State of Iowa v. Dana Jay Breese

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0647
Filed January 7, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Dana Jay Breese,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County,
The Honorable Gregory D. Brandt, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Jesse A. Macro Jr. of Macro Law, LLP, West Des Moines, attorney for
appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and David Banta, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Chicchelly, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ.
Opinion by Langholz, J.

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LANGHOLZ, Judge.

Dana Breese offered to watch a disabled woman while the woman’s
mother went to the store. When the mother returned home earlier than
expected, she found Breese masturbating in front of the woman with her
adult diaper removed. Breese pleaded guilty to assault with intent to commit
sexual abuse—an aggravated misdemeanor. See Iowa Code § 709.11(3)
(2024). The district court sentenced him to an indeterminate two-year prison
sentence. And Breese appeals, arguing that the court should have granted
him a deferred judgment rather than imposing a prison sentence.

We review a district court’s discretionary sentencing decisions,
including the exercise of its discretion whether to grant a deferred judgment,
for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Gordon, 998 N.W.2d 859, 862
(Iowa 2023). This deferential standard of review recognizes that the court’s
decision “to impose a particular sentence within the statutory limits is
cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d
720, 724 (Iowa 2002). And even when the court would have been justified in
imposing the sentence sought by the defendant, “our task on appeal is not to
second guess the decision made by the district court, but to determine if it
was unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.” Id. at 725. So it is not
enough that the defendant disagrees with the court’s weighing of the
sentencing factors and the sentence ultimately selected. See Gordon,
998 N.W.2d at 863.

Breese argues that the district court abused its discretion in selecting
a prison sentence rather than a deferred judgment because it “only
considered limited factors” and based its decision “upon an emotional
response.” We disagree. In its written sentencing order, the court stated that
it found “the following factors the most significant in determining” Breese’s

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sentence: “[t]he nature and circumstances of the crime,” “[p]rotection of the
public from further offenses,” the “[v]ictim impact statement,” “[t]he plea
agreement,” Breese’s “criminal history,” Breese’s “propensity for further
criminal acts,” Breese’s “age and character,” and the “[m]aximum
opportunity for rehabilitation.” And at sentencing, the court reasoned:
Mr. Breese, when it comes to sexual predators, you are what we fear most.
This is an individual who is totally dependent on other individuals, and you
took advantage of that situation.

Quite honestly, I don’t know that words can justify or forgive what
you have done in this particular instance. You are basically asking this
Court, that if after a period of two years, this be just dissolved from your
record. The Court finds that that is wholly inappropriate in this particular
case, and your request for a deferred judgment is denied.

The serious nature of this, and the fact you preyed on the most
vulnerable, in this Court’s mind, dictate, as the PSI says, due to the
seriousness of this, that you be incarcerated for a period not to exceed two
years.

These reasons are not untenable or unreasonable. They are based on
proper sentencing factors—not merely an emotional response. See Iowa
Code § 901.5; Gordon, 998 N.W.2d at 862. To be sure, the district court
focused on the nature of the offense and related circumstances. But placing
“considerable emphasis” on a particular factor at sentencing is not an abuse
of discretion so long as a court also “consider[s] other factors pertinent to
sentencing.” State v. Leckington, 713 N.W.2d 208, 216–17 (Iowa 2006). And
the court expressly stated in the sentencing order that it did consider many
other factors too.

Seeing no abuse of discretion in the district court’s exercise of its
considerable sentencing judgment, we thus affirm Breese’s sentence.

AFFIRMED.

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