State of Iowa v. Hannah Leeann Johnston

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0302
Filed December 18, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

HANNAH LEEANN JOHNSTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Virginia Cobb, Judge.

A defendant appeals the sentence imposed after revocation of her deferred

judgment and probation. AFFIRMED.

Karmen R. Anderson of Anderson & Taylor, PLLC, Des Moines, for

appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Schumacher, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ.
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BADDING, Judge.

Not long after her eighteenth birthday, Hannah Johnston was arrested for

first-offense possession of marijuana. She pleaded guilty to that offense and

received a deferred judgment in October 2022. By December 2023, four probation

violation reports had been filed. The final report resulted in the district court

revoking Johnston’s deferred judgment and ordering her to serve 180 days in jail.

Johnston appeals the sentence imposed by the district court,1 claiming the court

abused its discretion by considering unproven charges. Because Johnston failed

to show the court relied on those charges in determining her sentence, we affirm.

Less than one month after she received her deferred judgment, Johnston

was arrested for operating while intoxicated. The judicial district department of

correctional services filed a probation violation report, and Johnston stipulated to

the violation. The district court found Johnston in contempt but continued her on

probation. A second report of violations was filed in June 2023, this time after

Johnston tested positive for methamphetamine and admitted use. The report

alleged that Johnston had also, among other things, stopped attending outpatient

substance use treatment. And an addendum in July stated that Johnston had

another positive test for methamphetamine. Johnston stipulated to the violation

alleged in the July addendum and was again found in contempt. As an additional

condition of her probation, the court ordered Johnston to complete inpatient

substance use treatment.

1 State v. Thompson, 951 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2020) (finding good cause to appeal

following guilty plea where defendant was challenging “the order revoking her
deferred judgment and entering a judgment of conviction and sentence”).
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According to a third probation violation report that was filed in September,

Johnston was discharged early from inpatient treatment because of mental health

concerns. She then missed an appointment with her probation officer and did not

tell the officer where she was residing. Once more, Johnston stipulated that she

violated her probation and was found in contempt. The court also extended her

probation for another year.

The fourth and final report of violations was filed in December. This report

alleged that Johnston had been charged with possession of drug paraphernalia

and possession of fentanyl. She had also stopped attending outpatient substance

use treatment. An addendum in January 2024 alleged that Johnston’s urinalysis

test that month was “positive for opiates other than heroin and methamphetamine.”

After Johnston stipulated to these latest violations, a hearing was held in February

to determine whether to continue her probation or revoke the deferred judgment

and impose a sentence. See Iowa Code § 908.11(4) (2024); see also State v.

Covel, 925 N.W.2d 183, 187 (Iowa 2019) (noting that after the court determines

the defendant has violated a condition of probation, “the second step is

determining whether the person should be committed to prison or whether the

court should take other steps to protect society and improve chances of

rehabilitation”).

At the hearing, Johnston’s probation officer recommended that the court

revoke Johnston’s deferred judgment and probation, explaining:

She’s been on probation for a year and a half, and I’ve
supervised her the whole time. We’ve done inpatient treatment.
We’ve tried outpatient substance abuse treatment. We’ve done GPS
monitoring for over two months. Her probation was extended, and I
had her come in more frequently for probation appointments, and
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she’s just continued to use. She’s not working. She wasn’t attending
outpatient treatment as recommended. She’s gotten three new
charges while on probation.

The prosecutor echoed the probation officer’s recommendation, noting “we

have tried every avenue” and “been here so many times”:

Ms. Johnston is not yet 20 years old, Your Honor, and at this
point she’s facing a possession of Fentanyl charge in Polk County.
It would be a second offense, which means that if she’s found with
any kind of drug, if she’s convicted of that charge in Polk County,
she’s facing felony charges as a 19-year-old. That is terrifying to me
as a member of the community, as a prosecutor, and as an individual
with friends who have children her age. I am nervous to put her back
into the community so quickly given the history of this case where
we’ve had sentences being imposed and less than 60 days later
we’re back in court on new possession charges.

