Church v. Grajeda et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION
WILLIE CHURCH, TDCJ #02202661, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. §
§ Case No. 5:24-CV-01388-JKP
EMMANUEL GRAJEDA, C.O., ET AL., §
§
Defendants. §
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 31) filed by Defendant
Emmanuel Grajeda. Plaintiff Willie Church filed a response (ECF No. 37), and Grajeda filed a
reply (ECF No. 40). After due consideration of the briefing, the record evidence, and the applicable
law, the Court GRANTS the motion.
I. BACKGROUND1
This is a civil rights excessive force case filed by a pro se prisoner. ECF No. 1. The action
arises out of events occurring while Plaintiff Willie Church was confined at the John B. Connally
Unit in Kenedy, Texas,2 and Defendant Emmanuel Grajeda worked as a correctional officer
assigned to the building housing Church’s cell. Id. at 3–5. Church’s cell was located within an area
of the prison designated as “close custody” security level, which is reserved for inmates determined
to be dangerous by prison officials. ECF No. 31-4 (Ex. 3) at 3; ECF No. 31-5 (Ex. 4) at 2. Close
custody inmates are subjected to heightened security measures. ECF No. 31-4 (Ex. 3) at 3. They
1 The factual background is uncontested unless otherwise noted. The Court considers disputed facts in the light most
favorable to the non-movant as required through the summary judgment process.
2 Records from the TDCJ show that Church is currently confined in the Cotulla Unit based on convictions for
aggravated robbery, burglary of a habitation, and robbery out of Nueces County. See TDCJ Inmate Search - Inmate
Details (last visited Oct. 2, 2026).
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are confined to their cells for 23 hours per day and are not permitted to voluntarily leave or remove
any part of their body from their cells at any time. Id. While assigned to the close-custody area,
Grajeda was responsible for maintaining security, feeding inmates, conducting inmate counts, and
responding to emergencies. Id.
On January 23, 2023, Grajeda left the cell block containing Church’s cell to respond to an
emergency in a different area of the prison. ECF No. 31-5 (Ex. 4) at 2. While Grajeda dealt with
the emergency, prisoners within Church’s cell block began engaging in prohibited behaviors such
as exchanging contraband on lines, lighting fires outside of cells, and “jacking” food tray slots.
ECF No. 31-4 (Ex. 3) at 3; ECF No. 31-5 (Ex. 4) at 2. The practice of “jacking” entails wedging
an object into the locking mechanism of a food tray slot—an opening built into a cell door to pass
food through—thereby preventing the slot from locking. ECF No. 31-4 (Ex. 3) at 3. With the lock
disengaged, inmates can push open the barrier covering the slot from inside their cell. Id.
The events underlying Church’s excessive force claim occurred once Grajeda returned to
the close-custody area. These events were captured by TDCJ video footage.3 See ECF No. 31-6
(Ex. 5). The video shows Grajeda walking down a set of stairs and through an entrance on the first
floor. Id. at 4:49. Church’s cell is immediately adjacent to the entrance. Id. When Grajeda enters,
there is a fire burning at the bottom of a cell door located diagonally opposite from Church’s cell
on the first floor, as well as a larger fire burning on the third floor. Id. Church’s food tray slot is
jacked open, and he has placed at least one arm through the slot so that his hand hangs outside of
his cell. Id. As Grajeda walks past Church’s cell, Church throws a liquid at Grajeda’s back. Id. at
4:49–:55. Grajeda assumed the liquid was Church’s bodily fluid, based on the common practice
of prisoners throwing bodily fluids at guards. ECF No. 31 at 6; ECF No. 31-5 (Ex. 4) at 2–3.
3 The video footage is not accompanied by audio.
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The video clearly depicts Grajeda’s reaction. Grajeda immediately turns to face Church,
walks to his cell, and then kicks the open tray slot closed. ECF No. 31-6 (Ex. 5) at 4:49–5:00.
Grajeda’s foot strikes the tray, and the tray in turn hits Church’s dangling hands before falling back
to the open position. Id. at 4:56–5:03. Church keeps his hands hanging through the open slot as
Grajeda walks away. Id.
After kicking Church’s tray slot, Grajeda walks out of the video frame. Id. He returns
carrying a water cooler. Id. at 5:02–:37. He uses water from the cooler to extinguish the fire burning
outside the first-floor cell, and then he walks back toward the entrance next to Church’s cell. Id. at
5:40–6:11. Church again throws a liquid at Grajeda. Id. Grajeda pauses and walks to Church’s cell.
Id. at 6:12–:21. He lifts the water cooler and swings it toward Church’s cell door, dumping water
onto Church’s dangling hands.4 Id. The cooler does not make contact with Church. Id. Church
grabs the cooler as Grajeda moves away from Church’s cell, and Grajeda yanks the cooler out of
Church’s grasp before exiting the cell block. Id. at 6:20–:26.
Four days before the incident between Church and Grajeda, Church was involved in an
unrelated use of force incident while confined in a different TDCJ unit. ECF No. 31 at 2–4. This
previous use of force incident involved Church reaching his hands through his food tray slot and
engaging in some sort of struggle with an officer. Id. Church sustained injuries from this previous
4 The parties dispute whether water touched Church. Church claims Grajeda dumped water “all over [him],” see ECF
No. 1 at 4, but Grajeda asserts the cooler was empty when he swung it at Church’s cell. ECF No. 31 at 11; ECF No.
