In the Interest of M.A., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1274
Filed January 9, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF M.A.,
Minor Child,

F.F., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Fayette County, Linnea M.N. Nicol,

Judge.

A mother appeals the juvenile court’s dispositional review order and finding

of reasonable efforts. AFFIRMED.

Kristin R. Schiller Herman, Calmar, for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Sarah Dooley Rothman of Rothman Law Office, Independence, attorney

and guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Schumacher, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.

A mother appeals the juvenile court’s dispositional review order and finding

of reasonable efforts. Upon our de novo review, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

We have previously discussed this case’s history in a separate appeal:

This family has been involved in
department-of-health-and-human-services investigations and the
juvenile court for years, which has included child abuse assessments
founded due to dangerous substances, presence of illegal drugs,
and denial of critical care. The parents also have histories of criminal
activity, primarily relating to drug use.
The mother and father divorced in 2017, pursuant to a
stipulated decree, agreeing to shared physical care of their three
children: M.A., born in 2006; O.A., born in 2007; and M.A., born
in 2010.1 In 2019, the district court modified the dissolution decree,
placing physical care of the children with the father due to the
department’s involvement. Thereafter, the father moved with the
children to Nebraska without input from the mother, limiting the
mother’s contact with the children. In response, the mother filed a
petition to modify the decree, requesting physical care of the
children.

In re M.A., No. 24-0092, 2024 WL 1548812, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2024).

In 2021, the district court granted the mother’s modification request based on the

father’s “actions in alienating his children from” their mother, placing physical care

of the children with her. Id. As a result, M.A. returned to live with her mother in

Iowa.

In 2023, another department investigation opened after it received

allegations of methamphetamine use by the mother. Both “M.A. and M.A. reported

being aware the mother was ‘using drugs again,’ and stated they were

1 This appeal concerns only one of the children: M.A., born in 2010.Both the elder
M.A. and O.A. have reached the age of majority and are not subjects of this juvenile
proceeding.
3

‘responsible’ for caring for their younger half-siblings,” allegedly while their mother

used drugs in the basement. Id. The children were removed from their mother’s

custody and adjudicated in need of assistance (CINA).2 Id. While M.A. was initially

placed with her paternal grandmother, she eventually returned to her father’s home

in Nebraska pursuant to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children

(ICPC).

Throughout the proceedings, the department’s two main concerns were the

mother’s substance use and her inability to communicate with M.A. To her credit,

the mother made significant progress in addressing the former. She completed

inpatient treatment, and even post-release, continued to maintain her sobriety in

outpatient treatment. As of the last hearing, the mother was actively engaging in

both treatment and medication management. Her two younger children were even

returned to her custody, and their juvenile proceedings were dismissed.

But in regard to the latter issue, the mother did not address her poor

relationship with M.A. From the beginning of the proceedings, M.A. adamantly

expressed her desire to live with her father. Before the finalization of the ICPC

home study, she “look[ed] forward to being able to move back to live with [her] dad

in Nebraska.” And once she did return to Nebraska, she thrived. According to the

department, M.A. was an excellent student and “very artistic.” M.A.’s guardian ad

litem opined that she was “happy and healthy [in her father’s home] and able to be

a teenager, not having to parent her younger half-siblings” and that the mother

2 M.A. was removed along with her two younger half-siblings, but they went to

separate placements. The two younger children are not at issue in this appeal, so
we do not address them unless necessary.
4

shows no empathy for the lingering effects that [her substance use]
has had on her teenagers. She belittles the concerns that [M.A.] has
about her half-siblings while in their mother’s care, ignoring the reality
that [M.A.] has lived through [the mother’s] various completions of
treatment, periods of sobriety and relapses, and knows firsthand the
negative impact they can have on a child.

The guardian ad litem further described the mother’s contacts with M.A. and her

older sister as being “consistently aimed at denying her responsibility for the

situation, blaming the teens for the situation that she created, and have not shown

an ability to have a positive relationship with them.” M.A., 2024 WL 1548812, at *1.

The mother demanded that M.A. be available at all times in case she called, but

she preferred to call M.A. outside of the designated timeframes, instead reaching

out while M.A. “is in school or later in the evening when she’s getting ready for

bed.” Due to these concerns, the guardian ad litem recommended only supervised

visitation between the mother and M.A. M.A. herself stated “she only goes on visits

with her mom ‘because she knows she has to’ and ‘to see her siblings.’” Before

the final hearing, she “submitted a thoughtful and detailed letter to the court,

expressing her desire to remain in Nebraska with the father.” Id. at *3.

