In the Interest of W.S., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-1894
Filed January 28, 2026
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In the Interest of W.S., Minor Child,
B.L., Mother,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Tama County,
The Honorable Angie Johnston, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Sarah Dooley Rothman of Rothman Law Office, Albion, attorney for
appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee State.

Rebecca L. Petig of Bierman & Petig, P.C., Grinnell, attorney and guardian
ad litem for minor child.
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Considered without oral argument
by Buller, P.J., and Langholz and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Sandy, J.

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SANDY, Judge.

The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of the mother and
any putative father to W.S., who tested positive for methamphetamine and
amphetamine at birth. The mother appeals.

STATEMENT OF FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

W.S. was born in November 2024.1 At the time of W.S.’s birth, both
the child and the mother tested positive for methamphetamine and
amphetamine. The mother also tested positive for THC. Medical staff
reported concerns regarding the mother’s ability to provide care while
hospitalized following delivery. Based on those circumstances, the Iowa
Department of Health and Human Services initiated a child abuse
assessment on the date of the child’s birth.

That same month, the juvenile court entered an order authorizing
temporary removal. W.S. was placed directly from the hospital into foster
care, where he has remained since removal. He was placed with foster
parents, who were licensed to provide foster care and willing to adopt, and
had remained in that home ever since.

The State filed a child-in-need-of-assistance petition shortly after
removal. Following a November hearing, the removal was continued. In
December, the parties stipulated that W.S. was a child in need of assistance
under multiple subsections of Iowa Code section 232.96A (2024) due to
substance exposure, lack of adequate supervision, and risk of harm.
Disposition was entered in January 2025, continuing the child’s placement

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Paternity was never legally established. One individual was identified by the
mother as a possible father. Paternity testing was scheduled multiple times but never
completed. No putative father appeared or assumed responsibility for the child.

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outside the mother’s custody and requiring the mother to engage in
substance-use treatment, comply with drug testing, and participate in
services designed to facilitate reunification.

Throughout the pendency of the case, the mother struggled with
chronic substance use. Drug testing both before and after the child’s birth
reflected repeated positive results for methamphetamine and other
substances. The mother attempted treatment on more than one occasion,
including inpatient and outpatient services, but did not demonstrate
sustained sobriety in the community. At least one attempt at inpatient
treatment ended prematurely. Although there were periods when the mother
partially engaged with services, her substance use remained a recurring
concern.

The mother was also subject to supervised probation in an unrelated
criminal matter. During the course of the child-in-need-of-assistance case,
she was arrested multiple times for probation violations tied to substance use.
In March 2025, her probation was revoked, and she was sentenced to
incarceration. She remained incarcerated through the permanency hearing
and the termination trial.

Prior to her incarceration, the mother had supervised visitation due to
the child’s age and safety concerns. Following her incarceration, parent-child
contact was limited but not eliminated. The department facilitated video and
in-person contact consistent with institutional requirements.

A permanency hearing was held in May. At that time, the child had
been out of parental custody for approximately six months. The juvenile
court changed the permanency goal to termination of parental rights and

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adoption, citing the mother’s incarceration, unresolved substance use, and
the child’s need for permanency.

On June 9, the State filed a petition seeking termination of parental
rights. The petition stated multiple statutory grounds under Iowa Code
section 232.116, including grounds related to abandonment by any putative
father, the child’s age and length of removal, and the mother’s severe
substance-related disorder. The termination hearing was held on
September 3, 2025. The mother appeared remotely from prison and was
represented by counsel. The court received testimony from service providers
and admitted documentary exhibits, including records from the underlying
child-in-need-of-assistance case.

On October 28, the juvenile court entered an order terminating the
mother’s parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) and (l), as
well as the rights of any putative father under section 232.116(1)(b). The
court found that the child could not be safely returned to parental custody at
the time of the termination hearing and that termination was in the child’s
best interests. The court further found that none of the statutory exceptions
to termination applied.

The mother now appeals. She challenges the termination order on
grounds by contesting the timing of the permanency and termination
proceedings, the denial of additional time to work towards reunification, and
the adequacy of reunification efforts, particularly with respect to visitation
while she was incarcerated.

The State asserts that the juvenile court’s findings are supported by
clear and convincing evidence, that permanency and termination were not

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premature under the governing statutory framework, and that reasonable
efforts were made under the circumstances of the case.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Our review is de novo. In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 532 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2025) (en banc). We follow a three-step process of determining
(1) whether a statutory ground for termination under Iowa Code
section 232.116 has been established; (2) whether termination is in the
child’s best interest after applying the framework codified in
section 232.116(2); and (3) whether a permissive exception under
section 232.116(3) should be applied to deny termination. Id. We do not
address any steps not challenged by a parent. Id. After we address any
challenged steps of the three-step process, we then address any additional
challenges raised by a parent. Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Statutory Grounds.

When the juvenile court terminates a parent’s rights under more than
one statutory ground, we may affirm on any ground supported by the record.
In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). Here, the juvenile court
terminated the mother’s rights under section 232.116(1)(h) and (l). We focus
on paragraph (h), which permits termination of parental rights upon proof of
all the following:
(1) The child is three years of age or younger.

(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance
pursuant to section 232.96.

(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of
the child’s parents for at least six months of the last twelve months, or for

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the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less
than thirty days.

(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child
cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in
section 232.102 at the present time.

Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h). The mother does not directly challenge any of
the criteria set forth in 232.116(1)(h). Rather, she contends that the timing of
the permanency hearing was off2 so as to render the termination proceeding
invalid. A review of the record leaves us unsatisfied that such alleged error
was preserved for our review. Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa
2002) (“[I]ssues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district
court before we will decide them on appeal.”). The mother did not raise her
permanency-hearing-timing argument at the termination hearing, and so, the
juvenile court also never ruled on that argument. Because error was not
preserved, we decline to address the issue for the first time on appeal. As the
mother makes no claim that the child could be returned to her custody at the

2
Specifically, the mother advances that the termination of parental rights was an
error of law based on it occurring prematurely. She relies on Iowa Code section 232.104
and alleges that this code section prevents permanency hearings from being held until
twelve months after removal. Iowa Code section 232.104 states that
The time for the initial permanency hearing for a child subject to
out-of-home placement shall be the earlier of the following: (1) For a
temporary removal order entered under section 232.78, 232.95, or 232.96,
for a child who was removed without a court order under section 232.79,
or for an order entered under section 232.102, for which the court has not
waived reasonable efforts requirements, the permanency hearing shall be
held within twelve months of the date the child was removed from the home.
Iowa Code § 232.104(1)(a)(1) (emphasis added). The child was removed on November 4,
2024. The permanency hearing occurred on May 7, 2025. The mother reads Iowa Code
§ 232.104 as requiring the juvenile court to wait until twelve months after removal to
conduct permanency.

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time of the termination hearing, any challenge to statutory termination under
section 232.116(1)(h) fails, and we affirm on that ground.

II. Additional Time.

As recited above, the mother does not contend that the child could
have been returned to her custody at the time of the termination hearing—
she was in prison. Rather, she contends that if she had been given more time
she may have made parole during the extension so as to possibly allow the
child to return to her custody. She essentially argues she should have been
given more time for reunification given her incarcerated status.

This is an option permitted by statute. See Iowa Code § 232.117(5)
(permitting entry of a permanency order under section 232.104 if the court
does not terminate parental rights); see also id. § 232.104(2)(b) (authorizing a
permanency option of an additional six months to work toward reunification).
But to exercise this option, we must be able to “enumerate the specific
factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which comprise the basis
for the determination that the need for removal of the child from the child’s
home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” Id.
§ 232.104(2)(b).

The juvenile court, when considering the grant of an extension of time,
stated:
There is literally no way of knowing whether [the mother] will be able to
obtain housing and maintain sobriety when released from prison. [W.S.] is
less than one year old and all his needs must be met by [his] caregiver. In
addition, [W.S.] has had some health problems that are likely the result of
[the mother’s] drug use while she was pregnant. [The mother] is physically
unable to currently meet any of [W.S.’s] needs and it is entirely speculative
that she would be able to meet those needs to maintain [W.S.’s] safety even
if she were released from prison tomorrow.

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Like the juvenile court, we see no evidentiary support for a
determination that the need for removal will change if the mother was given
six more months. By the time of the termination trial, the child had been out
of the mother’s custody for nearly ten months, but the mother was no closer
to regaining custody than when the child was initially removed. She had gone
long stretches without physically visiting, let alone caring, for the child, and
the visits she did exercise remained supervised. See In re L.H., 13 N.W.3d 627,
629 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024) (finding failure to progress beyond supervised
visits supports termination of parental rights), overruled on other grounds by
L.A., 20 N.W.3d at 534. Indeed, “children should not be forced to wait for
their parent to be able to care for them, particularly when [the court] ha[s] so
little evidence to rely upon to believe the circumstances will be different in
six months.” In re M.M., No. 15-0214, 2015 WL 1332330, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.
Mar. 25, 2015). The juvenile court was correct to conclude that the mother
should not be given six more months to work toward reunification.

III. Reasonable Efforts.

The mother argues that the visitation with the child she was afforded
was not reasonable and prevented the establishment of a bond that could have
been an exception to termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(c). The
mother frames this issue on appeal as a reasonable-efforts challenge towards
the ability to establish a parent-child bond, which she could then prove as a
permissive exception to termination, rather than a reasonable-efforts
challenge towards reunification itself.

Iowa Code § 232.102A(1)(a) states that “[r]easonable efforts” are “the
efforts made to preserve and unify a family prior to the out-of-home
placement of a child in foster care or to eliminate the need for removal of the
child or make it possible for the child to safely return to the family’s home.”

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See also In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). Visitation is “an
important ingredient to the goal of reunification.” In re M.B., 553
N.W.2d 343, 345 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996).

Here, the mother was provided regular weekly visits when she was not
incarcerated. And when she was incarcerated, the department case manager
worked to facilitate contact between the mother and the child consistent with
Iowa Department of Corrections rules. The mother does not deny that she
did not have a strong bond with her child. Rather, she argues that the reason
for the lack of bond was because of her lack of visitation. However, at no time
did the mother file a motion for lack of reasonable efforts before the juvenile
court. “We have repeatedly emphasized the importance for a parent to object
to services early in the process so appropriate changes can be made.” In re
C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493–94 (Iowa 2000). No such objections occurred.
The juvenile court found that the mother had “been inconsistent with visits
and at least on one occasion the provider believed [the mother] to be under
the influence while at a visit.” The State fulfilled its obligation to provide
reasonable efforts toward reunification in this case.

AFFIRMED.

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