Logue v. Redd

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THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH
DANNY LEROY LOGUE aka
DANNY RAY STURGIS,
Petitioner,
v.
BRIAN REDD,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER
DISMISSING HABEAS PETITION
Case No. 2:24-cv-00758-AMA
District Judge Ann Marie McIff Allen
Utah Inmate Danny Leroy Logue aka Danny Ray Sturgis (“Petitioner”), filed a pro se
petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C.S. § 2241 (2026). Petition (ECF No. 1.) While
serving a life sentence without opportunity for parole, Petitioner was transferred from the Utah
State Prison to the Utah State Correctional Facility. Petitioner contends that the Utah Department
of Corrections failed to afford him due process as required by the United States Constitution
because he was transferred without a judicial modification of his original sentence. ECF No. 1,
at 6. Respondent moves to dismiss, arguing that Petitioner fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Petition is DISMISSED because it fails to
raise any cognizable claims.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Petitioner's pro se pleadings are entitled to liberal construction. See, Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) ("A document filed
pro se is to be liberally construed.") (internal quotations omitted) (internal citations omitted.)
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) ("[I]f the court can reasonably read the
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pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so despite the
plaintiff's failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor
syntax and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements.")
"Nevertheless, the court should not assume the role of advocate, and should dismiss claims
which are supported only by vague and conclusory allegations." Northington v. Jackson, 973
F.2d 1518, 1521 (10th Cir. 1992).
A motion to dismiss may be granted when the petition has "failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). All well-pleaded facts, as distinguished
from conclusory allegations, are accepted as true, and those facts are viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Beedle v. Wilson, 422 F.3d 1059, 1063 (10th Cir. 2005). To
survive a motion to dismiss, a petition must present factual allegations that "raise a right to relief
above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). This
review contemplates the assertion of "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face." Id. at 570. Thus, "when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a
[plausible] claim of entitlement to relief," the cause of action should be dismissed. Id. at 558.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed that "[c]omplaints drafted by pro se
litigants . . . are not insulated from the rule that dismissal with prejudice is proper for failure to
state a claim when 'it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it
would be futile to give him an opportunity to amend.'" Fleming v. Coulter, 573 Fed. Appx. 765,
769 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Perkins v. Kan. Dep't of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir.
1999)). Further, "courts have no obligation to permit a pleading amendment when a litigant does
not file a formal motion for leave to amend." Id. (citing Calderon v. Kan. Dep't of Soc. & Rehab.
Servs., 181 F.3d 1180, 1186 (10th Cir. 1999)). Finally, dismissal without leave to amend is
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appropriate where a motion to dismiss has provided petitioner with notice of defects in his
petition and the petitioner declined to avail himself of the opportunity to correct the deficiency.
Id.
ANALYSIS
Petitioner fails to state a cognizable claim that his federal rights have been violated. The
Due Process Clause does not protect a duly convicted prisoner against transfer from one
institution to another within the state prison system. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225
(1976). "Given a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of
his liberty to the extent that the State may confine him and subject him to the rules of its prison
system so long as the conditions of confinement do not otherwise violate the Constitution." Id. at
224. Utah law allows the Department of Corrections to "transfer offenders from one correctional
facility to another." U.C.A. § 64-13-14(3) (2026.) The Due Process Clause does not require
hearings in connection with transfers whether or not they are the result of the inmate's
misbehavior or may be labeled as disciplinary or punitive. Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236,
242 (1976).
Petitioner has offered no support for the propositions that his sentence required that he be
confined only in the Utah State Prison, or that transfer to another facility required a judicial
order. Petitioner has not filed a memorandum in support of the conclusory claims in the Petition.
Petitioner was put on notice of the possible deficiencies in his Petition by Respondent’s
motion to dismiss. See ECF No. 4 (filed June 6, 2025). Respondents asserted three bases for their
motion to dismiss: 1) inmates have no constitutional due process interest protecting a right to be
confined in a particular institution; 2) Petitioner's claims are untimely; and 3) Petitioner failed to
exhaust his remedies as required by 28. U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)(1).
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Petitioner's Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss argues that
Respondents miscalculated the statute of limitations, but does not confront either of the other
issues raised in the motion to dismiss. Petitioner has also declined to avail himself of the
opportunity to amend the Petition to allege sufficient facts to raise a viable claim for relief.
Therefore, dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate. See Fleming v. Coulter, 573 Fed.
Appx. at 769.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability. A certificate of appealability may
issue only if the petitioner “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.” U.S.C.S. 2253(c)(2) (2026). The Supreme Court has clarified the standard for obtaining a
certificate of appealability after a habeas petition is denied on procedural grounds:
When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural
grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional
claim, a [certificate of appealability] should issue (and an appeal of
the district court's order may be taken) if the prisoner shows, at least,
that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition
states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right, and that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court
was correct in its procedural ruling.
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000). Here, Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of
appealability because he has not alleged sufficient facts to establish that jurists of reason would
find it debatable that the Petition states a valid claim of a denial of a constitutional right.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in federal court.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The
Petition for habeas corpus is DENIED and the action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Petitioner's motion to strike (ECF No. 8) is DENIED for mootness.
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IT IS ALSO ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is DENIED.
This action is CLOSED.
DATED this 23 rd day of January 2026.
BY THE COURT
________________________________________
JUDGE ANN MARIE MCIFF ALLEN
United States District Court
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