Edward Lee Williams v. State of Iowa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0599
Filed July 24, 2024

EDWARD LEE WILLIAMS,
Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Patrick McElyea,

Judge.

Applicant appeals the summary dismissal of his postconviction-relief

application. AFFIRMED.

R.E. Breckenridge of Breckenridge Law P.C., Ottumwa, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Aaron Rogers, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Considered by Schumacher, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Blane, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2024).
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BLANE, Senior Judge.

Edward Lee Williams appeals the grant of summary disposition and

dismissal of his most recent postconviction-relief application (PCR). He contends

that the jury that was discharged due to a mistrial was the same jury at the second

trial that returned his guilty verdict. He also contends that the judge from the

mistrial should not have been the judge at the second trial. He claims his trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to object to those events. Finally, he argues that

the PCR court erred when it failed to comply with the procedures in Iowa Code

section 822.6 (2021). Upon our review, we find Williams’ arguments are not

supported by the record and affirm.

I. Background facts and proceedings.

In 1969, Williams was charged with murder in the first degree. A jury trial

started on September 22, 1969, but a mistrial was declared on September 24, and

the jury was excused. A second trial began on October 13. On October 20, the

jury found Williams guilty as charged. Williams appealed. The Iowa Supreme

Court affirmed. State v. Williams, 207 N.W.2d 98, 104–110 (Iowa 1973). In 1981,

Williams filed his first PCR application, which was denied and affirmed by the Iowa

Supreme Court without opinion. See Williams v. State, No. 64492 (Iowa 1981). In

1994, he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court, which was

denied. See Williams v. Scurr, No. 93-2697, 1994 WL 69477, at *1 (8th Cir. Jan.

24, 1994). Williams filed his second PCR application in 2007. It was dismissed as

untimely. Williams again appealed. By unpublished order on June 24, 2008, the

Iowa Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as frivolous. None of these

proceedings raised an issue regarding the jury.
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On June 7, 2021, Williams filed his third PCR application raising one primary

issue—that the jury empaneled at the first trial, which was declared a mistrial, was

the same jury at the second trial that returned the guilty verdict. He also added

that the judge from the mistrial should not have been the judge at the second trial.

Based on this claim, he asserted his criminal trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to object to these alleged errors.

On August 22, 2022, the State filed a motion for summary dismissal setting

forth two grounds: (1) that Williams failed to state a claim for which relief could be

granted and (2) the claim was barred by the statute of limitations, specifically

arguing the PCR application was not timely filed and there was no evidence or

issues that could not have been raised earlier. See Iowa Code § 822.6(3).

At the hearing, Williams, represented by counsel, participated by video

conferencing. He contested the State’s motion based on statute of limitations. He

also argued that the newly discovered evidence exception applied. Williams was

the only witness and testified:

Q. Did you have a different jury panel at that time or was it the
same jury that you had for your previous trial? A. It was the same
jury.
Q. When did you discover that? A. About two or three years
ago there was a case in Waterloo where they had a discussion about
the jury so I checked my paperwork and I could not find when we
selected the second jury.
Q. So do you believe that it was the same jury that came and
tried your case the second time? A. Yes.
....
Q. But you have no independent recollection of the first set of
jurors being the same people at the second trial? That’s what I’m
asking. Do you understand my question? A. Yes. No, huh-uh. I
don’t have any recollection.
....
Q. What makes you believe then that it was the same jury?
A. Because the first trial that resulted in a mistrial I was there with my
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attorney, the State was represented, the judge was presiding and we
selected a jury and then we went to trial. All right. In the second trial
we didn’t do any of that. We went right in and we began the
prosecution. So I’m saying where was the second jury, you know? I
wasn’t there. My attorney wasn’t there. There was no record of it
so, you know, so where was the second jury? I know I didn’t pick it.
Q. Okay. And that information can be verified through your
underlying case which is part of this record, right? A. Yes.

The court took judicial notice of the court file in Williams’ criminal trial. See id.

§ 822.6A.

The PCR court granted the State’s motion for summary dismissal. The

court, citing to the record in the criminal case, found

On September 25, 1969, a District Court Judge signed an order
specifically excusing the jury panel that heard the first trial from jury
service the week of October 13, 1969, when the second trial was set
to commence. The record reflects a new jury was empaneled on
October 13, 1969 to hear the second trial. On October 20, 1969, the
jury returned a verdict finding the Applicant guilty of first-degree
murder. This verdict form is signed by one of the jurors listed on the
“trial jury and witness record” dated October 13, 1969. This name
does not appear in the “trial jury and witness record” for September
22, 1969.

Based upon these findings, the court concluded, “[T]he record is abundantly clear

that the Applicant had two separate and distinct juries to hear his two trials.” The

Ruling further stated:

this issue was not raised on direct appeal nor was it raised in any
prior postconviction relief action. The Applicant would have been
immediately aware of this issue and there has been no articulable
reason presented why this was not raised either on direct appeal or
within the initial three-year statute of limitations for postconviction
relief actions.

The court then denied Williams’ PCR application “pursuant to [Iowa Code section]

822.6(3) for failure to state a genuine issue of material fact, and pursuant to [Iowa
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Code section] 822.3 for failure to timely file the application within the statute of

limitations.” Williams appeals.

II. Standard of review.

In general, we review the denial of an application for postconviction relief

for legal error. Sothman v. State, 967 N.W.2d 512, 522 (Iowa 2021). But when an

application raises the constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we

review the record de novo. See id. We review the summary dismissal of an

application for postconviction relief for errors at law. Castro v. State, 795 N.W.2d

789, 792 (Iowa 2011).

