the same transaction
or involves a common nucleus of operative facts.” Brownback, 592 U.S. at 215 n.3 (internal
quotations omitted).
1 The term “res judicata” has become ambiguous due its usage as both a synonym for, and a type
of, preclusion. See, e.g., Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. 209, 215 n.3 (2021) (“The terms res
judicata and claim preclusion often are used interchangeably. But res judicata comprises two
distinct doctrines. The first is issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel . . . . The
second doctrine is claim preclusion, sometimes itself called res judicata.” (quotations and
citations omitted)); J.Z.G. Res., Inc. v. Shelby Ins. Co., 84 F.3d 211, 214 (6th Cir. 1996)
(describing “true res judicata” as one of the two doctrines of res judicata). As used herein, res
judicata refers only to claim preclusion, distinct from the doctrine of issue preclusion/collateral
estoppel.
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If a claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, “[t]he weight of authority supports
dismissal for failure to state a claim.” Owens v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:18-cv-
02345-JTF-dkv, 2018 WL 4374238, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Jul. 18, 2018), report and
recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 4179076 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 31, 2018) (collecting Sixth
Circuit cases affirming Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal based on res judicata). Courts are “empowered
to raise res judicata sua sponte . . . in the interests of, inter alia, the promotion of judicial
economy.” Holloway Const. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 891 F.2d 1211, 1212 (6th Cir. 1989)
(citations omitted). Furthermore, res judicata is an appropriate basis to dismiss for failure to
state a claim during the initial screening of a complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2). See Smith v.
Morgan, 75 F. App’x 505, 506 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal “pursuant to § 1915(e)
because the doctrine of res judicata bars consideration of the instant complaint”); see also Leirer
v. Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles Compliance Unit, 246 F. App’x 372, 374 (6th Cir. 2007)
(affirming dismissal based on res judicata pursuant to § 1915(e) because the plaintiff “could have
made all of the same allegations and claims he makes in his current lawsuit in that earlier second
lawsuit”). In the Sixth Circuit, claims are barred by res judicata if four elements are satisfied:
(1) a final decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a
subsequent action between the same parties or their privies; (3) an issue in the
subsequent action which was litigated or which should have been litigated in the
prior action; and (4) an identity of the causes of action.
Trs. of Operating Eng’rs Loc. 324 Pension Fund v. Bourdow Contracting, Inc., 919 F.3d 368,
380 (6th Cir. 2019), reh’g denied (June 20, 2019) (quoting Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761, 771
(6th Cir. 2002)).
Stinson’s claims are barred by res judicata. The Court takes judicial notice that Stinson
has filed similar lawsuits against Defendants Brooks and Griffin in this Court, asserting claims
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arising from the same events.2 Stinson v. Fowlkes (“Stinson I”), No. 2:19-cv-2867-MSN-tmp
(W.D. Tenn. 2019); Stinson v. Fowlkes (“Stinson II”), No. 2:21-cv-2128-MSN-tmp (W.D. Tenn.
2021);3 Stinson v. Fowlkes (“Stinson III”), No. 2:22-cv-2694-SHM-tmp (W.D. Tenn. 2022);
Stinson v. Fowlkes (“Stinson IV”), No. 2:24-cv-02870-MSN-atc (W.D. Tenn. 2024).
The first element of res judicata is satisfied because final decisions on the merits were
entered in the prior cases. Stinson I, II, III, and IV were each dismissed for failure to state a
claim under § 1915(e)(2).4 Stinson I, No. 2:19-cv-2867-MSN-tmp, ECF No. 18 (W.D. Tenn.
Apr. 19, 2021); Stinson II, No. 2:21-cv-2128-MSN-tmp, ECF No. 12 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 9, 2021),
appeal dismissed, No. 21-5904 (6th Cir. Dec. 30, 2021); Stinson III, No. 2:22-cv-2694-SHM-
tmp, 2023 WL 3938880, at *6 (W.D. Tenn. June 9, 2023), appeal dismissed, No. 23-5869, 2023
WL 9063672 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 2023); Stinson IV, No. 2:24-cv-02870-MSN-atc, ECF No. 12
(W.D. Tenn. Sep. 11, 2025). Dismissal under § 1915(e) operates as an adjudication on the merits
as to future complaints filed in forma pauperis, Davis v. Butler Cnty., Ohio, 658 F. App’x 208,
213 (6th Cir. 2016), as this case has been filed (ECF No. 24).
