Ricci v. Gaiotti

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
03-JUN-2026
07:37 AM
Dkt. 105 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

GARY J. RICCI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
ANNETTE GAIOTTI, DONALD GOLDBERG, Defendants-Appellees,
and
DOES 1-10, Defendants.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 2CCV-XX-XXXXXXX)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Leonard, Presiding Judge, and Wadsworth and Guidry, JJ.)

Plaintiff-Appellant Gary J. Ricci (Ricci) appeals from
the Judgment entered in favor of Defendants-Appellees Annette
Gaiotti and Donald Goldberg (Defendants) on November 26, 2024, by
the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit (Circuit Court).1/ Ricci
also challenges the Circuit Court's Order Granting Defendants[']
. . . Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Medical
Causation, Filed on January 29, 2024 [Dkt. 201] (Order Granting
MPSJ).2/
The operative First Amended Verified Complaint, filed
on March 18, 2022, asserted a single, negligence claim against
Defendants. Ricci alleged that he suffered an injury to his left

1/
The Honorable Michelle L. Drewyer presided.
2/
Ricci originally appealed from the Order Granting MPSJ. On
November 22, 2024, we temporarily remanded this matter to the Circuit Court
for entry of an appealable judgment. On November 26, 2024, the Circuit Court
entered the Judgment, which perfected the appeal under Hawai#i Rules of
Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER

eye – his only working eye – and related damages when a rock hit
him while using a weed whacker at Defendants' property (the
Incident). More specifically, Ricci claimed in responses to
interrogatories that he suffered "loss of vision, difficulty
focusing[ and] tear duct issues/soaking eye" and was
"[d]epressed, worried about [his] future vision" after he "was
struck in the left eye by flying debris . . . ."
On January 29, 2024, Defendants filed a motion for
partial summary judgment as to medical causation (MPSJ). They
argued that Ricci would be unable to prove the causation element
of his negligence claim, because he did not have any medical
evidence that his alleged eye deficits were caused by the
Incident as opposed to pre-existing conditions and injuries or
subsequent events. Defendants pointed to attached interrogatory
responses and deposition testimony by Ricci indicating that he
had scratched his left eye on an agave plant in March 2020, a
month before the Incident; confirming that records from his
treatment providers showed he had cataracts in his left eye prior
to the Incident; and confirming that a treatment provider after
the Incident found no evidence of a foreign body present in his
left eye.3/ Defendants argued that given these circumstances,
Ricci would need expert medical testimony to establish a causal
link between the Incident and his alleged eye deficits, and
though the deadline for producing expert reports had passed,
Ricci had not identified an expert or produced a report
establishing medical causation.4/
In opposing the MPSJ, Ricci discussed the Incident and
his alleged eye injuries. He argued that the prior agave injury
to his eye was documented as a "mild abrasion." He stated his
intent to have expert testimony on medical causation at trial,

3/
Ricci stated his belief that the records from his treatment
providers were falsified. Ricci also claimed that Aloha Eye Clinic and
Bennett Eye Institute, which were not named as defendants in this case,
committed malpractice when treating him following the alleged Incident.
4/
Ricci had disclosed and produced a report by a clinical
psychologist, Santo Triolo, Ph.D., who provided a psychological evaluation of
Ricci. Although Dr. Triolo noted Ricci's claim of "an on the job injury
involving an insult to his left eye," Dr. Triolo did not provide an opinion on
causation.

2
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER

but provided no expert report. He also attached what appear to
be unauthenticated pages from his medical records, some with
handwritten notes.
In their reply, Defendants argued that Ricci had failed
to support his opposition with any admissible evidence and, in
particular, the attached medical records were not properly
authenticated and were hearsay. Defendants also pointed out that
Ricci still did not have a medical opinion establishing
causation.
Following a March 7, 2024 hearing, the Circuit Court
entered the Order Granting MPSJ.5/
On appeal, Ricci appears to contend that the Circuit
Court erred in granting the MPSJ, but the opening brief contains
no statement of the points of error.6/ As best we can discern,
Ricci appears to argue that: (1) the Circuit Court applied a
"double standard" when Ricci was not able to use his
unauthenticated medical records to prove his case, while
Defendants were allowed to use documents to make "purely
unrelated, irrelevant claims"; (2) Ricci was "denied" the
opportunity to retain an expert; and (3) Ricci "had arranged with
doctors and was to have 4 experts at trial[,]" who were not
allowed to testify.7/

