Abdel-Khalik v. Pfifer et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
MOHAMED MAHMOUD ABDEL-
KHALIK,
Petitioner,
)
)
)
)
No. 2:26-cv-03058-TLP-cgc
v. 	)
)
)
)
)
CHRISTOPHER BULLOCK,
Respondent.
ORDER GRANTING PETITON FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner Mohamad Mahmoud Abdel-Khalik, a noncitizen detained by Immigrations and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), petitions for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(ECF No. 1.) The Court ordered Respondent to show cause why the Writ should not be granted.
(ECF No. 6.) Respondent responded and Petitioner replied. (ECF Nos. 9, 10.) For the reasons
below, the Court GRANTS the Petition and ORDERS Petitioner’s immediate release.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a Palestinian1 national who entered the United States as a B2 visitor from the
United Arab Emirates in 1988. (ECF No. 9-1 at PageID 60.) Petitioner has lived in the United
States ever since. (Id.) Petitioner was granted Lawful Permanent Resident (“LPR”) status in
1997 but was convicted of passport fraud in 2005. (Id.) In 2007, an immigration judge ordered
Petitioner removed from the United States. (ECF No. 9-2 at PageID 63.) Immigration and
1 Respondent mistakenly states that Petitioner is a citizen of the United Arab Emirates. (ECF
No. 9 at PageID 51.) Although Petitioner was born in that country, his birth certificate lists him
as a Palestinian national. (See ECF No. 1-3 at PageID 24.)
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Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) then placed him on an Order of Supervision (“OSUP”) “pending
[his] removal from the United States.” (ECF No. 1-5 at PageID 28.) After placing him on an
OSUP, ICE gave Petitioner a list of conditions that he needed to follow and notified him that his
failure to follow any of the conditions “may result in a fine, more restrictive release conditions,
return to detention, criminal prosecution, and/or revocation of [his] employment authorization
document.” (ECF No. 1-6 at PageID 31–32.) One of those conditions was that he “not commit
any crimes or be associated with any criminal activity while on [the OSUP].” (ECF No. 1-6 at
PageID 31.) ICE also gave Petitioner a Release Notification, which stated that he would be
given “an opportunity to prepare for an orderly departure” once Petitioner secured his travel
documents. (ECF No. 1-5 at PageID 28.) Petitioner remained on an order of supervision for
nearly twenty years until ICE took him into custody in August 2026.
On August 13, 2026, ICE detained Petitioner after he showed up for his required check-in
at the agency’s Nashville office. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 6; ECF No. 9 at PageID 51.) Petitioner
claims that he “was informed that he was being taken into custody by ICE for an unspecified
violation of the Order of Supervision.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 6.) Petitioner also asserts that he
did not violate “the terms of his Order of Supervision” and that ICE provided no information “at
his check-in that any particular violation had occurred.” (Id. at PageID 4.)
But Respondents attached Petitioner’s Notice of Revocation of Release as an exhibit to
the response. (ECF No. 9-3 at PageID 64.) The form states that Petitioner’s OSUP is revoked
under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l) for violating the conditions of his release. (Id.) 	In particular, the form
lists Petitioner’s “arrest and conviction after placement on OSUP for assault, violation of
probation, theft, false reports and trespass” as the violations. (Id.) At the status conference,
Respondent’s counsel explained that Petitioner’s most recent convictions were from 2013 for
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theft and false reports. Paul Gray, the Assistant Field Office Director, signed the Notice of
Revocation. (Id. at PageID 65.)
ICE has detained Petitioner since August 13. Petitioner filed his Petition while ICE
detained him at the West Tennessee Detention Facility in Mason, Tennessee. (ECF No. 10 at
PageID 70.) ICE then moved Petitioner to the River Correctional Center in Ferriday Louisiana
where the agency is now detaining him. (Id. at PageID 71.)
Petitioner alleges that ICE did not follow its own regulations in deciding to revoke
Petitioner’s supervision. Petitioner asserts that Mr. Gray, as Assistant Field Office Director,
lacked authority to revoke Petitioner’s OSUP under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l). (ECF No. 1 at PageID
17.) Petitioner also asserts that ICE “violated agency instructions” by not allowing him to
prepare for an orderly departure included in his Release Notification. (Id.) Because of these
violations, Petitioner urges the Court to set aside Respondent’s revocation of Petitioner’s OSUP
under the Accardi doctrine and order his immediate release. (Id. at PageID 17–18.)2
Respondent does not respond to Petitioner’s argument that Mr. Gray did not have the
authority to revoke Petitioner’s OSUP. Respondent instead argues that the Court should deny
the Petition because Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. (ECF No. 9 at
PageID 52–53.) Respondent also argues that Petitioner’s detention is presumptively reasonable
under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 because Petitioner has been detained for less than six months, and that
ICE properly revoked Petitioner’s OSUP because he violated the terms of his supervision. (Id. at
PageID 54–55.) The Court, however, finds these arguments unpersuasive.
