In the Interest of C.B., C.B., C.B., and W.B., Minor Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-0428
Filed July 23, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF C.B., C.B., C.B., and W.B.,
Minor Children,

A.B., Mother,
Appellant,

E.B., Father,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Decatur County, Monty Franklin

(termination hearing) and Jordan Brackey (rulings on termination and new trial),

Judges.

A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental

rights. AFFIRMED ON THE FATHER’S APPEAL; REVERSED AND

REMANDED ON THE MOTHER’S APPEAL.

Amanda Demichelis of Demichelis Law Firm, P.C., Chariton, for appellant

mother.

Adam D. Hanson, Winterset, for appellant father.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Lisa Jeanes, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Ivan Miller, Red Oak, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor children.

Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Badding and

Chicchelly, JJ.
2

BADDING, Judge.

The juvenile court judge who presided over this extended child welfare

proceeding passed away before he could enter a ruling on the State’s petitions to

terminate parental rights to four children. Months later, after a new judge had been

appointed under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1802(2), the children’s mother

moved for a new trial or to reopen the record. She argued that the judge would be

“unable to make credibility determinations regarding the witnesses and parties”

and that “substantial changes have occurred in the case” since the termination

hearing. The judge denied the mother’s motion and terminated the parents’ rights

under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) and (h) (2023).

The mother and the father of the two youngest children separately appeal,1

challenging each of the three steps in the termination analysis. The mother also

claims the court abused its discretion in denying her motion for a new trial or to

reopen the record. Because we agree with the mother’s last claim, we reverse the

juvenile court’s ruling and remand for a new hearing on the petitions to terminate

her parental rights. We affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

More than three years ago, four children were removed from their parents’

custody after their mother tested positive for methamphetamine. The father of the

two youngest children was also reportedly using methamphetamine. The Iowa

Department of Health and Human Services split the children between three homes,

1 The fathers of the two older children, who were born in 2012 and 2017, did not

appeal the termination of their parental rights. As a result, when we refer to “the
father” throughout the rest of this opinion, we mean the father of the two youngest
children, who were born in 2020 and 2021.
3

hours away from each other and their parents.2 The children were adjudicated in

need of assistance in April 2022.

The mother and father almost immediately began participating in

reunification services. They each completed substance-use and mental-health

evaluations and began participating in drug testing. Although the mother tested

positive for marijuana in June, she completed outpatient substance-use treatment

by November. The mother also attended counseling with a therapist she had been

seeing since 2019. The father tested positive for methamphetamine in June and

October. He completed an outpatient program in December and then entered

inpatient treatment in February 2023. The father finished that program in March

and continued with outpatient treatment. Unfortunately, he relapsed in November

and struggled to reengage in substance-use treatment.

The mother, however, has abstained from methamphetamine since her

positive test for that drug at the beginning of the case. While she had some positive

tests for marijuana throughout the proceedings, she later obtained a medical

marijuana card. The mother also continued participating in therapy, maintained

full-time employment, and had stable housing appropriate for the children. But the

distance between the children’s placements caused disruptions in the mother’s

visits, as did her refusal to work with service providers that she felt were biased

against her. While the father’s visits with the two youngest children went well, a

provider who supervised the mother’s visits noted she was quick to yell at the

2 Since then, the oldest child has been moved twice; the second oldest was moved

once; and the youngest two children were moved five times, with a sixth move
contemplated after the termination hearing.
4

children, didn’t tell them “please” or “thank you,” and sometimes seemed

overwhelmed. The mother maintained that provider was lying about her

observations and asked for her to be removed from the case. The department

instead recommended a parenting assessment for the mother.

The assessment was completed in November. Although the evaluator

observed the mother’s “ability to be attuned to her children is limited by her ongoing

depression and feelings of being overwhelmed,” no safety concerns were noted.

The evaluator warned, however, that “[a]ll of the children need a consistent adult

or adults in their lives whom they can learn to depend on and trust.” After receiving

the assessment, the department recommended an extension of time for the

parents at a review hearing in late November. The department’s report noted, “At

this time the concern with [the mother] is no longer a substance abuse concern but

continuing to work with [her] on her parenting abilities.”

