In re the Marriage of Mejia-Kingery and Kingery

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0725
Filed February 25, 2026
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In re the Marriage of Jennifer Melissa Mejia-Kingery and Sterling
Eugene Kingery
Upon the Petition of
Jennifer Melissa Mejia-Kingery, n/k/a Jennifer Melissa Thompson,
Petitioner–Appellee,

And Concerning
Sterling Eugene Kingery,
Respondent–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County,
The Honorable Stuart P. Werling, Judge.
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AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
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Lynne C. Jasper, Bettendorf, attorney for appellant.

Stephen T. Fieweger, Davenport, attorney for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
Opinion by Greer, P.J.

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GREER, Presiding Judge.

Sterling Kingery appeals from the economic provisions of the
dissolution decree dividing the equity in the marital residence he shared with
Jennifer Mejia-Kingery. He argues the district court erred (1) by only
awarding him $1,000 for his share of the marital residence, despite
appreciation in the marital residence aided by his sweat equity, and (2) in
calculating the marital home equity. He also requests that we order Jennifer
to pay his appellate legal fees and costs incurred in connection with this
appeal. Jennifer asks that we affirm the dissolution decree and asserts that
Sterling is not entitled to a larger share of the equity in the marital residence,
which she brought into the marriage, given that this was a short-term
marriage. Further, Jennifer maintains that Sterling is not entitled to recovery
of his appellate legal fees and costs in connection with this appeal.

On our de novo review, we modify the district court’s property
division equalization payment award to Sterling. We find the district court’s
determination of the home’s equity was supported by the minimal evidence
of value presented. And while the marriage was of short duration, 1 after
giving Sterling credit for his financial contributions involving the marital
residence, we find a more equitable payment would be $5,500. Finally, we
decline to award Sterling his appellate legal fees and costs.

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The district court found “this to be a short-term marriage of only about three
years,” but the marriage legally lasted from June 24, 2020, until the dissolution order was
entered on March 31, 2025. The parties did live separately for six months in 2022 and
then permanently separated in June 2024.

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I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Sterling and Jennifer married on June 24, 2020. 2 Prior to their
marriage, Sterling and Jennifer each purchased and owned their own
respective homes. Jennifer bought her home in November 2017. Around
November 2018, Sterling sold his residence and moved in with Jennifer. 3
Sterling resided in the marital home for ten months before he proposed to
Jennifer around September 2019. While Sterling lived in the marital home,
he paid $650 of the $1,200 monthly mortgage payment to Jennifer as rent,4
and he paid half of the utility bills. At the time, Jennifer worked as a physical
therapist and had done so for the last twenty-five to twenty-six years. Sterling
was also employed; he worked as a school counselor and had done so for the
last twenty-three to twenty-four years.

On September 23, 2019, Jennifer signed a quitclaim deed placing
Sterling’s name on the deed of the marital residence. The parties married on
June 24, 2020. On January 29, 2024, Jennifer petitioned to dissolve the
marriage. With no evidence to the contrary, the district court assumed that
the parties had “relatively equal middle-class estates when they married.”

At the March 31, 2025 trial, the parties stipulated that each of them
was entitled to the assets that they held solely in their name, including

2
Both parties were in their fifties during the marriage, and no children were
impacted by this dissolution of marriage.
3
Sterling testified he offered to contribute $6,500 he received from his home sale
towards the marital home, but that Jennifer said “[s]he did not want the money.”
This amount also went to pay the real estate taxes and the home insurance
4

premium.

3
retirement accounts, bank accounts, and vehicles. Only the division of the
marital home equity was disputed.

The district court determined the value of Jennifer’s home at the time
the quitclaim deed was signed and as of their marriage was $250,000.
Accepting the April 2024 real estate appraisal provided at trial, the district
court found the current fair market value of the marital home was $268,500.
Based on these figures, the district court subtracted the value of the home at
the time of the quitclaim deed and the date of their marriage from the fair
market value of the home at the time of trial, finding that there was about
$18,500 of equity in the house to consider.

The parties stipulated that Jennifer should be given credit for the
$7,500 downpayment she paid at the time of purchase, further reducing the
equity to $11,000 available for a distribution. The court relied on the short
duration of the marriage to determine that Sterling was only entitled to a
small portion of the equity in the home. Thus, the district court awarded
Sterling $1,000 of the $11,000 equity in the marital home. Sterling appeals.

II. Standard of Review.

“An appeal regarding the dissolution of marriage is an equitable
proceeding.” In re Marriage of Gust, 858 N.W.2d 402, 406 (Iowa 2015); see
Iowa Code § 598.3 (2024). We review equitable proceedings de novo. Gust,
858 N.W.2d at 406. “We give weight to the findings of the district court,
particularly concerning the credibility of witnesses,” but we are not bound by
them. In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 676 (Iowa 2013). A
district court’s ruling will not be disturbed unless the ruling fails to do equity.
Id.