40 at 4–5. Ultimately, the video footage contradicts Grajeda’s description of the cooler as empty; the video shows
that, after Grajeda slings the cooler at Church’s cell, a substance spreads across the floor and displaces items next to
Church’s cell. See ECF No. 31-6 (Ex. 5) at 6:20–:25. Thus, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Church, and in the light depicted on video, the Court assumes for the purposes of summary judgment that the cooler
was not empty and some amount of water touched Church. See Carnaby v. City of Houston, 636 F.3d 183, 187 (5th
Cir. 2011) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007) (holding that court should not rely on plaintiff’s description
of facts where record discredits such description but should instead consider “the facts in the light depicted by the
videotape”)); see also Waddleton v. Rodriguez, 750 F. App’x 248, 254 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (stating that “[t]his
court will not adopt facts that are clearly contradicted by the video”).
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incident, including swelling and abrasions to his left wrist and right hand, as well as a left forearm
deformity and abrasion. Id. at 3; ECF No. 31-2 (Ex. 1) at 7.
Following Grajeda’s use of force on January 23rd, Church had an appointment with a TDCJ
nurse to complete a medical screening for the unrelated use of force incident. ECF No. 31-2 (Ex.
1) at 9. During this appointment, Church complained of injuries to his right hand and left forearm.
Id. The TDCJ nurse observed “abrasions and edema” on Church’s right hand, as well as a left
forearm deformity with abrasions and swelling. Id.
Church filed an internal grievance against Grajeda, which triggered another medical
screening appointment. ECF No. 1 at 6; ECF No. 31-2 (Ex. 1) at 11. During this appointment,
Church complained about an injury to his right hand and claimed he was unable to fully open and
close his fist. ECF No. 31-2 (Ex. 1) at 11. According to the appointment note, the TDCJ nurse did
not observe any swelling, bruising, or deformity to his right hand. Id. The nurse also noted that
Church could close his fist without difficulty. Id.
During a follow-up appointment, Church complained about pain and swelling in his right
hand and told the TDCJ nurse he injured his hand on January 23, 2023, when he “got hit by a metal
tray slot in his hand.” Id. at 13. Medical staff observed swelling and tenderness in Church’s right
hand, as well as decreased flexion in his index finger. Id. An x-ray image showed swelling and an
“age indeterminate fracture” to the top of Church’s right ring finger. Id. at 15. TDCJ medical staff
provided Church with a splint. Id. at 14. By April of 2023, x-ray imagining showed no evidence
of a fracture or dislocation but did show “[s]clerosis . . . related to ongoing healing.” Id. at 23.
Church contends Grajeda engaged in excessive force twice on January 23, 2023: (1) when
he kicked Church’s open food tray slot; and (2) when he poured water on Church from the cooler.
ECF No. 1 at 3–4. Church alleges Grajeda’s uses of force caused him “pain [and] agony,”
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“emotional distress,” and the injuries to his right hand and left forearm documented in his medical
records. Id. at 4; ECF No. 37 at 4–6.
Grajeda moves for summary judgment, asserting that there are no genuine disputes of
material fact regarding excessive force and that he is entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 31.
Grajeda provides the following summary judgment evidence: (1) Church’s TDCJ medical records;
(2) a video depicting the unrelated use of force incident between Church and a non-party TDCJ
officer; (3) an affidavit from Assistant Warden Esmerejildo Moreno; (4) an affidavit from Grajeda;
(5) a video depicting the underlying use of force incident between Church and Grajeda; and (6) an
affidavit from TDCJ nurse Krystal Snider. ECF Nos. 31-2 to 31-7 (Exs. 1–6). After Grajeda filed
his motion, the Court issued an order instructing Church on his summary judgment burden and
directing him to file a response. ECF No. 32. Church filed his response, but he did not attach any
evidence to it. ECF No. 37.5 Grajeda replied. ECF No. 40. The motion is ripe for ruling.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT BURDEN
Summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows “there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also Rodriguez v. Pacificare, Inc., 980 F.2d
1014, 1019 (5th Cir. 1993). “A fact is material only if its resolution would affect the outcome of
the action.” Wiley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 585 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 2009). A genuine
dispute for trial exists if the record taken as a whole could lead a reasonable trier of fact to find for
the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986);
5 Church refers to various documents in his response, such as documents from a TDCJ internal investigation and prison
policies. See, e.g., ECF No. 37 at 2, 8. However, he does not attach any of these documents to his response as evidence.
The Court therefore cannot consider the documents in ruling on the present motion. See ECF No. 32 (order instructing
Church that he has the burden to bring forward evidence to create genuine issue of material fact and explaining that
conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, and speculation are insufficient).
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Bayle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 2010). Because there must be a genuine
dispute of material fact, “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties
will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion
and of identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute
of material fact or the appropriateness of judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at
323; Adams v. Travelers Indem. Co., 465 F.3d 156, 163 (5th Cir. 2006). To satisfy this burden, the
moving party must provide affidavits or identify any portion of the pleadings, discovery, or
admissions that demonstrate the absence of a triable dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp.,
477 U.S. at 323; Rodriguez, 980 F.2d at 1019. “If the moving party fails to meet this initial burden,
the motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant’s response.” Pioneer Expl., L.L.C. v.
Steadfast Ins. Co., 767 F.3d 503, 511 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted).
