In re the Marriage of Paul

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1153
Filed July 2, 2025

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF RUSSELL DEAN PAUL, JR.
AND DIANE MARIE PAUL

Upon the Petition of
RUSSELL DEAN PAUL, JR.,
Petitioner-Appellant,

And Concerning
DIANE MARIE PAUL,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Jeanie Vaudt, Judge.

A former husband challenges the physical-care and spousal-support

provisions in a dissolution decree. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

Andrew B. Howie of Shindler, Anderson, Goplerud & Weese, P.C., West

Des Moines, for appellant.

Matthew G. Sease of Sease & Wadding, Des Moines, and Carmen

Eichmann of Eichmann Law Firm, West Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and

Chicchelly, JJ.
2

TABOR, Chief Judge.

After a fourteen-year marriage, Russell and Diane Paul divorced in

September 2023. In this appeal, Russell challenges three aspects of their divorce

decree. First, he contests the decision to grant physical care of their two children

to Diane. Second, he contends the award of traditional spousal support was

inequitable. And third, Russell argues that the district court erred in ordering him

to maintain a minimum balance in his flexible spending account (FSA) for the

children’s unreimbursed medical expenses. In response, Diane defends the

decree and seeks appellate attorney fees.

Following our independent review of the record, we decline to change the

children’s physical care. We also find the spousal support award achieves equity

between the parties—though we modify the decree to provide that Russell’s

obligation ceases upon his death. We also modify the decree to terminate

Russell’s requirement to maintain life insurance for the benefit of the children when

his child-support obligation ends. Lastly, we affirm the reasonable requirement for

Russell to maintain a balance of $1500 per year in his FSA given their daughters’

medical and orthodontic needs. But because we affirm the spousal support award,

we find that Diane has the means to pay her own attorney fees.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

Russell and Diane married in 2008. They have two daughters: A.P., born

in 2010, and N.P., born in 2012. During their marriage, Russell worked as the

assistant director, and then as director, of the public works department for the city

of Pleasant Hill. As director, he earned nearly $134,000 per year. Diane worked
3

as a veterinary technician; her earnings varied through the marriage. At the time

of trial, she was making about $34,000 annually.1

In September 2021, Russell petitioned to dissolve their marriage. At the

time of the July 2023 trial, Diane was forty years old and suffered from fibromyalgia.

She described her condition as causing “extreme fatigue” accompanied by painful

joints, knees, feet, and back. The debilitating condition makes it difficult for her to

work full-time. Russell was thirty-eight years old and, by contrast, in good health.

Their marital home was a two-story log cabin on twenty acres of land in

Prairie City. Retaining that property was important to Diane because she and the

girls were avid horseback riders and enjoyed caring for the animals there. But she

also testified that the cabin and outbuildings needed repairs. In the decree, the

court awarded the marital home to Diane, assigning a value of $359,000.2 The

outstanding mortgage debt was over $305,000 with an interest rate of 2.5 percent.

The court gave Diane one year from the date of the decree to refinance the

mortgage loan in her name. If unsuccessful, she was to list the property for sale. 3

The court provided this context: “Diane feels Russell is leaving her high and dry in

many respects regarding the marital home. The family only resided in this

residence for two and one-half years.” But Diane testified that she did not want to

1 The district court found that Diane netted an additional $10,000 per year from

real estate rentals.
2 In its order responding to Russell’s motion under Iowa Rule of Civil

Procedure 1.904(2), the court found that the home’s 2023 assessed value
was $453,800.
3 The court also ordered that the equity in the marital home “shall be split equally

between Russell and Diane.”
4

move her daughters: “This is my children’s home. It is where their animals are.

This is the place we call home.”

As for the children’s custody, the district court ordered joint legal custody

and awarded physical care to Diane with liberal visitation for Russell. The district

court also ordered Russell to pay Diane $2000 per month in spousal support until

she remarries or dies. In doing so, the court noted the length of the parties’

marriage and the “considerable” difference between their incomes. And the court

found that Russell was “leaving Diane adrift regarding the cabin and the costly

maintenance it still requires.”

Russell appeals the physical-care and spousal-support orders. He also

challenges a provision mandating that he maintain a $1500 balance in his FSA for

the children’s uncovered medical expenses.