The juvenile court granted a three-month extension, and the mother began

semi-supervised visits with the children. But those visits required her to transport

her four children from their three placements—a 656-mile roundtrip that took the

mother all day and left her with about ten minutes to spend with the children outside

of the car. A report from the department in February 2024 stated that “no concerns

were noted” during the mother’s visits with all four children, although those visits

were inconsistent because of transportation barriers. The department

recommended another extension to address those barriers and allow the mother

to continue with her mental-health treatment.

But by March, the department had returned the mother to fully supervised

visits because she was missing some of her visits and because the case manager
5

was unable to verify information from a substance-use evaluation the mother had

recently completed.3 From there, the mother’s relationship with the department

soured. She blocked the case manager’s phone number and email address for

about a month, which resulted in more missed visits with the children. The case

manager’s supervisor tried to meet with the mother and the case manager to

improve their communication, but the meeting did not go well and ended with the

mother yelling at the case manager to leave. Meanwhile, the father was missing

drug tests and had not yet completed a new substance-use evaluation so that he

could restart treatment.

Citing these issues, a report from the department in May recommended

changing the permanency goal to termination. The juvenile court adopted that

recommendation, and the State petitioned to terminate the parents’ rights in early

July. Just a few weeks before the termination hearing in August 2024, the

department suspended the mother’s visitation with the children after she got into

an argument with the service provider that she had been asking to have removed

for months. The provider claimed that when she told the mother not to talk to the

children about coming to live with her, the mother “turned bright red and verbally

exploded and started yelling.” She told the provider, in front of the children, “to

leave my fucking house,” among other things. When the provider refused, the

mother called the police. The provider, in turn, called her supervisor. The provider

claimed that as she was making the call, the mother tried to grab the phone from

3 The evaluation stated the mother had reported using marijuana “10 times a month

for the prior 12 months.” A letter from the substance-use counselor later clarified,
“This should have stated 10 times total in the preceding 12 months.”
6

her, so the provider pushed her. The mother claimed the provider “threw her hands

up and . . . whacked/hit me with her phone.” A police officer responded to the

mother’s call, but no criminal charges were filed.

The department’s case manager cited that incident, as well as the mother’s

past combativeness with service providers, in support of her recommendation to

terminate the mother’s parental rights. She testified the “major concern” is that the

mother is not in “good mental health, and that she is not able to fully handle all four

children at once.” The mother’s only mental health diagnoses at that time were

depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder. As for the father, although

his visits with the two youngest children went well, the case manager testified that

he had “unaddressed substance abuse” issues, with inconsistent testing and

treatment after his last positive test. The children’s guardian ad litem agreed that

termination was in the children’s best interests, although the attorney for the oldest

child argued against termination because the child wanted to return to his mother’s

custody.

The juvenile court judge who presided over the hearing took the matter

under advisement, but he died in September before issuing a ruling. A successor

judge was appointed under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1802(2). In mid-

February 2025, with no ruling from that judge, the mother filed a motion for a new

trial or to reopen the record. She claimed that “substantial changes have occurred

in the case regarding the mother and new evidence has come to light,” including

“changes to her parenting ability, her ability to remain sober and maintain her

mental health and two of the children currently being moved from their prior

placement and not having alternative permanency plan[s] for the children.” The
7

mother argued the “ruling for [termination] is no longer timely and the Court would

be unable to credibly rule . . . that the children were in desperate need of

permanency,” given the time that had passed since the termination hearing. And

she contended the successor judge “has not had an opportunity to hear the

evidence himself and is unable to make credibility determinations regarding the

witnesses and parties in this matter.” The State and the children’s guardian ad

litem resisted the mother’s motion, while the father joined in the motion.4

The juvenile court denied the motion at the end of February,

contemporaneously with its ruling terminating the parents’ rights. Although the

court apologized “for the delay in this critical decision,” it reasoned that

rule 1.1802(2) required the court to

decide the case if it feels sufficiently informed to do so. After
reviewing the files, this court does feel sufficiently informed to make
such a decision. This decision is not one the court makes lightly.
This court understands the best-case scenario would have been for
the judge who observed the testimony to make the final decision.
However, this court’s review of that record makes [it] abundantly
clear, more than anything else, that these children have been waiting
very long for adults to make critical decisions regarding their future.
They should not wait any longer.

