Mathern v. Edward D. Jones & Company

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
28-JAN-2026
08:29 AM
Dkt. 65 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

ALLISEN C. MATHERN, Appellant-Appellant, v.
EDWARD D. JONES & COMPANY, CORVEL CORPORATION, and
DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
STATE OF HAWAII, Appellees-Appellees

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
(CIVIL NO. 3CCV-XX-XXXXXXX)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Hiraoka, Presiding Judge, Wadsworth and McCullen, JJ.)

In this secondary appeal, Appellant-Appellant Allisen
C. Mathern (Mathern) appeals from the October 27, 2025 Final
Judgment (Judgment) entered in favor of Appellees-Appellees
Edward D. Jones & Co. (Employer) and Director, Department of
Labor and Industrial Relations (DLIR), State of Hawaii (Director)
in the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit (Circuit Court).1/
Mathern also challenges the Circuit Court's May 4, 2023 "Order
Affirming Director's Decision and Order of May 5, 2022" (Order).
The Order and Judgment affirmed the Director's May 5, 2022
Decision and Order, which (1) adopted the findings of fact and
conclusions of law contained in an administrative hearings
officer's July 5, 2019 Recommended Decision, and (2) concluded
that Mathern was not discharged by Employer solely because she
suffered a work injury in alleged violation of Hawaii Revised

1/
The Honorable Henry T. Nakamoto presided.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER

Statutes (HRS) § 378-32(a)(2).2/
On appeal, Mathern contends that the Circuit Court:
(1) erred in concluding that DLIR did not violate Mathern's due
process rights when it delayed hearing and rendering a final
decision on her claim; and (2) "ignored the substantial evidence
and evidence of fraud by the [E]mployer" when the court affirmed
the Director's conclusion that Mathern was not discharged solely
because she suffered a work injury.3/
Our review of "decision[s] made by the circuit court
upon its review of an agency's decision is a secondary appeal."
Flores v. Bd. of Land & Nat. Res., 143 Hawai#i 114, 120, 424 P.3d
469, 475 (2018) (quoting Paul's Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Befitel, 104
Hawai#i 412, 416, 91 P.3d 494, 498 (2004)). We apply the
standards set forth in HRS § 91-14(g) (2012 & Supp. 2019) to
determine whether the Circuit Court's decision was right or
wrong. Id. at 120-21, 424 P.3d at 475-76 (quoting Paul's Elec.
Serv., 104 Hawai#i at 416, 91 P.3d at 498).
After reviewing the record on appeal and the relevant
legal authorities, and giving due consideration to the issues
raised and the arguments advanced by the parties, we resolve
Mathern's contentions as follows, and affirm.

2/
(HRS) § 378-32(a) (2015) states, in relevant part:

(a) It shall be unlawful for any employer to suspend,
discharge, or discriminate against any of the employer's
employees:
. . . .
(2) Solely because the employee has suffered a work
injury which arose out of and in the course of
the employee's employment with the employer and
which is compensable under chapter 386 unless
the employee is no longer capable of performing
the employee's work as a result of the work
injury and the employer has no other available
work which the employee is capable of
performing. Any employee who is discharged
because of the work injury shall be given first
preference of reemployment by the employer in
any position which the employee is capable of
performing and which becomes available after the
discharge and during the period thereafter until
the employee secures new employment. . . .
3/
Mathern's points of error, which are somewhat difficult to
discern, have been restated and reordered for clarity.

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(1) Mathern contends that DLIR (and presumably the
Director) violated her due process rights when it unreasonably
delayed hearing and rendering a final decision on her claim.
She argues that there were three periods of unreasonable delay,
as follows: (1) a 21-month period from October 21, 2015, when
Mathern filed her complaint with DLIR, through July 10, 2017,
when she requested that DLIR schedule a hearing; (2) an 18-month
period from August 16, 2017, when DLIR's then-Director explained
to Mathern why her complaint had not proceeded to hearing,
through February 1, 2019, when Mathern requested that the hearing
officer "initiate proceedings against the Employer" (the hearing
then went forward on May 14, 2019); and (3) a 33-month period
from July 25, 2019, when Mathern filed her exceptions to the
hearing officer's Recommended Decision, through May 5, 2022, when
the Director's Decision and Order was issued. These periods
coincide roughly with the passage of time between (1) the filing
of the complaint and the hearing, and (2) the issuance of the
hearing officer's Recommended Decision and the Director's
Decision and Order.
The Hawai#i Supreme Court has stated that where an
agency has followed all relevant administrative requirements, a
substantial wait for an agency decision will not be deemed
unreasonable unless "the delay was caused by an unjustified
agency decision to postpone resolution of the matter or was so
outside the bounds of the workings of a large and complex
bureaucracy as to be deemed unreasonable per se." Trivectra v.
Ushijima, 112 Hawai#i 90, 109, 144 P.3d 1, 20 (2006). Further, a
hearing officer has the authority to "[c]ontrol the procedures of
the hearing[,]" and to "[t]ake other actions that are necessary
and proper for the conduct of the hearing." Hawai#i
Administrative Rules (HAR) § 12-24-14(a)(1), (6) (effective
1981).
Based on the entire record, we conclude that DLIR did
not violate Mathern's due process rights due to unreasonable
delay in hearing and deciding her claim. Initially, Mathern has
not shown that DLIR failed to follow any relevant administrative
requirements. Regarding the alleged delays, as to the period

