Moore et al v. Federal National Mortgage Association et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MIDLAND/ODESSA DIVISION
CHRISTINE M. MOORE and
MICHAEL MOORE,
Plaintiffs,
v.
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE
ASSOCIATION (FANNIE MAE);
PRISCILLA ALMODOVAR; PETER
AKWABOAH; BARRETT DAFFIN
FRAPPIER TURNER & ENGEL, LLP;
JOSEPH M. VACEK; SHELLEY NAIL,
TRUSTEE; OCWEN LOAN
SERVICING, LLC; MACKIE WOLF
ZIENTZ & MANN, PC; ISRAEL
SAUCEDO; ALDRIDGE PITE LLP;
WILLIAM JARRELL; PAUL
MARCHUK; TREVOR SHOELS;
FREEDOM MORTGAGE
CORPORATION; DAVID COBOS; and
MARVIN MOORE;
Defendants.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
MO:25-CV-00326-DC-RCG
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
BEFORE THE COURT is Defendants PHH Mortgage Corporation (“Defendant PHH”)1
and Federal National Mortgage Association’s (“Defendant Fannie Mae”) Motion to Dismiss.
(Doc. 12).2 This case is before the Court through a Standing Order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636
and Appendix C of the Local Court Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States
Magistrate Judges. After due consideration of the Parties’ briefs and the case law, the Court
RECOMMENDS Defendants PHH and Fannie Mae’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED IN
PART. (Doc. 12).
1. Defendant PHH notes the Original Petition incorrectly names “Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC.” (Doc. 1). Ocwen is
no longer a legal entity, and PHH Mortgage Corporation—Ocwen’s successor by merger—appears on its behalf. Id.
2. All page number citations are to CM/ECF generated pagination unless otherwise noted.
Case 7:25-cv-00326-DC-RCG Document 33 Filed 01/13/26 Page 1 of 12

2
I. BACKGROUND
On May 9, 2025, Plaintiffs Christine Moore and Michael Moore (“Plaintiffs”) filed their
Original Petition in the 385th Judicial District Court of Midland County, Texas, asserting claims
for wrongful foreclosure, quiet title, fraud, and civil rights violations. (Doc. 1-1 at 12). Providing
little factual detail, Plaintiffs broadly allege on December 15, 2015, the abovenamed Defendants
foreclosed on their real property located at 1001 S. County Road 1060, Midland, Texas 79706
(the “Property”) without clear and lawful authority to do so. Id. Plaintiffs further allege
“Defendants fabricated, forged, and recorded false documents to falsely assert ownership rights”
and assert they were “forcibly evicted at gunpoint from their homestead based on fraudulent
claims.” Id. Plaintiffs also contend “Defendants’ attorneys falsely claimed Fannie Mae owned
the Property; yet Fannie Mae had denied ownership for over five years.” Id. Based on these
allegations, Plaintiffs seek actual damages in the amount of $11,140,287.36, emotional distress
damages alleged to exceed $250 million, and unspecified punitive, exemplary, constitutional and
civil rights damages. Id.
After the action was removed to this Court, Defendants PHH and Fannie Mae filed the
instant Motion to Dismiss, arguing Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against them and the
statute of limitations bars Plaintiffs’ claims. (Doc. 12). Plaintiffs and Defendants filed their
respective Response and Reply. (Docs. 15, 20). Accordingly, Defendants PHH and Fannie Mae’s
Motion to Dismiss is ripe for disposition.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to move for the dismissal of a
complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To survive a motion to
Case 7:25-cv-00326-DC-RCG Document 33 Filed 01/13/26 Page 2 of 12

3
dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A claim for relief must contain: (1) “a
short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction”; (2) “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to the relief”; and (3) “a demand for
the relief sought.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). A plaintiff “must provide enough factual allegations to
draw the reasonable inference that the elements exist.” Innova Hosp. San Antonio, L.P. v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., 995 F. Supp. 2d 587, 602 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (citing Patrick v.
Wal–Mart, Inc.-Store No. 155, 681 F.3d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 2012)); Torch Liquidating Trust ex
rel. Bridge Assocs. L.L.C. v. Stockstill, 561 F.3d 377, 384 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he complaint must
contain either direct allegations or permit properly drawn inferences to support every material
point necessary to sustain recovery”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), all factual allegations from the
complaint should be taken as true, and the facts are to be construed in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Assoc., 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir.
1993). Still, a complaint must contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “‘[N]aked
assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement,’” and “threadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are not entitled to the presumption
of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557); R2 Invs. LDC v. Phillips,
401 F.3d 638, 642 (5th Cir. 2005) (stating that the Court should neither “strain to find inferences
Case 7:25-cv-00326-DC-RCG Document 33 Filed 01/13/26 Page 3 of 12