5/
The record on appeal does not include a transcript of the hearing.
See Bettencourt v. Bettencourt, 80 Hawai#i 225, 230, 909 P.2d 553, 558 (1995)
("The burden is upon appellant in an appeal to show error by reference to
matters in the record, and he or she has the responsibility of providing an
adequate transcript." (brackets omitted) (quoting Union Bldg. Materials Corp.
v. The Kakaako Corp., 5 Haw. App. 146, 151, 682 P.2d 82, 87 (1984))).
6/
Ricci's opening brief fails to comply in numerous material
respects with Hawai#i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 28(b)(4). For
example, Ricci fails to provide "[a] concise statement of the points of error
set forth in separately numbered paragraphs[,]" and fails to state where in
the record the Circuit Court's alleged errors occurred and how the matters
were brought to the court's attention. HRAP Rule 28(b)(4). Further, Ricci's
argument is often difficult to discern and fails to provide citations to
relevant parts of the record. HRAP Rule 28(b)(7). Nevertheless, we have
"consistently adhered to the policy of affording litigants the opportunity 'to
have their cases heard on the merits, where possible.'" Marvin v. Pflueger,
127 Hawai#i 490, 496, 280 P.3d 88, 94 (2012) (quoting Morgan v. Plan. Dep't,
Cnty. of Kauai, 104 Hawai#i 173, 180–81, 86 P.3d 982, 989–90 (2004)). We thus
address Ricci's arguments to the extent discernible.
7/
Other assertions made in Ricci's opening brief regarding alleged
errors by the Circuit Court are waived for failure to present a discernible
argument "with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record
relied on." HRAP Rule 28(b)(7).

3
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER

After reviewing the record on appeal and the relevant
legal authorities, and giving due consideration to the issues
raised and the arguments advanced by the parties, we resolve
Ricci's contentions as follows, and affirm.
We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de
novo using the same standard applied by the trial court. Nozawa
v. Operating Eng'rs Local Union No. 3, 142 Hawai#i 331, 338, 418
P.3d 1187, 1194 (2018) (citing Adams v. CDM Media USA, Inc., 135
Hawai#i 1, 12, 346 P.3d 70, 81 (2015)). "Summary judgment is
appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law." Id. at 342, 418 P.3d at 1198 (brackets
omitted) (quoting Adams, 135 Hawai#i at 12, 346 P.3d at 81). "A
fact is material if proof of that fact would have the effect of
establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of a cause
of action or defense asserted by the parties." Id. (quoting
Adams, 135 Hawai#i at 12, 346 P.3d at 81). The evidence and the
inferences drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. Yoneda v. Tom, 110
Hawai#i 367, 384, 133 P.3d 796, 813 (2006) (citing Coon v. City &
Cnty. of Honolulu, 98 Hawai#i 233, 244-45, 47 P.3d 348, 359-60
(2002)).
The moving party has the burden to establish that
summary judgment is proper. Nozawa, 142 Hawai#i at 342, 418 P.3d
at 1198 (citing French v. Haw. Pizza Hut, Inc., 105 Hawai#i 462,
470, 99 P.3d 1046, 1054 (2004)).

Where the moving party is the defendant, who does not bear
the ultimate burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is
proper when the non-moving party-plaintiff
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no
genuine issue as to any material fact, since a
complete failure of proof concerning an essential
element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily
renders all other facts immaterial.

