In the Interest of A.V. and A.V., Minor Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-1390
Filed February 25, 2026
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In the Interest of A.V. and A.V., Minor Children,
S.V., Mother,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County,
The Honorable Erik Howe, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Shireen L. Carter of Shireen Carter Law Office, PLC, Norwalk,
attorney for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran,
Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State.

Shannon L. Wallace of Youth Law Center, Des Moines, attorney and
guardian ad litem for minor children.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Badding and Langholz, JJ.
Opinion by Badding, J.

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BADDING, Judge.

The two young girls at issue here—born in 2016 and 2020—were
removed from their mother’s custody after police found them in the back seat
of a car with the mother passed out behind the wheel. 1 Despite sixteen
months of services, the mother could not resolve the substance use, mental
health, and parenting concerns that prevented the children from being
returned to her care. The juvenile court terminated her parental rights under
Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f ) (2025) and transferred guardianship of both
girls to the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services.

The mother appeals. 2 She concedes the State proved a statutory
ground for termination, but she denies that outcome is in the best interests
of her children. Our review is de novo. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 39–40
(Iowa 2010).

Even where a statutory ground exists, we may only affirm the
termination of parental rights when it serves a child’s best interests. In re
Z.P., 948 N.W.2d 518, 525 (Iowa 2020). In reviewing that issue, we “give
primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for
furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the
physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa
Code § 232.116(2); see also P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 37. Termination of parental
rights, as the mother emphasizes in her petition, “is an outcome of last
resort.” In re B.F., 526 N.W.2d 352, 356 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). At the same

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The mother claims she was awake but looking at her phone. However, her blood
alcohol content was more than three times the legal limit. And she later pled guilty to
child endangerment.
2
The juvenile court also terminated the rights of a man believed to be the oldest
child’s father and all unknown fathers of both children. No father has appealed.

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time, where the legislative criteria for termination have been satisfied, “[t]he
interests of the child take precedence over family reunification,” and the
“termination proceedings must be viewed with a sense of urgency.” In re
A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 169 (Iowa 2021) (cleaned up).

At the time of the termination hearing in July 2025, the department
had identified a “potential” adoptive home for the girls, but a concurrent plan
was not yet in place. Based on this fact, the mother contends that terminating
her rights will “create legal orphans” rather than advance the goal of
permanency. However, a concurrent plan for adoption “is not a precondition
to termination.” In re N.F., 579 N.W.2d 338, 342 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998). In
some situations, terminating a parent’s rights rather than leaving them intact
is the better path toward permanency. See, e.g., In re T.M., No. 25-0252, 2025
WL 1706566, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 18, 2025) (finding termination of a
parent’s rights to three children was in their best interests “even though
adoptive homes had not yet been secured”); In re J.R., No. 23-0317, 2023
WL 3612385, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. May 24, 2023) (“While we agree it would
be better if the department had a concurrent placement plan for [the child],
we still think termination of the mother’s rights better serves [the child]’s
best interests than not given her inability to make sustained progress . . . .”).

Here, the juvenile court found the benefits of termination outweighed
the uncertainty about their long-term placement, noting the girls “have
thrived physically, mentally, and emotionally since their removal.” The court
observed:
[The older child] has been able to get extra support in school and almost
catch up to grade level.[3] She has received individual tutoring, and her

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A learning assessment in the early stages of the case revealed the older child—
then a second grader—was reading at a “kindergarten level.”

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reading and math skills have improved tremendously. She is also
reportedly a social butterfly and has formed many connections at her new
school. [The younger child] has also been able to receive extra support and
has reduced sucking on her thumb. She has received the proper medical
and dental care she needs, including tonsillectomy and adenoid surgery.

We are also persuaded by these milestones. Life was less bright for the
sisters at the beginning of this case. According to the older child’s teacher,
she was “chronically absent” and would sometimes “wait for up to an hour
after school” for the mother to pick her up. The younger girl had “significant
behavioral problems” that nearly caused her expulsion from day care. And
an investigation into allegations that surfaced after the girls’ removal led to
findings of physical and sexual abuse under their mother’s care. Because the
mother was unable to interact appropriately with the children during
in-person visits, their interactions were moved to video only in January 2025.
By May, all contact between the mother and her girls was suspended.

History is often “indicative of the quality of the future care that parent
is capable of providing,” so we give weight to a parent’s past performance
when deciding whether termination is in the best interests of their children.
In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 778 (Iowa 2012) (citation omitted). The
demonstrable improvement in the girls’ safety, development, and well-being
after their removal confirms that termination is in their best interests. See
Iowa Code § 232.116(2). And while the timeline for their adoption is hazy,
their ongoing stability is clear. Both the guardian ad litem and case manager
reported that the girls’ foster family is “dedicated to continuing” their care
and that the girls would remain in that placement “until we can find that
forever home.”

The mother also contends that six more months of services would
enable her to provide the care necessary to reunite with her children. The

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juvenile court may grant that relief instead of termination if a parent shows
“the need for removal ʻwill no longer exist at the end of the additional six-
month period.’” See In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Iowa 2021) (quoting
Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b)). But the mother failed to make that showing
here. Her participation in services throughout the juvenile court proceedings
was sporadic. She failed to acknowledge her continued alcohol and drug
use—even when confronted with positive tests. And about four months after
the incident that required the girls’ removal, she was found asleep and
intoxicated behind the wheel once again. On top of these issues, the mother’s
contact with the children was suspended two months before the termination
hearing. Simply put, the mother did not demonstrate the progress necessary
to justify additional delay. We decline to disturb the juvenile court’s refusal
of a six-month extension.

AFFIRMED.

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