Lawton v. Commissioner Of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
GEORGETTE DEANN LAWTON,
Plaintiff,
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v. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-cv-4404
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending 	before 	the 	Court1 	is 	Defendant 	Frank 	Bisignano’s2
(“Commissioner”) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 59(e). (ECF No. 15). Based on a review of the
motion, arguments, and relevant law, the Court DENIES Commissioner’s
Motion (id.).
I. 	Background
Plaintiff filed a claim for disability insurance benefits on November 21,
2023, alleging disability starting on August 14, 2017. 	(ECF No. 5-3 at 15).
1 The parties consented to proceed before a Magistrate Judge for all proceedings under
28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (ECF No. 12).
2 Frank Bisignano was sworn in as the Commissioner of Social Security on May 7,
2025. Bisignano is “automatically substituted” as the defendant in this suit. FED. R. CIV. P.
25(d); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any action instituted in accordance with this subsection
shall survive notwithstanding any change in the person occupying the office of Commissioner
of Social Security or any vacancy in such office.”).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
October 15, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Plaintiff’s claims were initially denied by the Social Security Administration
on February 13, 2024, and again on reconsideration on June 3, 2024. (Id.). On
June 18, 2024, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge. 	(Id.). 	On November 6, 2024, Administrative Law Judge Laura Bach
(the “ALJ”) held a telephonic hearing. (Id.). On April 4, 2025, the ALJ issued
a decision, finding Plaintiff not disabled at Step Five. (Id. at 28–29). Plaintiff
appealed to the Appeals Council and the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s
request for review on July 22, 2025. 	(Id. at 2). 	Plaintiff filed suit against
Commissioner seeking review of the denial of benefits under Title II of the
Social Security Act. 	(ECF Nos. 1, 6). 	The Parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment (ECF Nos. 6, 10).
On August 27, 2026, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 6) and denied Commissioner’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 10). (ECF No. 13). In its Memorandum Opinion, the Court
found that the twelve-month continuous-use standard the ALJ applied to
assess Plaintiff’s need for an assistive device was not supported by the Social
Security Administration rulings. (Id. at 7–9). The Court noted that the ruling
regarding the necessity of a hand-held assistive device, SSR 96-9P, asks
whether there is medical documentation establishing the need for such an
assistive 	device 	and 	describing 	the 	circumstances 	requiring 	the 	device;
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however, the Court noted that the ruling contains no durational requirement.
(Id. at 7–8). 	Separately, the Court found that another ruling, SSR 23-1P,
encompassing 	a 	“duration 	requirement,” 	focuses 	on 	whether 	a 	medically
determinable impairment has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of at least 12 months. (Id. at 8–9 (emphasis in original)). In short, the
Court reasoned that the duration requirement does not ask whether a specific
accommodation for an impairment is continuous for twelve months in the
record. 	(Id. 	at 	9). 	The 	Court 	further 	found 	that 	the 	record 	contained
documentation of Plaintiff’s use of a walker in 2019 and during her surgical
recovery; therefore, because the ALJ did not fully account for an assistive
device in the RFC, the Court concluded that the ALJ’s decision was not
supported by substantial evidence and was prejudicial error. 	(Id. at 10–13).
Accordingly, the Court vacated the Commissioner’s decision, remanded the
matter to the Commissioner for further proceedings, and entered a final
judgment. (Id. at 15; ECF No. 14).
On September 22, 2026, Commissioner timely moved to amend the
Opinion pursuant to Rule 59(e), requesting that the Court correct a purported
misstatement 	of 	law—specifically 	“requesting 	that 	the 	Court 	amend 	its
Opinion as to the broad proclamation that SSR 23-1p does not have any
bearing on the RFC analysis, but rather, is limited to Step Two findings.” (ECF
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No. 15 at 2). Commissioner contends that not only are impairments subject to
the duration requirement, but also the limitations stemming from those
impairments. (Id. at 3). However, the Commissioner concedes that he “is not
asking the Court to change its ultimate decision reversing and remanding the
matter, as he is not seeking reconsideration of the Court’s ruling that the ALJ
did not fully consider and account for an assistive device in the residual
functional capacity (RFC).” (Id. at 1, 2).
Plaintiff has not responded, and the time for doing so has passed. 	The
motion is therefore ripe for decision.
II. 	Legal Standard
Motions for reconsideration under Rule 59 serve a “narrow purpose of
allowing a party to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly
discovered evidence.” 	Waltman v. Int’l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir.
1989) (internal quotations omitted). 	Thus, a court may grant a motion for
reconsideration 	and alter 	or 	amend 	a judgment 	to “(1) 	accommodate an
intervening 	change 	in 	controlling 	law; 	(2) 	account 	for 	newly 	discovered
evidence; or (3) correct a manifest error of law or fact.” 	Trevino v. City of Ft.
Wor., 944 F.3d 567, 570 (5th Cir. 2019). 	“A Rule 59(e) motion must ‘clearly
establish’ one of these categories to obtain relief.” Callis v. Lumpkin, No. 6:20-
cv-060, 2022 WL 112030, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2022) (quoting Lamb v.
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Ashford 	Place 	Apartments 	L.L.C., 	914 	F.3d 	940, 	943 	(5th 	Cir. 	2019)).
Importantly, a motion for reconsideration “cannot be used to raise arguments
which could, and should, have been made before the judgment issued.” Simon
v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990). Nor should it be used to
introduce evidence that was available prior to the entry of judgment or to
relitigate old issues, advance new theories, or secure a rehearing on the merits.