If the movant carries its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present
competent summary judgment evidence showing the existence of a genuine dispute of material
fact. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586–87; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Once the burden shifts,
“[u]nsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not
sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Brown v. City of Houston, Tex., 337 F.3d
539, 541 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996). The party
opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate
the precise manner in which this evidence raises a genuine dispute of material fact. Ragas v. Tenn.
Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537
(5th Cir. 1994)). Further, should the nonmoving party fail to address or respond to a fact raised by
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the moving party and supported by evidence, the court may consider the fact as undisputed and
such undisputed facts may form the basis for a summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).
In determining the merits of a motion for summary judgment, a court has no duty to search
the record for material fact issues or to find a party’s ill-cited evidence. Hernandez v. Yellow
Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 651 (5th Cir. 2012); Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458. In addition, a court may
not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence and must view all evidence and draw
all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc.,
402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
Factual allegations arising out of events captured on video are viewed “in the light depicted
by the videotape.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007). “When opposing parties tell two
different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury
could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion
for summary judgment.” Id. at 380. However, when qualified immunity is at issue, “to the extent
that any material fact dispute remains after viewing the facts in light of the available video
evidence, the court should deny summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity.” Bagley v.
Guillen, 90 F.4th 799, 800 (5th Cir. 2024).
III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DEFENSE
Generally, the affirmative defense of qualified immunity is an immunity from suit and
shields a government official for actions within their discretionary authority when their conduct
complies with clearly established statutory or constitutional law of which a reasonable person
would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Wallace v. Cnty. of Comal,
400 F.3d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 2005). “Once a government official establishes that his conduct was
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within the scope of his discretionary authority, it is up to the plaintiff to show that (1) the official
‘violated a statutory or constitutional right,’ and (2) the right was ‘clearly established at the time.’”
Sweetin v. City of Tex. City, 48 F.4th 387, 391–92 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Bevill v. Fletcher,
26 F.4th 270, 275 (5th Cir. 2022)). In this case, there is no question that the nature of Grajeda’s
conduct falls with the scope of his discretionary authority as a correctional officer assigned to
maintain security.
Determination of the applicability of the qualified immunity defense thus requires two
inquiries: (1) whether the official’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right or
statute, and (2) whether the official’s conduct was objectively unreasonable under clearly
established law existing at the time of the incident of which a reasonable person would have
known. Bey v. Prator, 53 F.4th 854, 857 (5th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 1783 (2023);
Goodman v. Harris Cnty., 571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2009). If the Court answers both questions
in the affirmative, the government official is not shielded from liability based upon qualified
immunity. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009); Buehler v. Dear, 27 F.4th 969, 981–
82 (5th Cir. 2022). A court need not analyze these prongs sequentially because if either is not
satisfied, the government official is entitled to qualified immunity. Buehler, 27 F.4th at 981–82.
Still, the Fifth Circuit provides guidance that although a district court may “‘leapfrog’ the first
prong and resolve cases solely on the basis that defendants’ conduct—even if unlawful—did not
violate clearly established law, ‘we think it better to address both steps in order to provide clarity
and guidance for officers and courts.’” Id.
Once a defendant properly raises qualified immunity, the burden is on the plaintiff to
establish both prongs of the qualified immunity inquiry. Id.; Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d
624, 627 (5th Cir. 2012); Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010). Consequently,
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when a government official asserts qualified immunity upon summary judgment, the assertion
shifts the typical summary judgment burden of proof. Brown, 623 F.3d at 253; see Celotex Corp.,
477 U.S. at 323. For conduct that is within the scope of the official’s discretionary authority, the
initial summary judgment burden falls on the plaintiff to demonstrate the inapplicability of
qualified immunity by establishing a genuine dispute of material fact on both prongs of the inquiry.
Brown, 623 F.3d at 252–53; Poole, 691 F.3d at 627–28. However, all inferences are still drawn in
the plaintiff’s favor. Brown, 623 F.3d at 253.
A. Constitutional Violation
Regarding the first inquiry, the plaintiff must show there is a genuine dispute of material
fact whether the defendant violated a constitutional right—that is, a jury could return a verdict
entitling the plaintiff to relief for a constitutional injury. Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 410 (5th
Cir. 2007). Because the summary-judgment burden falls on the plaintiff to demonstrate a genuine
dispute of material fact on both prongs of the inquiry, the official is entitled to qualified immunity
if the Court determines there is not a genuine dispute that the alleged conduct violated a
constitutional right. Buehler, 27 F.4th at 981–82; Poole, 691 F.3d at 627–28; Shepard v. Hansford
Cnty., 110 F. Supp. 3d 696, 707–08 (N.D. Tex. 2015).6
B. Clearly Established Law
Regarding the second inquiry, the plaintiff “must rebut the defense by establishing that the
official’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law and that genuine issues of
material fact exist regarding the reasonableness of the official’s conduct according to that law.”
6 The Court recognizes that some well-cited caselaw states the inquiry differently as: “the threshold ‘constitutional
violation question’ [is] whether … the officer’s alleged conduct violated a constitutional right…. If we determine that
the alleged conduct did not violate a constitutional right, our inquiry ceases because there is no constitutional violation
for which the government official would need qualified immunity.” Lytle v. Bexar Cnty., 560 F.3d 404, 410 (5th Cir.
2009) (emphasis added).