III. Discussion.

There are several preliminary issues which we must first address. The

State contends that Williams did not preserve the issues for appeal. The primary

issue raised by Williams is his claim that the jury at his mistrial improperly convicted

him when it was seated for his second trial. The district court ruled on that issue

and it is properly before us. We do agree that Williams’ second issue, that the

same judge should not have presided at his second trial, was not addressed by

the district court, Williams did not file a motion to enlarge under Iowa Rule of Civil

Procedure 1.904(2), and so it is not preserved for our review. See Lamasters v.

State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 863 (Iowa 2012) (holding that a motion to amend or

enlarge is necessary to preserve error if a district court does not rule on an issue).

Next, before addressing Williams’ primary arguments, we consider his claim

that his PCR counsel did not have access to the murder trial criminal court file upon

which the court relied in reaching its decision. On November 21, 2022, Williams’

counsel filed a motion to access the file. The court granted this request on
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November 22. Based upon our review of the hearing transcript, it is clear that

Williams’ counsel received a copy of the file. At the hearing, counsel stated: “Your

Honor, I don’t think—I have that on—I was able to get a copy emailed to me by the

Clerk of Court.” Later, counsel stated: “once you look at the criminal calendar you

will see . . . .” Williams’ counsel was not deprived access to the file and had the

opportunity to challenge the court’s reading of and findings that were based upon

the criminal court file.

Next, Williams contends the district court failed to follow the proper

procedure in ruling on the State’s motion for summary dismissal under Iowa Code

section 822.6(3). That section provides:

The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition
of the application, when it appears from the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact,
together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.

In PCR cases, motions for summary disposition are handled in the same manner

as a motion for summary judgment under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.981.

The goal of that provision “is to provide a method of disposition once
the case has been fully developed by both sides, but before an actual
trial.” Manning v. State, 654 N.W.2d 555, 559 (Iowa 2002) (quoting
Hines v. State, 288 N.W.2d 344, 346 (Iowa 1980)).
“We apply our summary judgment standards to summary
disposition of postconviction-relief applications.” Moon [v. State],
911 N.W.2d [137], 142 [(Iowa 2018)]. “[F]or a summary disposition
to be proper, the State must be able to prevail as if it were filing a
motion for summary judgment in a civil proceeding.” Schmidt v.
State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 784 (Iowa 2018).

Linn v. State, 929 N.W.2d 717, 730 (Iowa 2019).

On appeal, Williams claims that the State did not establish it was entitled to

summary disposition; that his testimony created a fact dispute, the district court
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should not have granted summary disposition, and he is entitled to an evidentiary

hearing on the merits of his claim. We do not agree. Williams’ testimony, over

fifty-two years since the criminal trial, is equivocal at best whether the mistrial jury

was the same jury that found him guilty. He based his testimony on a review of

his own “paperwork.” He agreed he “had no independent recollection of the first

set of jurors being the same people at the second trial.” But, as he now recalls, at

the second trial he and his attorney did not go through the process of selecting a

new jury, so he surmises the mistrial jury must have heard the second trial and

returned the guilty verdict. Williams finally agreed “that information can be verified

through [his] underlying case which is part of this record.”

Iowa Code section 822.6A provides:

The underlying trial court record containing the conviction for which
an applicant seeks postconviction relief, as well as the court file
containing any previous application filed by the applicant relating to
the same conviction, shall automatically become part of the record in
a claim for postconviction relief under this chapter.

The district court properly considered the criminal court file in deciding the State’s

motion. The court file establishes that a different jury than the one from the mistrial

was seated for Williams’ second trial and returned the guilty verdict. There was no

genuine dispute of material fact, and the court properly granted the State’s motion

for summary dismissal. Further, since the record establishes that a second jury

and not the mistrial jury returned the guilty verdict, Williams’ criminal trial counsel

had no basis to object and did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel. See

State v. Horness, 600 N.W.2d 294, 298 (Iowa 1999) (counsel is not ineffective for

failing to make an objection that has no merit).
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The State also argues that Williams’ PCR application is barred by the three-

year statute of limitations found in Iowa Code section 822.3. Williams claims he

qualifies for the newly-discovered-evidence exception. To qualify, Williams must

prove:

(1) that the evidence was discovered after the verdict;
(2) that it could not have been discovered earlier in the
exercise of due diligence;
(3) that the evidence is material to the issues in the case and
not merely cumulative or impeaching; and
(4) that the evidence probably would have changed the result
of the trial.

Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 516 (Iowa 2003) (quoting Jones v. State, 479

N.W.2d 265, 274 (Iowa 1991)). We agree with the State that Williams does not

qualify for the exception. Whether the first jury from the mistrial sat as the trier of

fact and rendered the verdict during the second trial would have been readily

observable even before the verdict was returned. Further, the claim regarding the

jury is not newly discovered evidence that would affect the verdict. Williams’

assertion of what he “discovered” does not qualify as evidence. He heard about a

jury issue occurring in a Waterloo case “where they had a discussion about the

jury.” As a result, he checked his “paperwork,” which presumably he has had since

his trial. He could not find in his paperwork that a second jury had been selected.

He also could not recall a second jury being selected. Obviously, whether a

second jury had been selected was readily discoverable with due diligence before

the expiration of the three-year limitation. The district court was likewise correct in

deciding that Williams’ PCR application was untimely and subject to dismissal

under Iowa Code section 822.3.

AFFIRMED.