4
favorable to plaintiffs” nor accept “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions, or legal
conclusions.”).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) governs pleading standards for fraud claims,
including state-law fraud claims. Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338–39 (5th
Cir. 2008) (“[S]tate-law fraud claims are subject to the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b).”)
(citing Abrams v. Baker Hughes Inc., 292 F.3d 424, 430 (5th Cir. 2002); Williams v. WMX
Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 1997)). Rule 9(b) provides: “In alleging fraud or
mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). “What constitutes ‘particularity’ will necessarily differ with the facts of
each case and hence the Fifth Circuit has never articulated the requirements of Rule 9(b) in great
detail.” Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 288 (5th Cir. 1992). The Fifth Circuit
“interprets Rule 9(b) strictly, requiring the plaintiff to specify the statements contended to be
fraudulent, identify the speaker, state when and where the statements were made, and explain
why the statements were fraudulent.” Flaherty & Crumrine Preferred Income Fund, Inc. v. TXU
Corp., 565 F.3d 200, 207 (5th Cir. 2009). “At a minimum, Rule 9(b) requires allegations of the
particulars of time, place, and contents of the false representations, as well as the identity of the
person making the misrepresentation and what he obtained thereby.” Tel–Phonic Servs., Inc. v.
TBS Int’l, Inc., 975 F.2d 1134, 1139 (5th Cir. 1992).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants PHH and Fannie Mae move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims, arguing they are
conclusory, fail to meet the applicable pleading standard, and are time barred by established
Texas law governing foreclosure and related proceedings. (Doc. 12 at 1–2). The Court addresses
these arguments below.
Case 7:25-cv-00326-DC-RCG Document 33 Filed 01/13/26 Page 4 of 12

5
A. Failure to State a Claim
Defendants PHH and Fannie Mae first argue Plaintiffs’ Original Petition constitutes an
impermissible “shotgun pleading” that fails to satisfy the minimal pleading standards of Rule
8(a) and therefore warrants dismissal. (Doc. 12 at 4). The Court agrees.
In their Original Petition, Plaintiffs allege causes of action for (1) wrongful foreclosure;
(2) fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation; (3) quiet title; (4) trespass; (5) civil conspiracy;
(6) abuse of process; (7) deprivation of rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (8) violation of Texas
Constitutional Rights, Article I, Section 19. (Doc. 1-1 at 12). Plaintiffs assert generally that
“Defendants wrongfully conducted [the] foreclosure sale of the Property despite having no clear
title and no lawful authority to foreclose”; they “fabricated, forged, and recorded false
documents to falsely assert ownership rights”; “Defendants’ attorneys falsely claimed Fannie
Mae owned the property”; and “Defendants’ actions foreseeably and directly caused catastrophic
harm to Plaintiffs and their children[.]” Id. at 11. Consequently, Plaintiffs’ Original Petition fails
to identify which of the several named Defendants allegedly engaged in what conduct. Under the
federal pleading standard, “the complaint must specify the acts of the defendants individually,
not collectively, to meet the pleading standards of Rule 8(a).” Shemwell v. Cannon, 352 F.
Supp. 3d 690, 697 (N.D. Tex. 2019); See Callier v. Nat’l United Grp., LLC, No. 21-CV-71,
2021 WL 5393829, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2021) (“[G]eneral assertions directed at no one in
particular are not sufficient to raise an inference of plausibility against a particular defendant.”).
This principle was further confirmed by Cobarobio v. Midland County, where the court held the
federal pleading standard was not met by a complaint containing “global assertions of fault,”
Case 7:25-cv-00326-DC-RCG Document 33 Filed 01/13/26 Page 5 of 12