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Tucker v. City of Shreveport, 998 F.3d 165, 172–73 (5th Cir. 2021); Gates v. Tex. Dep’t of
Protective & Regul. Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 419 (5th Cir. 2008). The plaintiff has the burden to point
out clearly established law, and the Court asks whether the defendant’s actions were objectively
unreasonable in light of the clearly established law at the time of the alleged constitutional
violation. See Freeman, 483 F.3d at 411; Clarkston v. White, 943 F.3d 988, 993 (5th Cir. 2019).
To meet this burden, the plaintiff need not identify a specific case, but a body of relevant caselaw
in which an officer acting under similar circumstances was held to have violated the Constitution.
Joseph ex rel. Estate of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 330 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Dist. of
Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63–64 (2018)).
As the Supreme Court held long ago, “government officials performing discretionary
functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “The Supreme Court noted in
Harlow that in most cases, the ‘of which a reasonable person would have known’ language in the
qualified immunity standard does not add anything to the ‘clearly established law’ requirement
because ‘a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his
conduct.’” Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 349 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818–19).
The Supreme Court later “refined the qualified immunity standard by defining ‘clearly
established’ in a way that encompasses the ‘objective reasonableness’ inquiry: To be ‘clearly
established’ for purposes of qualified immunity, ‘[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” Id. at
349–50 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). “Whether qualified immunity
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can be invoked turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ of the official’s acts.” Ziglar v. Abbasi,
582 U.S. 120, 151 (2017) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819). And “the objective reasonableness
of an official’s conduct [is] measured by reference to clearly established law” as of “the time an
action occurred.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. If the law is not clearly established when conduct
occurs, officials cannot “reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor
could [they] fairly be said to ‘know’ that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as
unlawful.” Id.
The “requirement—that an official loses qualified immunity only for violating clearly
established law—protects officials accused of violating ‘extremely abstract rights.’” Ziglar,
582 U.S. at 151 (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639).
By defining the limits of qualified immunity essentially in objective terms, [courts]
provide no license to lawless conduct. The public interest in deterrence of unlawful
conduct and in compensation of victims remains protected by a test that focuses on
the objective legal reasonableness of an official’s acts. Where an official could be
expected to know that certain conduct would violate statutory or constitutional
rights, he should be made to hesitate; and a person who suffers injury caused by
such conduct may have a cause of action. But where an official’s duties legitimately
require action in which clearly established rights are not implicated, the public
interest may be better served by action taken “with independence and without fear
of consequences.”
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 (omitting footnote and quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)).
“The clearly established standard does not mean that officials’ conduct is protected by
qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful.” Cantrell
v. City of Murphy, 666 F.3d 911, 919 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wernecke v. Garcia, 591 F.3d 386,
393 (5th Cir. 2009)). This has been “known since Anderson.” Kinney, 367 F.3d at 350. “Indeed,
‘[t]here need not be commanding precedent that holds that the very action in question is unlawful;
the unlawfulness need only be readily apparent from relevant precedent in sufficiently similar
situations.’” Cantrell, 666 F.3d at 919 (quoting Brown v. Miller, 519 F.3d 231, 236–37 (5th Cir.
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2008)); accord Kinney, 367 F.3d at 349–50; Terry v. Hubert, 609 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2010).
“The dispositive question is ‘whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly
established.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam) (adding emphasis while
quoting Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)). “That is because qualified immunity is
inappropriate only where the officer had ‘fair notice’—‘in light of the specific context of the case,
not as a broad general proposition’—that his particular conduct was unlawful.” Morrow v.
Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 875 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194,
198 (2004) (per curiam)). “The central concept is that of ‘fair warning’: The law can be clearly
established ‘despite notable factual distinctions between the precedents relied on and the cases
then before the Court, so long as the prior decisions gave reasonable warning that the conduct then
at issue violated constitutional rights.’” Kinney, 367 F.3d at 350 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.
730, 739 (2002)). Requiring “materially similar” facts is inconsistent with Supreme Court
precedent. Id.
However, courts “must frame the constitutional question with specificity and granularity.”
Morrow, 917 F.3d at 874–75. The Supreme Court has “repeatedly” guided courts “not to define
clearly established law at a high level of generality.” al–Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742 (citing cases);
accord City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9, 12 (2021) (per curiam). It has stated:
the right the official is alleged to have violated must have been “clearly established”
in a more particularized, and hence more relevant sense: The contours of the right
must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he
is doing violates that right. This is not to say that an official action is protected by
qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held
unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must
be apparent.
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (citations omitted). This means that it is insufficient “that a rule be
suggested by then-existing precedent.” Bond, 595 U.S. at 12. Stated slightly differently, “clearly
established” means “that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing
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violates that right.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (cleaned up while omitting
citation). Thus, there need not be “a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed
the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” al–Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. This leaves the
rare possibility that, in an obvious case, analogous caselaw is not needed because the unlawfulness
of the challenged conduct is sufficiently clear even though existing precedent does not address
similar circumstances. Joseph, 981 F.3d at 330.
Qualified immunity “shields an officer from suit when [the officer] makes a decision that,
even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances
[the officer] confronted.” Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198. “The precedent must be clear enough that
every reasonable official would interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to
apply. Otherwise, the rule is not one that ‘every reasonable official’ would know.” Wesby,
583 U.S. at 63–64. Under this guidance, “[q]ualified immunity is justified unless no reasonable
officer could have acted as [the defendant officer] did here, or every reasonable officer faced with
the same facts would not have [acted as the defendant officer did].” Mason v. Faul, 929 F.3d 762,
764 (5th Cir. 2019); Tucker v. City of Shreveport, 998 F.3d 165, 174–75 (5th Cir. 2021).