II. Scope and Standard of Review

Because divorces are equitable proceedings, we review de novo. In re

Marriage of Mauer, 874 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa 2016). But despite our de novo

review, we defer to the district court’s factual findings “for institutional and

pragmatic reasons.” In re Marriage of Sokol, 985 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Iowa 2023).

That “institutional deference” is a check “against undue tinkering with spousal

support awards.” Id. We will only disturb the district court’s determination of

spousal support when it fails to do equity between the parties. Id.

III. Analysis

A. Physical Care

Russell and Diane agreed to joint legal custody of their two daughters. But

they disagreed on physical care. Russell sought joint physical care, while Diane
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asked the court to place physical care with her. The district court adopted Diane’s

position. On appeal, Russell renews his request for joint physical care. But, as an

alternative, he asks to be the primary caregiver.

Before addressing Russell’s argument, we highlight our enviable options—

two solid parents, who generally work together in the best interests of their

daughters. Indeed, in considering physical care, our top concern is the children’s

best interests. In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 695 (Iowa 2007).

Going forward, we are guided by the factors in Iowa Code

section 598.41(3) (2021),4 as well as those set out in Hansen: (1) stability and

4 These factors are:

a. Whether each parent would be a suitable custodian for the
child.
b. Whether the psychological and emotional needs and
development of the child will suffer due to lack of active contact with
and attention from both parents.
c. Whether the parents can communicate with each other
regarding the child’s needs.
d. Whether both parents have actively cared for the child
before and since the separation.
e. Whether each parent can support the other parent’s
relationship with the child.
f. Whether the custody arrangement is in accord with the
child’s wishes or whether the child has strong opposition, taking into
consideration the child’s age and maturity.
g. Whether one or both of the parents agree or are opposed
to joint custody.
h. The geographic proximity of the parents.
i. Whether the safety of the child, other children, or the other
parent will be jeopardized by the awarding of joint custody or by
unsupervised or unrestricted visitation.
j. Whether a history of domestic abuse, as defined in section
236.2, exists. . . .
k. Whether a parent has allowed a person custody or control
of, or unsupervised access to a child after knowing the person is
required to register or is on the sex offender registry . . . .
Iowa Code § 598.41(3).
6

continuity, (2) communication and mutual respect between parents, (3) the degree

of discord between parents, and (4) the extent of agreement between parents on

routine care. 733 N.W.2d at 700 (providing four considerations for joint physical

care). “The objective of a physical care determination is to place the children in

the environment most likely to bring them to health, both physically and mentally,

and to social maturity.” Id. at 695.

Russell attacks the district court for rejecting joint physical care without

explicitly analyzing the Hansen factors. See Iowa Code § 598.41(5)(a) (requiring

that when a parent requests joint physical care, the court’s decision to award

physical care to one parent must be “accompanied by specific findings of fact and

conclusions of law that the awarding of joint physical care is not in the best interest

of the child”).

It’s true that the decree did not include a lengthy explanation for rejecting

Russell’s request for joint physical care. But the district court did say that an equal

split of physical care was “totally unrealistic under the facts presented” and was

not in the best interests of A.P. and N.P. The court pointed to Russell’s “inflexibility”

when it came to sharing care of their daughters.5 Although terse, that rationale—

along with our own reading of the record—allows us to review the physical-care

determination. See Hall v. Weissenburger, No. 22-1926, 2023 WL 5065185, at *2

(Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2023).

5 The court accepted Diane’s testimony that Russell would engage in “an extreme

amount of negotiating” when she wanted to change the parenting schedule: “He
wants time back that I am taking, he feels, from him with the children.” Russell
gave a contradictory view, insisting that he would “always agree in the ability to be
flexible with the schedule.” But the court found Diane to be the more credible
witness.
7

Turning to the merits, we build from the premise that “[p]hysical care issues

are not to be resolved based upon perceived fairness to the spouses, but primarily

upon what is best for the child[ren].” Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 695. Joint physical

care is not the best arrangement for children if the parents have trouble

communicating, show deep discord, or harbor profound disagreements on routine

care. See id. at 698–99. The record here showed minor communication difficulties

and some personal conflict between the parents. For example, Diane recounted

recent “combative text messaging” from Russell over her request to alter the

exchange schedule for the girls. But overall, the parents’ disagreements did not

interfere with their ability to act in the children’s best interests. See Hensch v.