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III. Analysis.

A. Property Division. Sterling challenges the district court’s
property division. “Under our statutory distribution scheme, the first task
in dividing property is to determine the property subject to division.” In re
Marriage of Fennelly & Breckenfelder, 737 N.W.2d 97, 102 (Iowa 2007). “The
second task is to divide this property in an equitable manner according to the
enumerated factors in section 598.21 of the Iowa Code.” Id.

An equitable division does not equate to an equal division. In re
Marriage of Hoak, 364 N.W.2d 185, 194 (Iowa 1985). “Although an equal
division is not required, it is generally recognized that equality is often most
equitable.” In re Marriage of Rhinehart, 704 N.W.2d 677, 683 (Iowa 2005).

Here, no one disputes the award of the home to Jennifer, although
Sterling had a premarital interest in the home because Jennifer executed a
quitclaim deed giving him “all right, title, interest, estate, claim and
demand” in the home nearly a year after Sterling moved in and ten months
before they married. Sterling argues the district court incorrectly determined
the value of the home at the time of the quitclaim deed and their marriage
was $250,000. Additionally, Sterling argues that the division of the equity in
the home is inequitable due to the appreciation in the marital home and his
sweat equity. We consider each argument in turn.

1. Valuation of the home. On appeal, we defer to the district court’s
valuation of assets included in the marital estate when they are in the range
of permissible evidence. McDermott, 827 N.W.2d at 679. The district court
determined the relative value of the home at the time of the marriage was
around $250,000. Admittedly, the evidence provided was scant. But,
Jennifer testified her opinion of the home’s $250,000 market value was based

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on two sources: (1) an online real estate platform’s estimated fair market
value of $250,000 of the house at the time of the quitclaim deed, and (2) the
$255,000 purchase price her neighbor, with a similarly sized house in the
neighborhood, received from a sale. Without an appraisal to rebut Jennifer’s
testimony, Sterling first testified that he had “nothing to counter [ Jennifer’s]
testimony that [the home] was worth $250,000 at the time in which the
quitclaim deed was executed.” After a break at the trial, Sterling offered
documentation of the 2021 real estate tax assessment assessing the home for
real estate tax purposes at $173,300. He argued it was nonsensical that the
home, by Jennifer’s testimony, was worth $250,000 in 2019 and then went
down in value as the tax assessment showed. On this issue, the court found
Jennifer more credible.

The district court also concluded that the fair market value of the
home at the time of the trial was $268,500 based on an appraisal.
Accordingly, the court concluded that there was $18,500 of equity in the
marital home on the date of the filing of the petition. This $18,500 figure is
what the district court relied on in dividing the amount of equity between
Sterling and Jennifer. There is no dispute that Jennifer should be given credit
for the $7,500 she paid as a downpayment at closing, further reducing the
equity from $18,500 to $11,000 available for distribution.

We find that this is within the range of permissible evidence and refuse
to disturb the district court’s valuation of the marital home and
determination of the equity in the marital home.

2. Division of the marital home equity. Noting that they “split
everything down the middle” as it related to the marital home expenses and
mortgage and his contributions included hands-on improvements he made to
the home, Sterling challenges the district court’s division of the equity in the

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marital property as inequitable. Sterling asked the court to award him an
equal division of the equity in the marital home after Jennifer is credited her
deposit. Sterling contends an equal division of the remaining equity in the
marital home is equitable based on the appreciation of the house, as well as
his financial contributions and the sweat equity he contributed to the home.
Jennifer contends nothing Sterling did by way of manual labor increased the
value of the home.

We consider the factors found in Iowa Code section 598.21(5) when
dividing the parties’ property in dissolution of marriage proceedings.5 We

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Iowa Code section 598.21(5) provides:

The court shall divide all property, except inherited property or gifts
received or expected by one party, equitably between the parties after
considering all of the following:

a. The length of the marriage.

b. The property brought to the marriage by each party.

c. The contribution of each party to the marriage, giving appropriate
economic value to each party’s contribution in homemaking and child care
services.

d. The age and physical and emotional health of the parties.

e. The contribution by one party to the education, training, or increased
earning power of the other.

f. The earning capacity of each party, including educational background,
training, employment skills, work experience, length of absence from the
job market, custodial responsibilities for children, and the time and
expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the
party to become self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably
comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage.

....

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are to consider property owned prior to the marriage when dividing the
parties’ assets. In re Marriage of Hansen, 886 N.W.2d 868, 872 (Iowa Ct. App.
2016) (noting property brought into the marriage is one of many factors to
weigh in the equitable division of property).

