In the Interest of A.T., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-0057
Filed May 21, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF A.T.,
Minor Child,

K.T., Mother,
Appellant,

R.S., Father,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Carrie K. Bryner,

Judge.

Parents separately appeal the termination of their parental rights.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

Deborah M. Skelton, Pleasant Hill, for appellant mother.

Ellen Ramsey-Kacena, Assistant Public Defender, Cedar Rapids, for

appellant father.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Allison Courtney Ray Ackerman of Nidey Erdahl Meier & Araguas, PLC,

Cedar Rapids, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Buller and

Sandy, JJ.
2

SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge.

Parents separately appeal the termination of their parental rights to their

child. Both challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the grounds for

termination and claim the State failed to prove the Iowa Department of Health and

Human Services (the department) made active efforts to reunify them with their

child. The mother also claims termination is not in the child’s best interests due to

the closeness of the parent-child relationship. And the father claims the court

should have placed the child in a guardianship with a maternal aunt in lieu of

terminating parental rights. Upon our review, we affirm on both appeals.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

This family came to the department’s attention most recently in August

2023,1 at the time of A.T.’s birth, due to concerns of methamphetamine use by the

mother. The parents have a history of substance use and domestic violence.

Several years prior, the parents’ older child was removed from their custody at

birth due to those same issues. Jurisdiction of that proceeding was transferred to

tribal court,2 and the case ended with the child’s placement in a guardianship with

a maternal great aunt. Here, upon A.T.’s removal from the parents’ custody, the

child was placed with that relative.

A.T. was adjudicated in need of assistance, and services were initiated for

the family. The tribe intervened but declined to have jurisdiction transferred to the

tribal court.

1 Neither the child nor the mother tested positive for methamphetamine at the time

of the child’s birth. Although the mother maintained she was going to challenge
the basis for the child’s removal, she did not do so.
2 The father is a member of the Sac & Fox Tribe of the Mississippi in Iowa.
3

The mother entered residential treatment at Heart of Iowa. In October, the

department authorized a trial home placement of the child with the mother, under

the condition the mother remain at Heart of Iowa. The trial placement was

suspended briefly in late October but resumed within a few weeks. In December

2024, the mother completed the residential portion of treatment, and the

department informed her that she needed to obtain employment or pursue

education to continue residing there. The mother understood A.T.’s placement

with her was contingent on her being at Heart of Iowa. In early January 2024, the

mother informed the department that she was leaving the facility and returning to

Marshalltown. When the caseworker arrived to pick up the child, she learned the

mother’s most recent drug test was positive for methamphetamine. The child was

placed again with the aunt, where she has remained.

The mother’s engagement in services waned after she moved to

Marshalltown. She obtained a substance-use evaluation, which recommended

extended outpatient services. The mother attended outpatient treatment

sporadically. Her attendance at visits with the child was also inconsistent. She

tested positive for methamphetamine on several occasions. She also missed drug

tests. The State petitioned to terminate parental rights in March 2024.

Meanwhile, the father saw the child in the hospital after her birth despite a

no-contact order between the parents.3 After the child’s initial removal, the father

met with the caseworker and completed a home study. But the father decided not

to participate in services because he believed the mother “was going to do what

3 The father testified the no-contact order was in place between the parents from

2021 to late 2023.
4

needed to be done or whatever” and he “was trying to stay away from her and just

let her do good and get it all done with.” That was the only contact the department

had with the father until after the termination petition was filed, despite repeated

attempts by several providers to reach him. In late April, the father contacted the

department to set up a visit with the child. The father confirmed the visit, but when

the provider arrived with the child at the address the father provided, the father

was not there. The provider waited for twenty minutes before leaving with the child

to return her to the aunt’s home.

The termination trial took place over three days in May, June, and July. The

father testified he had seen the child “two or three” times during the mother’s recent

visits. The parents maintained they were “not together” but explained that the

father attended the visits with the mother “so [A.T.] didn’t freak out” because the

child didn’t know him. The father acknowledged he had not participated in

services. The mother had changed residences several times, including living with

the paternal grandfather, where the father lived.4 The mother acknowledged she

had tested positive for methamphetamine and marijuana “[s]ometime in June,” in

the midst of the termination trial. She believed she was “possibly” going to inpatient

treatment in Fort Dodge and having A.T. placed with her would be incentive for her

to stay sober. Both parents requested the court grant them additional time to work

toward reunification if the court did not return the child to them immediately.

