Panuelos v. Bank of America, N.A.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
24-SEP-2024
08:39 AM
Dkt. 80 MO

NOS. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX and CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
BERNARDO PANUELOS, Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
CATHERINE BOYD; STEPHEN BURGSTALLER; CRISTINA
BURGSTALLER; JACQUELINE BUI; MARIETTA B. HICKEY
aka MARIETTA BOMBARDIERI; PAMELA B. SHULTS;
ANDRICK C.Y. TONG; BARBARA J.K. DUARTE;
BRUCE A. FOX; STEVEN V. TAYLOR; MIA B. TAYLOR;
SHELLEY M. BUCK; FARZAD AZAD; KATHRYN M. AZAD;
GARY W. FEINER; MICHAEL J. HILLINGER;
and LISA M. HILLINGER, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.; HIGHTECHLENDING, INC.;
DAVID FUGATE; AMERICAN SAVINGS BANK, F.S.B.;
JEFFREY T. DANA; JENNIFER M. HAGUE; MATTHEW ROBERT BUSH;
HEATHER NOEL BENNETT; QUICKEN LOANS, INC.; MARK BURROWES;
RONALD K. SCOTT; SHERYL RAE SCOTT; PROVIDENT FUNDING
ASSOCIATES, L.P.; DEREK D. KAWAIAEA; ACADEMY MORTGAGE
CORPORATION; FERNANDO FRONDA; EVERGREEN MONEYSOURCE
MORTGAGE COMPANY; ALVIN LEO SIPE AND SUSAN KITANIK SIPE,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEES OF THE BLACK INK TRUST DATED
DECEMBER 27, 2016; GABRIEL L. BONDE; FRANK WHITNEY MacLEAN
AND PAMLA HAY MacLEAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEES
OF THE FRANK WHITNEY MacLEAN AND PAMLA HAY MacLEAN
REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST DATED NOVEMBER 3, 2004;
CHARLES Z. FEDAK; MERI L. FEDAK; CLAYTON T. HAUSEUR
AND GRACE K. HAUSEUR, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
TRUSTEES OF THE HAUSEUR FAMILY TRUST DATED
JANUARY 17, 2008; WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
Defendants-Appellees;
and DOE DEFENDANTS 1-50, Defendants
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
(CIVIL NO. 2CC191000153)

and
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
MICHAEL J. HILLINGER and LISA M. HILLINGER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
and
CATHERINE BOYD; STEPHEN BURGSTALLER; CRISTINA
BURGSTALLER; JACQUELINE BUI; MARIETTA B. HICKEY
aka MARIETTA BOMBARDIERI; PAMELA B. SHULTS;
ANDRICK C.Y. TONG; BARBARA J.K. DUARTE;
BRUCE A. FOX; STEVEN V. TAYLOR; MIA B. TAYLOR;
SHELLEY M. BUCK; FARZAD AZAD; KATHRYN M. AZAD;
GARY W. FEINER; BERNARDO PANUELOS,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.; HIGHTECHLENDING, INC.;
DAVID FUGATE; AMERICAN SAVINGS BANK, F.S.B.;
JEFFREY T. DANA; JENNIFER M. HAGUE; MATTHEW ROBERT BUSH;
HEATHER NOEL BENNETT; QUICKEN LOANS, INC.; MARK BURROWES;
RONALD K. SCOTT; SHERYL RAE SCOTT; PROVIDENT FUNDING
ASSOCIATES, L.P.; DEREK D. KAWAIAEA; ACADEMY MORTGAGE
CORPORATION; FERNANDO FRONDA; EVERGREEN MONEYSOURCE
MORTGAGE COMPANY; ALVIN LEO SIPE AND SUSAN KITANIK SIPE,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEES OF THE BLACK INK TRUST DATED
DECEMBER 27, 2016; GABRIEL L. BONDE; FRANK WHITNEY MacLEAN
AND PAMLA HAY MacLEAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEES
OF THE FRANK WHITNEY MacLEAN AND PAMLA HAY MacLEAN
REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST DATED NOVEMBER 3, 2004;
CHARLES Z. FEDAK; MERI L. FEDAK; CLAYTON T. HAUSEUR
AND GRACE K. HAUSEUR, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
TRUSTEES OF THE HAUSEUR FAMILY TRUST DATED
JANUARY 17, 2008; WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
Defendants-Appellees;
and DOE DEFENDANTS 1-50, Defendants