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between the filing of the complaint and the hearing, the Director
found that "the Hearing Officer properly stayed the hearing due
to the pending determination as to whether [Mathern] suffered a
work injury which arose out of and in the course of [Mathern's]
employment with [Employer] and which was compensable under [HRS]
chapter 386." Indeed, Mathern could not prevail on her claim
under HRS § 378-32(a)(2) unless, among other things, she suffered
a work injury "which is compensable under chapter 386."
Mathern's workers' compensation claim was closed in January 2019,
and the hearing officer held a hearing on her HRS § 378-32 claim
in May 2019. We cannot conclude that in these circumstances, the
hearing officer's decision, in the exercise of his discretion, to
wait for a full and final resolution of the workers' compensation
claim before proceeding with the section 378-32 hearing was
unjustified or "so outside the bounds of the workings of [DLIR]
as to be deemed unreasonable per se." Trivectra, 112 Hawai#i at
109, 144 P.3d at 20; cf. Puchert v. Agsalud, 67 Haw. 25, 37 n.5,
677 P.2d 449, 458 n.5 (1984) (construing predecessor version of
HRS § 378-33(b): "Continuing a hearing, rather than dismissing a
complaint, avoids the problem of having to re-file and re-process
the same paperwork.").
As to the period between the issuance of the hearing
officer's Recommended Decision and the Director's Decision and
Order, DLIR's then-Director explained in a February 24, 2020
letter to Mathern's counsel that DLIR was reviewing the entire
case file and recorded proceedings of the July 5, 2019 hearing
before issuing a final decision and order. Such a review was
authorized by HAR § 12-24-15(c) ("Upon filing of exceptions by a
party adversely affected by the recommended decision, the
director may consider the whole record or portions thereof . . .
[and] then make a final decision stating the reasons or basis
therefor and enter an appropriate order."). The Director
asserted below and now on appeal that the COVID-19 pandemic, of
which we take judicial notice, also played a significant role in
the delay. We cannot conclude that in these circumstances the
delay between the issuance of the hearing officer's Recommended
Decision and the Director's Decision and Order was unjustified or

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"so outside the bounds of the workings of [DLIR] as to be deemed
unreasonable per se." Trivectra, 112 Hawai#i at 109, 144 P.3d at
20.
In any event, Mathern has not shown that she suffered
any prejudice as a result of the delays she cites, particularly
in light of the finding that her position with Employer was
eliminated. See infra; S. Foods Grp., L.P. v. State, Dep't of
Educ., 89 Hawai#i 443, 453, 974 P.2d 1033, 1043 (1999) (to
reverse or modify an agency decision under HRS § 91–14(g), "the
appellate court must conclude that an appellant's substantial
rights were prejudiced by the agency."). On this record, the
Circuit Court did not err in concluding that DLIR (and the
Director) did not violate Mathern's due process rights.
(2) Mathern contends that the Circuit Court erred when
it "ignored the substantial evidence and evidence of fraud by
[E]mployer at the agency level" and ruled:

The DLIR was not clearly erroneous by ignoring the
allegedly substantial evidence in support of [Mathern's]
returning to work. The [Certified Record on Appeal]
supports the decision that [Employer] gave [Mathern] seven
months of leave, and that it eliminated her position due to
a legitimate business purpose as the Pahoa branch office
closed and [Employer] did not have a role for [Mathern] to
return to after her leave of absence.