Richard v. Davis, No. 17-cv-1811, 2017 WL 6761825, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 27,
2017) (citing Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 478–79 (5th Cir. 2004)).
III. 	Discussion
Here, Commissioner does not show an intervening change in law, the
emergence of new evidence, or a manifest error of law or fact. 	Instead,
Commissioner merely requests an amendment of the Opinion to clarify the
relationship between SSR 23-1P and the RFC analysis. 	However, as the
Commissioner 	concedes, 	SSR 	23-1P’s 	durational 	requirement 	goes 	to 	a
claimant’s impairments and limitations. 	(ECF No. 15 at 3). 	This does not
contradict 	the 	Court’s 	Opinion, 	which 	found: 	“[SSR 	23-1P’s] 	‘duration
requirement’ focuses on whether a medically determinable impairment ‘has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months.’
. . . The duration requirement does not ask whether a specific accommodation
[(like an assistive device)] for that impairment is continuous for twelve months
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in the record.” 	(ECF No. 13 at 8–9 (emphasis in original)). 	To be sure, the
Court distinguished an impairment, like Plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease
and osteoarthritis that are subject to the durational requirement, from a
specific 	accommodation 	for 	that 	impairment, 	like 	Plaintiff’s 	documented
walker that is not the focus of the durational requirement. (ECF No. 13 at 7–
9). 	The Code of Federal Regulations also describes the RFC assessment in
terms of evaluating impairments and limitations that relate to a claimant’s
physical abilities, but it does not point to accommodations or assistive devices
in similar terms. Section § 404.1545(a)–(b) states:
(a) General —
(1) 	Residual 	functional 	capacity 	assessment. 	Your
impairment(s), and any related symptoms, such as pain, may
cause physical . . . limitations that affect what you can do in a
work setting. 	Your residual functional capacity is the most you
can still do despite your limitations. We will assess your residual
functional capacity based on all the relevant evidence in your case
record.
. . . .
(3) Evidence we use to assess your residual functional capacity. . .
. We will also consider descriptions and observations of your
limitations from your impairment(s), including limitations
that result from your symptoms, such as pain . . . .
. . . .
(b) Physical abilities. When we assess your physical abilities, we first
assess the nature and extent of your physical limitations and then
determine 	your 	residual 	functional 	capacity 	for 	work 	activity 	on 	a
regular and continuing basis. 	A limited ability to perform certain
physical 	demands 	of 	work 	activity, 	such 	as 	sitting, 	standing,
walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling, or other physical functions
(including 	manipulative 	or 	postural 	functions, 	such 	as 	reaching,
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handling, stooping or crouching), may reduce your ability to do past work
and other work.
(emphasis added).
Commissioner 	also 	interprets 	the 	Opinion 	as 	positing 	a 	“broad
proclamation that SSR 23-1p . . . is limited to Step Two findings.” (ECF No. 15
at 2). 	Not so. 	Commissioner is incorrect that the Court stated a broad
proclamation that SSR 23-1p is limited to Step Two; the Court reasoned that
SSR 23-1P’s duration requirement is built into the Step Two finding because
at that step, “the ALJ determines whether any of the claimant’s impairments
or any combination thereof is severe and has lasted or is expected to last a
continuous period of at least twelve months.” 	(See ECF No. 13 at 9; Kevin C.
v. King, No. 24-cv-353, 2025 WL 746144, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 2025), report
and recommendation adopted sub nom. Kevin C. v. Dudek, No. 24-cv-353, 2025
WL 744481 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2025) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) and
20 C.F.R. § 404.1509)).
The Court concluded that the ALJ’s decision was thus not supported by
substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to fully consider the documented
use of a walker in the record and account for it into the RFC. 	(ECF No. 13 at
10). 	What’s more, Commissioner submits that he “is not requesting that the
Court amend its order to find in favor of the Commissioner.” 	(ECF No. 15 at
1).
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A district court has “considerable discretion” to grant or deny a motion
under Rule 59(e). 	See Edward H. Bohlin Co. v. Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 355
(5th Cir. 1993). However, the Fifth Circuit has cautioned that reconsideration
under Rule 59(e) is an extraordinary remedy that courts should use sparingly.
See Templet, 367 F.3d at 479. Commissioner has not identified an intervening
change in controlling law, the availability of new evidence not previously
available, a manifest error of law or fact in relation to the dismissal of this
case, 	or 	any 	other 	extraordinary 	circumstances 	justifying 	alteration 	or
amendment 	of 	the 	judgment 	of 	dismissal. 	As 	such, 	the 	Court 	finds
Commissioner has not shown that the extraordinary relief provided by Rule
59(e) is justified in this case. 	See Townsel v. White, No. 1:20-cv-18, 2020 WL
3669937, at *1 (N.D. Miss. July 6, 2020) (“[C]onstruing the Plaintiff’s filing
liberally, he appears to argue that the Court made a manifest error in fact . . .
. 	However, the Plaintiff has provided nothing to support his contention and
appears to simply be dissatisfied with the Court’s ruling. 	In other words, the
Plaintiff has provided the Court nothing new to consider, and the Court
therefore finds that its initial ruling should remain unchanged.”).
IV. 	Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Commissioner’s Motion to
Alter or Amend Judgment. (ECF No. 15).
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It is SO ORDERED.
SIGNED in Houston, Texas on October 15, 2026.
______________________________
Richard W. Bennett
United States Magistrate Judge
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