Exotics Hawaii-Kona, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 116

4
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER

Hawai#i 277, 302, 172 P.3d 1021, 1046 (2007) (emphases omitted)
(quoting Hall v. State, 7 Haw. App. 274, 284, 756 P.2d 1048, 1055
(1988)). Further, a defendant moving for summary judgment "may
satisfy his or her initial burden of production by either (1)
presenting evidence negating an element of the non-movant's
claim, or (2) demonstrating that the non[-]movant will be unable
to carry his or her burden of proof at trial." Ralston v. Yim,
129 Hawai#i 46, 60, 292 P.3d 1276, 1290 (2013).
"Once a summary judgment movant has satisfied its
initial burden of producing support for its claim that there is
no genuine issue of material fact, the party opposing summary
judgment must 'demonstrate specific facts, as opposed to general
allegations, that present a genuine issue worthy of trial.'"
Nozawa, 142 Hawai#i at 342, 418 P.3d at 1198 (brackets omitted)
(quoting Lales v. Wholesale Motors Co., 133 Hawai#i 332, 359, 328
P.3d 341, 368 (2014)).
In a negligence action, the plaintiff bears the burden
of proving legal causation, which requires that the plaintiff
first show that the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor
in bringing about the plaintiff's injuries. See O'Grady v.
State, 140 Hawai#i 36, 43-44, 398 P.3d 625, 632-33 (2017). Here,
Defendants argued in the MPSJ that Ricci would be unable to prove
the causation element of his negligence claim, i.e., that
Defendants' alleged conduct in connection with the Incident was a
substantial factor in bringing about Ricci's alleged eye
deficits. Defendants pointed to evidence of pre-existing
conditions and subsequent treatment that undermined the causation
element, and contended that Ricci would need expert medical
testimony to establish a causal link between the Incident and his
alleged eye deficits. They showed that the deadline for
producing expert reports had passed, such that Ricci would be
unable to present such testimony at trial. In sum, Defendants
satisfied their initial burden on summary judgment.
The burden then shifted to Ricci, who did not show that
he would be able to prove the causation element of his negligence
claim with admissible evidence at trial. In particular, he did
not show that he would be able to present expert testimony

5
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER

establishing a causal link between the Incident and his alleged
eye deficits.
In an ordinary negligence case, expert testimony is
generally not required to establish causation. See Bernard v.
Char, 79 Hawai#i 371, 377, 903 P.2d 676, 682 (App. 1995). In
medical malpractice actions, on the other hand, plaintiffs are
required to establish legal causation through expert medical
testimony based on a reasonable medical probability. Estate of
Frey v. Mastroianni, 146 Hawai#i 540, 557, 463 P.3d 1197, 1214
(2020) (quoting Barbee v. Queen's Med. Ctr., 119 Hawai#i 136,
158, 163, 194 P.3d 1098, 1120, 1125 (App. 2008)). This is
"[b]ecause 'the causal link' between alleged acts of medical
negligence and their specific results is often 'not within the
realm of common knowledge[.]'" Id. (some internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Barbee, 119 Hawai#i at 161, 194 P.3d at
1123).
This is not a medical malpractice action, but it is
also not an ordinary negligence case, inasmuch as the proffered
facts regarding Ricci's eye deficits and their potential causes
do not present matters within the realm of common knowledge or
ordinary experience. In these circumstances, Ricci needed to
offer expert medical testimony to establish a causal link between
the Incident and his eye deficits. He did not show that he would
be able to provide such testimony — or any other admissible
medical causation evidence — at trial.
Ricci contends that the Circuit Court applied a "double
standard" when he was not able to use his medical records to
prove his case, while Defendants were allowed to use documents to
make "purely unrelated, irrelevant claims." In fact, Defendants
relied on Ricci's interrogatory responses and deposition
testimony regarding his eye deficits and their potential causes
to support the MPSJ. This evidence was plainly relevant to the
causation element of Ricci's negligence claim. Ricci does not
deny that his opposition rested on medical records that were not
properly authenticated and were hearsay. His argument is without
merit.

6
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER

Ricci contends that he was "denied" the opportunity to
retain an expert. This contention is not supported by any
evidence and, indeed, is contradicted by Ricci's claim that he
had four experts ready to testify at trial. Ricci had roughly 21
months from when he filed his initial March 15, 2022 complaint to
the December 4, 2023 extended deadline to disclose experts and
produce their reports. His failure to do so was not the result
of any denial of opportunity by the Circuit Court.
Ricci contends that he "had arranged with doctors and
was to have 4 experts at trial[,]" who were not allowed to
testify when the Circuit Court entered the Order Granting MPSJ.
Ricci does not deny that he failed to provide any expert reports
or opinions on causation by the December 4, 2023 deadline or
thereafter, when he filed his opposition to the MPSJ. Dr.
Triolo's evaluation did not provide an opinion on causation. See
supra note 4. Ricci's argument is without merit.
On this record, the Circuit Court did not err in
granting the MPSJ, which effectively granted summary judgment in
Defendants' favor.
For these reasons the Order Granting MPSJ and the
Judgment are affirmed.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, June 3, 2026.