IV. ANALYSIS
As set out above, Church alleges Grajeda engaged in two instances of excessive force:
(1) Grajeda kicked Church’s open food tray slot, causing the metal tray to hit Church’s hands; and
(2) Grajeda poured water on Church by lifting the water cooler and swinging it toward the cell
door. ECF No. 1 at 3–4. Grajeda contends he is entitled to summary judgment because there is no
genuine issue of material fact as to whether his actions amounted to excessive force. ECF No. 31.
Grajeda further asserts he is entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 9. Because Grajeda raises
qualified immunity, the burden falls upon Church to raise a genuine dispute of material fact on
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both inquiries of the qualified immunity defense. For the reasons explained below, Church does
not meet his burden, and Grajeda is entitled to qualified immunity.
A. First Qualified Immunity Prong: Constitutional Violation
The well-established rule is that the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v. McMillian,
503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992). Moreover, convicted inmates have a constitutional right under the Eighth
Amendment to be free from the use of excessive force. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319–
21 (1986); Anthony v. Martinez, 185 F. App’x 360, 363 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). However,
not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard” rises to the level of an Eighth Amendment
violation. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9.
In considering excessive force claims, the “core judicial inquiry” is “whether force was
applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to
cause harm.” Id. at 6–7. The term “maliciously” means to intentionally do a wrongful act without
just cause or excuse, with an intent to inflict injury, or under circumstances which show an evil
intent. See Adams v. Cantwell, No. 6:20CV11, 2022 WL 4091967, at *10 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2022),
adopted, 2022 WL 4082471 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2022) (citing Douglas v. Owens, 50 F.3d 1226,
1232–33 and n.13 (3rd Cir. 1995); Parkus v. Delo, 135 F.3d 1232, 1234 (8th Cir. 1998)). The term
“sadistically” means to inflict pain for one’s own pleasure. Id. Both these definitions are used in
the Fifth Circuit’s Pattern Jury Instructions for Civil Cases. See 5th Cir. Pattern Jury Inst., 2014
ed., sec. 10.7, pg. 106.
Several factors inform a court’s analysis regarding whether force was used maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm. These factors include: (1) the extent of the injury suffered; (2) the need
for application of force; (3) the relationship between that need and the amount of force used; (4)
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the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials; and (5) any effort made to temper the
severity of a forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6–7. No single factor is exclusive or
determinative of whether excessive force was used. Baldwin v. Stalder, 137 F.3d 836, 839 (5th
Cir. 1998).
1. Grajeda’s First Use of Force: Kicking Church’s Food Tray Slot
For the reasons explained below, the Court finds there is no genuine dispute of material
fact regarding whether Grajeda used force maliciously and sadistically to cause harm when he
kicked Church’s food tray slot. Grajeda is thus entitled to summary judgment as to his first use of
force because Church fails to satisfy the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis.
a. Application of Hudson Factors
On balance, the Hudson factors weigh against Church’s excessive force claim regarding
Grajeda kicking the food tray slot. Even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to
Church, only the first and fifth Hudson factors reasonably weigh in his favor. Specifically, a jury
could reasonably infer based on the summary judgment evidence that Church was injured because
of Grajeda’s kick—he broke his right ring finger and had to wear a splint.7 See ECF No. 31-2 (Ex.
1) at 14–15. Additionally, the fifth and final Hudson factor—the effort made to temper the severity
of a forceful response—favors Church because Grajeda does not contend he made any effort at all
to use less force, such as by issuing a verbal warning before resorting to kicking the food tray. See
ECF No. 31 at 18 (Grajeda arguing that his kick was the least forceful option available and that he
had to respond quickly before addressing “more pressing threats posed by the rest of the rioters”).
7 The Court is not persuaded by Grajeda’s argument that Church’s injuries were caused only by the earlier, unrelated
use of force incident. See ECF No. 31 at 14. Although it is possible a jury could agree that Church’s injuries were
caused by the unrelated incident, the TDCJ medical records are inconclusive and do not rule out the possibility that
Grajeda’s kick caused Church separate injuries. See, e.g., ECF No. 31-2 (Ex. 1) at 15 (TDCJ medical records stating
that Church’s finger fracture is “age indeterminate”).
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But the remaining Hudson factors weigh decisively against Church’s excessive force claim.
Regarding the second factor, the summary judgment evidence shows Grajeda needed to use force
to restore discipline and maintain order. Church’s bald assertion that he did “nothing to provoke”
Grajeda’s behavior is squarely contradicted by the video evidence, which shows Grajeda’s use of
force was a direct response to Church throwing his bodily fluid at Grajeda’s back. See ECF No. 1
at 4; ECF No. 31-6 (Ex. 5) at 4:49–55. The video also reveals Church violated prison rules by
jacking his food tray slot and placing his hands outside his cell—all while close custody inmates
collectively engaged in disruptive and defiant behavior such as lighting fires and throwing lines to
trade contraband.8 ECF No. 31-6 (Ex. 5) at 4:49–55. Church does not rebut Grajeda’s evidence
showing this practice of jacking food tray slots and removing body parts from the confines of a
cell violated prison rules and created a security risk. ECF Nos. 31-4 & 31-5 (Exs. 3, 4). Based on
this evidence, there can be no genuine dispute that Church actively provoked a response and
prompted Grajeda to take disciplinary action. See Morris v. Hines, No. 5:20CV36, 2021 WL
5086369, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2021) (finding second Hudson factor weighed in favor of
officer when “the summary judgment evidence shows Plaintiff had taken control of the food slot
tray and started a fire, both of which are violations of prison rules”), adopted, 2021 WL 4272327
(E.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2021). Accordingly, the second Hudson factor—the need for application of
force—favors Grajeda.
