In the Interest of J.M., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-2007
Filed March 11, 2026
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In the Interest of J.M., Minor Child,
T.M., Father,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County,
The Honorable Stephanie Forker Parry, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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John S. Moeller of John S. Moeller, P.C., Sioux City, attorney for appellant
father.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Lisa Jeanes, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee State.

Joseph W. Kertels of Juvenile Law Center, Sioux City, attorney and
guardian ad litem for minor child.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Badding and Langholz, JJ.
Opinion by Langholz, J.

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LANGHOLZ, Judge.

A father appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental
rights to his then-five-year-old daughter.1 First, he challenges one of the two
grounds for termination found by juvenile court. And second, he argues that
termination is not in the daughter’s best interest because at the time of
termination, there was “no identifiable person to adopt [the daughter],” so
the father “should be given additional time to work on reunification.”

On our de novo review, we agree with the juvenile court. The father
challenges only one statutory ground for termination, so he has waived any
challenge to the other ground. And we agree that termination is in the
daughter’s best interest even though the Iowa Department of Health and
Human Services (“HHS”) had not yet identified an adoptive home for her
at the time of termination. After ten foster-care placements in her short life
and no likelihood of successful reunification with the father, she deserves
permanency now rather than remaining in limbo. We thus affirm the juvenile
court’s termination order.

I. Statutory Grounds for Termination

Terminating parental rights under Iowa Code chapter 232 follows a
three-step process. In re L.B., 970 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 2022). First, the
State must prove a statutory ground for termination. Id. Second, the State
must show termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. And third, the
parent bears the burden to show whether a discretionary exception applies
that should preclude termination. Id. We need not address any steps not

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The juvenile court also terminated the mother’s parental rights. She does not
appeal. We avoid using the parties’ names to respect their privacy because this opinion—
unlike the juvenile court’s orders—is public. Compare Iowa Code § 232.147(2) (2025),
with id. §§ 602.4301(2), 602.5110; see also Iowa Ct. R. 21.25.

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challenged by a parent. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). We review
a termination decision de novo, giving “respectful consideration” to the
juvenile court’s factual findings, especially when based on credibility
determinations. In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa 2021).

The juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights under
paragraphs “b” and “f” of Iowa Code section 232.116(1). “When the
juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground,
we may affirm the juvenile court’s order on any ground we find supported by
the record.” In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). The father
challenges only one of the grounds for termination. Because he does not
challenge that termination was proper under Iowa Code
section 232.116(1)(f ), he has waived any challenge to that statutory ground
and we can affirm based on that ground without discussing it further. See In re
G.N., No. 20-1128, 2020 WL 7022388, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2020)
(affirming based on unchallenged statutory grounds and collecting cases
doing the same); see also P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 40 (reasoning that the appellate
court did not have to analyze an unchallenged statutory ground); In re Est. of
White, No. 23-1009, 2024 WL 3887438, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 21, 2024)
(“The appellate court will not reverse a ruling of the trial court that rests on
independent alternative grounds where the appellant challenges only one of
those grounds.” (quoting 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 839 (May 2024 update))).

II. The Daughter’s Best Interest

The father next challenges the juvenile court’s finding that
termination is in the daughter’s best interest. He makes only one argument:
that he “should be given additional time to work on reunification” because
the daughter’s current foster family will not be adopting her and, as of the
termination hearing, HHS had not identified another adoptive home.

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The best interest of the child is the “paramount concern in a
termination proceeding.” L.B., 970 N.W.2d at 313. We consider both the
child’s long-range and immediate best interest. In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170,
172 (Iowa 1997). And we must “give primary consideration to the child’s
safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and
growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and
needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). So “we cannot deprive a child
of permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination under
section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and
be able to provide a stable home for the child.” In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100,
112 (Iowa 2014) (cleaned up).

Applying this best-interest standard, our court has repeatedly rejected
the argument that the lack of an adoptive home should preclude termination.
See, e.g., In re T.C., 522 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (“We will not
refuse to terminate the rights of parents who would otherwise be terminated
because an adoptive home has not been secured.”); In re N.F., 579 N.W.2d
338, 342 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998); In re T.M., No. 25-0252, 2025 WL 1706566,
at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 18, 2025); In re D.M., No. 25-1473, 2025
WL 3654241, at *3–4 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2025). We do so again here.

The father struggles with unaddressed substance-use and mental-
health concerns—indeed he has been under the influence during a court
hearing and a video call with his daughter. He is unemployed and homeless.
At the time of the termination hearing, he had not taken advantage of the
offered weekly in-person interactions with his daughter for over seven
months and he was inconsistent with calling her. And the daughter “has
appeared uncomfortable” when they do interact and tried to “hang up and

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not talk to him.” The father has also failed to participate in reunification
services or otherwise demonstrate that his daughter “is a priority in his life.”

Meanwhile, the daughter has struggled awaiting permanency. At the
time of the termination hearing, she was in her tenth foster-care placement.
She had been at that placement for about seven months and was doing
somewhat better as her foster family and therapist were working with her to
address behavioral issues and engage her in as many activities as possible.
While the foster family was not an adoptive home, they were willing to keep
the daughter in their home until an adoptive home was found. And HHS was
engaged in identifying such a home.

We see no prospect in the foreseeable future that the father could take
on his parental responsibilities and become a safe and nurturing placement
for the daughter. And while HHS “had not yet located a permanent home for
the child, [she] deserves the opportunity to find one without further delay.”
D.M., 2025 WL 3654241, at *4. So we agree with the juvenile court that
termination of the father’s parental rights is in the daughter’s best interest.

AFFIRMED.

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