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
(CIVIL NO. 2CC191000153)

and
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
JACQUELINE BUI, Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
CATHERINE BOYD; STEPHEN BURGSTALLER; CRISTINA
BURGSTALLER; MARIETTA B. HICKEY
aka MARIETTA BOMBARDIERI; PAMELA B. SHULTS;
ANDRICK C.Y. TONG; BARBARA J.K. DUARTE;
BRUCE A. FOX; STEVEN V. TAYLOR; MIA B. TAYLOR;
SHELLEY M. BUCK; FARZAD AZAD; KATHRYN M. AZAD;
GARY W. FEINER; BERNARDO PANUELOS;
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

MICHAEL J. HILLINGER; and LISA M. HILLINGER,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.; HIGHTECHLENDING, INC.;
DAVID FUGATE; AMERICAN SAVINGS BANK, F.S.B.;
JEFFREY T. DANA; JENNIFER M. HAGUE; MATTHEW ROBERT BUSH;
HEATHER NOEL BENNETT; QUICKEN LOANS, INC.; MARK BURROWES;
RONALD K. SCOTT; SHERYL RAE SCOTT; PROVIDENT FUNDING
ASSOCIATES, L.P.; DEREK D. KAWAIAEA; ACADEMY MORTGAGE
CORPORATION; FERNANDO FRONDA; EVERGREEN MONEYSOURCE
MORTGAGE COMPANY; ALVIN LEO SIPE AND SUSAN KITANIK SIPE,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEES OF THE BLACK INK TRUST DATED
DECEMBER 27, 2016; GABRIEL L. BONDE; FRANK WHITNEY MacLEAN
AND PAMLA HAY MacLEAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEES
OF THE FRANK WHITNEY MacLEAN AND PAMLA HAY MacLEAN
REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST DATED NOVEMBER 3, 2004;
CHARLES Z. FEDAK; MERI L. FEDAK; CLAYTON T. HAUSEUR
AND GRACE K. HAUSEUR, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS
TRUSTEES OF THE HAUSEUR FAMILY TRUST DATED
JANUARY 17, 2008; WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
Defendants-Appellees;
and DOE DEFENDANTS 1-50, Defendants

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
(CIVIL NO. 2CC191000153)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
(By: Hiraoka, Presiding Judge, Nakasone and Guidry, JJ.)

These consolidated appeals come from a wrongful
foreclosure lawsuit filed by several plaintiffs against Bank of
America, N.A. (BANA) and others in the Circuit Court of the
Second Circuit.1 Bernardo Panuelos, Michael J. Hillinger and
Lisa M. Hillinger (the Hillingers), and Jacqueline Bui appeal
from Hawai#i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 54(b)-certified
Judgments for BANA, each entered on August 26, 2020.2 They
challenge the circuit court's August 11, 2020 "Order Granting
Defendants Bank of America, N.A. and Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss First Amended

1
The Honorable Rhonda I.L. Loo presided.
2
Barbara J.K. Duarte was also an appellant, but her appeal has been
dismissed by stipulation.

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Complaint and Motion to Sever, Filed February 21, 2020, and
Substantive Joinders by Joining Defendants." We vacate the
Judgments, affirm in part and vacate in part the Order, and
remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