Regarding the third Hudson factor, the summary judgment record shows Grajeda used an
appropriate amount of force in relation to the need to restore discipline and maintain order. The
8 Church takes issue with the use of the word “riot” to describe the behavior of the close custody inmates, claiming
that the definition of “riot” under an unattached prison policy requires that two or more inmates are physically fighting.
ECF No. 37 at 6–7. To be clear, whether there was a “riot” as that term is defined by Church or prison policy does not
impact the Court’s excessive force analysis. When the Court uses the word “riot” in this Memorandum Opinion and
Order, it is simply referring to the disruptive behavior of inmates plainly depicted in the TDCJ video.
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video reveals Grajeda applied fleeting and relatively minimal force by kicking the tray slot closed;
Grajeda immediately walked away after just one quick kick to the tray, and the contact between
the tray and Church’s hands lasted only an instant. ECF No. 31-6 (Ex. 5) at 4:56–5:02. This level
of force was appropriate, given the pressing need to restore order among disruptive inmates. See
Campbell v. Atumah, No. 6:24CV223, 2026 WL 1999906, at *19 (E.D. Tex. May 3, 2026) (finding
Hudson factors weighed against an excessive force violation when prison official used “minimal
force to gain compliance and cease the assault” of inmate), adopted, 2026 WL 1707618 (E.D. Tex.
June 12, 2026). Furthermore, in assessing the amount of force necessary to address an active
security threat, courts should not lightly second-guess an officer’s decisions in hindsight. See
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321–22 (1986) (explaining in context of excessive force claim
that prison officials must be given “wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of
policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline
and to maintain institutional security”). The summary judgment evidence shows Grajeda had to
swiftly respond to Church’s rule violations while simultaneously restoring order among several
disruptive inmates. See ECF Nos. 31-4 to 31-6 (Exs. 3–5). When affording Grajeda the appropriate
level of deference, the summary judgment record simply does not support any reasonable finding
that the amount of force applied through Grajeda’s kick was inappropriate in relation to the need
to use force. Accordingly, the third Hudson factor—the relationship between the need to use force
and the amount of force used—favors Grajeda.
Finally, the record demonstrates that Grajeda reasonably perceived multiple threats prior
to kicking Church’s food tray slot. He perceived a threat of exposure to contagious diseases after
being hit by Church’s bodily fluid, as well as a security threat based on Church impermissibly
jacking his food tray slot and placing his hands outside his cell. ECF Nos. 31-4 & 31-5 (Exs. 3–
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4). Moreover, the severity of the security threat was compounded by the context of an active riot
and the disruptive behavior of other close custody inmates. See Adams v. Cantwell, No. 6:20CV11,
2022 WL 4091967, at *10 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2022) (finding fourth Hudson factor weighed in
favor of prison official and explaining that the official faced a “significant security problem” based
on “open defiance of orders”), adopted, 2022 WL 4082471 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2022). Based on
the foregoing evidence, the Court finds the fourth Hudson factor favors Grajeda because there is
no genuine dispute that he reasonably perceived threats before kicking Church’s food slot tray.
In sum, the competent summary judgment evidence demonstrates that at least three of the
five Hudson factors favor Grajeda and weigh against finding that he used excessive force by
kicking Church’s food tray slot.
b. The Core Judicial Inquiry
Ultimately, the Court’s analysis of Church’s excessive force claim hinges on one central
question—whether Grajeda used force in a good-faith effort to restore discipline, or maliciously
and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992).
Here, Church has not met his burden to present competent summary judgment evidence that creates
a genuine dispute of material fact regarding this core inquiry.
The summary judgment evidence shows that Church was actively violating prison rules
and creating a security risk by jacking his food tray slot during a riot. See ECF Nos. 31-4 & 31-5
(Exs. 3–4). The evidence further establishes that, while Grajeda was attempting to address
disruptive behavior of inmates such as lighting fires and slinging contraband, Church threw a
bodily liquid at Grajeda’s back and put him at risk of contracting a disease. ECF No. 31-6 (Ex. 5)
at 4:49–:56. After being provoked, Grajeda responded by kicking Church’s food tray towards the
closed position and necessarily hitting Church’s dangling hands. Id. at 4:53–5:00. The tray made
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contact with Church’s hands only briefly, as Grajeda immediately walked away after kicking the
tray to continue addressing the active riot in the cell block. Id. at 4:56–5:02.
Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Church, this record only reasonably
supports that Grajeda kicked Church’s food tray slot to restore discipline and maintain security.