The department, the tribe, and the guardian ad litem recommended

termination of parental rights. The court entered an order terminating both parents’

4 The father denied the mother had lived there.
5

rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(b), (e), and (h) (2024). The

parents separately appeal.

II. Standard of Review

We review termination-of-parental-rights proceedings de novo. In re A.B.,

957 N.W.2d 280, 293 (Iowa 2021). Upon our review, our primary consideration is

the best interests of the child, In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006), the

defining elements of which are the child’s safety and need for a permanent home,

In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 748 (Iowa 2011).

III. Analysis

Because A.T. is a member of the Sac & Fox Tribe of the Mississippi in Iowa,

the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), coupled with Iowa law, controls our

analysis. See Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911–1923 (covering child

custody proceedings); Iowa Code chapter 232B (setting forth Iowa’s Indian Child

Welfare Act). These provisions have the dual purpose of protecting the best

interests of the children and preserving Native American culture. See 25 U.S.C.

§ 1902; In re D.S., 806 N.W.2d 458, 465 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011). In this case, the

parents only raise ICWA provisions in the context of the active-efforts requirement

discussed below.

In general, when reviewing termination-of-parental-rights proceedings

under Iowa law, we follow a three-step analysis, asking whether (1) a statutory

ground for termination is satisfied, (2) the child’s best interests are served by

termination, and (3) a statutory exception applies and should be exercised to

preclude termination. See In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022); see also

Iowa Code § 232.116(1)–(3). The provisions of ICWA “are to be strictly construed
6

and applied to protect American Indian families.” In re C.A.V., 787 N.W.2d 96, 99

(Iowa Ct. App. 2010). Yet, even under an ICWA analysis, the paramount interest

remains the protection of the best interests of the child. In re J.L., 779 N.W.2d

481, 492 (Iowa 2009), abrogated on other grounds by In re T.F., 972 N.W.2d 1, 9

(Iowa 2022).

A. Statutory Grounds for Termination

The district court terminated the parents’ parental rights on three statutory

grounds, but we may affirm if one ground is supported by the record. A.B., 957

N.W.2d at 313. We focus on section 232.116(1)(h), which entails our review of the

parents’ challenges to the court’s determination that the child could not safely be

returned to their custody. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(4) (requiring the State

to show by clear and convincing evidence that the child could not be returned

safely to the custody of either parent at the time of the termination hearing).

Relating to the mother, we conclude the mother’s active and unaddressed

methamphetamine use precludes a finding that the child can be safely returned to

her custody. Although the mother appeared to make some progress at the outset

of this case while at Heart of Iowa, since she opted to leave the facility, she has

made no consistent or meaningful strides toward sobriety. Despite the mother’s

testimony that having A.T. in her care is “motivation” “to stay sober,” A.T.’s trial

home placement ended with the mother’s relapse in January 2024. And the

mother has tested positive for methamphetamine several times since then. As the

court observed, “In fact, the mother is in a much worse place than she was when

the case opened.” In short, “[i]t is unsafe for children to be returned to an

environment where drug use is present, and the [mother] has yet to demonstrate
7

that [s]he can provide an environment free from such behavior.” In re A.T.,

No. 25-0119, 2025 WL 1085210, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2025).

Turning to the father, we find he offers no meaningful argument to support

his claim. After paternity was established, the father did not participate in services

at any time during this proceeding. He now admits his plan to let the mother handle

the case “kind of backfired.” As the court observed, “The father has engaged in a

few visits between the first and last days of trial, but did nothing else. . . . [He has]

not followed through with the Case Permanency Plan. [He] cannot be considered

a safe placement at this time or any time in the reasonable future.” Indeed, the

father has not progressed past fully supervised visits, which in and of itself

“prevent[s] an immediate return of custody.” In re L.H., 13 N.W.3d 627, 629 (Iowa

Ct. App. 2024).

Based on these and the other facts detailed above, we concur with the

court’s assessment that the child could not be returned to the custody of either

parent at the time of the termination hearing. Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h)

was satisfied.

B. Active Efforts

Both parents claim the State failed to prove that the department provided

active efforts to reunify them with A.T. “A party seeking . . . termination of parental

rights over an Indian child shall provide evidence to the court that active efforts

have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs

designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have

proved unsuccessful.” Iowa Code § 232B.5(19); accord 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d).

