In the Interest of R.B. and S.B., Minor Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 26-0369
Filed May 13, 2026
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In the Interest of R.B. and S.B., Minor Children,
K.S., Mother,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County,
The Honorable Thomas J. Straka, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Gina L. Kramer of Kramer Law Office, PLLC, Dubuque,
attorney for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran,
Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State.

Taryn McCarthy of Clemens, Walters, Conlon, Runde & Hiatt, L.L.P.,
Dubuque, attorney for minor children.
Kristy Hefel of Dubuque Public Defender’s Office,
guardian ad litem for minor children.
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Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J.,
and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Tabor, C.J.

1
TABOR, Chief Judge.

A mother, Kathrine, challenges the juvenile court’s order suspending
her visits with nine-year-old R.B. and twelve-year-old S.B. under Iowa
Code section 232.102A(2) (2025). Besides contesting the suspension of
family interactions, Kathrine contends that the court erred in denying her
motion for reasonable efforts.

After our independent assessment of the record, we reach the same
conclusion as the juvenile court on suspending family interactions.1 As the
children’s therapist determined, continued visitation with Kathrine posed a
serious risk of emotional harm to her sons. As to her second claim, we don’t
reach the merits. While the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services
did little to nothing to facilitate therapeutic visitation, the mother’s
reasonable efforts challenge is not properly before us. Thus, we affirm the
permanency order.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

In January 2025, the juvenile court adjudicated R.B. and S.B. as
children in need of assistance (CINA) because of “ongoing concerns” over
their mother’s alcohol abuse. As the court noted, the boys told social workers
that their mother drank “Hawkeye [vodka] everyday all day.” As the court
found, Kathrine would drink to intoxication and become physically and
emotionally abusive to her sons or “simply pass[] out as their sole caretaker.”

1
We review permanency orders de novo. In re E.R., 973 N.W.2d 889, 893 (Iowa
Ct. App. 2021). We give weight to the juvenile court’s fact findings but are not bound by
them. Id. We must “examine the entire record and adjudicate anew rights on the issues
properly presented.” Id. (citation omitted).

2
Two months earlier, she was arrested for operating while intoxicated,
registering a blood alcohol content over three times the legal limit at .282.
Alarmingly, she was on her way to pick up the boys from school.

The department placed the boys with their paternal grandmother,
where they have remained. They often declined visits with their mother
because they were uncomfortable interacting with her. 2 The boys started
therapy in June 2025. They were both diagnosed with adjustment disorders.
As their therapist testified: “[T]here’s just a lot of emotional dysregulation,
trying to process through certain either traumas throughout their life.” On
top of adjustment challenges the boys faced, their mother sent them many
inappropriate text messages containing harmful statements.

In July, the State moved to suspend visitation, noting that the
children’s therapist believed that continued parental visitation posed a
serious risk to the emotional well-being and future mental health of both R.B.
and S.B. After a hearing, the court ordered visitation be suspended in
accordance with the therapist’s recommendation.

Kathrine moved to enlarge that order, asking the court “to clarify if the
motion was granted under Iowa Code [section] 232.102A(2) based on a
finding that substantial evidence exists that the family interactions, whether
supervised or unsupervised, would pose a serious risk of physical or
emotional harm to the child.” She also asked to bifurcate “the roles of
guardian ad litem [GAL] and attorney for the children, as both children
expressed a desire for visits, while their guardian ad litem verbally advised
that she agreed with ending visits.” The court granted the motion to enlarge,

2
The boys’ father was incarcerated during the CINA case but did maintain
telephone contact with his sons. He is not a party to this appeal.

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confirming that it suspended visitation under section 232.102A(2) and
appointing a separate attorney for the children.

In early January 2026, the mother moved for reasonable efforts,
challenging the suspension of family interactions on September 2. The
motion continued:
2. Since then, Kathrine has had no visits with her children.
Kathrine has repeatedly reached out to the Department to ask about how
she can resume contact. Kathrine has signed all requested releases for her
mental health provider.

3. The Department has indicated that any contact would first have
to be in a therapy session. The Department has further stated that the boys’
current therapy provider would not facilitate such a session.

4. [Kathrine] has diligently contacted every therapy provider in the
area that she is aware of and has been unable to find someone willing and
able to facilitate such visits. [She] has asked the Department for help in
locating a provider but has not received such help.

5. [R.B.] and [S.B.] continue to initiate contact with Kathrine via
their cell phones, indicating that they desire such contact.