2 Petitioner also challenges Respondent’s revocation of his OSUP on due process grounds and
under the APA. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 10–17.) Because the Court finds that Respondent’s
revocation of Petitioner’s OSUP violates the Accardi doctrine, and this Accardi violation
constituted a due process violation, the Court will not address Petitioner’s other arguments.
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As explained below, the Court finds that Mr. Gray lacked authority to revoke Petitioner’s
OSUP and that this action falls under the Accardi doctrine. The Court also finds that Mr. Gray’s
revocation of Petitioner’s OSUP violated due process. Petitioner is accordingly entitled to
immediate release from ICE custody. And because the Court finds that Mr. Gray could not
revoke Petitioner’s OSUP, the Court will not address Petitioner’s argument that Respondent’s
did not permit Petitioner to prepare for an orderly departure.
ANALYSIS
As a preliminary matter, the Court rejects Respondent’s argument that Petitioner needs to
exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking federal court intervention. Respondent
argues that Petitioner can seek a bond determination from an immigration judge. (ECF No. 9 at
PageID 52–53.) But this argument would be correct only if ICE was detaining Petitioner under 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a). (Id.) “Section 1226 provides that ‘an alien may be arrested and detained
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” Johnson v.
Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 533 (2021) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226). But noncitizens who have
spent significant time within the interior of the United States are entitled to a bond hearing
during removal proceedings under statute. Lopez-Campos v. Raycroft, 175 F.4th 713, 734 (6th
Cir. 2026). Respondent, however, correctly points out that ICE is detaining Petitioner under 8
U.S.C. § 1231. And noncitizens detained under § 1231 have no right to a bond hearing under
federal law or regulations. Martinez v. Larose, 968 F.3d 555, 565 (6th Cir. 2020). Petitioner
thus has no administrative remedies to exhaust. Having addressed exhaustion, the Court turns
next to the merits of the case.
Under the Accardi doctrine, courts may set aside an agency action that violates agency
regulations “with the force and effect of law.” See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy,
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347 U.S. 260, 265–67 (1954). The purpose of the Accardi doctrine is “to prevent the
arbitrariness which is inherently characteristic of an agency’s violation of its own procedures.”
Hollingsworth v. Balcom, 441 F.2d 419, 422 (6th Cir. 1971). A Court can thus set aside agency
action when the agency fails to follow an agency regulation. Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378
F.3d 541, 545 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Sameena, Inc. v. U.S. Air Force, 147 F.3d 1148, 1153
(9th Cir. 1998) (“Where a prescribed procedure is intended to protect the interests of a party
before the agency, even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that
procedure must be scrupulously observed.”) And here, Respondent violated the Accardi doctrine
by failing to comply with 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l).
ICE has broad discretion to revoke a noncitizen’s OSUP under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l).
Under the regulation, ICE may revoke an OSUP “in the exercise of discretion” when the
revoking official finds one of these conditions are met:
(i) The purposes of release have been served;
(ii) The [noncitizen] violates any condition of release;
(iii) It is appropriate to enforce a removal order or to commence removal proceedings
against [a noncitizen]; or
(iv) The conduct of the [noncitizen], or any other circumstance would indicate that
release would no longer be appropriate.
Id. § 241.4(l)(2). But this discretion is not unbounded. Not every ICE employee has the
regulatory authority to revoke an OSUP. And ICE must follow certain procedures when
revoking a noncitizen’s OSUP. For example, upon revocation, ICE must notify the noncitizen
“the reasons for revocation of his or her release.” Id. § 241.4(l)(1). ICE also must afford the
noncitizen “an informal interview promptly after his or her return to [ICE] custody to afford the
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[noncitizen] an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification.”3
Id.
But even more importantly here, the regulation gives only two officials the authority to
revoke an OSUP: the Executive Associate Director of ICE and the District Director. Id. §
241.4(l)(2). If the district director exercises their discretion to revoke an OSUP, they must find
that “revocation is in the public interest and circumstances do not reasonably permit referral of
the case to the Executive Associate [Director].”4 Id. ICE thus violates this regulation when an
official other than these two executives revokes a noncitizen’s OSUP, and many district courts
3 Petitioner alleges that ICE did not conduct an interview under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1). (ECF No.
10 at PageID 76.) Respondent’s counsel, however, stated at the status conference that Petitioner
did not receive an interview because he did not cooperate with the interview process. The Court
will not resolve this factual dispute because it finds that Mr. Gray did not have the authority to
revoke Petitioner’s OSUP. That said, the Court has serious concerns that ICE failed to hold an
informal interview and failed to follow other required procedures at the time it revoked his
OSUP. For example, the informal interview form contains a section for the Deportation Officer
to write down the noncitizen’s “oral response regarding the reasons for revocation.” (ECF No.