Reviewing courts have interpreted active efforts to mean “a ‘vigorous and
8

concerted level of casework beyond the level’ typically constituting reasonable

efforts.” D.S., 806 N.W.2d at 468 (quoting Iowa Code § 232B.5(19)). “The active

efforts must be made in a manner that takes into account the prevailing social and

cultural values, conditions, and way of life of the Indian child’s tribe” and may

include:

a. A request to the Indian child’s tribe to convene traditional
and customary support and resolution actions or services.
b. Identification and participation of tribally designated
representatives at the earliest point.
c. Consultation with extended family members to identify
family structure and family support services that may be provided by
extended family members.
d. Frequent visitation in the Indian child’s home and the
homes of the child’s extended family members.
e. Exhaustion of all tribally appropriate family preservation
alternatives.
f. Identification and provision of information to the child’s
family concerning community resources that may be able to offer
housing, financial, and transportation assistance and actively
assisting the family in accessing the community resources.

Iowa Code § 232B.5(19).

The mother contends “the only requirement met by the State was the

transportation assistance.”5 But the department offered family-centered services,

solution-based casework, SafeCare services, family interactions, trial home

placement, drug testing, child protective assessments, mental-health services,

psychosexual evaluations, substance-use resources, paternity testing, relative

placement, kinship navigator services, and transportation assistance. The

5 We observe that transportation assistance was also offered for the father,
although he failed to accept it for the most part. The provider transported A.T. to
the father’s home for the father’s only scheduled visit and “they were willing to try
to work with him to make sure that wasn’t a barrier.”
9

department was also in regular communication with tribal representatives,

including tribal family services providers.

At the termination trial, a qualified expert witness who was an enrolled

member of the tribe and had worked in Indian child welfare for twenty years

testified. She stated she was “familiar with the culture, familiar with the family

relations within our culture.” She testified the tribe became involved with A.T.’s

case during the “assessment phase” and that it had received subsequent

“notifications on the case and updates” from the department. She stated the tribe

denied the parents’ request to transfer jurisdiction of the case to tribal court due to

the mother’s initial placement in residential treatment and her subsequent move to

Marshalltown. The tribal expert opined the department “went above and beyond

[with the mother’s] visits,” and she confirmed there was nothing more the

department “could have done with this family to work towards reunification.” See

In re Z.F., No. 23-1416, 2024 WL 1297009, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2024)

(“The tribal expert witness confirmed that the department efforts were what ‘I would

have done every step the same.’”). Ultimately, she believed the department “made

every effort to provide services and work with the family.”

The tribal expert further opined it was in the child’s best interests to

terminate parental rights, despite the potential cultural implications. She testified:

Q. From your knowledge of this case, is there anything
cultural or traditional that the State is taking as a negative in this
matter? A. No.
Q. Would [A.T.] suffer serious emotional or physical damage
if she were placed with her parents? A. Yes.
Q. And is that based on the fact that the parents have not
addressed the safety concerns that caused her to be removed?
A. Yes, and there—Yes.
10

Q. And the tribe has approved the maternal aunt as a
placement, is that correct? A. Yes.
Q. Do you believe that that maternal aunt is making active
efforts to connect the child with the tribe and their culture? A. Yes.

Turning to the father’s claim, he argues active efforts were not made

because the department did not make adequate attempts to contact him.6 The

father maintains he “was simply ignored in this case.” But the record reveals the

opposite—the father repeatedly chose to ignore this case despite efforts by the

department to enlist his involvement. When questioned specifically about whether

the parents had taken advantage of services offered to them, the tribal expert

testified:

Q. Have active efforts been made to reunify [A.T.] and her
parents? A. I believe they have been offered. I believe active efforts
were offered.
Q. Would it be accurate to say that the parents didn’t take
advantage of all of the things that were offered to them? A. Yes.

