In the Interest of J.M. and S.A., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-1570
Filed December 17, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF J.M. and S.A.,
Minor Children,

R.A., Father,
Appellant,

M.M., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Carrie K. Bryner,

Judge.

The mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental

rights. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

Annette F. Martin, Cedar Rapids, for appellant father.

Alexander S. Momany of Howes Law Firm, PC, Cedar Rapids, for appellant

mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Robin L. Himes of Linn County Advocate, Cedar Rapids, attorney and

guardian ad litem for minor children.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Badding and

Sandy, JJ.
2

TABOR, Chief Judge.

The juvenile court’s first duty is to protect the best interests of the children

in its jurisdiction.1 However difficult the obstacles are for the parents to resume

custody, the court cannot return children to an unsafe situation. Against those

fundamentals, the parents here separately appeal the termination of their parental

rights.2 Because neither parent can safely raise their respective children, we

affirm.3

I. Facts and Background Proceedings

M.M. is the mother of four children. In early 2024, nine-year-old J.M. and

three-year-old S.A. lived with her in Cedar Rapids. M.M.’s other two children lived

with family members. That April, M.M. attended a doctor’s appointment for S.A.,

who has cerebral palsy and was then twenty-one months old. An eyewitness

reported to police that M.M. was “screaming and swearing” at S.A. and had turned

over her car seat so that the toddler fell out face first. M.M. pleaded guilty to child

endangerment and received a deferred judgment. But fifteen months later at the

trial to terminate her parental rights, M.M. testified she didn’t hurt S.A. and only

accepted the plea agreement because she didn’t want to go to jail.

1 “[T]he paramount concern that guides all matters arising out of [child-in-need-of-

assistance] and termination of parental rights proceedings [is] the best interests of
the child.” Iowa Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 27 N.W.3d 76, 83
(Iowa 2025).
2 M.M. is the mother of both S.A. and J.M. R.A. is S.A.’s father. The juvenile court

also terminated the parental rights of putative fathers of J.M.
3 We review termination-of-parental-rights proceedings de novo. In re A.S., 906

N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018). “We are not bound by the juvenile court’s findings
of fact, but we do give them weight, especially in assessing the credibility of
witnesses.” Id. (citation omitted).
3

After their mother was arrested, the court removed S.A. and J.M. from

M.M.’s custody. S.A.’s father R.A., who lives in Georgia, was unable to travel to

Iowa and assume custody. So the Iowa Department of Health and Human

Services placed S.A. and J.M with their aunt. But after learning that the aunt

allowed M.M. to have unauthorized contact with the children, the department

moved them to a foster home. In June 2024, the court ordered M.M. to address

her mental-health and substance-use issues, drug test four times per month, and

undergo medication management and therapy for her mental-health needs. It also

ordered an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) study on

R.A.’s home in Georgia.

By the termination trial one year later, M.M. showed little progress toward

being a more stable parent. Her employment and housing were unstable. On the

first day of the trial, she was unemployed and living with her pastor. On the second

day of trial, one week later, she didn’t appear but her attorney reported she had

been kicked out of the pastor’s home and moved to Illinois. The department case

manager testified it was difficult to provide services because M.M.’s phone number

changed often. The quality of her parenting at supervised visits was mixed. At

some visits, she was very inactive. Once the supervisor had to end the visit early

because M.M. did not bring appropriate food. The department suspended

visitation when M.M. had an outburst in front of the children, threatening the foster

family and the judge.

M.M. also didn’t address her mental-health and substance-use challenges.

According to the department, she was asked to drug test sixty-seven times and

tested twice. Both tests were positive for marijuana. As for her mental health,
4

M.M. had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, ADHD, and PTSD,

but she didn’t “believe” those diagnoses. She refused medication because she

didn’t want to be “drugged up.” And she testified her mental-health struggles did

not affect her parenting. By the termination trial, she had attended just one therapy

session.

R.A. had sparse involvement in S.A.’s life. In fact, he had only seen his

daughter in person once. He testified that he calls and video chats weekly, but the

foster parents reported these interactions were less frequent. He also testified that

he sent money and clothes for S.A., but the foster parents recalled that happening

only twice. The case manager agreed S.A. knows R.A. is her father because of

their phone contact. Yet the manager did not believe that terminating the father’s

rights would cause S.A. significant trauma because they had no real parent-child

relationship. On top of that, the ICPC report on R.A.’s home was denied when his

drug screen was positive for alcohol and marijuana; yet R.A. testified that he had

not used marijuana for several months. R.A.’s attorney asked for more drug

testing, but the case manager had not yet set that up with the state of Georgia.

On the other hand, R.A. has custody of S.A.’s sister, E.A., who was one

year older. His daycare provider and family friends testified that he is a safe and

attentive single parent. He has a job as an HVAC technician, a car, and family

health insurance. R.A. has been in his own apartment for several months. His

mother and his godmother provide back-up care for E.A. when R.A. is working or

attending classes at a local college. R.A. testified he wants to raise both his

daughters and believes S.A. should be placed with her full sibling.
5

But the department rejected that prospect. The case manager testified

while S.A. has scarcely met E.A., she is strongly bonded with her half-brother J.M.

And their current placement in Iowa has the potential to be a permanent home for

both children. The current foster family has developed a strong attachment with

the children, who have been in their care only since May 2025.