Sterling argues that the district court did not accurately take into
consideration the appreciation in the value of the home that occurred during
the marriage. If a court awards all of the premarital assets to the spouse that
brought those assets to the marriage, under certain circumstances, it may
award the other spouse a portion of the appreciation in value of those assets.
See In re Marriage of Grady-Woods, 577 N.W.2d 851, 853 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998).
Sterling notes that “appreciation in the value of assets during the marriage is
a marital asset.” Hansen, 886 N.W.2d at 873. He further contends that it
does not matter “how each asset appreciated—fortuitously versus
laboriously—when the parties have been married for nearly fifteen years.”

h. The amount and duration of an order granting support payments to
either party pursuant to section 598.21A and whether the property division
should be in lieu of such payments.

i. Other economic circumstances of each party, including pension benefits,
vested or unvested. Future interests may be considered, but expectancies
or interests arising from inherited or gifted property created under a will
or other instrument under which the trustee, trustor, trust protector, or
owner has the power to remove the party in question as a beneficiary, shall
not be considered.

j. The tax consequences to each party.

k. Any written agreement made by the parties concerning property
distribution.

l. The provisions of an antenuptial agreement.

m. Other factors the court may determine to be relevant in an individual
case.

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Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d at 104 (emphasis in original). But here, the marriage
tenure was short.

Sterling differentiates the treatment of the equity of the marital
residence at issue with that in Hansen. In Hansen, the parties were married
four years. Hansen, 886 N.W.2d at 873. After considering the length of the
marriage, the premarital nature of the home, and the lack of appreciation of
value, a panel of our court set aside the equalization payment as inequitable.
Id. (contesting the consideration of the premarital asset’s net equity). There,
“because the parties’ marriage was short, the family home was [the
husband’s] premarital asset, the asset did not appreciate in value, the parties
did not enter the marriage with an equal value of assets, and there was no
overriding contribution or sacrifice by either party,” an equal division of the
net assets was not equitable. Id. (noting the husband made all of the
payments towards the premarital home, but the wife contributed by
maintaining, decorating, and landscaping the property). Although lack of
appreciation was a consideration, the court in Hansen noted that the wife
“would have a better claim for a portion of net equity of the family home if
this had been a long-term marriage.” Id. at 872.

While the facts here resemble those in Hansen, Sterling does raise
several factors that warrant consideration. The main focus of the district
court centered on the parties’ short-term marriage and that Jennifer
purchased the marital home prior to the marriage. But the district court did
not address whether Sterling should have any credit for the appreciation of
value of the real estate or for his years of splitting the mortgage payments and
the basic expense of operation. Further, the district court did not address any
“sweat equity” arguments advanced by Sterling.

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From November 2019 forward, except for the months he moved out of
the home, Sterling contends he financially contributed to the home by paying
one-half of all the expenses for the home, including the mortgage payment
and the utilities. Without producing any receipts, Sterling testified he
contributed to the appreciation of the home through his own labor by
manually putting on a new roof, widening the driveway, extending the parking
pad, replacing the underpinning on the deck, replacing the entire surface of
the deck, and remodeling the garage. Many of these updates were considered
in the real estate appraisal. While our supreme court in Fennelly de-
emphasized the fortuitous or laborious nature of the appreciation in long-
term marriage, see 737 N.W.2d at 104, we do not have that situation here. And
while we cannot say that Sterling’s efforts made a direct contribution to the
net equity, we would note that his labor is a factor in the overall contribution
he made to this marriage. “An equitable property division of the appreciated
value of the property should be a function of the tangible contributions of
each party . . . .” In re Marriage of Hass, 538 N.W.2d 889, 893 (Iowa Ct. App.
1995).

Sterling made several contributions through his labor in maintaining
the home and in the marriage, the ten months of payments he made towards
the home after 2018 when he first moved in, the payments he made towards
the home after the transfer of ownership for about nine months, and the
forty-two months 6 of payments he made towards the home during the
marriage before the final separation. When we factor in those contributions,
we do not find that it was equitable to only award Sterling a minimal part of

6
This number considers the six months in 2022 that Sterling paid nothing towards
the home costs and that after June 2024 he was no longer living in or contributing to the
household. The district court noted that the date of final separation was in June 2023, but
the testimony reflected a June 2024 date.

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the equity that has accrued since the home was purchased in 2017. Under
these circumstances, we find that it is equitable to award him $5,500 of the
$11,000 equity in the marital home.

B. Appellate Attorney Fees. Sterling requests appellate attorney fees
and costs incurred by him in connection with this appeal. “[W]e have
discretion to award appellate attorney fees.” In re Marriage of Samuels, 15
N.W.3d 801, 808 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024). “When deciding whether to award
appellate attorney fees, we consider the needs of the party seeking the award,
the ability of the other party to pay, and the relative merits of the appeal.” Id.
(cleaned up). Having considered those factors, we deny Sterling’s request.

IV. Conclusion.

We modify the decree of dissolution of marriage and order judgment
against Jennifer and in favor of Sterling in the amount of $5,500, with credit
for any payments made on the original award. We deny Sterling’s request for
attorney fees.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

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