BANA nonjudicially foreclosed on several properties
owned by various plaintiffs below. The plaintiffs claim the
foreclosures didn't comply with former Hawaii Revised Statutes
(HRS) § 667-5.3 They sought damages for wrongful foreclosure and
lost rental income, treble damages under HRS § 480-13,
restitution, and rescissory or other equitable damages. Some
plaintiffs also sought to quiet title to, and regain possession
of, their foreclosed properties.
BANA moved to dismiss the lawsuit or to sever the
plaintiffs' cases. The circuit court dismissed all claims made
by Panuelos, the Hillingers, and Bui, and severed the remaining
plaintiffs' cases. HRCP Rule 54(b)-certified judgments were
entered against Panuelos, the Hillingers, and Bui. We
consolidated their appeals. The parties submitted supplemental
briefs on several supreme court decisions published after
briefing for these appeals had been completed, including Llanes
v. Bank of Am., N.A., ___ Hawai#i ___, ___ P.3d ___, 2024 WL
3064621 (as amended on recon., Sept. 9, 2024); In re Manuel, 152
Hawai#i 290, 526 P.3d 267 (2023); and Delapinia v. Nationstar
Mortg. LLC, 150 Hawai#i 91, 497 P.3d 106 (2021).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a ruling on a motion to dismiss de novo.
Bank of Am., N.A. v. Reyes-Toledo, 143 Hawai#i 249, 256, 428 P.3d
761, 768 (2018). We assume the facts alleged in the complaint
are true and view them in the light most favorable to the

3
HRS § 667-5 was repealed effective June 28, 2012. 2012 Haw. Sess.
Laws Act 182, § 50 at 684.

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plaintiffs to determine if they warrant relief under any legal
theory. Id. at 257, 428 P.3d at 769. But we don't have to
accept conclusory allegations on the legal effect of the facts
alleged. Kealoha v. Machado, 131 Hawai#i 62, 74, 315 P.3d 213,
225 (2013). If the circuit court's decision was correct, "it
must be affirmed . . . even though the lower tribunal gave the
wrong reason for its action." State v. Taniguchi, 72 Haw. 235,
239, 815 P.2d 24, 26 (1991).

III. DISCUSSION

The factual allegations in the First Amended Complaint,
viewed in light most favorable to Panuelos, the Hillingers, and
Bui (collectively, Plaintiffs), are: Plaintiffs owned real
property on Maui. Between 2008 and 2011, BANA held nonjudicial
foreclosure sales under former HRS § 667-5 in a way that
increased the likelihood of BANA being the successful bidder at
the auction. That enabled BANA to continue earning servicing
fees while holding the foreclosed property for resale. BANA's
nonjudicial foreclosures did not comply with HRS § 667-5 in
several ways described in the First Amended Complaint.
As to damages, the First Amended Complaint alleged:

28. As a result of BANA's wrongful conduct in
foreclosing, each Plaintiff lost title and possession and
use of their real property in an unlawful sale in the same
manner as part of the same common scheme.

29. As a result of the wrongful acts described
above, each Plaintiff lost the monies they had invested or
expended in their Property, lost the market value of their
Property, lost the use and rental value of the Property from
and after the date he or she lost possession, and incurred
other losses related to obtaining alternative properties,
all in amounts they are entitled to recover and to be proved
at trial. Such recovery may be at law, in equity, by
restitution, equitable or rescissory damages.

The First Amended Complaint did not allege that
Plaintiffs' mortgages did not contain a power of sale, or that
Plaintiffs were not subject to foreclosure. Plaintiffs did not

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challenge BANA's right to foreclose; they complained that BANA
did not follow proper procedure when it did.
In these appeals: (a) Panuelos and the Hillingers
contend the circuit court erroneously concluded their claims were
barred by HRS § 501-118; (b) Panuelos, the Hillingers, and Bui
contend the court erroneously concluded that their claims for
restitution or rescissory damages, and for specific violations of
HRS Chapter 667, Part I, were time-barred; (c) Bui contends the
circuit court erroneously concluded she was judicially estopped
from pursuing her claims and (d) her quiet title and ejectment
claims were time-barred; and (e) Panuelos, the Hillingers, and
Bui contend the circuit court abused its discretion by severing
the plaintiffs' cases after erroneously concluding they didn't
arise from the same series of transactions.