On the merits of the termination petitions, the court concluded the State had met

its burden. It terminated both parents’ rights under Iowa Code

section 232.116(1)(f) and (h). The mother and father each appeal.

II. Father’s Appeal

Although the juvenile court stated the father joined in the mother’s motion

for a new trial or to reopen the record in those proceedings, he has not challenged

4 We have been unable to locate anything in the record setting out the father’s

position. But the juvenile court’s ruling stated the father had joined in the motion.
8

the denial of that motion on appeal. See In re Marriage of Seyler, 559 N.W.2d 7,

10 n.1 (Iowa 1997) (noting that a “party may waive due process rights and agree

to have a successor judge decide the case”). Instead, the father focuses on the

merits of the court’s decision to terminate his parental rights.

We conduct a de novo review of that decision. See In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d

311, 313 (Iowa 2022). In doing so, we use our familiar three-step framework that

asks whether (1) a statutory ground for termination is satisfied, (2) the children’s

best interests are served by termination, and (3) a statutory exception applies and

should be exercised to preclude termination. Id.; see also Iowa Code

§ 232.116(1)–(3). If all three steps support termination, we then consider any other

issues the parent raises, like whether more time should have been granted. See

Iowa Code §§ 232.104(2)(b), 232.117(5). Although the father has combined some

of these steps in his petition on appeal, we understand from his arguments that he

is challenging each step and asking for more time. But upon our de novo review

of the record, we conclude that his claims should be denied.

On the first step, the father only contests the final common elements of Iowa

Code section 232.116(1)(f) and (h),5 both of which require clear and convincing

evidence that the children cannot be returned to their parents’ custody “at the

present time.” See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 111 (Iowa 2014) (interpreting “at

the present time” to mean the date of the termination hearing). The court reasoned

5 The differences between section 232.116(1)(f) and (h) involve the ages of the

children at issue and the length of removal. See In re M.B., No. 19-1884, 2020
WL 569649, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2020).
9

that while the father “made some progress toward reunification throughout the

case,” his substance use “was a recurring issue”:

There were times he did very well and was appropriately proud of his
progress, but his very ill-timed relapse . . . led to several months of
inaction in addressing his needs. [The father] also had another
relapse in January of 2024. While [he] may recently have made
efforts to re-engage in treatment, he let critical months go by without
addressing these relapses.

We agree with the court about the father’s commendable progress. He had

stable housing, consistent employment, and no mental-health concerns. And the

department had “zero concerns” about his visits, which were uniformly positive.

But the father tested positive for methamphetamine several times during this case.

His last positive test was in November 2023, and he admitted using

methamphetamine again in January 2024. While the father had a negative test in

May, he missed tests before that and did not consistently attend substance-use

treatment. The father seemed to concede that he would need more time before

the children could be returned to his custody, asking “for a three-month extension”

at the termination hearing so that he could complete treatment. See In re A.S.,

No. 22-1249, 2023 WL 382299, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2023) (concluding

the father’s concession that “he needed a few more months to be in a position to

have the child returned to his custody . . . foreclosed reunification”). Sadly, we

must agree with the court that the father’s history of relapses and inconsistent

participation in treatment after those relapses prevented the children’s safe return

to his custody. See In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 313 (Iowa 2021) (concluding that

the mother’s “long history of substance abuse, repeated relapses, and
10

demonstrated inability to maintain sobriety outside a supervised setting”

established the final element of section 232.116(1)(f)).

For the second step, the father passively argues without much analysis that

termination is not in the children’s best interests. Bypassing any waiver concerns

with this argument, we agree with the juvenile court that “it is not in the children’s

best interest to suspend the crucial days of childhood while a parent experiments

with ways to address their own problems.” See In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613

(Iowa 1987) (“The crucial days of childhood cannot be suspended while parents

experiment with ways to face up to their own problems.”).

