In the Interest of K.W., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-0409
Filed June 18, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF K.W.,
Minor Child,

K.L., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Brent Pattison, Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child.

AFFIRMED.

Teresa M. Pope of Pope Law, PLLC, Des Moines, for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

ConGarry D. Williams of Des Moines Juvenile Public Defender, Des

Moines, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered without oral argument Greer, P.J., and Badding and

Chicchelly, JJ.
2

CHICCHELLY, Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child, K.W.,

born in 2020.1 Upon our de novo review, we affirm the termination.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (the department)

became involved with this family for the first time after receiving allegations of

domestic violence between the parents in K.W.’s presence. This investigation also

revealed additional concerns about the parents’ active substance use, leading to

K.W.’s removal from his parents’ custody. After around fourteen months, K.W.

returned home.

Approximately one year after the first case closed, the mother relapsed on

methamphetamine. The juvenile court removed K.W. again and placed him with

his maternal grandmother, where he remained for the rest of the proceedings.

K.W. was adjudicated as a child in need of assistance, and the department tried to

work with the parents to reunify. But while the department provided numerous

resources, providers found it difficult to work with the mother, describing her as

“very hostile.” In particular, the mother’s relationship with the placement was high

conflict. Their interactions escalated early in the proceedings after the mother

accused the placement’s paramour of sexually abusing K.W. The mother refused

to return him after a visit, which resulted in an investigation. But the abuse

allegations were never substantiated, and the juvenile court described them as “a

1 The father’s parental rights were also terminated during a separate termination

hearing. He appealed, and we affirmed the termination of his parental rights. In
re K.W., No. 24-1242, 2024 WL 4965895 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2024).
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distraction from the undisputed issues in the case—addressing the parents’ long

history of substance abuse, mental health struggles, and domestic violence.”

Throughout the proceedings, the mother’s road to recovery was

inconsistent. At the beginning of the case, the mother admitted to “using

methamphetamine and heroin intravenously” and tested positive for

methamphetamine. But after a few months, the mother refused to comply with

additional drug testing and accused the department of “messing with the tests.”

When the mother did agree to test, she had only brief periods of sobriety before

using illegal substances again, such as methamphetamine, THC, cocaine, or

fentanyl.2 In the weeks before the State petitioned to terminate, the department

began noticing physical indicators of the mother’s substance use, specifically

“bright red meth marks on each side of her face.” But mid to late-2024, the mother

engaged in methadone treatment,3 after which her tests were generally positive for

only methadone and THC. As for the mother’s mental health, she initially refused

to sign releases of information or take her medications as prescribed. And while

she did eventually start treatment, her participation was inconsistent until just

before the second termination hearing.

Finally, the mother failed to address the department’s concerns about her

romantic relationships. Despite their relationship being the catalyst for the first

2 The parties disagree whether the mother was “sober” because she continued to

test positive for THC until three weeks before the January 2025 termination
hearing. We do note that the mother does not have an Iowa medical cannabidiol
registration card, which would permit her to consume medical cannabidiol in
non-smoking methods. See Iowa Code §§ 124E.4, .17 (2025).
3 We have previously recognized methadone as “a synthetic addictive narcotic

drug” used “in the treatment of heroin addiction.” In re G.B., No. 22-0439,
2022 WL 1657190, at *1 n.2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 25, 2022) (citation omitted).
4

CINA proceeding, the mother still maintained contact with the father against the

department’s directives. And while the parents ended their relationship before the

termination hearing, the mother then “became involved with another person who

has his own substance abuse and domestic violence history.” This led to another

founded child abuse assessment because the mother was supervising her new

paramour’s daughter.

An initial termination hearing occurred in July 2024, after which the court

terminated the father’s parental rights but granted the mother a six-month

extension to work towards reunification. The court found that while the mother’s

engagement in substance-use and mental-health treatments were lacking, she

had made some improvements. The mother secured housing and employment,

participated in other department services, and improved her relationship with

K.W.’s placement. But less than one month into her extension, the mother again

tested positive for cocaine, alcohol, and THC. Although this was considered a

setback by the department, her social work case manager testified that the

mother’s acknowledgement of her cocaine use was a success.4 This resulted in

the department’s willingness to start semi-supervised visits with K.W. in

December 2024.

The State petitioned for termination of the mother’s parental rights again. A

second termination hearing occurred in January 2025, at which the mother

contested termination and requested another six-month extension or, in the

4 While the mother initially took accountability for her cocaine use, she testified at

the termination hearing that she had never used. The juvenile court took special
notice of this in its order, as the mother’s inability to take accountability for and
maintain her sobriety was “especially important” to its decision to terminate.
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alternative, a guardianship with the maternal grandmother. The juvenile court

disagreed and terminated the mother’s parental rights. The mother appeals.

II. Review.

Our review of termination-of-parental-rights proceedings is de novo. In re

A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018). “We are not bound by the juvenile court’s

findings of fact, but we do give them weight, especially in assessing the credibility

of witnesses.” Id. (citation omitted).

III. Discussion.

The mother challenges each step of the termination of her parental rights in

our three-step analysis: (1) the statutory grounds for termination; (2) the

best-interests-of-the-child determination; and (3) permissive exceptions to

termination. See id. at 472–73. The mother also reasserts her requests for a

six-month extension or guardianship as alternatives to termination. We address

each argument in turn.

A. Statutory Grounds for Termination.

The mother first argues that the statutory grounds for termination were not

met. The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights under Iowa Code

section 232.116(1)(f), finding:

(1) The child is four years of age or older.
(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of
assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of
the child’s parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or
for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home
has been less than thirty days.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present
time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents
as provided in section 232.102.
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The mother only challenges the fourth element: whether K.W. could be returned to

her custody at the time of the termination hearing. Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f)(4);

see also In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010) (interpreting “at the present

time” to mean “at the time of the termination hearing”).