A. Panuelos's and the Hillingers' claims for
damages are not barred by HRS § 501-118.

Panuelos's and the Hillingers' properties were
registered in Land Court. The Land Court Assistant Registrar had
entered post-foreclosure transfer certificates of title in the
registration book on February 9, 2016 — three years before the
First Amended Complaint was filed. The circuit court concluded
that Panuelos's and the Hillingers' claims were barred by HRS
§ 501-118 because they weren't filed before new certificates of
title were entered.
Manuel is dispositive. The supreme court held:

[A]n action alleging a wrongful nonjudicial foreclosure of
Land Court property that seeks only damages against the
foreclosing lender is not an action that "directly
impeaches" any foreclosure proceedings affecting registered
land within the meaning of HRS § 501-118(c); therefore, the
action is not barred by the entry of a [transfer certificate
of title] to the buyer at a foreclosure sale.

Id. 152 Hawai#i at 303, 526 P.3d at 280.
In these cases, Panuelos and the Hillingers seek only
recovery of damages from BANA; they don't seek return of title to
or possession of their foreclosed properties. Their claims for
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damages were not barred by HRS § 501-118. The circuit court
erred by dismissing their claims on that basis. Their claims for
damages are, however, limited by the supreme court's recent
Llanes decision (as amended on reconsideration).

B. The claims for restitution or rescissory
damages and for specific violations of HRS
Chapter 667, Part I were subject to class
action tolling.

Panuelos, the Hillingers, and Bui joined the action
below when the First Amended Complaint was filed on May 3, 2019.
They were members of the putative class in Degamo v. Bank of Am.,
N.A., Civil No. 13-00141, United State District Court, District
of Hawai#i. This "tolled the time for filing an individual
wrongful foreclosure claim until September 29, 2021," Manuel, 152
Hawai#i at 303–04, 526 P.3d at 280–81. The First Amended
Complaint was filed while the statute of limitations was tolled.
The circuit court concluded that class action tolling
only applied to "identical causes of action asserted in the
[Degamo] class action. If the claims are materially different
from the [Degamo] class action, . . . tolling does not apply."
The court found that "Plaintiffs' request for rescissory damages
[and] allegations related to loan servicing and posting notices
on the properties after postponement of the original foreclosure
sales . . . are materially different from the claims and theories
of damages asserted in Degamo[.]" The court dismissed those
claims as time-barred.
The Degamo complaint was filed in Hawai#i state court
on September 7, 2012. That "tolled the time for filing an
individual wrongful foreclosure claim[.]" Manuel, 152 Hawai#i at
303, 526 P.3d at 280. The Degamo complaint doesn't contain the
words restitution, rescissory damages, loan servicing, or loan
modification. It didn't have to. Hawai#i is a notice pleading
jurisdiction where it is "not necessary to plead legal theories
with precision." Reyes-Toledo, 143 Hawai#i at 259, 428 P.3d at
771 (cleaned up). The Degamo complaint alleged wrongful

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foreclosure — that BANA (and its agents) conducted nonjudicial
foreclosures without strictly complying with HRS § 667-5. BANA
had "fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests." Id. Class action tolling applied to all
factual bases and potential remedies applicable to a wrongful
foreclosure claim. The circuit court erred by narrowly applying
class action tolling only to factual and legal theories pleaded
with precision. Id.

C. Bui was not judicially estopped from pursuing
her wrongful foreclosure claim.

Bui filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in 2010. Her
schedule of assets included the property eventually foreclosed on
by BANA. Her petition also included her statement of intention
to surrender the property and to not claim it as exempt. A
separate "Declaration of Debtor re: Surrender of Property" was
filed. Bui received a discharge on June 21, 2010.
The circuit court ruled that Bui was judicially
estopped from pursuing her claim because she had surrendered her
property in her bankruptcy proceeding. We review de novo. Ching
v. Dung, 148 Hawai#i 416, 426, 477 P.3d 856, 866 (2020). A party
asserting judicial estoppel must show three things: (1) the other
party's later position is inconsistent with its earlier position;
(2) the other party persuaded a court to accept its earlier
position; and (3) the other party would derive an advantage for
itself or impose a detriment on the opposing party if not
estopped. Id. at 429, 477 P.3d at 869.
(1) The Bankruptcy Code requires that the debtor file
a statement of intent to retain or surrender encumbered
property.4 In re Ryan, 560 B.R. 339, 347 (Bankr. D. Haw. 2016),
vacated on other grounds, BAP No. HI-16-1391-TaLB, 2018 WL
1938512 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2018). 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)
states that "nothing in paragraphs (A) or (B) . . . shall alter

4
11 U.S.C.A. § 521(a)(2)(A) (2014).