The Director adopted the following findings of fact by
the hearing officer, none of which Mathern expressly contests in
her opening brief, see Poe v. Haw. Labor Rels. Bd., 97 Hawai#i
528, 536, 40 P.3d 930, 938 (2002) (ruling that an agency's
unchallenged findings are binding on appeal):

3. [Mathern] was hired on March 18, 2014, as a Branch
Office Administrator (BOA).

4. [Mathern] worked in the Pahoa office with one other
employee, a Financial Advisor (FA).
5. On January 2, 2015, during her employment with
[Employer], [Mathern] suffered a work injury.
6. [Mathern's] last day of work was February 10, 2015.

7. [Mathern] filed for workers' compensation on April 12,
2015. The work injury was found to be compensable
under Chapter 386, HRS. As a result, [Mathern]
collected temporary disability benefits based on an
average weekly wage rate of $640.00 as determined by
the Disability Compensation Division decision dated
July 15, 2015.

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8. [Employer] placed [Mathern] on federal Family Medical
Leave (FMLA) on her one-year employment anniversary,
March 18, 2015. The 12 weeks of job protected leave
expired on June 10, 2015. [Employer] extended
[Mathern's] leave through September 10, 2015.

9. Between February 13, 2015 through September 30, 2015,
[Mathern] was off duty from work.
10. On September 23, 2015, [Mathern] was discharged by
[Employer] via letter, and informed she could re-apply
for employment once she was released to return to
work. [Mathern] received the letter on September 28,
2015 by United Parcel Service.
11. On September 25, 2015, Peter E. Diamond, M.D. opined
that [Mathern] could now return to work with
restrictions based on his earlier June 11, 2015,
independent medical examination (IME) of [Mathern].

12. On September 28, 2015, Dr. Kurt Halverson, D.C.,
[Mathern's] personal workers' compensation doctor
still placed [Mathern] off duty from work between
October 1-31, 2015.

13. On October 21, 2015, [Mathern] filed her complaint
with the Wage Standards Division.
14. Throughout 2015 and 2016, [Mathern] continued to
receive medical treatment for the work-related injury.

15. On October 11, 2016, [Mathern] was released by her
workers' compensation doctor to return to work
beginning November 1, 2016, with specific work
restrictions detailed in the September 21, 2016
Functional Capacity Evaluation Report from CHART Rehab
attached. An additional restriction was added
effective April 1, 2017. [Mathern] continues to
receive occupational therapy for her injury.

(Record citations omitted.)
The Director also relied on the hearing officer's
discussion of the relevant facts, which included the following
additional relevant findings:

[Mathern] and [Employer] agree that due to the
impending Kilauea lava flow from December 19, 2014, the
Pahoa office was temporarily closed. [Mathern] and the FA
were temporarily located to the Hilo Shopping Center office
from December 22, 2014, to January 2015. Once the lava flow
stopped, the equipment was moved back from the Hilo office
into the Pahoa office with the intent to re-open the Pahoa
office. However, the Pahoa office never reopened.
During January 2015, the plan was to re-open the Pahoa
office, however, before reopening the Pahoa office, the Hilo
FA decided to retire, and the Pahoa FA decided to take over
that office. The Hilo office already had an employee in the
BOA position, therefore the [Mathern] would not have been
eligible to transfer with the FA. Because the FA relocated,
the [Employer] permanently closed the Pahoa office, and that
office remains closed to this day.

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Under HRS § 378-32(a)(2), it is unlawful for an
employer "to suspend, discharge, or discriminate against any of
the employer's employees . . . [s]olely because the employee
has suffered a work injury which arose out of and in the
course of the employee's employment with the employer . . . ."
However, HRS § 378-32(a)(2) contains a "limited exception" that
allows an employer to "suspend, discharge, or discriminate
against" an employee "[s]olely because the employee has suffered
a work injury" if "the employee is no longer capable of
performing the employee's work as a result of the work injury and
the employer has no other available work which the employee is
capable of performing." BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Los
Angeles, Inc. v. Murakami, 145 Hawai#i 38, 44 n.9, 445 P.3d 710,
716 n.9 (2019) (quoting predecessor statute HRS § 378-32(2)).
Thus, an employer does not violate the statute: (1) "if it
discriminates against [or discharges] an employee for a
legitimate reason" or (2) the employee is no longer capable of
performing the employee's work as a result of the work injury and
the employer has no other available work which the employee is
capable of performing. Id. at 45, 445 P.3d at 717. "[A]
'legitimate' reason must be one that is justifiable in view of
the purpose of the statute," which is to protect employees who
suffer work injuries "by ensuring that they are restored to their
position or placed in a commensurate position when they return
from a work-related injury." Id. (original brackets omitted)
(quoting Adams v. CDM Media USA, Inc., 135 Hawai#i 1, 15, 346
P.3d 70, 84 (2015), and citing S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 782, in
1981 Senate Journal, at 1249; H. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 580, in
1981 House Journal, at 1179).
Here, the hearing officer concluded that both: (1)
Employer did not discharge Mathern solely because she had
suffered a covered work injury (i.e., there was a legitimate
reason to discharge her); and (2) Mathern was no longer capable
of performing her work as a result of the work injury when she
was discharged, and Employer had no work for her once she was
released by her doctor to return to work.