At a permanency hearing on January 23, Kathrine testified that the
department suggested a provider or two but offered no further help in finding
someone to facilitate therapy with the boys. At the close of the hearing, the
State’s attorney responded to the reasonable efforts challenge:
[I’m] frankly not entirely sure what service is being requested of the
department. [Kathrine] has shown an ability to contact possible family
therapy providers; she has done so. The fact that that family therapy is not
available is not under the department’s purview, so I’m not entirely sure
what the department could do to assist [her] in finding them therapy. [The
case manager] testified he is not aware of any other providers other than
the people that she’s provided and claims she made contact with.

4
On February 12, the court issued its permanency order, transferring
guardianship of R.B. and S.B. to their paternal grandmother under Iowa Code
section 232.104(2)(d)(1). Beyond the mother’s troubling alcohol abuse
detailed in the CINA adjudication order, here the court also expressed
concern for Kathrine’s mental health “as evidenced by the highly
inappropriate texts she was sending to the boys.”

The court didn’t rule on Kathrine’s reasonable-efforts motion. On
February 25, Kathrine filed a notice of appeal. Then on March 5, she moved
to enlarge the permanency order “to clarify whether her motion for
reasonable efforts was denied.” On March 10, the juvenile court granted that
motion and enlarged its prior order to deny Katherine’s motion for
reasonable efforts. That same day, she filed her petition on appeal.

II. Analysis

Kathrine raises two issues in that petition. First, she contends that the
juvenile court erred in finding that visits should be suspended under Iowa
Code section 232.102A(2). Second, she argues that the court erred in
denying her motion for reasonable efforts.

Without reaching the merits, we address her second claim first. The
juvenile court did not rule on Kathrine’s reasonable-efforts motion in its
permanency order. And Kathrine filed a notice of appeal before moving to
enlarge. Because that appeal divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction, the
later ruling is of no consequence. See State v. Mallett, 677 N.W.2d 775, 776
(Iowa 2004). Thus, we cannot review the department’s inaction in arranging
for therapeutic visitation.

As for family interactions, we recognize that the legislature prioritized
the importance of visitation by enacting Iowa Code section 232.102A(2). See

5
In re J.B., No. 26-0064, 2026 WL 895846, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2026)
(recognizing visitation as a key ingredient to the goal of reunification). But
that same statute also safeguards a child’s physical and emotional well-being,
providing in full:
Family interactions shall continue regardless of a parent’s failure to comply
with the requirements of a court order or the department unless a court
finds that substantial evidence exists that the family interactions, whether
supervised or unsupervised, would pose a serious risk of physical or
emotional harm to the child.

Iowa Code § 232.102A(2). Here, the juvenile court found substantial
evidence warranting suspension of Kathrine’s family interactions with R.B.
and S.B.

In her petition on appeal, Kathrine contends that the therapist offered
“contradictory” testimony on the risk of serious emotional harm to the boys
from continued interactions with their mother. Kathrine acknowledges that
the therapist testified that ongoing contact posed “an increased risk for
things like anxiety, depression, low self-esteem, [and] cognitive distortions”
to the children. But she points to the therapist’s testimony on cross-
examination that there was more “long-term” than “imminent risk” to the
boys’ mental health from continuing interactions with their mother. Kathrine
also highlights testimony from the therapist that it could be “an appropriate
strategy” to give the boys a choice to turn down visits rather than suspending
them altogether.

We are unpersuaded by the mother’s critique of the therapist’s
testimony. First, section 232.102A(2) does not include the word
“imminent.” Thus, the serious risk of long-term emotional harm justifies the
juvenile court’s suspension of family interactions. Moreover, key to the
therapist’s opinion was the slew of wildly inappropriate text messages that

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Kathrine sent her sons.3 Under examination by the State, the therapist agreed
that from reviewing those messages, it was “almost immediately” apparent
that “contact between mother and the children was causing them emotional
trauma and dysregulation.”

Second, foisting responsibility for declining visits with their mother
onto these already-traumatized preteen boys was not a viable alternative. As
the therapist clarified, while the boys were not forced to go to visitation if
they didn’t want to see their mother, there were circumstances when that
strategy could go wrong. And as the record shows, the boys were coping well
with the suspension of family interactions. Their GAL reported that they felt
safer with their grandmother than with their mother.

Like the juvenile court, we find that the therapist’s testimony supplied
substantial evidence of a serious risk of emotional harm from continuing
family interactions. Thus, we affirm the permanency order.

AFFIRMED.

We choose not to extensively quote those messages, but it is relevant to note that
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the mother repeatedly made crass and callous accusations about the paternal
grandmother, the boys’ caretaker.

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