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the debtor's or the trustee's rights with regard to [the
collateral] under this title." Id. The code does not define
"surrender," nor does it say to whom the debtor must surrender
the property, or what "surrender" requires the debtor to do. Id.
In Ryan the Honorable Robert J. Faris, bankruptcy judge for the
District of Hawai#i (in which Bui's bankruptcy was also filed),
held:

the debtor's stated intent to surrender merely means that
the debtor does not intend to reaffirm, redeem, or exempt
the property. . . . [S]ection 521(a)(2) is a notice
provision that does not affect the respective rights of the
debtor and the secured creditor . . . .

Id. at 349–50 (footnotes omitted) (citing Mayton v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co. (In re Mayton), 208 B.R. 61, 67-68 (9th Cir. BAP
1997) ("[T]he only logical basis for reconciling the conflicting
elements of [§ 521(a)(2)] is to hold that it is essentially a
notice statute.") and 4 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 521.14[4], at
521–49 (16th ed. 2016) (§ 521(a)(2) "does not affect the debtor's
substantive rights vis a vis the creditor[.]")). We agree with
and adopt Judge Faris's reasoning. We conclude that Bui's
"surrender" of her property in her bankruptcy case was not
inconsistent with her later assertion of wrongful foreclosure.
(2) Bui's "surrender" of her property didn't
"persuade" the bankruptcy court to do anything because her
discharge "was entirely independent of the 'surrender' of the
[p]roperty" as a matter of bankruptcy law. Ryan, 560 B.R. at
351.
(3) Bui did not derive an advantage over, or impose a
detriment on, BANA by complying with the Bankruptcy Code. BANA
obtained relief from the automatic bankruptcy stay on April 21,
2010. The mortgagee's affidavit of foreclosure under power of
sale was recorded on June 17, 2010, four days before Bui received
a discharge. Bui is not challenging BANA's right to foreclose;
she claims that BANA didn't comply with HRS § 667-5 when it did.

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Bui's wrongful foreclosure claim was not barred by
judicial estoppel. The circuit court erred by dismissing the
claim on that basis.

D. Bui's quiet title and ejectment claims
against Bush and Bennett were time-barred,
but her quiet title claim against Quicken
Loans was not.

Bui alleged claims for quiet title and ejectment
against defendants Matthew Robert Bush, Heather Noel Bennett, and
Quicken Loans, Inc. Bui's foreclosed property was conveyed to
Bush and Bennett on January 4, 2011. The deed was recorded on
February 4, 2011. Bui joined the action below on May 3, 2019.
The circuit court concluded that Bui's claims to quiet title and
for ejectment were time-barred by a six-year statute of
limitations. The court did not specify the authority on which it
relied; we assume it was HRS § 657-1(4) (2016), which applies to
"[p]ersonal actions of any nature whatsoever not specifically
covered by the laws of the State."
At first we note that Bush and Bennett's mortgage to
Quicken Loans was dated December 29, 2017, and recorded on
January 8, 2018. Even if a six-year statute of limitations
applied, Bui's quiet title claim against Quicken Loans was timely
and the circuit court erred by dismissing that claim based on the
statute of limitations. Bui didn't assert an ejectment claim
against Quicken Loans because she did not allege that Quicken
Loans had possession of the foreclosed property.
The First Amended Complaint doesn't allege that Bush
and Bennett's deed was forged or had been procured by fraud in
the factum.5 Thus, the deed is at most voidable, not void. See
Delapinia, 150 Hawai#i at 104, 497 P.3d at 119 ("sales pursuant
to a wrongful foreclosure are voidable, regardless of whether the
violation was statutory or contractual, substantial or a mere