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As to the former conclusion, i.e., the legitimate
reason, the hearing officer reasoned: "[Mathern's incumbent FA
at [the] Pahoa office chose not to return to the Pahoa office,
and relocated to the Hilo office when the FA at that location
retired. There was already a BOA at that site, and no other
vacant BOA position existed there or at any other location on the
island of Hawaii." The Director relied on this same reasoning in
the Decision and Order. This reasoning is based on the hearing
officer's relevant factual findings, which were supported by
substantial evidence. In particular, Steven Rarick, Employer's
Department Leader of Associate Relations, confirmed in his
testimony that the Pahoa office location was temporarily closed
following the 2014-15 lava flow; a temporary move was made to the
Hilo office; in March 2015, when the Hilo FA retired, the Pahoa
FA combined her business with the Hilo FA; the Pahoa FA relocated
her office to the Hilo location, and the Pahoa office permanently
closed; there was a BOA working at the Hilo office; the FA and
the BOA are the only two employees in that location; and there
were no other available BOA positions on Hawai#i Island. For her
part, Mathern could not explain in her testimony why she believes
she was discharged solely due to her injury and stated she did
not know why she was terminated.
On appeal, Mathern argues in part that she was capable
of returning to work and performing her duties when she was
discharged. We need not decide this issue, however, as
substantial evidence supports the Director's conclusion that
Employer did not discharge Mathern solely because she had
suffered a covered work injury. See supra.
Mathern also argues that Employer actually discharged
her because she had exhausted her FMLA. Mathern claims that
Employer later took the "inconsistent position" that the Pahoa
office was closed and there was no position left for her, which
Mathern also characterizes as "fraud." These arguments raise
factual issues that turn on the hearing officer's resolution of
any conflicts in the witnesses' testimony or other evidence.
"[C]ourts decline to consider the weight of the evidence to
ascertain whether it weighs in favor of the administrative

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findings, or to review the agency's findings of fact by passing
upon the credibility of witnesses or conflicts in testimony
. . . ." In re Hawaiian Elec. Co., 81 Hawai#i 459, 465, 918 P.2d
561, 567 (1996) (citing In re Hawaiian Elec. Light Co., 60 Haw.
625, 629, 594 P.2d 612, 617 (1979)).
Here, the hearing officer, "[h]aving reviewed the
evidence presented by the parties and having observed the
demeanor of those who testified," determined that Mathern was not
discharged solely due to her work injury, in that Employer's
Pahoa office was permanently closed in early 2015 and there were
no other available positions for her on Hawai#i Island. Mathern
has not shown that these mixed determinations of fact and law,
which the Director adopted, were "[c]learly erroneous in view of
the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole
record[.]"4/ HRS § 91-14(g)(5) (2012 & Supp. 2019).
Accordingly, the Circuit Court did not err in affirming
the Director's Decision and Order.
For the reasons discussed above, the Final Judgment
entered on October 27, 2025, in the Circuit Court of the Third
Circuit is affirmed.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, January 28, 2026.

On the briefs:

Ted H.S. Hong /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
for Appellant-Appellant. Presiding Judge

Li-Ann Yamashiro and
Adam S. Rosenberg, /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
Deputy Attorneys General, Associate Judge
for Director, Department of
Labor and Industrial
Relations, State of Hawai#i, /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
Appellee-Appellee. Associate Judge

Judy M. Iriye
(Littler Mendelson, P.C.),
for Edward D. Jones & Company,
Appellee-Appellee

4/
We also reject Mathern's contention that Employer first argued
during the May 14, 2019 hearing that the Pahoa office had been closed and
Mathern's position had been eliminated. Employer in fact raised this issue in
its August 19, 2016 response to the charge of discrimination filed by Mathern
with the Hawai#i Civil Rights Commission, as well as in Employer's May 7, 2019
Hearing Memorandum.