The second element is satisfied because Stinson named Brooks and Griffin in Stinson I, II
III, and IV. See Stinson I, No. 2:19-cv-2867-MSN-tmp, ECF No. 1 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 17, 2019)
(suing Brooks and Griffin); Stinson II, No. 2:21-cv-2128-MSN-tmp, ECF No. 8 (W.D. Tenn.
2 “A court may take judicial notice of other court proceedings.” Buck v. Thomas M. Cooley L.
Sch., 597 F.3d 812, 816 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Winget v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 537 F.3d
565, 576 (6th Cir. 2008)).
3 On March 18, 2021, Case No. 2:21-cv-2128-MSN-tmp was consolidated with Case No. 2:21-
cv-2148-MSN-tmp, another case Stinson had filed, because the cases were almost identical.
Stinson II, No. 2:21-cv-2128-MSN-tmp, ECF No. 4 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 18, 2021).
4 Stinson proceeded in forma pauperis in each of these cases. See Stinson I, No. 2:19-cv-2867-
MSN-tmp, ECF No. 18 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 19, 2021); Stinson II, No. 2:21-cv-2128-MSN-tmp,
ECF No. 7 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 19, 2021); Stinson III, No. 2:22-cv-2694-SHM-tmp, ECF No. 7
(W.D. Tenn. Oct. 28, 2022); Stinson IV, No. 2:24-cv-02870-MSN-atc, ECF No. 8 (W.D. Tenn.
Dec. 12, 2024).
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Apr. 28, 2021) (same); Stinson III, No. 2:22-cv-2694-SHM-tmp, ECF No. 30 (W.D. Tenn. Apr.
4, 2023) (same); Stinson IV, No. 2:24-cv-02870-MSN-atc, ECF No. 1 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 5, 2024)
(same). Brooks and Griffin were the Assistant United States Attorneys assigned to the Criminal
Case. Though Dunavant and Stanton were not named in the earlier actions, they served as
United States Attorneys at the time of the alleged events and thus stand in privity with Brooks
and Griffin for purposes of this element of res judicata. See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v.
Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402–03 (1940) (“There is privity between officers of the same government
so that a judgment in a suit between a party and a representative of the United States is res
judicata in relitigation of the same issue between that party and another officer of the
government.”).
The third and fourth elements are satisfied because the previous cases involved the same
issues and factual allegations as those raised in this case. In determining whether an identity of
causes of action exists, courts in the Sixth Circuit evaluate whether “the claims arose out of the
same transaction or series of transactions, or if the claims arose out of the same core of operative
facts.” Id. at 383 (quoting Winget v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 537 F.3d 565, 580 (6th Cir. 2008)).
This element is also satisfied if there is an affinity between “the facts creating the right of action
and . . . the evidence necessary to sustain each action,” with “the evidentiary component looking
to whether the same underlying factual evidence could support and establish both claims.” Id. at
383–84 (internal citations and quotations omitted). “[T]he critical consideration is operative
‘factual overlap’ between the claims.” Id. at 384 (citing Heike v. Cent. Mich. Univ. Bd. of Trs.,
573 F. App’x 476, 483 (6th Cir. 2014)).
Here, all of the claims in the instant case arose from the same core of operative facts as
and were, or could have been, asserted in the prior cases. In Stinson I, II, and III, Stinson alleged
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improper conduct by Griffin and Brooks, among other defendants, in and related to the Criminal
Case, see No. 2:19-cv-2867-MSN-tmp, ECF No. 1; No. 2:21-cv-2128-MSN-tmp, ECF No. 8;
No. 2:22-cv-2694-SHM-tmp, ECF No. 30, and, in Stinson IV, specifically alleged a conspiracy
by Griffin and Brooks, among others, to steal his idea for VIP Concession, see No. 2:24-cv-
02870-MSN-atc, ECF No. 1. Those cases thus share identity with this cause of action, and all
issues raised in this case were or should have been raised in those cases.
Because each element of res judicata is satisfied, it is recommended that all claims
against Defendants be dismissed.