The defining elements of a child’s best interests are the child’s safety and

need for a permanent home. In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 748 (Iowa 2011); see

also Iowa Code § 232.116(2) (requiring the court to give “primary consideration to

the child[ren]’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing

and growth of the child[ren], and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition

and needs of the child[ren]”). By the termination hearing, the children had been

removed from the father’s custody for twenty-nine months. Just before the father

was ready to progress to semi-supervised visits, he relapsed on

methamphetamine. Because the father had not yet overcome his addiction after

years of services, the juvenile court correctly found that terminating his parental

rights was in the children’s best interests. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 41 (Iowa

2010) (“It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency . . . by

hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable

home for the child.”).
11

As for the third step, the father argues “that a permanent separation through

termination would be detrimental to the children due to their age and their bond

with him.” This argument invokes the permissive parent-child bond exception in

Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(c), which allows the court to avoid termination if

there is “clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental

to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.” See

In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 225 (Iowa 2016) (noting the “factors weighing against

termination in section 232.116(3) are permissive, not mandatory” (citation

omitted)). Like the juvenile court, we do not discount the father’s strong bond with

his children. But he did not “provide the clear and convincing evidence necessary

to show that, on balance, that bond makes termination more detrimental than not”

given the safety concerns at issue. W.M., 957 N.W.2d at 315.

Finally, we agree with the court’s denial of the father’s request for more time.

An extension is appropriate only if we can conclude “the need for removal . . . will

no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” Iowa Code

§ 232.104(2)(b). The father argues that his “history not only shows a few relapses,

but also demonstrates multiple successes as well,” including his negative drug test

in May 2024. We do not discount those successes. But the father had already

been granted multiple extensions, during which he continued to use

methamphetamine. And even though his drug test in May was negative, the father

had still not fully reengaged in substance-use treatment. With this history, we find

an extension was unwarranted. We accordingly affirm the termination of the

father’s parental rights.
12

III. Mother’s Appeal

Like the father, the mother also challenges each of the three steps in our

termination framework. And she alternatively contends the juvenile court abused

its discretion in denying her motion for a new trial or to reopen the record. 6 We

find this last claim—which we review for an abuse of discretion—to be dispositive.

See Hunter v. Union State Bank, 505 N.W.2d 172, 174 (Iowa 1993) (reviewing a

motion for a new trial under what is now Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1802(2)

for an abuse of discretion); In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 526 (Iowa 2019) (reviewing

a motion to reopen the record for an abuse of discretion).

Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1802(2) states:

In the event of the death . . . of a judge who has under
advisement an undecided motion, or case tried without a jury, any
other judge of the district may be called in . . . and, if by a review of
the transcript or a reargument the judge can, in the judge’s opinion,
become sufficiently informed to render a decision, the judge shall do
so; otherwise the judge may order a continuance, declare a mistrial,
or order a new trial of all or any of the issues, or direct the recalling
of any witnesses, or make such disposition of the matter as the
situation warrants.

In interpreting its role under this rule, the juvenile court began with the

premise that it was required to read the rule “with the strict obedience to language

that the rules of civil procedure require.” From there, the court concluded the rule

“places an obligation on the successor judge to decide a case on the review of the

transcript (or reargument) if that judge feels he can become sufficiently informed

to render a decision.” While the court acknowledged “there are some limitations

6 Although the mother’s motion cited Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1004(1)
and (7) in support of her request for a new trial, the juvenile court analyzed the
request under rule 1.1802(2). We will do the same.
13

placed on a successor judge to resolve certain credibility issues, . . . there is case

law that suggests that a court should not let this inability preclude a decision if one

can be made.” After reviewing the pleadings, exhibits, and transcript from the

termination hearing, the court felt that it was sufficiently informed to render a

decision, reasoning:

A complete record was made at the hearing, and the parents and
children were awarded a procedurally required hearing where their
rights were respected. Their attorneys could present evidence.
Their attorneys were able to cross-examine the witnesses of the
State. All of this record was properly preserved via a court
stenographer. This court reviewed all the evidence and the record,
including every exhibit filed in the underlying [child-in-need-of-
assistance] cases. While one may argue that the lengthy delay of
this order mitigates the State and litigants’ interest in a timely
decision, this court finds that at the retrial, any successor judge would
have to review the entirety of the case files due to [the prior judge]
taking judicial notice of them. This additional review would delay
things even further. Parties would avoid the time and expense of a
second proceeding since this record is complete. Any appellate
court tasked with reviewing this matter would find itself similarly
situated in having to make a de novo decision without the benefit of
live testimony.

We disagree for three reasons. First, “[t]his is a juvenile case in which the

best interests of the children dictate that the rules of procedure be liberally applied

in order that all probative evidence might be admitted.” In re J.R.H., 358 N.W.2d

311, 318 (Iowa 1984). Second, “when we say a case is reviewed de novo, this

does not mean that we decide the case in a vacuum or approach it as though the

trial court had never been involved.” Hora v. Hora, 5 N.W.3d 635, 645 (Iowa 2024)

(cleaned up). “To the contrary, while not bound by the district court’s findings, we

give them weight and defer especially where the credibility of witnesses is a factor

in the outcome.” Id. (cleaned up); see also In re H.L.B.R., 567 N.W.2d 675, 679

(Iowa Ct. App. 1997) (“Where there is conflicting evidence on some issues, we
14

give consideration to the juvenile court on issues of credibility.”). Third, the juvenile

court’s reasoning was based on In re K.L.C., 372 N.W.2d 223 (Iowa 1985), which

is distinguishable from the unique circumstances presented here, especially

considering later decisions from our supreme court on the same issue.

In K.L.C., a mother argued that she was denied due process when “the

judge who presided at the termination hearing was not the same judge who issued

the final termination.” 372 N.W.2d at 226. The “crux of the mother’s complaint,”

according to the court in K.L.C., was “that the judge who decided her case did not

view the witnesses.” Id. “Without totally discounting the importance of having a

fact finder present during the production of evidence, especially in passing on the

credibility of individual testimony,” the court concluded the mother had not been

denied due process for several reasons:

The State, as parens patria, along with other litigants in a
juvenile termination proceeding, have a legitimate interest in having
a child’s future decided promptly without undue delay. As a fiscal
matter, the litigants have a significant interest in avoiding the time
and expense of a second proceeding when the first proceeding
provides a record that is complete. As a practical matter every
appeal causes a final decision to be rendered without personal
contact with the witnesses. On appeal, we review parent-child
terminations de novo, adjudicating rights anew. Finally, [the
successor judge] followed authorized procedure to decide this case.

Id. at 226–27 (internal citation omitted).

In cases since K.L.C., our supreme court has elevated the importance of

credibility determinations in determining the proper procedure to be employed by

a successor judge under rule 1.1802(2). For instance, the court in Hunter found a

successor judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to order a new trial

because most facts were undisputed and “credibility was not that crucial to the
15

court’s decision.” 505 N.W.2d at 175. The court also agreed with the successor

judge’s reasoning that “[i]f I have to determine this case on who the trial court

believes, that is a strong argument for having the trial court see those people and

observe their testimony and weigh the conflicting stories by seeing them in life.”

Id. at 174–75. The supreme court built on that reasoning in Seyler, where it stated:

“In a case where the resolution of a material issue requires a determination as to

the weight and credibility of testimony, due process requires that the trier of fact

hear all of the evidence necessary to make a meaningful evaluation.” 559 N.W.2d

at 9 (citation omitted). The court emphasized that “[i]n a child custody case where

credibility of the witnesses is of paramount importance, due process requires that

the deciding judge hear the evidence.” Id. at 10.