On the briefs:
/s/ Katherine G. Leonard
Gary J. Ricci, Presiding Judge
Self-represented Plaintiff-
Appellant.
/s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
Norman K. Odani Associate Judge
(Law Offices of Leslie R. Kop)
for Defendants-Appellees.
/s/ Kimberly T. Guidry
Associate Judge

7

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
03-JUN-2026
07:37 AM
Dkt. 105 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

GARY J. RICCI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
ANNETTE GAIOTTI, DONALD GOLDBERG, Defendants-Appellees,
and
DOES 1-10, Defendants.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 2CCV-XX-XXXXXXX)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Leonard, Presiding Judge, and Wadsworth and Guidry, JJ.)

Plaintiff-Appellant Gary J. Ricci (Ricci) appeals from
the Judgment entered in favor of Defendants-Appellees Annette
Gaiotti and Donald Goldberg (Defendants) on November 26, 2024, by
the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit (Circuit Court).1/ Ricci
also challenges the Circuit Court's Order Granting Defendants[']
. . . Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Medical
Causation, Filed on January 29, 2024 [Dkt. 201] (Order Granting
MPSJ).2/
The operative First Amended Verified Complaint, filed
on March 18, 2022, asserted a single, negligence claim against
Defendants. Ricci alleged that he suffered an injury to his left

1/
The Honorable Michelle L. Drewyer presided.
2/
Ricci originally appealed from the Order Granting MPSJ. On
November 22, 2024, we temporarily remanded this matter to the Circuit Court
for entry of an appealable judgment. On November 26, 2024, the Circuit Court
entered the Judgment, which perfected the appeal under Hawai #i Rules of
Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER

eye – his only working eye – and related damages when a rock hit
him while using a weed whacker at Defendants' property (the
Incident). More specifically, Ricci claimed in responses to
interrogatories that he suffered "loss of vision, difficulty
focusing[ and] tear duct issues/soaking eye" and was
"[d]epressed, worried about [his] future vision" after he "was
struck in the left eye by flying debris . . . ."
On January 29, 2024, Defendants filed a motion for
partial summary judgment as to medical causation (MPSJ). They
argued that Ricci would be unable to prove the causation element
of his negligence claim, because he did not have any medical
evidence that his alleged eye deficits were caused by the
Incident as opposed to pre-existing conditions and injuries or
subsequent events. Defendants pointed to attached interrogatory
responses and deposition testimony by Ricci indicating that he
had scratched his left eye on an agave plant in March 2020, a
month before the Incident; confirming that records from his
treatment providers showed he had cataracts in his left eye prior
to the Incident; and confirming that a treatment provider after
the Incident found no evidence of a foreign body present in his
left eye.3/ Defendants argued that given these circumstances,
Ricci would need expert medical testimony to establish a causal
link between the Incident and his alleged eye deficits, and
though the deadline for producing expert reports had passed,
Ricci had not identified an expert or produced a report
establishing medical causation.4/
In opposing the MPSJ, Ricci discussed the Incident and
his alleged eye injuries. He argued that the prior agave injury
to his eye was documented as a "mild abrasion." He stated his
intent to have expert testimony on medical causation at trial,

3/
Ricci stated his belief that the records from his treatment
providers were falsified. Ricci also claimed that Aloha Eye Clinic and
Bennett Eye Institute, which were not named as defendants in this case,
committed malpractice when treating him following the alleged Incident.
4/
Ricci had disclosed and produced a report by a clinical
psychologist, Santo Triolo, Ph.D., who provided a psychological evaluation of
Ricci. Although Dr. Triolo noted Ricci's claim of "an on the job injury
involving an insult to his left eye," Dr. Triolo did not provide an opinion on
causation.

2
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER

but provided no expert report. He also attached what appear to
be unauthenticated pages from his medical records, some with
handwritten notes.
In their reply, Defendants argued that Ricci had failed
to support his opposition with any admissible evidence and, in
particular, the attached medical records were not properly
authenticated and were hearsay. Defendants also pointed out that
Ricci still did not have a medical opinion establishing
causation.
Following a March 7, 2024 hearing, the Circuit Court
entered the Order Granting MPSJ.5/
On appeal, Ricci appears to contend that the Circuit
Court erred in granting the MPSJ, but the opening brief contains
no statement of the points of error.6/ As best we can discern,
Ricci appears to argue that: (1) the Circuit Court applied a
"double standard" when Ricci was not able to use his
unauthenticated medical records to prove his case, while
Defendants were allowed to use documents to make "purely
unrelated, irrelevant claims"; (2) Ricci was "denied" the
opportunity to retain an expert; and (3) Ricci "had arranged with
doctors and was to have 4 experts at trial[,]" who were not
allowed to testify.7/