As noted above, this proceeding began at the time of A.T.’s birth in mid-

August 2023. In August and September, the father communicated with the

department. He stipulated to A.T.’s removal and adjudication, and he requested

paternity testing prior to participating in services. The father reported that he lived

on the settlement with his father, and he indicated he would like to be considered

6 The father also claims the department failed to notify him that A.T.’s trial
placement had ended. However, the record shows the father was aware the
mother and child were no longer living at Heart of Iowa. Indeed, it appears the
mother was living with the father. In a March report to the court, the guardian ad
litem noted:
During this reporting period, I have had contact with HHS case
manager . . . and [A.T.’s] current placement, [the maternal aunt]. I
have not had any contact with [A.T.]’s father . . . as he has not
engaged in the case. It is reported that [the parents] now live
together at [the father]’s father’s house.
11

for placement of the child. The court ordered a home study of the father’s home,

which was done. A social history was also completed. The father’s paternity was

established on October 2. The dispositional hearing took place two days later.

In the dispositional order, the court required the father to cooperate with

drug testing four times per month, complete a substance-use evaluation, and

complete a psycho-sexual evaluation. His visits with the child were to be fully

supervised. However, the caseworker reported the father “has denied wanting

services.” The family support specialist (FSS) further reported, “During the recent

court hearing, [the father]’s attorney expressed that he does not want to participate

in any services at this time.” FSS later reiterated the father had not been

participating in services “of any kind” despite “attempt[s] to contact” him “to see if

he wants to start services.”

In a January 2024 report to the court, the department stated:

Paternity test results were finalized on 10/2/2023 which
established [the father]’s paternity. [The father] has chosen not to
participate in services other than completing the home study and
social history. There has been no interaction with [the father] in this
reporting period. [The department caseworker] has reached out to
[the father] via phone call on 10/30/23, 11/14/23, 12/5/23 and
1/16/24. [The department caseworker] has reached out to [the
father] via text message 10/6/23, 10/18/23, 11/8/23, 12/21/23 and
1/18/24. There has been no response to these attempts at contact.

In a March report to the court, the department listed further attempts to reach the

father by phone and text in February and March. The caseworker reported,

“During this reporting period there has been no contact or involvement with [the

father] despite this worker attempting contact.” FSS similarly reported that the

caseworker had “made attempts to contact [the father] and offer him visits with

[A.T.] No response.”
12

At the termination trial, the department caseworker reiterated that she had

consistently attempted to contact the father, explaining, “Typically I would do at

least a phone call a month and a text message or two a month, just checking in

trying to make some contact.” She testified drug testing was “discussed” “when

we did the home study,” which “was the only time [she] really got an opportunity to

talk to him.” The department scheduled testing, but the father did not participate.

When asked what the department offered the father “in terms of active efforts” in

this case, the caseworker testified:

There were efforts by both myself and providers to connect with him
and try to set up interactions, try to ensure that he understood the
steps that were being asked of him. Without a response it was
difficult to move forward with those, but the effort was continuously
made to try to make sure he understood what was being asked and
assistance as needed to complete those tasks.

The father agreed he “made the decision” not to engage in services. He

acknowledged he ignored the department’s attempts to contact him after the home

study was completed. Then his phone plan lapsed while he “save[d] up the money

so that [he] could get the phone that [he] wanted.” He became aware A.T. was no

longer in the mother’s care “[a] little while after . . . she had gotten out of the Heart

of Iowa or left it,” and then he “got the letter in the mail just that all of this termination

thing was happening.” After the father reactivated his phone in April, he contacted

the department to set up a visit. The provider arranged to transport the child to the

father for the visit, and the father confirmed the visit the night before it was

scheduled. Ultimately, the visit did not happen. The father testified he “went to

help” a family member with a “tree that had fallen down” and he missed the visit.

He did not reschedule, explaining, “No, I mean, we had court coming.”
13

The father explained he hadn’t participated in drug testing because he didn’t

have “[t]he drug testing number” “to be able to provide any testing.” Yet he

acknowledged that when his phone was turned on, the amount of contact he had

received from the department was “probably about right.” He also agreed he could

have used his father’s phone if he needed to. The father stated he didn’t

“reciprocate” the department’s efforts to reach him because he thought the mother

was handling the case and he “wanted to stay out of the picture.”