5
Bui would have had to allege "the circumstances constituting
fraud" with particularity. HRCP Rule 9(b).

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irregularity"). HRS § 657-1(4)'s six-year statute of limitations
applies to a claim that a deed is voidable because the
foreclosure from which it resulted was wrongful. Cf. Hancock v.
Kulana Partners, LLC, 145 Hawai#i 374, 382, 452 P.3d 371, 379
(2019) (holding that HRS § 657-1(4) applies to claim that deed
was voidable).
Bui argues, "Count III [(her quiet title claim)] is not
a claim to void an instrument to which Bui was a party, or a
claim for compensation for deprivation of title, but a claim to
declare title in Bui" and "there is no limitations period for a
quiet title claim[.]" Bui's argument exalts form over substance.
HRS Chapter 669 governs quieting title. HRS § 669-1(a) (2016)
allows actions "brought by any person against another person who
claims, or who may claim adversely to the plaintiff, an estate or
interest in real property, for the purpose of determining the
adverse claim." HRS Chapter 669 prescribes a remedy; it does not
have its own statute of limitations. But there must be a legal
basis to invoke the remedy of determining competing title claims.
Here, Bui claims superior title because Bush and Bennett's deed
is voidable, having resulted from a wrongful foreclosure. That
claim is subject to HRS § 657-1(4)'s six-year statute of
limitations. Bush and Bennett's deed was recorded over six years
before Bui joined the action below. The circuit court was not
wrong to conclude that Bui's quiet title and ejectment claims
against Bush and Bennett were time-barred.

E. We lack jurisdiction over the appeals from
the circuit court's order of severance.

Panuelos, the Hillingers, and Bui contend the circuit
court erred by granting BANA's motion to sever. BANA has not
raised the issue of jurisdiction, but "if the parties do not
raise the issue of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a court
sua sponte will." Kapuwai v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 121
Hawai#i 33, 40, 211 P.3d 750, 757 (2009) (brackets omitted).

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"[W]hen judgment is entered under [HRCP] Rule 54(b), a
timely notice of appeal brings up for review all interlocutory
decisions and orders implicated by the judgment." Anastasi v.
Fid. Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 134 Hawai#i 400, 414, 341 P.3d 1200,
1214 (App. 2014) (italics added) (underscoring omitted) (quoting
10 Moore's Fed. Prac. § 54.28[3][c] (3d ed. 2009)), vacated in
part on other grounds, 137 Hawai#i 104, 366 P.3d 160 (2016). The
circuit court's August 11, 2020 Order dismissed "[a]ll claims
asserted by" Panuelos, the Hillingers, and Bui. It severed "the
remaining Plaintiffs' cases from this action into separate
actions by property" and directed the court clerk to "open new
cases with separate case numbers corresponding to the relevant
parties[.]" (Italics added.) On remand Panuelos, the
Hillingers, and Bui will be parties to one case, 2CC191000153.
Severance of the other plaintiffs' cases wasn't implicated by the
HRCP Rule 54(b)-certified judgments on appeal. We lack
jurisdiction to review the propriety of the circuit court's
severance of the other plaintiffs' cases.

IV. DISPOSITION

The HRCP Rule 54(b)-certified judgments for BANA and
against Panuelos, the Hillingers, and Bui, entered on August 26,
2020, are vacated. The circuit court's August 11, 2020 Order is:
(1) vacated to the extent it dismissed (a) Panuelos', the
Hillingers', and Bui's claims for damages (including restitution
or rescissory damages), and (b) Bui's quiet title claim against
Quicken Loans; but (2) affirmed to the extent it dismissed Bui's
quiet title and ejectment claims against Bush and Bennett. No
other parts of the Order are before us on these appeals.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, September 24, 2024.

On the briefs:
/s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
James J. Bickerton, Presiding Judge
Bridget G. Morgan-Bickerton,
Jeremy K. O'Steen, /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
Van-Alan H. Shima, Associate Judge

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for Plaintiffs-Appellants
Bernardo Panuelos, /s/ Kimberly T. Guidry
Michael J. and Lisa M. Associate Judge
Hillinger, and Jacqueline
Bui.

Patricia J. McHenry,
Allison Mizuo Lee,
for Defendant-Appellee
Bank of America, N.A.
and Defendant-Appellee
Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems,
Inc.(in CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX).

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