Mysak, 902 N.W.2d 822, 827 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017).

But the scales tip away from joint physical care when we look at the stability

and continuity of caregiving. Hansen expressed those concepts in terms of “an

approximation rule, namely, that the caregiving of parents in the post-divorce world

should be in rough proportion to that which predated the dissolution.” 733 N.W.2d

at 697. Before the separation, Diane took the role of chief caretaker for their

daughters as they navigated their way through early childhood. See id. at 697–98

(“[W]here one spouse has been the primary caregiver, the likelihood that joint

physical care may be disruptive on the emotional development of the children

increases.”). Granted, that role was possible because Russell worked as the

primary breadwinner. But, as noted, we look to the children’s best interests and

not the perceived fairness to either parent.

The record is flush with examples of Diane’s commitment to child-rearing.

She was a stay-at-home mom who arranged the children’s playdates and medical
8

appointments. Once they reached school age, Diane often volunteered in their

classrooms. When the girls were sick, she would stay home with them. While

Russell was also an active parent, his daily participation did not come close to

matching Diane’s caregiving role. And as the district court emphasized, Russell’s

rigidity on parenting time did not bode well for a smooth shared-care arrangement

post-divorce.

After considering the relevant factors and the district court’s credibility

determinations, we find that the children’s best interests are served by affirming

the grant of physical care to Diane.

B. Spousal Support

In his next assignment of error, Russell contends that the spousal-support

award failed to do equity. Primarily, he contends their fourteen-year marriage was

too short to justify traditional alimony without another factor at play. See, e.g., In

re Marriage of Mills, 983 N.W.2d 61, 71–72 (Iowa 2022) (affirming award of

traditional alimony after marriage of fourteen years based on spouse’s permanent

disability and lack of earning capacity). In Russell’s view, Diane’s fibromyalgia is

not that factor. He notes that Diane did not document her condition with medical

records. He also questions the gravity of her disability, stressing that it did not

prevent her from pursuing her equestrian hobby. At trial, Russell acknowledged

that he knew about Diane’s diagnosis since 2015 or 2016. He also testified that

she discussed her symptoms. Yet he did not believe that it was “at a point where

it would cripple her from doing what she wanted to do.”
9

Despite Russell’s skepticism, the record shows that Diane’s diagnosis of

fibromyalgia limited her ability to work full time as a veterinary technician. She

testified about the symptoms that prompted her to seek medical treatment:

Extreme fatigue. My joints, knees, feet, up into my back would
sometimes be swollen, extremely painful. Ibuprofen seemed to help,
but not a lot. My feet were the worst. It felt like I was walking on pins
and needles, and that would then travel up into my back. Time off
my feet is what really helped overall, and being able to rest when I
needed to, when it would flare up, helped a lot. I also tried arch
supports specifically to help, and I tried compression hose that were
specifically fitted for me, prescribed by a doctor. And while those
helped, they didn’t really fix . . . anything. If I went right back to work,
. . . it was always there. It was always painful.

She also described the physicality of her job, including lifting large dogs for

surgery and cleaning kennels. And she testified that when her symptoms flared

up, she could not go into work: “Time off is what helped.” She explained that she

tries to log thirty hours per week so that she can qualify for health insurance and

benefits. In her current job, she does not receive paid sick leave or vacation.

Against that factual backdrop, we turn to the legal analysis. Traditional

spousal support is most often justified when a marriage has lasted at least two

decades. In re Marriage of Gust, 858 N.W.2d 402, 410–11 (Iowa 2015). But Gust

did not impose a “a bright-line test” at the twenty-year durational threshold. In re

Marriage of Nelson, No. 15-0492, 2016 WL 3269573, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 15,

2016). Rather, the duration of a marriage is just one factor to consider in the

statutory framework. Sokol, 985 N.W.2d at 185 (invoking criteria listed in Iowa

Code section 598.21A(1)). True, our supreme court has explained that a district

court’s discretion narrows when it awards spousal support outside of generally
10

recognized categories. See id. at 186 (citing Mills, 983 N.W.2d at 73). Yet, the

enduring inquiry is whether the award does equity between the parties.