6
“lump[ing] all Defendants together without identifying actions of any individual Defendant,” and
failing to “set out the specific factual allegations . . . [relating to] any particular defendant.”
No. 13-CV-00111, 2015 WL 13608102, at *9 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2015), aff’d, 695 F. App’x 88
(5th Cir. 2017); see Stephens v. Uranium Energy Corp., No. 15-1862, 2016 WL 3855860, at *13
(S.D. Tex. July 15, 2016) (“The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly ‘rejected the group pleading
doctrine.’”).
Here, Plaintiffs’ allegations fall squarely within the type of improper group pleading
rejected in Shemwell, Cobarobio, and Stephens. And although Plaintiffs attempt to add new
allegations, claims, and theories in their Response (See Doc. 15), “claims and allegations that are
not raised in the complaint, but raised for the first time in a response to a motion to dismiss are
not properly before the court.” Middaugh v. InterBank, 528 F. Supp. 3d 509, 535 (N.D. Tex.
2021). Put simply, Plaintiffs’ Original Petition does not tie any factual allegations to Defendants
PHH or Fannie Mae. Instead, the Original Petition pleads only identical, collective accusations
against all defendants without any factual differentiation. Courts have routinely held that such
allegations cannot survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge because they fail to satisfy the federal
pleading standard. See Cobarobio, 2015 WL 13608102, at *28; see also Griggs v. State Farm
Lloyds, 181 F.3d 694, 699 (5th Cir. 1999); Searcy v. Knight (In re Am. Int’l Refinery), 402 B.R.
728, 738 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2008).
Plaintiffs’ only remaining factual allegation directed at Defendant PHH or Fannie Mae is
the assertion that “Defendants’ attorneys falsely claimed Fannie Mae owned the Property; yet
Fannie Mae had denied ownership for over five years.” (Doc. 1-1 at 11). Even accepting this
allegation as true, the conclusory assertion Defendant Fannie Mae “had denied ownership for
over five years” cannot survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge. (Doc. 1-1 at 11). As required under
Case 7:25-cv-00326-DC-RCG Document 33 Filed 01/13/26 Page 6 of 12

7
the federal pleading standard, Plaintiffs must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. And a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to
permit “the reasonable inference that the elements exist.” Innova Hosp., 995 F. Supp. 2d at 603.
Here, Plaintiffs allege no facts showing any legal duty Defendant Fannie Mae owed, what
wrongful conduct Defendant Fannie Mae engaged in, or any act committed by Defendant Fannie
Mae that satisfies the elements of any of Plaintiffs’ claims. A single conclusory statement,
devoid of supporting factual detail, cannot plausibly establish liability under any of Plaintiffs’
theories and thus cannot survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge. See Torch Liquidating Trust, 561
F.3d at 384 (“[T]he complaint must contain either direct allegations or permit properly drawn
inferences to support every material point necessary to sustain a recovery.”). Because this
threadbare allegation does not plead the elements of any claim with the factual specificity
required under the federal standard, it does not provide a reasonable basis to predict recovery
against Defendant Fannie Mae.
In sum, Plaintiffs’ allegations fail to show a reasonable probability of recovery against
Defendants PHH and Fannie Mae. The Original Petition largely groups these Defendants
together and relies on conclusory allegations, without providing specific facts showing any
individual defendant engaged in actionable conduct. Even if the Court accepts the allegations as
true, they are insufficient to survive as Rule 12(b)(6) challenge.
B. Statute of Limitations
Defendants PHH and Fannie Mae next argue the applicable statutes of limitations bar
Plaintiffs’ claims for § 1983 violations, quiet title, fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation, civil
conspiracy, and wrongful foreclosure. (Doc. 12 at 5). The Court agrees, except as to Plaintiffs’
quiet title claim.
Case 7:25-cv-00326-DC-RCG Document 33 Filed 01/13/26 Page 7 of 12

8
“A statute of limitations may support dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) where it is evident
from the plaintiff’s pleadings that the action is barred and the pleadings fail to raise some basis
for tolling or the like.” King-White v. Humble Indep. Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 754, 758 (5th Cir.
2015) (quoting Jones v. Alcoa, Inc., 339 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 2003)). Under Texas law,
Plaintiffs’ claims for § 1983 violations, fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy,
and wrongful foreclosure are subject to statutes of limitations that expired years before this
lawsuit was filed. Claims brought under § 1983 borrow the forum state’s general statute of
limitations for personal injury actions. See Jenkins v. Tahmahkera, 151 F.4th 739, 747 (5th Cir.
2025) (quoting Winfrey v. Rogers, 901 F.3d 483, 492 (5th Cir. 2018)). In Texas, that period is
two years. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003. Claims for fraud and wrongful foreclosure
are subject to a four-year statute of limitations. See Bardere v. Hughes, Watters & Askanase,
LLP, No. 12-CV-05125, 2013 WL 12126276, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2013), R. & R. adopted,
2013 WL 12126277 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2013) (citing Martin v. Cadle Co., 133 S.W.3d 897, 905
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.004(a)(4)). And
because civil conspiracy is a derivative claim that depends on the existence of an underlying tort,
and because Plaintiffs’ underlying tort claims are time-barred, the civil conspiracy claim is
likewise barred. See Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 680 (Tex. 1996).
That is because claims accrue (under either federal or Texas law) “the moment the
plaintiff becomes aware that he has suffered an injury or has sufficient information to know that
he has been injured.” Johnson v. Harris Cnty., 83 F.4th 941, 945 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting
Edmonds v. Oktibbeha Cnty., 675 F.3d 911, 916 (5th Cir. 2012)); see, e.g., Williams v. Kroger
Tex., L.P., No. 16-CV-1631, 2016 WL 5870976, at *3 n.1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2016) (“The
statute of limitations for a personal injury cause of action under Texas law begins to run from the
Case 7:25-cv-00326-DC-RCG Document 33 Filed 01/13/26 Page 8 of 12