Church presents no evidence showing Grajeda intentionally acted without just cause or excuse,
with an intent to inflict injury, or under circumstances that show an evil intent. See Adams, 2022
WL 4091967, at *10 (citing Douglas v. Owens, 50 F.3d 1226, 1232–33 and n.13 (3rd Cir. 1995);
Parkus v. Delo, 135 F.3d 1232, 1234 (8th Cir. 1998)); see also 5th Cir. Pattern Jury Inst., 2014
ed., sec. 10.7, pg. 106 (providing definitions for malicious and sadistic use of force). There is no
evidence that Grajeda acted to inflict pain for his own pleasure. Id. Critically, Church does not
create any genuine dispute regarding Grajeda’s intent with the unsubstantiated assertion that it was
“impossible” to close the door with a kick. ECF No. 37 at 6. As the Court warned Church before
his response was due, he was required to provide evidence to meet his summary judgment burden,
and unsubstantiated assertions are not sufficient to create any genuine dispute of material fact.
ECF No. 32 at 1–2.
Accordingly, when viewing the competent summary judgment evidence in a light most
favorable to Church, no genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Grajeda used force
maliciously or sadistically in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Adams, 2022 WL 4091967,
at *11 (recognizing that “[t]he absence of malicious or sadistic action for the purpose of causing
harm results in a meritless claim of excessive force”); Williams v. Valenti, 432 F. App’x 298, 302
(5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“On the record, we conclude that there is no evidence Valenti used
force maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm.”). Church thus fails to raise a
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genuine dispute of material fact regarding the first prong of qualified immunity—that a
constitutional violation occurred—as to Grajeda’s first use of force.
2. Grajeda’s Second Use of Force: Water Cooler Incident9
As a preliminary matter, the Court disagrees with Grajeda’s contention that the water
cooler incident “simply is not a use of force.” ECF No. 31 at 11. Although Grajeda asserts the
cooler was empty, the video shows that a liquid substance spreads over the floor below the cell
and displaces several items. ECF No. 31-6 (Ex. 5) at 6:20–:25. Viewed in the light most favorable
to Church, and in the light depicted on video, it appears the cooler was not empty and that some
amount of water touched Church when Grajeda slung the cooler at the cell door. Accordingly, the
Court still applies the relevant excessive force analysis to the water cooler incident, even though
the cooler itself did not touch Church.
Ultimately, for the reasons explained below, the Court finds summary judgment is
warranted because the evidence shows the water cooler incident involved a de minimis amount of
force that resulted in no discernable injury. Given this state of the record, no reasonable jury could
find Grajeda used force maliciously and sadistically when he poured water on Church.
a. Application of Hudson Factors
All five Hudson factors weigh in Grajeda’s favor as to him swinging the water cooler and
dumping water on Church. First, Church does not contend, and no reasonable jury could find based
on the summary judgment record, that he suffered any injury from the water cooler incident. The
record conclusively shows the water cooler did not make contact with Church. ECF No. 31-6 (Ex.
9 In his motion, Grajeda describes his second use of force as “the cooler throw.” ECF No. 31 at 10–11. The Court
avoids this description because it risks overstating Church’s excessive force allegations and mischaracterizing
Grajeda’s conduct. Namely, the video shows that Grajeda did not “throw” the cooler as that term is commonly
understood and defined; he did not release the cooler and propel it toward Church. See Throw, Merriam-Webster’s
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/throw (last visited Oct. 2, 2026). Instead, he lifted the
cooler and swung it at the cell door while holding it. ECF No. 31-6 (Ex. 5) at 6:18–:25.
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5) at 6:12–:25. In addition, even if some amount of water touched Church, no reasonable jury could
find Church was injured simply from water touching his skin. Church does not contend that the
water exacerbated the injuries caused by Grajeda’s kick, and there is no evidence showing any
injury caused only from the water. Accordingly, there is no genuine dispute as to whether Church
suffered any discernable injury from the water cooler incident, and the first Hudson factor weighs
definitively in favor of Grajeda. See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38 (2010) (“An inmate who
complains of a ‘push or shove’ that causes no discernible injury almost certainly fails to state a
valid excessive force claim.”).
Second, the record makes clear that Church provoked a response from Grajeda when he
decided to throw bodily fluid on Grajeda a second time through his jacked food tray slot. ECF No.
31-6 (Ex. 5) at 4:49. The evidence further supports that the need to respond grew more urgent after
Church demonstrated he was determined to continue violating prison rules despite Grajeda’s first
use of force. See Waddleton v. Rodriguez, 750 F. App’x 248, 256 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam)
(deciding that the second, third, and fourth Hudson factor favored prison official’s use of force
when prisoner was “uncooperative” and “resisted” discipline efforts); Esparaza v. Kuykendall, No.
9:17-CV-45, 2020 WL 1515751, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2020) (finding no genuine dispute that
officers needed to use force when the official was “struggling with a recalcitrant prisoner”).
Accordingly, the second Hudson factor—the need for application of force—favors Grajeda.
Third, the evidence shows that the amount of force Grajeda used during the water cooler
incident was appropriate. Indeed, Grajeda used only a de minimis amount of force by swinging the
water cooler toward the cell door and simply causing water to touch Church’s skin. See Ekpin v.
Bell, No. 2:04-CV-0036, 2004 WL 1515562, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 6, 2004) (finding that the “force
exercised by defendant . . . in pouring water on plaintiff is clearly de minimis and outside the scope
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of the Eighth Amendment”). There can be no genuine dispute that this trivial level of force was
proportionate to the real need to alleviate the threat posed by Church after he continued to throw
bodily fluids and violate prison rules. See Waddleton, 750 F. App’x at 256 (finding third Hudson
factor weighed against excessive force when prison official used force in response to
“uncooperative” and “resist[ing]” inmate). Accordingly, the third Hudson factor—the relationship
between the need to use force and the amount of force used—favors Grajeda.