The juvenile court terminated M.M.’s parental rights to J.M under Iowa Code

section 232.116(1), paragraphs (e) and (f) (2025) and to S.A. under paragraphs (e)

and (h). And it terminated R.A.’s rights to S.A. under paragraphs (e) and (h). The

parents appeal separately.

II. Discussion

We review termination proceedings in three steps. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d

280, 294 (Iowa 2021). First, we evaluate whether the State has proven a statutory

ground for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1). Id. Second, we

assess whether termination is in the children’s best interests under

section 232.116(2). Id. Third, we consider whether any exceptions in

section 232.116(3) preclude termination. Id.

A. Mother’s Appeal

M.M. challenges the first and third steps of the termination analysis.

On the first step, “we may affirm the juvenile court’s termination order on

any ground that we find supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In re D.W.,

791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010); see Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(a)–(p). Here, we

focus on paragraphs (f) and (h). M.M. challenges only the common final element

of those grounds, requiring clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be

returned to parental custody at the time of the termination hearing as provided in
6

section 232.102.4 See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f)(4), (h)(4); In re L.M., 904

N.W.2d 835, 839 (Iowa 2017) (finding “at the present time” means the date of the

termination hearing). She asserts that she obtained a mental-health evaluation as

ordered and engaged in mental-health services. She chose not to take

medications because she didn’t like the side-effects. And she argues that she

maintained employment through the proceedings.

But our reading of the record reveals M.M.’s instability and lack of

engagement with services fail to make her a safe parent. Between the two hearing

dates, she had lost her housing and moved out of state. She took only minimal

steps to address her substance-use and mental-health struggles, resisting

medication for serious impairments, attending only one therapy session, and

refusing most drug-testing requests. She was also still testing positive for

marijuana. And she failed to see how either her substance use or her mental-

health conditions affected her parenting. Despite pleading guilty to child

endangerment for flipping her child’s car seat, M.M. denied hurting S.A. And while

she was frustrated and sad about the removal of her children, she agreed she

didn’t follow court orders to enable reunification. Bottom line, the children would

4 Our caselaw offers two formulations for what it means when a child “cannot be

returned” to parental custody as provided in section 232.102, which discusses
transferring the child’s custody if staying in the home would be “contrary to the
welfare of the child.” Many cases cite In re M.M., 483 N.W.2d 812, 814 (Iowa
1992), which provides a child cannot be returned if it would expose him or her to
“any harm amounting to a new child in need of assistance adjudication.” But our
supreme court often describes the fourth element as the inability to “safely return”
children to their parents’ custody. See, e.g., In re T.W., No. 20-0145, 2020 WL
1881115, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2020) (collecting cases). Under either
formulation, the State met its burden of proof here.
7

not be safe if returned to her custody. We agree with the juvenile court that clear

and convincing evidence supports this ground for termination.

Next, M.M. contends that a statutory exception applies to prevent

termination because she and the children share a close bond. See Iowa Code

§ 232.116(3)(c) (providing the court need not terminate parental rights on clear and

convincing evidence that doing so “would be detrimental to the child at the time

due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship”). The case worker agreed

that M.M. is bonded to the children, and they love her. But M.M. presents no

evidence that the children “will be disadvantaged by termination” or that “the

disadvantage overcomes” her parenting deficiencies. D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 709.

She has not shown sufficient evidence to apply this exception.

B. Father’s Appeal

R.A. challenges only the first step of the termination analysis, contending

there was insufficient evidence to support the statutory grounds for termination.

See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(e), (h). R.A.’s petition on appeal focuses on

paragraph (e), but we choose to analyze paragraph (h). See D.W., 791 N.W.2d

at 707. R.A. does not identify how the State’s proof fell short on that ground.5 But

5 Because R.A. includes no analysis that the statutory ground under paragraph (h)

wasn’t met, we could deem the argument waived. See, e.g., In re K.K., No. 16-
0151, 2016 WL 1129330, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. March 23, 2016). But we choose to
address it. In passing, R.A. also mentions “best interests” and the statutory
exceptions under section 232.116(3). Because he advances no substantive
argument, we do not address either of those steps. See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d
489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (holding broad or vague arguments do not merit review);
A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 475 (holding parent resisting termination bears burden of proof
under section 232.116(3)).
8

elsewhere in his petition, R.A. points to his stable home, income, and successful

parenting of S.A.’s sister.

We recognize that R.A. has custody of his other daughter. But the ICPC

study was denied because his drug screen was positive for marijuana and alcohol.

And while R.A. testified he hadn’t used marijuana in several months, the test came

back positive in June. We also understand it is costly and difficult to visit Iowa from

Georgia. But S.A. has been out of parental custody for fifteen months, and R.A.

had only seen her in person once.6 True, she calls R.A. “Dad” over the phone, but

they have no relationship beyond that. In addition, S.A. has a complex medical

condition, and R.A. has never attended her medical appointments or demonstrated

that he could handle her health needs while also caring for another preschooler.

The statutory timeframe to show he can assume custody of this child has run. See

Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(4). The case worker testified that the department could

not recommend that S.A. be united with her father in Georgia because the

department had never seen him perform parenting skills. On this record, we find

the State offered clear and convincing evidence that S.A. could not be returned to

her father’s custody at the time of the termination hearing.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

6 The juvenile court found that R.A. “chose to use the geographical distance as an

excuse to not engage in services or make any progress toward reunification with
his child.”