9
date a wrongful act causes an injury.” (citing Childs v. Haussecker, 974 S.W.2d 31, 36 (Tex.
1998))). Put another way, for accrual, “the proper focus is on the time of the [allegedly wrongful]
act, not the point at which the consequences of the act become painful.” Iwuala v. Country Wide
Financial, No. 25-CV-1404, 2025 WL 3759291, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2025) (citing
Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981)).
Although Plaintiffs’ Original Petition is not a model of clarity and fails to specify which
causes of action are asserted against which Defendants, the allegations directed toward
Defendants PHH and Fannie Mae fail to raise a reasonable inference that the acts complained of
first occurred in—or were undiscoverable prior to—May 2021, four years before this lawsuit was
filed. (See Doc. 1-1 at 11). Instead, each of Plaintiffs’ claims against PHH and Fannie Mae arises
from the foreclosure sale of the Property that occurred on December 15, 2015. Id. Because
Plaintiffs did not file this action within the applicable statutory periods, their claims for § 1983
violations, fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, and wrongful foreclosure
against Defendants PHH and Fannie Mae are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations and
should be dismissed.
Plaintiffs’ quiet title claim, however, stands on a different footing. A four-year statute of
limitations applies to a quiet title action only where it is alleged that the deed is voidable; there is
no statute of limitations bar “where a deed of trust is absolutely void.” See Wiltse v. Carrington
Mortg. Servs., LLC, No. 12-CV-680, 2002 WL 12883037, at * 3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 28,
2012) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); Ford v. Exxon Mobile Chem. Co., 235 S.W.3d 615,
618 (Tex. 2007); Poag v. Flories, 317 S.W.3d 820, 825 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet.
denied). Here, Plaintiffs allege not only that Defendants wrongfully conducted a foreclosure sale
of the Property despite having no clear title and no lawful authority to foreclose, but also that
Case 7:25-cv-00326-DC-RCG Document 33 Filed 01/13/26 Page 9 of 12

10
Defendants “fabricated, forged, and recorded false documents to assert ownership rights.”
(Doc. 1-1 at 11). Under Texas law, a forged document is void ab initio, not merely voidable. See
Jones v. Patterson, No. 11-17-00112-CV, 2019 WL 2051301, at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland May
9, 2019, no pet.). And because Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, their pleadings must be liberally
construed. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Construed liberally, Plaintiffs’ Original
Petition can be read as alleging the deed of trust is absolutely void and therefore not subject to a
statute of limitations bar. See Wiltse, 2012 WL 12883037, at *3. Thus, because Plaintiffs’
Original Petition could be read as asserting a quiet title action where it is alleged that the deed of
trust is absolutely void, the Court finds at this stage that claim is not subject to a statute of
limitations bar.
Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiffs assert causes of action against Defendants PHH and
Fannie Mae for § 1983 violations, fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, and
wrongful foreclosure, those claims should be deemed time-barred. Plaintiffs’ quiet title claim,
however, should not.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
In accordance with the above discussion, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants PHH
and Fannie Mae’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED IN PART. (Doc. 12). The Court further
RECOMMENDS Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants PHH and Fannie Mae for § 1983
violations, fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, and wrongful foreclosure be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, as they are time-barred. Lastly, the Court
RECOMMENDS Plaintiffs remaining claims for quiet title, trespass to try title, abuse of
process, and violations of Texas constitutional rights against Defendants PHH and Fannie Mae
be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Case 7:25-cv-00326-DC-RCG Document 33 Filed 01/13/26 Page 10 of 12

11
SIGNED this 13th day of January, 2026.
RONALD C. GRIFFIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 7:25-cv-00326-DC-RCG Document 33 Filed 01/13/26 Page 11 of 12

12
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
In the event that a party has not been served by the Clerk with this Report and
Recommendation electronically, pursuant to the CM/ECF procedures of this District, the Clerk is
ORDERED to mail such party a copy of this Report and Recommendation by certified mail.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), any party who desires to object to this report must serve and
file written objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. A party filing
objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions, or recommendations to which
objections are being made; the District Judge need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general
objections. Such party shall file the objections with the Clerk of the Court and serve the
objections on all other parties. A party’s failure to file such objections to the proposed findings,
conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report shall bar the party from a de novo
determination by the District Judge. Additionally, a party’s failure to file written objections to
the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of
plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the District Judge. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,
1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996).
Case 7:25-cv-00326-DC-RCG Document 33 Filed 01/13/26 Page 12 of 12