Fourth, the evidence establishes that Grajeda reasonably perceived a threat when Church
threw bodily fluid at him a second time. In addition to the risk of contracting a disease, Church
continued to pose a security risk by jacking his food tray slot and hanging his arms outside his cell.
ECF No. 31-6 (Ex. 5) at 6:05–:11; ECF Nos. 31-4 & 31-5 (Exs. 3–4). And these risks became more
pressing the moment Church decided to throw his bodily fluid a second time, even following
Grajeda’s first use of force. Waddleton, 750 F. App’x at 256; see also Adams v. Cantwell, No.
6:20CV11, 2022 WL 4091967, at *10 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2022) (finding fourth Hudson factor
weighed in favor of prison official and explaining that official faced a “significant security
problem” based on “open defiance of orders”), adopted, 2022 WL 4082471 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 6,
2022). Accordingly, the fourth Hudson factor—the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible
officials—favors Grajeda.
The final Hudson factor—the effort made to temper the severity of a forceful response—
also favors Grajeda. Because Grajeda used a de minimis amount of force during the water cooler
incident, there can be no genuine dispute that he should have tried to use less force. Short of
refraining from using any force at all, Grajeda could not have chosen a less forceful response than
a response that led only to, at most, some amount of water falling on Church’s skin. Cf. Just. v.
Price, No. 6:23CV016, 2025 WL 2552296, at *5 (E.D. Tex. July 28, 2025) (finding use of pepper
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spray to an inmate’s face constituted “minimal force” when inmate refused orders to return to cell),
adopted, 2025 WL 2552182 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2025).
In sum, all five Hudson factors favor Grajeda and demonstrate that no reasonable jury could
find he used excessive force when he swung the water cooler and poured water on Church.
b. The Core Judicial Inquiry
Applying the “core judicial inquiry” requires the Court to reject Church’s excessive force
claim regarding the water cooler incident. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). Based on
the summary judgment record, no reasonable jury could conclude that Grajeda applied force
maliciously or sadistically to cause harm. Id. Indeed, as discussed above, there is no evidence—or
even a contention from Church—that the water cooler incident itself caused harm. See Wilkins,
559 U.S. at 38 (“An inmate who complains of a ‘push or shove’ that causes no discernible injury
almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim.”); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327
(1986) (standing for the principle that “de minimis uses of physical force” are necessarily excluded
from constitutional recognition, provided the use of force is not “repugnant to the conscience of
mankind”).
Moreover, Church presents no evidence at all showing Grajeda intentionally acted without
just cause or excuse, with an intent to inflict injury, or under circumstances that show an evil intent.
See Adams, 2022 WL 4091967, at *10 (citing Douglas v. Owens, 50 F.3d 1226, 1232–33 and n.13
(3rd Cir. 1995); Parkus v. Delo, 135 F.3d 1232, 1234 (8th Cir. 1998)); see also 5th Cir. Pattern
Jury Inst., 2014 ed., sec. 10.7, pg. 106 (providing definitions for malicious and sadistic use of
force). There is also no evidence that Grajeda acted to inflict pain for his own pleasure when he
poured water on Church. Id. Instead, the evidence only reasonably shows that Grajeda acted in
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response to Church continuously violating prison rules, and under circumstances requiring Grajeda
to restore order.
Accordingly, no genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Grajeda used force
maliciously or sadistically when he swung the water cooler and poured water on Church, and
Church’s excessive force claim thus fails as a matter of law. Adams, 2022 WL 4091967, at *11;
Williams v. Valenti, 432 F. App’x 298, 302 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
B. Second Qualified Immunity Inquiry: Clearly Established Law
As explained above regarding both alleged instances of excessive force, the summary
judgment record leaves no genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Grajeda committed
a constitutional violation. Church has not met his burden to create any genuine dispute that Grajeda
applied force “maliciously” or “sadistically” when he kicked the food tray slot or when he poured
water on Church from the water cooler. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). Accordingly,
Church has not created a genuine dispute regarding the first prong of qualified immunity, and
Grajeda is thus entitled to summary judgment on Church’s excessive force claim. See Buehler v.
Dear, 27 F.4th 969, 981–82 (5th Cir. 2022) (explaining that, once a defendant properly raises
qualified immunity, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish both prongs of the qualified immunity
inquiry); Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 627–28 (5th Cir. 2012) (same).
But even if Church had satisfied the first qualified immunity prong, Grajeda would still be
entitled to qualified immunity based on the second prong for both alleged instances of excessive
force. Church has not shown that Grajeda’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of
clearly established Eighth Amendment law. Tucker v. City of Shreveport, 998 F.3d 165, 172–73
(5th Cir. 2021); Gates v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 419 (5th Cir.
2008). In other words, Church has not pointed to any authority putting an officer on notice that
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Grajeda’s particular conduct, under the specific circumstances of this case, was unlawful.
Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam); Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 875
(5th Cir. 2019).
Accordingly, even assuming a constitutional violation occurred, Church does not defeat
Grajeda’s qualified immunity defense. Grajeda is entitled to summary judgment.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant Emmanuel Grajeda’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 31). By separate document, the Court will enter a Final
Judgment dismissing this action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
SIGNED this 15th day of October 2026.
JASON PULLIAM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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