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Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
28-JAN-2026
08:29 AM
Dkt. 65 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

ALLISEN C. MATHERN, Appellant-Appellant, v.
EDWARD D. JONES & COMPANY, CORVEL CORPORATION, and
DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
STATE OF HAWAII, Appellees-Appellees

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
(CIVIL NO. 3CCV-XX-XXXXXXX)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Hiraoka, Presiding Judge, Wadsworth and McCullen, JJ.)

In this secondary appeal, Appellant-Appellant Allisen
C. Mathern (Mathern) appeals from the October 27, 2025 Final
Judgment (Judgment) entered in favor of Appellees-Appellees
Edward D. Jones & Co. (Employer) and Director, Department of
Labor and Industrial Relations (DLIR), State of Hawaii (Director)
in the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit (Circuit Court).1/
Mathern also challenges the Circuit Court's May 4, 2023 "Order
Affirming Director's Decision and Order of May 5, 2022" (Order).
The Order and Judgment affirmed the Director's May 5, 2022
Decision and Order, which (1) adopted the findings of fact and
conclusions of law contained in an administrative hearings
officer's July 5, 2019 Recommended Decision, and (2) concluded
that Mathern was not discharged by Employer solely because she
suffered a work injury in alleged violation of Hawaii Revised

1/
The Honorable Henry T. Nakamoto presided.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER

Statutes (HRS) § 378-32(a)(2).2/
On appeal, Mathern contends that the Circuit Court:
(1) erred in concluding that DLIR did not violate Mathern's due
process rights when it delayed hearing and rendering a final
decision on her claim; and (2) "ignored the substantial evidence
and evidence of fraud by the [E]mployer" when the court affirmed
the Director's conclusion that Mathern was not discharged solely
because she suffered a work injury.3/
Our review of "decision[s] made by the circuit court
upon its review of an agency's decision is a secondary appeal."
Flores v. Bd. of Land & Nat. Res., 143 Hawai#i 114, 120, 424 P.3d
469, 475 (2018) (quoting Paul's Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Befitel, 104
Hawai#i 412, 416, 91 P.3d 494, 498 (2004)). We apply the
standards set forth in HRS § 91-14(g) (2012 & Supp. 2019) to
determine whether the Circuit Court's decision was right or
wrong. Id. at 120-21, 424 P.3d at 475-76 (quoting Paul's Elec.
Serv., 104 Hawai#i at 416, 91 P.3d at 498).
After reviewing the record on appeal and the relevant
legal authorities, and giving due consideration to the issues
raised and the arguments advanced by the parties, we resolve
Mathern's contentions as follows, and affirm.

2/
(HRS) § 378-32(a) (2015) states, in relevant part:

(a) It shall be unlawful for any employer to suspend,
discharge, or discriminate against any of the employer's
employees:
. . . .
(2) Solely because the employee has suffered a work
injury which arose out of and in the course of
the employee's employment with the employer and
which is compensable under chapter 386 unless
the employee is no longer capable of performing
the employee's work as a result of the work
injury and the employer has no other available
work which the employee is capable of
performing. Any employee who is discharged
because of the work injury shall be given first
preference of reemployment by the employer in
any position which the employee is capable of
performing and which becomes available after the
discharge and during the period thereafter until
the employee secures new employment. . . .
3/
Mathern's points of error, which are somewhat difficult to
discern, have been restated and reordered for clarity.

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(1) Mathern contends that DLIR (and presumably the
Director) violated her due process rights when it unreasonably
delayed hearing and rendering a final decision on her claim.
She argues that there were three periods of unreasonable delay,
as follows: (1) a 21-month period from October 21, 2015, when
Mathern filed her complaint with DLIR, through July 10, 2017,
when she requested that DLIR schedule a hearing; (2) an 18-month
period from August 16, 2017, when DLIR's then-Director explained
to Mathern why her complaint had not proceeded to hearing,
through February 1, 2019, when Mathern requested that the hearing
officer "initiate proceedings against the Employer" (the hearing
then went forward on May 14, 2019); and (3) a 33-month period
from July 25, 2019, when Mathern filed her exceptions to the
hearing officer's Recommended Decision, through May 5, 2022, when
the Director's Decision and Order was issued. These periods
coincide roughly with the passage of time between (1) the filing
of the complaint and the hearing, and (2) the issuance of the
hearing officer's Recommended Decision and the Director's
Decision and Order.
The Hawai#i Supreme Court has stated that where an
agency has followed all relevant administrative requirements, a
substantial wait for an agency decision will not be deemed
unreasonable unless "the delay was caused by an unjustified
agency decision to postpone resolution of the matter or was so
outside the bounds of the workings of a large and complex
bureaucracy as to be deemed unreasonable per se." Trivectra v.
Ushijima, 112 Hawai#i 90, 109, 144 P.3d 1, 20 (2006). Further, a
hearing officer has the authority to "[c]ontrol the procedures of
the hearing[,]" and to "[t]ake other actions that are necessary
and proper for the conduct of the hearing." Hawai#i
Administrative Rules (HAR) § 12-24-14(a)(1), (6) (effective
1981).
Based on the entire record, we conclude that DLIR did
not violate Mathern's due process rights due to unreasonable
delay in hearing and deciding her claim. Initially, Mathern has
not shown that DLIR failed to follow any relevant administrative
requirements. Regarding the alleged delays, as to the period