D. 	Motion to Amend
In his Motion to Amend, Stinson seeks to add claims against Comspark (ECF No. 28, at
2–3), and to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida (Id. at 5). “[M]otions for leave to amend are reviewed under the deferential standard of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, and the Court ‘should freely give leave when justice so
requires.’” Porter v. AAR Aircraft Servs., Inc., 316 F.R.D. 691, 692 (W.D. Tenn. 2016) (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2)). An exception to this forgiving standard is when a proposed
amendment is futile. Id. (citing Pedreira v. Ky. Baptist Homes for Child., Inc., 579 F.3d 722,
729 (6th Cir. 2009)); see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, (1962). “A proposed
amendment is futile if the amendment could not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”
Berry v. Regions Fin. Corp., 507 F. Supp. 3d 972, 977 (W.D. Tenn. 2020), appeal dismissed, No.
21-5038, 2021 WL 1511687 (6th Cir. Jan. 29, 2021) (quoting Riverview Health Inst. LLC v.
Med. Mut. of Ohio, 601 F.3d 505, 512 (6th Cir. 2010)). Denial of a motion to amend also “is
appropriate where there is ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant,
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing
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party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc.’” Joy v.
Burchyett, No. 1:21-cv-01190-STA-jay, 2022 WL 16787846, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 8, 2022)
(quoting Benzon v. Morgan Stanley Distribs., Inc., 420 F.3d 598, 613 (6th Cir. 2005)).
First, as a threshold matter, Stinson’s Motion to Amend is deficient because the proposed
amended complaint is not attached to the Motion as an exhibit. See Local Rule 15.1(a) (“A
motion to amend or supplement a pleading must include as an appended exhibit the signed
proposed amended or supplemental pleading.”). Even if Stinson remedied this deficiency,
however, his Motion should still be denied.
Here, the amendment Stinson seeks is futile because the applicable statutes of limitation
for each of his proposed new claims have long expired. “[T]he Sixth Circuit does not allow
plaintiffs to add new defendants to a complaint after the statute of limitations has run.” Wilson,
2023 WL 6466383, at *4 n.3 (citing Smith v. City of Akron, 476 F. App’x 67, 69 (6th Cir. 2012)).
Stinson intends to assert claims of breach of contract, negligence, and professional malpractice
against Comspark. (ECF No. 28, at 5.) In Tennessee, the statute of limitations for breach-of-
contract claims is six years. Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-109(a). Tennessee’s statute of limitations
for tort claims, including negligence, is one year. Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104. For claims of
professional misconduct, Tennessee also generally applies a one-year statute of limitations from
the date the cause of action accrues. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(c)(1) (“Actions against
licensed public accountants, certified public accountants, or attorneys for malpractice shall be
commenced within one (1) year after the case of action accrued, whether the action or suit is
grounded or based in contract or tort.”); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-116(a) (“The statute of
limitations in health care liability actions shall be one (1) year as set forth in § 28-3-104.”).
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As to when the claims accrued, the “‘discovery rule’ determines the accrual of ‘tort
actions’ in Tennessee, including actions ‘predicated on negligence, strict liability or
misrepresentation.’” Alsbrook v. Concorde Career Colls., Inc., 469 F. Supp. 3d 805, 830 (W.D.
Tenn. 2020) (quoting Potts v. Celotex Corp., 796 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Tenn. 1990)). Thus, a tort
action accrues—and the statute of limitations begins to run—when the injury is discovered,
occurs, or reasonably should have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable care and
diligence. Id. at 831. The discovery rule also applies, though perhaps more narrowly, in breach-
of-contract actions. Although the Tennessee Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the issue
directly, the Tennessee Court of Appeals and this Court have recognized that the discovery rule
may toll the statute of limitations for breach of contract claims only where the breach is
“inherently undiscoverable.” See McClanahan v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 660 F. Supp. 3d 728,
740 (W.D. Tenn. 2023), reconsideration denied, No. 1:22-cv-01031-STA-jay, 2023 WL
3587556 (W.D. Tenn. May 22, 2023); Goot v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., No.