The award of traditional spousal support was equitable here because

Russell has a much greater earning potential than Diane. His income was more

than three times hers at the time of the decree. Diane had a two-year associate’s

degree that she earned before their marriage. Russell had more education—a

bachelor’s degree in environmental studies, plus a certificate in public

administration that he obtained during the marriage.6 Beyond these educational

disparities, Diane’s earning capacity was limited by her assumption of the major

child-care duties7 and her debilitating diagnosis of fibromyalgia. The district court

also emphasized that Russell was “leaving Diane adrift regarding the cabin” and

the costs of delayed maintenance that the acreage required.

To counter, Russell asserts that Diane left the marriage with “significant

assets” and downplays the repair expenses associated with the log cabin. But as

Diane argues on appeal: “it is not in serious dispute [she] has significantly higher

monthly expenses than her current income.” She submitted a list of estimated

expenses for the log cabin that surpassed $30,000. We find those expenses of

maintaining the marital home contribute to her need for spousal support.

Russell next contends that if Diane is entitled to any support, it would be

transitional rather than traditional alimony. See In re Marriage of Pazhoor, 971

N.W.2d 530, 541–42 (Iowa 2022) (recognizing new alimony category to give

6 The parties devoted a large portion of an inheritance Diane received from her

father to pay off Russell’s student loans.
7 Russell acknowledges that this division of labor was a joint decision made during

their marriage that benefitted the family.
11

“short-term support” to transition spouses from married to single life). We disagree

with that contention. First, transitional support was not an option that Russell

raised at trial. There, he urged the court to award no alimony. Focusing on the

factors in section 598.21A(1), we find that it would not be feasible for Diane to

become self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that

enjoyed during the marriage without traditional spousal support. A short-term

transfusion of funds would not do equity, especially given her health limitations.

Finally, Russell argues that, at a minimum, his spousal-support obligation

should not extend beyond his death. He notes that the district court did not explain

why it did not include Russell’s death as one of the conditions terminating his

support obligation. “The general rule is that periodic payments of alimony are

presumed to terminate upon the payor’s death.” In re Marriage of Klinghammer,

No. 02-0112, 2003 WL 21070599, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 14, 2003). Like the

Klinghammer court, we find no reason to depart from that general rule here. See

id. Accordingly, we modify the decree to provide that Russell’s spousal support

obligation ceases upon his death as well as upon the conditions specified by the

district court. We also modify the decree to terminate Russell’s requirement to

maintain life insurance for the benefit of A.P. and N.P. when his child-support

obligation ends.

C. Flexible Spending Account

In his final claim, Russell objects to the district court’s order that he maintain

$1500 per year in his FSA for the children’s uncovered medical expenses. He

describes the account as “use it or lose it” and argues that it would be inequitable

to require a minimum balance that might be lost due to nonuse. He also suggests
12

that because it is an employer-based benefit, if his employer eliminates that

benefit, he may be “at risk for a contempt action.” On that second point, we read

the decree only to require the minimum contribution of $1500 to the FSA so long

as that benefit is available. Otherwise, we see the modest contribution

requirement as reasonable given the daughters’ health needs. For example, A.P.

has scoliosis and may need occasional physical therapy treatments. Plus, both

girls have braces, and the parents have used the FSA to cover those orthodontic

costs. We decline to modify that aspect of the decree.

D. Appellate Attorney Fees

After responding to Russell’s challenges, Diane asks us to order him to pay

$7500 toward her appellate attorney fees.8 We have discretion whether to award

attorney fees in an appeal of a dissolution decree. In re Marriage of Samuels, 15

N.W.3d 801, 808 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024). In exercising that discretion, we consider

Diane’s needs, Russell’s ability to pay, and the relative merits of the issues raised

on appeal. See id. Considering these factors, we decline Diane’s request. While

Diane prevailed on appeal, Russell’s claims were close calls that merited

consideration by our court. And because we affirm the award of traditional spousal

support, Diane has the means to pay her own attorney fees. See In re Marriage

of Hanna, No. 16-1482, 2017 WL 4315050, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2017).

But the costs of this appeal are assessed against Russell.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

8 The record does not show that counsel filed an attorney-fee affidavit.