5/
The record on appeal does not include a transcript of the hearing.
See Bettencourt v. Bettencourt, 80 Hawai#i 225, 230, 909 P.2d 553, 558 (1995)
("The burden is upon appellant in an appeal to show error by reference to
matters in the record, and he or she has the responsibility of providing an
adequate transcript." (brackets omitted) (quoting Union Bldg. Materials Corp.
v. The Kakaako Corp., 5 Haw. App. 146, 151, 682 P.2d 82, 87 (1984))).
6/
Ricci's opening brief fails to comply in numerous material
respects with Hawai#i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 28(b)(4). For
example, Ricci fails to provide "[a] concise statement of the points of error
set forth in separately numbered paragraphs[,]" and fails to state where in
the record the Circuit Court's alleged errors occurred and how the matters
were brought to the court's attention. HRAP Rule 28(b)(4). Further, Ricci's
argument is often difficult to discern and fails to provide citations to
relevant parts of the record. HRAP Rule 28(b)(7). Nevertheless, we have
"consistently adhered to the policy of affording litigants the opportunity 'to
have their cases heard on the merits, where possible.'" Marvin v. Pflueger,
127 Hawai#i 490, 496, 280 P.3d 88, 94 (2012) (quoting Morgan v. Plan. Dep't,
Cnty. of Kauai, 104 Hawai #i 173, 180–81, 86 P.3d 982, 989–90 (2004)). We thus
address Ricci's arguments to the extent discernible.
7/
Other assertions made in Ricci's opening brief regarding alleged
errors by the Circuit Court are waived for failure to present a discernible
argument "with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record
relied on." HRAP Rule 28(b)(7).

3
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER

After reviewing the record on appeal and the relevant
legal authorities, and giving due consideration to the issues
raised and the arguments advanced by the parties, we resolve
Ricci's contentions as follows, and affirm.
We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de
novo using the same standard applied by the trial court. Nozawa
v. Operating Eng'rs Local Union No. 3, 142 Hawai#i 331, 338, 418
P.3d 1187, 1194 (2018) (citing Adams v. CDM Media USA, Inc., 135
Hawai#i 1, 12, 346 P.3d 70, 81 (2015)). "Summary judgment is
appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law." Id. at 342, 418 P.3d at 1198 (brackets
omitted) (quoting Adams, 135 Hawai#i at 12, 346 P.3d at 81). "A
fact is material if proof of that fact would have the effect of
establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of a cause
of action or defense asserted by the parties." Id. (quoting
Adams, 135 Hawai#i at 12, 346 P.3d at 81). The evidence and the
inferences drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. Yoneda v. Tom, 110
Hawai#i 367, 384, 133 P.3d 796, 813 (2006) (citing Coon v. City &
Cnty. of Honolulu, 98 Hawai#i 233, 244-45, 47 P.3d 348, 359-60
(2002)).
The moving party has the burden to establish that
summary judgment is proper. Nozawa, 142 Hawai#i at 342, 418 P.3d
at 1198 (citing French v. Haw. Pizza Hut, Inc., 105 Hawai#i 462,
470, 99 P.3d 1046, 1054 (2004)).

Where the moving party is the defendant, who does not bear
the ultimate burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is
proper when the non-moving party-plaintiff
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no
genuine issue as to any material fact, since a
complete failure of proof concerning an essential
element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily
renders all other facts immaterial.