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between the filing of the complaint and the hearing, the Director
found that "the Hearing Officer properly stayed the hearing due
to the pending determination as to whether [Mathern] suffered a
work injury which arose out of and in the course of [Mathern's]
employment with [Employer] and which was compensable under [HRS]
chapter 386." Indeed, Mathern could not prevail on her claim
under HRS § 378-32(a)(2) unless, among other things, she suffered
a work injury "which is compensable under chapter 386."
Mathern's workers' compensation claim was closed in January 2019,
and the hearing officer held a hearing on her HRS § 378-32 claim
in May 2019. We cannot conclude that in these circumstances, the
hearing officer's decision, in the exercise of his discretion, to
wait for a full and final resolution of the workers' compensation
claim before proceeding with the section 378-32 hearing was
unjustified or "so outside the bounds of the workings of [DLIR]
as to be deemed unreasonable per se." Trivectra, 112 Hawai#i at
109, 144 P.3d at 20; cf. Puchert v. Agsalud, 67 Haw. 25, 37 n.5,
677 P.2d 449, 458 n.5 (1984) (construing predecessor version of
HRS § 378-33(b): "Continuing a hearing, rather than dismissing a
complaint, avoids the problem of having to re-file and re-process
the same paperwork.").
As to the period between the issuance of the hearing
officer's Recommended Decision and the Director's Decision and
Order, DLIR's then-Director explained in a February 24, 2020
letter to Mathern's counsel that DLIR was reviewing the entire
case file and recorded proceedings of the July 5, 2019 hearing
before issuing a final decision and order. Such a review was
authorized by HAR § 12-24-15(c) ("Upon filing of exceptions by a
party adversely affected by the recommended decision, the
director may consider the whole record or portions thereof . . .
[and] then make a final decision stating the reasons or basis
therefor and enter an appropriate order."). The Director
asserted below and now on appeal that the COVID-19 pandemic, of
which we take judicial notice, also played a significant role in
the delay. We cannot conclude that in these circumstances the
delay between the issuance of the hearing officer's Recommended
Decision and the Director's Decision and Order was unjustified or

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"so outside the bounds of the workings of [DLIR] as to be deemed
unreasonable per se." Trivectra, 112 Hawai#i at 109, 144 P.3d at
20.
In any event, Mathern has not shown that she suffered
any prejudice as a result of the delays she cites, particularly
in light of the finding that her position with Employer was
eliminated. See infra; S. Foods Grp., L.P. v. State, Dep't of
Educ., 89 Hawai#i 443, 453, 974 P.2d 1033, 1043 (1999) (to
reverse or modify an agency decision under HRS § 91–14(g), "the
appellate court must conclude that an appellant's substantial
rights were prejudiced by the agency."). On this record, the
Circuit Court did not err in concluding that DLIR (and the
Director) did not violate Mathern's due process rights.
(2) Mathern contends that the Circuit Court erred when
it "ignored the substantial evidence and evidence of fraud by
[E]mployer at the agency level" and ruled:

The DLIR was not clearly erroneous by ignoring the
allegedly substantial evidence in support of [Mathern's]
returning to work. The [Certified Record on Appeal]
supports the decision that [Employer] gave [Mathern] seven
months of leave, and that it eliminated her position due to
a legitimate business purpose as the Pahoa branch office
closed and [Employer] did not have a role for [Mathern] to
return to after her leave of absence.