On the issue of active efforts, the district court found:

The Court does find that active efforts were provided in this
case. Despite repeated monthly attempts, the father never
responded to the case manager. Even after requesting a visit, he
did not make himself available immediately. Once the visit was
scheduled and confirmed, the father was not even at the home and
therefore the visit could not occur. The expression, “you can lead a
horse to water but can’t make him drink” definitely pertains to this
case. [The father] was contacted regularly, drug testing was set up
for him and multiple other services would have been accessible if he
had chosen to engage. However, the father believed that the mother
was doing well and chose not to be a “distraction.” He is a grown
man who cannot be forced to participate unless he chooses to do so.
However, his choice to absent himself from this case is not indicative
of a lack of active efforts. On the contrary, active efforts were made
and many more services were available to the father upon his
engagement but he CHOSE not to avail himself of these active
efforts. [The mother] was also offered active efforts through all of the
services provided including additional visitation and transportation
but did not even participate in all of the services offered. For
example, she could have had more visitation at the placement home
and did not take advantage of this. While some of the services
offered to the parents may not differ substantially from those offered
in a non-ICWA child in need of assistance case, [the tribal expert]
specified that in most cases the State already offers active efforts
even when the standard is reasonable efforts. She testified that the
ICWA requirement of active efforts had been met in this case and
there was nothing further that HHS could have done to work with the
parents.
14

Upon our review, we concur with the court’s conclusion that the department

provided active efforts for both parents. We further note that “[w]hile [the father] is

an enrolled member of the tribe, he admittedly never embraced his Indian

heritage.” C.A.V., 787 N.W.2d at 103. The father stated he had not enrolled any

of his children as members of the tribe because “it didn’t do [him] any favors.” 7

“The ‘active efforts’ requirement must be construed in the context of the existing

circumstances where the Indian father has never bonded with either his tribe or his

daughter.” Id. at 104. We affirm on this issue.

C. Best Interests / Bond Exception

The mother also claims termination is not in the child’s best interests due to

the closeness of the parent-child relationship.8 When determining best interests,

we give primary weight to “the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering

the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). Here,

these factors all weigh in favor of termination. We recognize the child shares a

bond with the mother. But to avoid termination under section 232.116(3)(c), the

“law requires clear and convincing evidence that ‘termination would be detrimental

to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.’” In re

A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 169 (Iowa 2021) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c)). The

department noted the mother missed “8 out of 8 interactions with [the child] for the

7 He explained that he was concerned about his children “not being willing to work”

because they received money from the tribe. However, we observe that after the
first day of the termination trial, the father completed paperwork to register A.T. as
a member of the tribe.
8 The mother’s petition conflates her best interest argument and permissive

exception argument.
15

month of May,” immediately preceding the termination trial. Meanwhile, the

guardian ad litem opined the child “has been doing well in [the relative]’s care. She

is in the same home as her brother. [A.T.] is a very smiley, healthy, baby.” Under

these circumstances, the mother has not established termination of her rights will

be detrimental to the child. And termination is in the child’s best interests.

D. Guardianship

Finally, the father claims “[i]t is in this child’s best interests that a

guardianship be established, rather than termination of parental rights.”

Specifically, the father requests that the child be placed in a guardianship with the

aunt, claiming, “A.T. has a sibling who has been placed in guardianship with the

[same] maternal great aunt. A.T. has been placed throughout the case with the

same maternal great aunt and with his sibling and that placement has been stable.”

To establish a guardianship in lieu of termination, the court must determine

by clear and convincing evidence that “termination of the parent-child relationship

would not be in the best interest of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.104(4)(a).

However, “a guardianship is not a legally preferable alternative to termination.” In

re B.T., 894 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017). This is because a guardianship

does not provide the same level of stability and safety for a child as termination of

parental rights and adoption; a guardianship is not permanent. See In re A.S., 906

N.W.2d 467, 478 (Iowa 2018). Here, the court declined to find “that a guardianship

of this very young child is at all appropriate.” Aside from A.T.’s young age, the

court noted evidence in the record that the parents were difficult to work with and

demanding regarding visits.
16

“An appropriate determination to terminate a parent-child relationship is not

to be countermanded by the ability and willingness of a family relative to take the

child,” In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 174 (Iowa 1997), and the child’s best interests

always remain the first consideration, see In re L.M.F., 490 N.W.2d 66, 67 (Iowa

Ct. App. 1992). Here, A.T.’s interests are best served by termination of parental

rights. Although A.T.’s brother is in a guardianship, under these circumstances,

we conclude a guardianship status lacks the permanency A.T. needs and

deserves. See In re A.C., No. 23-0567, 2023 WL 3612382, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.

May 24, 2023) (“The impermanent nature of guardianships denies children the

security and stability that a permanent home provides.”).

Having addressed the issues raised on the parents’ appeals, we affirm the

termination of their parental rights.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.