The juvenile court found that K.W. could not be returned to his mother’s

custody, and we agree. Even before her six-month extension, the mother had

failed to adequately address the circumstances which led to K.W.’s removal. While

she had made some progress, she failed to maintain her sobriety or comply with

the department’s recommendations for substance-use treatment. Even after being

granted an additional six months, the mother continued to struggle and did not fully

take advantage of the litany of services offered by the department. While the

juvenile court praised the mother’s improvements with her mental health, it

described her testimony regarding her sobriety as “less convincing” and found she

was unable to take accountability for her substance use. The court also noted its

concerns about the mother’s new relationship, which has already led to an

additional founded child abuse assessment.

While the mother cites her expanded visitation as evidence of her ability to

parent, this is not enough. The juvenile court specifically noted the department’s

testimony, in which the social work case manager testified that had she known

about the mother’s unwillingness to take accountability for her cocaine use, “she

likely would not have allowed visits to expand in December of 2024.” But more

importantly, graduation to semi-supervised visitation is insufficient. “Without this

necessary progression [to unsupervised visits], we cannot say the child[] could

have returned to the mother’s care.” In re C.N., No. 19-1861, 2020 WL 567283,
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at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2020). Accordingly, we find that the statutory ground

for termination has been met.

B. Best Interests of the Child.

The mother similarly argues that termination is not in the best interests of

the child. We “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best

placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the

physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code

§ 232.116(2). “It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency

after the State has proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by

hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable

home for the child.” See In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 224 (Iowa 2016) (citation

omitted).

The juvenile court similarly concluded that termination is in K.W.’s best

interests. While the mother has made some progress, “[t]ime is a critical element”

in termination proceedings. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 2000). “A

parent cannot wait until the eve of termination, after the statutory time periods for

reunification have expired, to begin to express an interest in parenting.” Id. While

we commend the steps the mother has taken to improve herself, K.W. deserves

permanency. In just five years of his short life, K.W. has spent nearly three years

away from his mother. See id. (finding the child’s considerable time out of the

home favors termination). In that time, the social work case manager testified that

K.W. has bonded with his maternal grandmother, who is willing to adopt. We

therefore find termination is in K.W.’s best interests.
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C. Permissive Exception to Termination.

The mother then asks us to apply a permissive exception to termination

based on a parent-child bond. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c) (establishing a

discretionary exception to termination upon finding “clear and convincing evidence

that the termination would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the

closeness of the parent-child relationship”). The burden is placed on the parent to

show that an exception to termination applies. A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 476. We do

not find that the mother met such a burden. “Any bond that exists between [the

mother] and the child in this case is limited considering the child’s young age and

the time he has spent out of [her] care.” In re D.S., 806 N.W.2d 458, 475 (Iowa Ct.

App. 2011). Further, in his mother’s absence, K.W. has bonded to his maternal

grandmother, who is a preadoptive placement option. See id. (finding that the

child’s successful integration into a foster family willing to adopt favors

termination). We therefore decline to apply a permissive exception to termination

based on a parent-child bond.

D. Six-Month Extension.

Next, the mother requests another six-month extension. See Iowa Code

§ 232.104(2)(b) (permitting the juvenile court to grant an extension to work towards

reunification if “the need for removal of the child from the child’s home will no longer

exist at the end of the additional six-month period”). In particular, she cites her

recent progress, especially her expanded visitation and sobriety, as justification for

the extension.

But the juvenile court found that a six-month extension would not change

the outcome, and we agree. For the reasons discussed previously and based on
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the mother’s history of instability, we are not confident in her ability to care for K.W.

See In re J.H., 952 N.W.2d 157, 171 (Iowa 2020) (considering the “parents’ past

performance” to “indicate the quality of care the parent is capable of providing in

the future” (citation omitted)). More importantly, K.W. has spent a considerable

portion of his short life waiting for his mother to learn to care for him, and he

deserves permanency. See In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 324 (Iowa 2021). We

therefore decline to apply another six-month extension.

E. Guardianship.

Lastly, the mother requests a guardianship with the maternal grandmother

in lieu of termination. Despite the mother’s argument that “termination offers little

by way of being ‘more permanent’ than guardianship,” we strongly disagree. “[A]

guardianship is not a legally preferable alterative to termination.” A.S., 906 N.W.2d

at 477 (citation omitted). Because guardianships require at least annual reporting

requirements and can be terminated at any time, a guardianship is by nature

impermanent. Id. at 477–78. While there are certain circumstances warranting a

guardianship, we do not find that this is one of them. Due to K.W.’s age, any

guardianship could last more than a decade. See id. at 478 (considering the

tender age of the child in declining to establish a guardianship). And as the juvenile

court found, the mother has “a long history in this case of conflict” with the maternal

grandmother, once even refusing to return K.W. to the maternal grandmother’s

care. The court further noted that the mother and placement “have fought over

issues as mundane as haircuts.” The mother’s poor relationship with the potential

guardian does not convince us that a guardianship would be in K.W.’s best

interests. Id. (considering the parent’s relationship with the potential guardian in
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determining whether a guardianship is in the child’s best interests). Instead, we

find termination to better serve K.W.’s interests and allow him to achieve

permanency. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental

rights.

IV. Disposition.

Finding the statutory grounds for termination have been met, the best

interests of the child favor termination, and no extensions or exceptions to

termination apply, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.