The court interrupted the prosecutor to ask about Johnston’s inpatient treatment,

following which the prosecutor continued:

[T]he fatality of Fentanyl use is what concerns me the most, and the
fact that Ms. Johnston has had multiple substance abuse and mental
health evaluations done, it’s concerning that this most recent
substance abuse evaluation suggested less treatment than her
previous ones, especially given the positive test results that were
received in this court on January 11th for methamphetamine and
opiates or Fentanyl.
....
. . . [G]iven all of the other avenues that we have attempted
with Ms. Johnston, I think at this point the only thing that the State
has left is imposing the original sentence of 180 days. And again, I
don’t ask for that lightly. I know that that is a very hard sentence to
serve, but I also think it’s the only way to ensure that Ms. Johnston
doesn’t continue to use Fentanyl, methamphetamine, marijuana.

Johnston seizes on these statements in arguing “[b]oth counsel for the State

and the district court judge spent the majority of the hearing discussing [the

fentanyl] charge and its implications on Johnston’s behavior, ability to rehabilitate,

and ultimately her sentence for revocation.” She contends this was improper

because she did not admit to anything “beyond the sole fact that she had been
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charged with those crimes.” The State concedes that Johnston did not admit the

new charges but argues that the majority of the hearing did not focus on those

charges “and the district court did not indicate it considered them in imposing

sentence.” We agree with the State.

Although we review sentencing proceedings for the correction of legal error,

“we will not reverse the decision of the district court absent an abuse of discretion

or some defect in the sentencing procedure.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720,

724 (Iowa 2002). “A court may not consider an unproven or unprosecuted offense

when sentencing a defendant unless (1) the facts before the court show the

accused committed the offense, or (2) the defendant admits it.” State v. Gordon,

921 N.W.2d 19, 25 (Iowa 2018) (citation omitted). The fact that the court merely

was aware of unproven offenses is not sufficient to overcome the presumption that

its sentencing discretion was properly exercised. State v. Guise, 921 N.W.2d 26,

30 (Iowa 2018); accord State v. Woodward, No. 03-0661, 2004 WL 144134, at *1

(Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2004). There must instead “be an affirmative showing that

the court relied on” the unproven offenses. Woodward, 2004 WL 144134, at *1

(citing Ashley, 462 N.W.2d at 282). Johnston has not met that burden.

Immediately after the prosecutor finished her recommendation, defense

counsel replied: “Your Honor, on behalf of my client, the Fentanyl charge is not in

front of this Court. The Fentanyl charge is in Polk County, and my client is going

to face that charge and address it in an appropriate manner.” Counsel continued,

At the end of the day, if we take a step back, the charge that
is here in Dallas County is first possession of marijuana. It is my
understanding this was her first criminal charge altogether. . . . What
we are asking the Court to do is . . . find her in contempt, give her 55
days with credit served, discharge her from probation, and let her go
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and deal with her Fentanyl charges and other violations in Polk
County.

After hearing from Johnston, who also asked “to be able to go handle my

charges over in Polk County and get that taken care of,” the court stated:

Here’s my concern: I’m concerned about your life, and it looks to me
like you’re having trouble handling probation because of, it sounds
like, both your addiction and your mental health issues. And I have
to question your ability to manage—and your attorney is right that
you’re not convicted of anything in the Polk County charges yet. I
get that. But it just seems to me that you are not handling street
probation well.

(Emphasis added.) The court then reasoned that “at the very least, by revoking

your deferred and revoking your probation, I know that you have no choice but to

be clean at least for some period of time.”

As the State argues, and the italicized passage makes clear, the district

court stated it was not considering Johnston’s unproven charges. See State v.

Matheson, 684 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa 2004) (“As a minimum the court should

make it clear the offending evidence was not a consideration.”); State v. Sailer,

587 N.W.2d 756, 764 (Iowa 1998) (trusting that our district courts “will filter out

improper or irrelevant evidence”). Its consideration of Johnston’s poor

performance while on probation and her need for treatment was not improper,

given her multiple positive drug tests for methamphetamine and her admissions to

using that drug. See Iowa Code § 907.5(1) (listing sentencing factors); State v.

McCalley, 972 N.W.2d 672, 678 (Iowa 2022) (considering defendant’s past “failure

to rehabilitate despite numerous opportunities”). For these reasons, we affirm

Johnston’s sentence.

AFFIRMED.