The Director adopted the following findings of fact by
the hearing officer, none of which Mathern expressly contests in
her opening brief, see Poe v. Haw. Labor Rels. Bd., 97 Hawai#i
528, 536, 40 P.3d 930, 938 (2002) (ruling that an agency's
unchallenged findings are binding on appeal):

3. [Mathern] was hired on March 18, 2014, as a Branch
Office Administrator (BOA).

4. [Mathern] worked in the Pahoa office with one other
employee, a Financial Advisor (FA).
5. On January 2, 2015, during her employment with
[Employer], [Mathern] suffered a work injury.

6. [Mathern's] last day of work was February 10, 2015.
7. [Mathern] filed for workers' compensation on April 12,
2015. The work injury was found to be compensable
under Chapter 386, HRS. As a result, [Mathern]
collected temporary disability benefits based on an
average weekly wage rate of $640.00 as determined by
the Disability Compensation Division decision dated
July 15, 2015.

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8. [Employer] placed [Mathern] on federal Family Medical
Leave (FMLA) on her one-year employment anniversary,
March 18, 2015. The 12 weeks of job protected leave
expired on June 10, 2015. [Employer] extended
[Mathern's] leave through September 10, 2015.
9. Between February 13, 2015 through September 30, 2015,
[Mathern] was off duty from work.
10. On September 23, 2015, [Mathern] was discharged by
[Employer] via letter, and informed she could re-apply
for employment once she was released to return to
work. [Mathern] received the letter on September 28,
2015 by United Parcel Service.
11. On September 25, 2015, Peter E. Diamond, M.D. opined
that [Mathern] could now return to work with
restrictions based on his earlier June 11, 2015,
independent medical examination (IME) of [Mathern].

12. On September 28, 2015, Dr. Kurt Halverson, D.C.,
[Mathern's] personal workers' compensation doctor
still placed [Mathern] off duty from work between
October 1-31, 2015.
13. On October 21, 2015, [Mathern] filed her complaint
with the Wage Standards Division.
14. Throughout 2015 and 2016, [Mathern] continued to
receive medical treatment for the work-related injury.

15. On October 11, 2016, [Mathern] was released by her
workers' compensation doctor to return to work
beginning November 1, 2016, with specific work
restrictions detailed in the September 21, 2016
Functional Capacity Evaluation Report from CHART Rehab
attached. An additional restriction was added
effective April 1, 2017. [Mathern] continues to
receive occupational therapy for her injury.

(Record citations omitted.)
The Director also relied on the hearing officer's
discussion of the relevant facts, which included the following
additional relevant findings:

[Mathern] and [Employer] agree that due to the
impending Kilauea lava flow from December 19, 2014, the
Pahoa office was temporarily closed. [Mathern] and the FA
were temporarily located to the Hilo Shopping Center office
from December 22, 2014, to January 2015. Once the lava flow
stopped, the equipment was moved back from the Hilo office
into the Pahoa office with the intent to re-open the Pahoa
office. However, the Pahoa office never reopened.
During January 2015, the plan was to re-open the Pahoa
office, however, before reopening the Pahoa office, the Hilo
FA decided to retire, and the Pahoa FA decided to take over
that office. The Hilo office already had an employee in the
BOA position, therefore the [Mathern] would not have been
eligible to transfer with the FA. Because the FA relocated,
the [Employer] permanently closed the Pahoa office, and that
office remains closed to this day.

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Under HRS § 378-32(a)(2), it is unlawful for an
employer "to suspend, discharge, or discriminate against any of
the employer's employees . . . [s]olely because the employee
has suffered a work injury which arose out of and in the
course of the employee's employment with the employer . . . ."
However, HRS § 378-32(a)(2) contains a "limited exception" that
allows an employer to "suspend, discharge, or discriminate
against" an employee "[s]olely because the employee has suffered
a work injury" if "the employee is no longer capable of
performing the employee's work as a result of the work injury and
the employer has no other available work which the employee is
capable of performing." BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Los
Angeles, Inc. v. Murakami, 145 Hawai#i 38, 44 n.9, 445 P.3d 710,
716 n.9 (2019) (quoting predecessor statute HRS § 378-32(2)).
Thus, an employer does not violate the statute: (1) "if it
discriminates against [or discharges] an employee for a
legitimate reason" or (2) the employee is no longer capable of
performing the employee's work as a result of the work injury and
the employer has no other available work which the employee is
capable of performing. Id. at 45, 445 P.3d at 717. "[A]
'legitimate' reason must be one that is justifiable in view of
the purpose of the statute," which is to protect employees who
suffer work injuries "by ensuring that they are restored to their
position or placed in a commensurate position when they return
from a work-related injury." Id. (original brackets omitted)
(quoting Adams v. CDM Media USA, Inc., 135 Hawai#i 1, 15, 346
P.3d 70, 84 (2015), and citing S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 782, in
1981 Senate Journal, at 1249; H. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 580, in
1981 House Journal, at 1179).
Here, the hearing officer concluded that both: (1)
Employer did not discharge Mathern solely because she had
suffered a covered work injury (i.e., there was a legitimate
reason to discharge her); and (2) Mathern was no longer capable
of performing her work as a result of the work injury when she
was discharged, and Employer had no work for her once she was
released by her doctor to return to work.