M2003-02013-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 3031638, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2005) (holding
that the discovery rule applies where the breach of contract is inherently undiscoverable); see
also Individual Healthcare Specialists, Inc. v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn., Inc., 566 S.W.3d
671, 715 (Tenn. 2019) (“Therefore, even if we were to adopt the Goot ‘inherently
undiscoverable’ rule in breach-of-contract cases, these facts do not meet that standard.”). “The
inherently undiscoverable requirement is met when the injured party is unlikely to discover the
wrong during the limitations period despite due diligence. To be inherently undiscoverable, the
wrong and injury must be unknown to the plaintiff because of their very nature and not because
of any fault of the plaintiff.” McClanahan, 660 F. Supp. 3d at 741 (quoting Goot, 2005 WL
3031638, at *11 n.31 (citation omitted)).
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Based on the facts alleged by Stinson, all of his purported claims against Comspark
accrued more than six years prior to his initiating this litigation. Stinson alleges that he entered
into a contractual agreement with Comspark in or about November 2011 to prepare and file the
Patent Application, that he paid Comspark for its services, and that Comspark failed to properly
perform. (ECF No. 28, at 2‒3.) Though he does not specify the time of Comspark’s alleged
breach or injury, he elsewhere alleges that he “was working on” the Patent Application until June
2016. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 4.) He now asserts that he only “discovered the direct involvement and
contractual obligation of Comspark International, Inc. through recent discovery efforts,
specifically the copy of the application, that is incomplete from the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office.” (ECF No. 28, at 3–4.) Stinson fails to explain, however, why he could not have
obtained a copy of the Patent Application sooner or otherwise why an exercise of reasonable
diligence would not have uncovered Comspark’s alleged wrongdoing. Indeed, Stinson has been
involved in numerous lawsuits involving the Patent Application for many years, see, e.g., Stinson
v. Fowlkes, No. 2:24-cv-2870-MSN-atc, ECF No. 1, at 10 (W.D. Tenn. 2024), and thus his
failure to obtain a copy of the Patent Application until now is inexplicable. Stinson’s attempt to
add Comspark at this stage appears to be an effort to repackage claims that have been dismissed
in his prior lawsuits, which does not justify tolling of the applicable limitation periods.
Accordingly, Stinson’s Motion to Amend to add Comspark as an additional defendant should be
denied.
Stinson also seeks to transfer this action back to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida—the very district from which it was previously transferred to this
Court. (ECF No. 28.) A civil action must be brought in (1) “a judicial district in which any
defendant resides, if all the defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located,”
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(2) in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the
claim occurred,” or, (3) if neither of the first two apply, in any “judicial district in which any
defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
The Southern District of Florida has already determined that venue correctly lies in this
Court. As the Southern District of Florida explained, “three Defendants reside in Memphis,
Tennessee, one Defendant resides in the District of Columbia, and all the alleged events took
place in Memphis, Tennessee.” (ECF No. 6, at 2.) Accordingly, the prior transfer to this Court
was proper. Even if Comspark were added as a defendant, the analysis would not change
because Comspark is a Tennessee corporation. Stinson’s Motion appears to be no more than an
attempt to return to a forum where he is subject to filing restrictions and to circumvent those
limitations by seeking a transfer through this Court rather than initiating a new action. Stinson’s
litigation history, including his repeated filings across multiple jurisdictions, suggests that this
motion is not grounded in considerations of convenience or justice but in an effort to evade filing
restrictions imposed by the Southern District of Florida. The Court will not facilitate such forum
shopping or attempts to circumvent another court’s orders. Accordingly, Stinson’s request to
transfer this action to the Southern District of Florida should also be denied.
III. 	Recommendation
For the reasons set forth above, it is recommended that Stinson’s Complaint be dismissed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim for which relief may be
granted and that his Motion to Amend be denied.
ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS
In light of the recommendation above, Stinson’s Motion to Opt Out of Mediation (ECF
No. 12) and Motion for Status of Service (ECF No. 27) are DENIED without prejudice as moot.
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If necessary, Stinson may renew these Motions after the resolution of the Report and
Recommendation by Judge Lipman.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that this case be dismissed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim for which relief may be
granted and that Stinson’s Motion to Amend (ECF No. 28) be denied. Stinson’s Motion to Opt
Out of Mediation (ECF No. 12) and Motion for Status of Service (ECF No. 27) are DENIED
without prejudice.
SO ORDERED this 2nd day of December, 2025.
s/Annie T. Christoff
ANNIE T. CHRISTOFF
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 2:25-cv-02292-BCL-atc Document 30 Filed 12/02/25 Page 14 of 14
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