Terence Edward Manning, Jr. v. State of Iowa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-1868
Filed January 28, 2026
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Terence Edward Manning Jr.,
Applicant–Appellant,
v.
State of Iowa,
Defendant–Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County,
The Honorable Scott D. Rosenberg, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Francis Hurley, Des Moines, attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Aaron Rogers, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Chicchelly, J.

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CHICCHELLY, Judge.

Terence Manning Jr. appeals the district court’s order denying his
application for postconviction relief (PCR). He claims that his trial counsel
was ineffective for seeking a competency evaluation that he alleges resulted
in a violation of his speedy trial rights. Upon our review, we affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Manning was convicted of willful injury causing serious injury after a
jury trial. Our supreme court affirmed his conviction and sentence. State v.
Manning, 26 N.W.3d 385, 388 (Iowa 2025). In a separate case, he pleaded
guilty to domestic abuse assault. Prior to his convictions, Manning’s trial
counsel applied for a competency hearing and sought to withdraw due to a
breakdown in the attorney-client relationship relating to competency
concerns. The district court ordered an evaluation which ultimately
concluded Manning was competent to stand trial.

Following his convictions, Manning filed two postconviction relief
applications that the district court ultimately consolidated. Manning made
several claims but raises only one on appeal. The district court denied
Manning’s applications finding Manning failed to provide sufficient evidence
as to each claim. Manning now appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
We generally review PCR proceedings for correction of errors at law.
Linn v. State, 929 N.W.2d 717, 729 (Iowa 2019). But because ineffective
assistance-of-counsel claims implicate constitutional issues, our review is de
novo. Goode v. State, 920 N.W.2d 520, 523 (Iowa 2018).

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INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Manning’s sole argument on appeal is that his trial counsel was
ineffective for seeking a competency hearing. To succeed on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, Manning must satisfy the two-prong test
that (1) his counsel failed to perform an essential duty and (2) such failure
prejudiced him. State v. Majors, 940 N.W.2d 372, 391 (Iowa 2020); see
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). For the first prong, “we
begin with the presumption that the attorney performed competently.”
Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001). To overcome this
presumption, Manning must prove “counsel’s representation [fell] below an
objective standard of reasonableness.” Lado v. State, 804 N.W.2d 248, 251
(Iowa 2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). For the second prong, he
“must prove ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Id. (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). An applicant must prove “both ineffective
assistance and prejudice,” so we need not address both elements if one is not
established. Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 142. “If the claim lacks prejudice, it
can be decided on that ground alone without deciding whether the attorney
performed deficiently.” Id.

We must determine whether Manning’s trial counsel failed to perform
an essential duty when he sought a competency hearing. We conclude he did
not. Iowa Code section 812.3(1) (2023) requires the district court to suspend
proceedings if defense counsel “alleges specific facts showing that the
defendant is suffering from a mental disorder which prevents the defendant
from appreciating the charge, understanding the proceedings, or assisting
effectively in the defense.” Once proceedings are suspended, the district
court shall determine if probable cause exists to sustain the allegations. Iowa
Code § 812.3(1).

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Trial counsel told the district court, “My primary concern is when
confronted with the evidence that the State would present against him, I have
felt that Mr. Manning’s responses were somewhat nonlinear. Mr. Manning
does not appear to appreciate what the actual evidence against him is.” The
district court then engaged in a lengthy colloquy with Manning and
determined an evaluation was appropriate. In doing so the district court
relied on trial counsel’s grounds and “what I have seen with my interaction
with you today is whether or not you can effectively assist in your defense and
that’s why the court is ordering the evaluation.” We find trial counsel seeking
an evaluation is a reasonable exercise of counsel’s duty to ensure his client is
competent to participate in the proceedings. See Jasper v. State, No. 16-2039,
2017 WL 6513603, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2017) (“A defendant may
not be subjected to a criminal trial if his ‘mental condition is such that he
lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings
against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense.’”
(citation omitted)).

It is a duty of trial counsel to move for an evaluation if counsel “has a
good faith doubt as to the defendant’s competence.” Criminal Justice
Standards on Mental Health, standard 7–4.3(c) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2016),
available at https://perma.cc/64XT-5HE4. In fact, our cases have regularly
evaluated whether failing to seek a competency evaluation is a failure to
perform an essential duty. See, e.g., McGee v. State, No. 19-1335, 2020
WL 5650470, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Sep. 23, 2020); Lehman v. State,
No. 22-0407, 2023 WL 5602633, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2023). Based
on our review of the record, we cannot find on this record that seeking a

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competency hearing is a failure to perform an essential duty. So, we affirm
the district court’s denial of Manning’s application for post-conviction relief.

AFFIRMED.

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