Credibility was a key issue in determining whether to terminate the mother’s

parental rights. And that decision was a close call in our review of the record. The

State was required to establish a nexus between the mother’s mental health—the

only remaining concern at termination—and an appreciable risk of adjudicatory

harm to the children under Iowa Code section 232.102. See In re M.S., 889

N.W.2d 675, 682 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016). But there was little evidence in the record

about that nexus or the adjudicatory harm the children would suffer if returned to

the mother’s custody. Indeed, on appeal, the State supports the court’s decision

by simply arguing the children could not be safely returned to their mother because

her visits “remained suspended at the time of the termination hearing.” While the

necessary progression of visits is a consideration in some cases, see In re C.N.,

No. 19-1861, 2020 WL 567283, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2020), here the parties

disputed why the mother’s visits did not progress.
16

Throughout the proceedings, the mother maintained that a service provider

was lying about observations she made in reports about the mother’s parenting.

Yet the juvenile court credited those observations in its ruling. The court also

resolved an important factual dispute at the termination hearing based on its

conclusion that the mother was not credible. That dispute involved the mother’s

last visit before the termination hearing. After reviewing the mother’s testimony

about that incident, the court stated:

Respectfully, this court gives little weight to [the mother’s]
testimony about the July 26, 2024 situation, as this court finds it
minimized her participation and demonstrates little accountability for
how it could impact her children. Obviously, this court could not view
[the mother’s] demeanor while she was on the stand. But this court
can make credibility decisions based on the supporting evidence and
lack of supporting evidence for a party’s position. [The mother], no
doubt, feels like she is justified in her actions. And there may have
been ways in which [the] worker . . . could have de-escalated things
herself. However, the evidence filed shows that [the mother’s] story
does not comport with others’ accounts.

The court then reviewed that evidence, which it found to be credible, before

concluding the mother “has not learned how to manage her emotions or handle

conflict appropriately, even when her actions impact her children.” That conclusion

led the court to determine the State had met its burden to terminate the mother’s

parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) and (h):

With [the mother], the impediment to reunification no longer is
her use of illegal substances. Instead, [she] continues to struggle
with her mental health and her lack of ability to work with the
providers to remedy the parenting deficiencies at the heart of this
case. . . . Her repeated inability to control her emotions and her
behavior resulted in a terrible situation that occurred in front of the
children and impacted them greatly.

We do not find the record to be so clear. The reports from the provider who

was part of the July incident with the mother are more negative than other
17

providers’ reports. And while the accounts from the incident noted the children

were crying, the case manager testified that she had only spoken to one of the

children’s therapists by the termination hearing, and that therapist had no opinion

on whether the mother’s visits should have been suspended. These, and other

key factual disputes, made the juvenile court’s decision to deny the mother’s

request for a new trial and to reopen the record unreasonable, especially

considering the interests at stake. See L.T., 924 N.W.2d at 526 (“In order to show

an abuse of discretion, a party must show the juvenile court’s action was

unreasonable under the attendant circumstances.”). Because the record is

incomplete on these crucial credibility questions and lacking relevant evidence

about the mother’s situation in the six months between the termination hearing and

the juvenile court’s ruling, we cannot adequately assess the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting the decision to terminate the mother’s parental rights.7 So we

conclude the case must be remanded.

We share the juvenile court’s concern with how long these children have

been removed from their parents’ custody and its desire to avoid adding to that

time. See In re T.R., 705 N.W.2d 6, 12 (Iowa 2005) (“[D]elays in termination of

parental rights cases are ‘antagonistic’ to the child’s best interest.” (citation

omitted)). But to serve the best interests of these children—some of whom have

been moved from placement to placement throughout these proceedings—we

conclude the court should have ordered a new termination hearing under

7 The same credibility concerns are not present with our analysis of the court’s

decision to terminate the father’s parental rights. Nor did the father claim in the
juvenile court or on appeal that his situation had changed in the months after the
termination hearing.
18

rule 1.1802(2) and considered the updated evidence the mother claimed was

important to the court’s decision, including “changes to her parenting ability, her

ability to remain sober and maintain her mental health,” and contemplated changes

in the children’s placements. See L.T., 924 N.W.2d at 526 (finding the court

abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen the record where twenty

months had passed since the original hearing and the new evidence “directly went

to the concerns of the juvenile court”).

