In the Interest of E.M. and J.J., Minor Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-1630
Filed December 17, 2025

IN THE INTEREST OF E.M. and J.J.,
Minor Children,

M.J., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Joseph Tofilon,

Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

Jason T. Carlstrom of Carlstrom Law Firm, West Des Moines, for appellant

mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Brandy Lundy of Lundy Law, PLC, Moorland, attorney and guardian ad litem

for minor children.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Greer and Sandy, JJ.
2

TABOR, Chief Judge.

Megan appeals the termination of her parental rights to her daughter and

son. Because Megan has not shown that she can be a safe, sober parent, and

because she will not likely achieve that standard within six months, we affirm.1

I. Facts and Background Proceedings

Nine-year-old E.M. has been the subject of three prior child-in-need-of-

assistance (CINA) proceedings, all prompted by Megan’s substance use and

involvement with violent romantic partners. This fourth case opened in April 2024

when Megan’s paramour Aaron assaulted her. E.M.’s father Joseph has joint

custody and sole physical care under a bridge order. The juvenile court removed

the child from both parents’ custody but later placed E.M. in Joseph’s care. 2

In September, Megan gave birth to J.J. His umbilical cord tested positive

for methamphetamine, amphetamine, THC, alcohol, and cocaine. Because of the

risk posed by the parents’ drug use, the court removed the infant from Megan’s

and Aaron’s custody. And after a brief stint under a safety plan drafted by the Iowa

Department of Health and Human Services, J.J. was placed with a foster family.3

The rest of the case is characterized by Megan’s inaction in resolving the

substance use and domestic violence concerns. Her drug tests were positive or

1 We review termination-of-parental-rights proceedings de novo. In re A.S., 906
N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018). “We are not bound by the juvenile court’s findings
of fact, but we do give them weight, especially in assessing the credibility of
witnesses.” Id. (citation omitted).
2 Joseph had his own struggles during the CINA case but demonstrated sobriety

and stability, and E.M. has been doing well in his care.
3 The department’s social work manager reported that J.J. is doing well and has a

strong bond with this pre-adoptive family, as well as his older sister.
3

presumptively positive regularly.4 She resumed her fraught relationship with

Aaron, violating no-contact orders and refusing to testify against him.5 In fact,

shortly after J.J. was removed from their care, Megan and Aaron got married.

Seeing little progress toward reunification, the State petitioned to terminate

Megan’s and Aaron’s parental rights in August 2025. That month, Megan entered

a residential treatment facility. She tested positive for methamphetamine and

marijuana at check-in, but providers reported she was doing well. The facility

allowed placement of children. Megan also wrote a letter to the court vowing to

stay in treatment and expressing her eagerness to reunite with her children.

After the hearing, the juvenile court terminated Megan’s parental rights to

E.M. under Iowa Code section 232.116(1) (2025), paragraph (f), and to J.J. under

paragraph (h). It also terminated Aaron’s parental rights, but he does not appeal.

II. Discussion

We review termination proceedings in three steps. See In re A.B., 957

N.W.2d 280, 294 (Iowa 2021); see also Iowa Code § 232.116(1)–(3). We first

decide whether the record supports a statutory ground for termination; we next

assess whether termination is in the children’s best interests; and finally we

examine whether a permissive exception applies to preclude termination. See In

re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 532 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025). We address only the steps

4 The department considers unexcused missed tests, refusals, and tampered tests

as presumptively positive.
5
During the CINA case, Aaron was charged for many offenses against Megan
including domestic abuse assault causing injury, criminal mischief for breaking her
car windshield, domestic abuse assault by strangulation, and three no-contact
order violations. Six months after E.M.’s removal, Aaron fought with Megan while
she was driving, causing her to flip her vehicle.
4

challenged by a parent. Id. Megan raises two issues under step one. She argues

the State didn’t prove the statutory grounds for termination and asks for more time

to work toward reunification. 6

First, “we may affirm the juvenile court’s termination order on any ground

that we find supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d

703, 707 (Iowa 2010); see Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(a)–(p). The juvenile court

found sufficient grounds to terminate under paragraph (f) as to E.M. and

paragraph (h) as to J.J. Megan challenges only the common final element of those

grounds, which requires clear and convincing proof that the child cannot presently

be returned to parental custody as provided in section 232.102.7 See Iowa Code

§ 232.116(1)(f)(4), (h)(4); In re L.M., 904 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Iowa 2017) (finding “at

the present time” means the date of the termination hearing).

Because the children can stay with her at the treatment facility, Megan

argues the State didn’t show they cannot be returned to her custody. But that

6 Megan also highlights her long-standing traumas, mentions the department’s

placement decisions involving J.J., and expresses a desire for more visitation. The
juvenile court denied Megan’s motion for reasonable efforts, and she doesn’t
reprise it in her petition on appeal. She also suggests that there is no need to
terminate her relationship with E.M. because the child is in Joseph’s custody. See
Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(a) (providing exception for termination when a child is in
relative custody). But Megan has not developed these claims sufficiently for us to
address them. See In re R.M.-V., 13 N.W.3d 620, 623 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024).
7 Our caselaw offers two formulations for what it means when a child “cannot be

returned” to parental custody as provided in section 232.102, which discusses
transferring the child’s custody if staying in the home would be “contrary to the
welfare of the child.” In In re M.M., the supreme court held that a child cannot be
returned if it would expose him or her to “any harm amounting to a new child in
need of assistance adjudication.” 483 N.W.2d 812, 814 (Iowa 1992). Alternately,
it means the inability to “safely return” children to their parents’ care. See, e.g., In
re T.W., No. 20-0145, 2020 WL 1881115, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2020)
(collecting cases). Under either formulation, the State met its burden of proof here.
5

argument conflates placement with custody. “[P]hysical placement in the semi-

supervised setting of a treatment facility is not the same as custody.” In re L.C.,

No. 25-0828, 2025 WL 2538907, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2025). And concerns

persist about her ability to safely parent. Megan insists that future harm is

speculative. But the case worker accurately summed up Megan’s history,

testifying that she has yet to successfully complete treatment, struggles to follow

rules while in treatment, and “struggle[s] when she is out in the community.” This

cycle of treatment and relapse tips the scales away from reunification. See In re

W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 313 (Iowa 2021); L.A., 20 N.W.3d at 533. Megan had only

been drug-free for one month and, if discharged, had no stable home. She also

hadn’t eased concerns about domestic violence in her life. The State offered clear

and convincing evidence that the children cannot be returned to her custody.

Megan next contends that the juvenile court should have given her six more

months to work toward reunification. To grant that extension, the court must find

the need for removal will soon be resolved. Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b); see In re

A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 89 (Iowa Ct App. 2005). Megan argues she is doing well

in treatment and future harm is speculative. But the juvenile court had “no

confidence” that she could accomplish in the next six months what she had “not

been able to accomplish in the last year and a half” while the children were

removed. We agree. We commend Megan for her commitment to treatment. But

even if she remains sober, the risk of domestic violence remains given her

relationship with Aaron. So more time is unwarranted.

AFFIRMED.