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As to the former conclusion, i.e., the legitimate
reason, the hearing officer reasoned: "[Mathern's incumbent FA
at [the] Pahoa office chose not to return to the Pahoa office,
and relocated to the Hilo office when the FA at that location
retired. There was already a BOA at that site, and no other
vacant BOA position existed there or at any other location on the
island of Hawaii." The Director relied on this same reasoning in
the Decision and Order. This reasoning is based on the hearing
officer's relevant factual findings, which were supported by
substantial evidence. In particular, Steven Rarick, Employer's
Department Leader of Associate Relations, confirmed in his
testimony that the Pahoa office location was temporarily closed
following the 2014-15 lava flow; a temporary move was made to the
Hilo office; in March 2015, when the Hilo FA retired, the Pahoa
FA combined her business with the Hilo FA; the Pahoa FA relocated
her office to the Hilo location, and the Pahoa office permanently
closed; there was a BOA working at the Hilo office; the FA and
the BOA are the only two employees in that location; and there
were no other available BOA positions on Hawai#i Island. For her
part, Mathern could not explain in her testimony why she believes
she was discharged solely due to her injury and stated she did
not know why she was terminated.
On appeal, Mathern argues in part that she was capable
of returning to work and performing her duties when she was
discharged. We need not decide this issue, however, as
substantial evidence supports the Director's conclusion that
Employer did not discharge Mathern solely because she had
suffered a covered work injury. See supra.
Mathern also argues that Employer actually discharged
her because she had exhausted her FMLA. Mathern claims that
Employer later took the "inconsistent position" that the Pahoa
office was closed and there was no position left for her, which
Mathern also characterizes as "fraud." These arguments raise
factual issues that turn on the hearing officer's resolution of
any conflicts in the witnesses' testimony or other evidence.
"[C]ourts decline to consider the weight of the evidence to
ascertain whether it weighs in favor of the administrative

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findings, or to review the agency's findings of fact by passing
upon the credibility of witnesses or conflicts in testimony
. . . ." In re Hawaiian Elec. Co., 81 Hawai#i 459, 465, 918 P.2d
561, 567 (1996) (citing In re Hawaiian Elec. Light Co., 60 Haw.
625, 629, 594 P.2d 612, 617 (1979)).
Here, the hearing officer, "[h]aving reviewed the
evidence presented by the parties and having observed the
demeanor of those who testified," determined that Mathern was not
discharged solely due to her work injury, in that Employer's
Pahoa office was permanently closed in early 2015 and there were
no other available positions for her on Hawai#i Island. Mathern
has not shown that these mixed determinations of fact and law,
which the Director adopted, were "[c]learly erroneous in view of
the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole
record[.]"4/ HRS § 91-14(g)(5) (2012 & Supp. 2019).
Accordingly, the Circuit Court did not err in affirming
the Director's Decision and Order.
For the reasons discussed above, the Final Judgment
entered on October 27, 2025, in the Circuit Court of the Third
Circuit is affirmed.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, January 28, 2026.

On the briefs:

Ted H.S. Hong /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
for Appellant-Appellant. Presiding Judge

Li-Ann Yamashiro and
Adam S. Rosenberg, /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
Deputy Attorneys General, Associate Judge
for Director, Department of
Labor and Industrial
Relations, State of Hawai#i, /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
Appellee-Appellee. Associate Judge

Judy M. Iriye
(Littler Mendelson, P.C.),
for Edward D. Jones & Company,
Appellee-Appellee

4/
We also reject Mathern's contention that Employer first argued
during the May 14, 2019 hearing that the Pahoa office had been closed and
Mathern's position had been eliminated. Employer in fact raised this issue in
its August 19, 2016 response to the charge of discrimination filed by Mathern
with the Hawai#i Civil Rights Commission, as well as in Employer's May 7, 2019
Hearing Memorandum.

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