Exotics Hawaii-Kona, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 116

4
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER

Hawai#i 277, 302, 172 P.3d 1021, 1046 (2007) (emphases omitted)
(quoting Hall v. State, 7 Haw. App. 274, 284, 756 P.2d 1048, 1055
(1988)). Further, a defendant moving for summary judgment "may
satisfy his or her initial burden of production by either (1)
presenting evidence negating an element of the non-movant's
claim, or (2) demonstrating that the non[-]movant will be unable
to carry his or her burden of proof at trial." Ralston v. Yim,
129 Hawai#i 46, 60, 292 P.3d 1276, 1290 (2013).
"Once a summary judgment movant has satisfied its
initial burden of producing support for its claim that there is
no genuine issue of material fact, the party opposing summary
judgment must 'demonstrate specific facts, as opposed to general
allegations, that present a genuine issue worthy of trial.'"
Nozawa, 142 Hawai#i at 342, 418 P.3d at 1198 (brackets omitted)
(quoting Lales v. Wholesale Motors Co., 133 Hawai#i 332, 359, 328
P.3d 341, 368 (2014)).
In a negligence action, the plaintiff bears the burden
of proving legal causation, which requires that the plaintiff
first show that the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor
in bringing about the plaintiff's injuries. See O'Grady v.
State, 140 Hawai#i 36, 43-44, 398 P.3d 625, 632-33 (2017). Here,
Defendants argued in the MPSJ that Ricci would be unable to prove
the causation element of his negligence claim, i.e., that
Defendants' alleged conduct in connection with the Incident was a
substantial factor in bringing about Ricci's alleged eye
deficits. Defendants pointed to evidence of pre-existing
conditions and subsequent treatment that undermined the causation
element, and contended that Ricci would need expert medical
testimony to establish a causal link between the Incident and his
alleged eye deficits. They showed that the deadline for
producing expert reports had passed, such that Ricci would be
unable to present such testimony at trial. In sum, Defendants
satisfied their initial burden on summary judgment.
The burden then shifted to Ricci, who did not show that
he would be able to prove the causation element of his negligence
claim with admissible evidence at trial. In particular, he did
not show that he would be able to present expert testimony

5
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER

establishing a causal link between the Incident and his alleged
eye deficits.
In an ordinary negligence case, expert testimony is
generally not required to establish causation. See Bernard v.
Char, 79 Hawai#i 371, 377, 903 P.2d 676, 682 (App. 1995). In
medical malpractice actions, on the other hand, plaintiffs are
required to establish legal causation through expert medical
testimony based on a reasonable medical probability. Estate of
Frey v. Mastroianni, 146 Hawai#i 540, 557, 463 P.3d 1197, 1214
(2020) (quoting Barbee v. Queen's Med. Ctr., 119 Hawai#i 136,
158, 163, 194 P.3d 1098, 1120, 1125 (App. 2008)). This is
"[b]ecause 'the causal link' between alleged acts of medical
negligence and their specific results is often 'not within the
realm of common knowledge[.]'" Id. (some internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Barbee, 119 Hawai#i at 161, 194 P.3d at
1123).
This is not a medical malpractice action, but it is
also not an ordinary negligence case, inasmuch as the proffered
facts regarding Ricci's eye deficits and their potential causes
do not present matters within the realm of common knowledge or
ordinary experience. In these circumstances, Ricci needed to
offer expert medical testimony to establish a causal link between
the Incident and his eye deficits. He did not show that he would
be able to provide such testimony — or any other admissible
medical causation evidence — at trial.
Ricci contends that the Circuit Court applied a "double
standard" when he was not able to use his medical records to
prove his case, while Defendants were allowed to use documents to
make "purely unrelated, irrelevant claims." In fact, Defendants
relied on Ricci's interrogatory responses and deposition
testimony regarding his eye deficits and their potential causes
to support the MPSJ. This evidence was plainly relevant to the
causation element of Ricci's negligence claim. Ricci does not
deny that his opposition rested on medical records that were not
properly authenticated and were hearsay. His argument is without
merit.

6
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER

Ricci contends that he was "denied" the opportunity to
retain an expert. This contention is not supported by any
evidence and, indeed, is contradicted by Ricci's claim that he
had four experts ready to testify at trial. Ricci had roughly 21
months from when he filed his initial March 15, 2022 complaint to
the December 4, 2023 extended deadline to disclose experts and
produce their reports. His failure to do so was not the result
of any denial of opportunity by the Circuit Court.
Ricci contends that he "had arranged with doctors and
was to have 4 experts at trial[,]" who were not allowed to
testify when the Circuit Court entered the Order Granting MPSJ.
Ricci does not deny that he failed to provide any expert reports
or opinions on causation by the December 4, 2023 deadline or
thereafter, when he filed his opposition to the MPSJ. Dr.
Triolo's evaluation did not provide an opinion on causation. See
supra note 4. Ricci's argument is without merit.
On this record, the Circuit Court did not err in
granting the MPSJ, which effectively granted summary judgment in
Defendants' favor.
For these reasons the Order Granting MPSJ and the
Judgment are affirmed.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, June 3, 2026.

On the briefs:
/s/ Katherine G. Leonard
Gary J. Ricci, Presiding Judge
Self-represented Plaintiff-
Appellant.
/s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
Norman K. Odani Associate Judge
(Law Offices of Leslie R. Kop)
for Defendants-Appellees.
/s/ Kimberly T. Guidry
Associate Judge

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