9-3 at PageID 66.) But here the Deportation Officer left that space blank. (Id.) And a
Deportation Officer (possibly the same one) stamped “REFUSED TO SIGN” on Petitioner’s
Notice of Rights and Request for Disposition. (ECF 9-4 at PageID 67.) But the section for ICE
to certify service contains only a scribbled signature and denotes that the notice was read to the
Petitioner in Arabic. (Id.) The Officer did not fill in the spaces to print his name, the name of
the interpreter, or the date and time of service. (Id.) And as stated above, the official who
revoked Petitioner’s supervision had no authority to do so. Considering that ICE supervised
Petitioner for over a decade after his most recent conviction with regular encounters and no
issues, the circumstances here point to ICE’s fly-by-night adherence to its own procedures. The
Court therefore suspects that ICE violated Petitioner’s due process rights in more ways than one.
4 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 also lists the Executive Associate Commissioner. But 8 C.F.R. § 1.2 defines
“Commissioner” as the Director of ICE. Section 241.4 refers therefore to the Executive
Associate Director of ICE. Section 1.2 also defines “district director” as, “to the extent that
authority has been delegated from such official: asylum office director, field operations; district
director for services; field office director; service center director; or special agent in charge.” §
1.2. The term also means “such other official, including an official in an acting capacity within
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or other component of the Department of Homeland
Security who is delegated the function or authority above for a particular district, region, or
area.” Id.
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have found that the Accardi doctrine applies when the revoking official is an Assistant Field
Office Director. See, e.g., Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer, 781 F. Supp. 3d. 137, 161–62 (W.D.N.Y.
2025); Mbonga v. Raycraft, 809 F. Supp. 3d 762, 766 – 67 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 7, 2025); Hammond
v. Dep’t Homeland Sec., No. 4:25-cv-2696, 2026 WL 91465, at *4–5 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 13, 2026.);
Santamaria Orellana v. Baker, No. 25-1788-TDC, 2025 WL 2841886, at *5–6 (D. Md. Oct. 7,
2025). The Court agrees with the reasoning in these cases.
Mr. Gray, an Assistant Field Director of ICE, revoked Petitioner’s OSUP. (ECF No. 9-3
at PageID 65.) And nothing in the record suggests that ICE delegated the authority to Mr. Gray
to take that action. Mr. Gray thus lacked the authority to revoke Petitioner’s OSUP and that
action constituted an Accardi violation. And even if ICE had delegated the authority to Mr. Gray
to revoke Petitioner’s OSUP, Petitioner rightly points out that revocation would still be defective
because Mr. Gray never stated that Petitioner’s revocation was in the public interest or that the
circumstances did not reasonably permit referral to the Assistant Field Office Director.
Now that the Court has found that ICE violated its own regulations under the Accardi
doctrine, it must determine the appropriate remedy. In making this determination, the Court
agrees with the reasoning provided by Judge Chuang in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Maryland:
While it is correct that not every technical failure to comply with policies or
procedures violates the Constitution, the requirement that an Executive Associate
Director make the determination to revoke release – that is, to restrict a person’s
liberty – is not merely a housekeeping requirement. A statutory or regulatory
provision affecting personal rights be made by a designated senior official is fairly
deemed to be an important procedural safeguard. . . . [T]he requirement that only
an ICE Executive Associate Director make a determination to revoke release in the
ordinary course ensures that an individual’s right to liberty is not restricted without
consideration by a senior ICE official exercising more mature judgment and thus is
fairly deemed to be part of a procedural framework, designed to insure the fair
processing of an action affecting an individual, a violation of which can be deemed
to be prejudicial and thus implicate due process.
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Santamaria Orellana, 2025 WL 2841886, at * 5–6 (citation modified). And other federal
courts have found that “failure to adhere to the requirement that an Executive Associate
Director or Field Office Director make the determination to revoke release in compliance
with 8 C.F.R. 241.4 violates due process and thus mandates release.” Tanashyan v. Mullin,
No. 5:26-cv-04455-SP, 2026 WL 2538250, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2026) (quoting
M.P.P.P. v. Santacruz, No. 2:26-cv-05246-RAO, 2026 WL 1601908, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June
1, 2026) (collecting cases). 	The Court finds that Respondent violated Petitioner’s due
process rights here and that immediate release is the appropriate remedy.
CONCLUSION
The Court therefore GRANTS the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and ORDERS
Petitioner’s immediate release from custody. The Court further ORDERS Respondent to
confirm Petitioner’s release or before the close of business on October 13, 2026.
SO ORDERED, this 10th day of October, 2026.
s/Thomas L. Parker
THOMAS L. PARKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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