In October 2023, the mother moved for reasonable efforts, alleging the

department failed to provide services such as visitation, family counseling, and

individual counseling for M.A. After a hearing, the district court denied the motion,

finding the department’s efforts were reasonable. The mother appealed, and we

affirmed, finding that continued removal from the mother’s custody was in M.A.’s

best interests and the department made reasonable efforts toward reunification.

See id. at *4–5. Less than one month later, the mother renewed her motion for
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reasonable efforts. After a second hearing, the court denied it. The mother

appeals again.

II. Review.

“We review child-in-need-of-assistance proceedings de novo.” In re D.D.,

955 N.W.2d 186, 192 (Iowa 2021). While not binding on us, “[w]e give weight to

the juvenile court’s factual findings.” Id.

III. Discussion.

The mother challenges the court’s dispositional review order on three

grounds: (1) alleged error in its removal decision; (2) alleged error in its

transfer-of-custody determination; and (3) finding that the department made

reasonable efforts toward reunification. We consider each argument in turn.

A. Continued Removal from the Mother’s Custody.

The mother first argues that the court erred in its finding that M.A. should

continue to be removed from her custody. But she focuses solely on the

improvements she has made in her substance use and fails to address the

department’s other central concern: the mother’s inability to have “appropriate

contact” with M.A. During the mother’s first appeal, we affirmed the continued

removal of M.A. from her custody, finding the “conflict between the mother and

[M.A.] persisted, which needed to be addressed before their relationships could be

repaired.” M.A., 2024 WL 1548812, at *3. In the month between that appeal and

her second motion, no substantial changes occurred. In fact, relations may be

even more strained, with the court finding that the mother had an “[un]reasonable

expectation” that M.A. pick up the phone at all hours of the day instead of following

the scheduled times. We therefore similarly find that the mother has not mended
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her broken relationship with her daughter, which is required before reunification.

Accordingly, we affirm the continued removal from her custody.

B. Transfer of Custody to the Father.

The mother next contends the court erred in transferring custody of M.A. to

the father.3 But this transfer of custody occurred in August 2023 and was not timely

appealed. In April 2024, we affirmed the transfer of custody based on

error-preservation and res judicata principles. See id. Accordingly, we must affirm

again. Id. (collecting cases summarizing these principles and finding such

precedent precludes the mother’s claim).

C. Reasonable-Efforts Finding.

Finally, the mother contends the department did not make reasonable

efforts based on the lack of visitation, individual therapy, and family therapy. See

Iowa Code § 232.102(6) (2023) (requiring the department to make “reasonable

efforts” toward reunification). But we find that the visitation issue is not preserved

for our review. “It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must

ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide

them on appeal.” Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). “Normal

error-preservation rules apply in CINA cases.” M.A., 2024 WL 1548812, at *3.

While it is unclear whether the court ruled on this issue,4 it was not raised by the

mother. In her most recent motion for reasonable efforts, the mother only alleged

3 The mother actually challenges the “continued transfer.” But her analysis focuses

solely on the removal itself, so that is how we interpret her argument.
4 It is unclear whether the juvenile court actually ruled on the visitation issue

because it adopted the exact same language from its first order denying the
mother’s reasonable-efforts motion and did not provide additional analysis.
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inadequate therapy services and did not request additional visitation. Because

she did not raise the issue before the court, we do not reach its merits. See Meier,

641 N.W.2d at 537. But error preservation aside, the mother has not established

any changes to visitation in the month between her previous appeal and her

second motion. We have already determined that the department’s visitation

efforts were reasonable, especially in light of “the distance between the mother’s

home and the father’s home.” M.A., 2024 WL 1548812, at *4. In the absence of

any additional findings or facts since that decision, we must affirm.

As for the delays in therapy, we are not persuaded by the mother’s

arguments. In her previous appeal, the court recommended both the mother and

M.A. participate in individual therapy before attempting any joint sessions. Since

that time, both have been participating in individual therapy but, “neither [M.A.] nor

[her mother] were ready to begin joint counseling.” The court did not find that this

delay was attributable to the department, but instead, it determined that the mother

is “not willing to change to improve [her] relationship” with M.A. “Reunification is a

goal, not a mandate.” D.D., 955 N.W.2d at 196 (Christensen, C.J., concurring

specially) (finding a mother cannot challenge reasonable efforts when her own

actions precluded reunification). We find that the department has made

reasonable efforts with M.A.’s participation in individual therapy. But until the

mother is willing to address the “real barrier,” which is “her own behavior,” the

department is unable to do more. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s denial of the

mother’s motion for reasonable efforts.
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IV. Disposition.

Because the continued removal of M.A. from the mother’s custody is in her

best interests and the department made reasonable efforts towards reunification,

we affirm.

AFFIRMED.