IV. Conclusion

We affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights. But under the

unique circumstances present here, we reverse the juvenile court’s ruling

terminating the mother’s parental rights and remand with instructions to grant her

motion for a new termination hearing and to reopen the record.

AFFIRMED ON THE FATHER’S APPEAL; REVERSED AND REMANDED

ON THE MOTHER’S APPEAL.

Chicchelly, J., concurs; Greer, P.J., specially concurs.
19

GREER, Judge (specially concurring).

I concur in the result and reasoning of the majority opinion. But, I point to a

concern that continues to surface in cases we review. Importantly, the legislature

requires that the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) make

reasonable efforts to help reunite families. See Iowa Code § 232.102(6) (2023)

(providing HHS must make “every reasonable effort to return the child to the child’s

home as quickly as possible consistent with the best interests of the child”). Our

supreme court has discussed the historical background behind this duty. See In

re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000). The court noted:

Our laws relating to the welfare of children have been driven
for the last twenty-five years by policies and laws generally
developed at the national level. Under the Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act of 1980, Public Law 96–272, 94 Statutes 500
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), the
concept of family preservation was established with a goal of
reuniting children with their families after reasonable efforts by social
services. Congress mandated services for families and children
under the threat of ineligibility for federal matching funds to
accomplish this goal. The reasonableness effort was conceived by
Congress in part to ensure that prior to the expenditure of federal
funds on foster care, reasonable efforts would be made to prevent
out-of-home placement, and reasonable efforts would be made for
unification following out-of-home placement. The requirement of
reasonable efforts exists both to protect rights of parents and
children, and provide financial incentive for states.
Iowa responded with its own scheme of reasonable efforts by
requiring the DHS to “make every reasonable effort to return the child
to the child’s home as quickly as possible consistent with the best
interests of the child.” The concept covers both the efforts to prevent
and eliminate the need for removal. The focus is on services to
improve parenting. However, it also includes visitation designed to
facilitate reunification while providing adequate protection for the
child.
20

Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Thus, while we are to emphasize

safety first for children, our state looks to make reasonable efforts to keep families

together, including providing visitation.

In this case, the four children were split into three different homes at the

time of removal over three years ago. From that starting position—as the

described in the opinion—“the oldest child has been moved twice; the second

oldest was moved once; and the youngest two children were moved five times,

with a sixth move contemplated after the termination hearing.” Additionally, at a

time when the mother appeared to be progressing, her ability to visit the four

children was impeded by the distance between her and the various placements.

As the majority notes, as the mother began semi-supervised visits with the

children, her “visits required her to transport her four children from their three

placements—a 656-mile roundtrip that took the mother all day and left her with

about ten minutes to spend with the children outside of the car.” A report from

HHS in February 2024 stated that “no concerns were noted” during the mother’s

visits with all four children although those visits were inconsistent because of

transportation barriers. But from there, the mother started missing visits and

concerns grew over her mental health and parenting abilities.

I recognize that the mother has a responsibility to assist in making the

changes necessary to reunite the family, and from my vantage point I cannot

assess what caused the downward fall, but, the stress of being separated from the

children by such an extreme distance, where the options for maintaining contact

involves hours of driving with next to no significant time for connection, cannot be

overstated.
21

In a perfect world, there would be specialty treatment centers that would

focus on substance-use recovery while allowing parents to remain with their

children and support the parent by addressing skills over the long-term. As this

case illustrates, the current system—with the growing foster home shortage8and

the limitations on resources—is not child-centered in its application.

8 As reported by Iowa Public Radio:

In 2024, there were more foster care kids who were referred to
a home than there were licensed foster families in Iowa, according
to Four Oaks, the state’s contractor for licensing foster and adoptive
parents.
The nonprofit said [there] were 2,427 referrals for children
needing a foster home and 1,734 licensed foster families in 2024.
Meghan McKinney, Foster Youth Face the Possibility of Living in Shelters Due to
a Lack of Foster Homes, Iowa Public Radio (Mar. 27, 2025),
https://perma.cc/35B9-8E38.