In re the Marriage of Waller and Kill

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0899
Filed June 10, 2026
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In re the Marriage of Ryan Paul Waller and Sasha Nichole Kill
Upon the Petition of
Ryan Paul Waller,
Petitioner–Appellee,

And Concerning
Sasha Nichole Kill,
Respondent–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County,
The Honorable Lawrence P. McLellan, Judge.
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REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
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Sydnee M. Waggoner (argued) and Anjela A. Shutts of Whitfield & Eddy,
P.L.C., Des Moines, attorneys for appellant.

Maureen C. Cosgrove and Kolby P. Warren of McCormally & Cosgrove,
PLLC, Des Moines, attorneys for appellee.
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Heard at oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Badding and Langholz, JJ.
Opinion by Tabor, C.J.

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TABOR, Chief Judge.

In the decree dissolving the marriage of Ryan Waller and Sasha Kill,
the district court determined that Ryan’s unvested shares of Microsoft stock
were part of the marital estate subject to division. The court ordered that the
parties each receive one-half of the proceeds from the sale of those stocks as
they vest after equally splitting the payment of any taxes due. Now appealing
from a contempt action, Sasha asks us to find the district court’s
interpretation of the decree resulted in her being double taxed. Because we
agree with Sasha’s calculations, we reverse the contempt ruling, in part, and
remand with directions.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

Ryan and Sasha married in Washington in 2009. They have three
children. In 2014, they moved to Iowa so Ryan could pursue a full-time
position with Microsoft. As part of his compensation, Microsoft awarded
him shares of restricted stock units. So long as he remains employed at
Microsoft, the stock options vest quarterly over five years. When they vest,
Microsoft withholds a portion of the stocks to account for federal and state
income taxes. At the end of the year, Ryan reports the total amount of
stocks—including the withheld portion—as income on his tax forms.

Ten years after moving to Iowa, Ryan and Sasha divorced. In those
proceedings, Sasha requested that Ryan’s restricted stock options be divided
“as soon as practicable” after the restrictions lapsed by Ryan selling the stock
and paying her “90% of the proceeds for the ½ interest in the lapsed” stock
units. She proposed that he pay her “the remaining 10% of the proceeds of
the lapsed shares” less any taxes he paid on shares to be provided to her.

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In the decree, the district court awarded each party one-half of the
proceeds from the stock distributions as they vested and ordered the parties
to equally split any taxes due on the stock sales.

When Ryan had shares vest in the first quarter following their
dissolution, his counsel emailed Sasha’s counsel. Ryan gave Sasha the option
to receive her distribution in shares or cash. The email included a table
describing the shares and withholding. For quarter one, Microsoft withheld
$5,333.79 worth of shares. Ryan asked Sasha to pay him $2,666.90 to cover
half the tax withholding and upon receipt of that payment, he would
distribute her share. Sasha did not object to this process, opted to receive
stock instead of cash, and paid Ryan the amount he requested.

Come second quarter—when Ryan informed her that another
distribution of shares had vested and requested prepayment of her share of
taxes—Sasha refused to pay, believing that the withholding accounted for his
Social Security and Medicare taxes. Sasha didn’t read the decree as holding
her liable for those taxes. Because Sasha did not pay the tax amount, Ryan
did not turn over her portion of the stock proceeds.

Sasha filed a contempt application, complaining that she should not
have had to pay the $2,666.90 in taxes in quarter one and that she was not
required to pay Ryan’s Social Security and Medicare taxes. Ryan answered,
contending that he followed the agreed-to process with no issues for the first
quarter. As to the second quarter—and by that time, the third and fourth
quarters—he did not distribute her proceeds because she had not paid her
portion of the taxes. Ryan filed his own contempt application, alleging Sasha
did not pay the taxes as required by the decree.

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The court held a show-cause hearing.1 In her testimony, Sasha
mentioned Microsoft’s withholding of the taxes: “The decree states that the
parties equally split the payment of any state and federal taxes due on account
of the sale of the stock, but it looked to me like all of the withholding was
being split and included additional taxes.” She also noted the challenge of
paying the taxes before she’d received her distribution: “me having to give
the withholding piece first before receiving shares or cash was extremely
hard, and I didn’t realize that that was going to be part of that.” At the end of
the hearing, the court asked the parties to clarify their requests. Sasha’s
counsel explained their concern about the Medicare and Social Security tax
liability, and made this request:
we are asking the Court to interpret and set a process by which the vested
stock—or the unvested stock would be paid out. And we’re asking that Mr.
Waller provide documentation about the stock received, that the stock is
cashed out, and that he pay to Ms. Kill her share of that, and if the taxes—
the taxes can be reduced by the amount that is paid to her.

In its written ruling, the court found neither party in contempt, but
both in default. It found that Medicare and Social Security taxes were
included in federal taxes, so Sasha was required to pay them. And, noting that
Sasha agreed that Ryan could deduct federal and state taxes, the court set out
a process for deduction rather than for Sasha’s payment of the taxes:
For stock that will vest in the future [Ryan] shall provide
documents like Exhibits 50 and 51 to [Sasha] within five (5) days of
notification by Microsoft that shares of stock have vested. [Ryan] shall
proceed to sell the shares as outlined in the documentation provided to
[Sasha] and complete the sale within five (5) days after sending the
documentation to [her]. [Ryan] shall deduct one-half of the federal and

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The district court noted it could not modify the property division: “You’ve asked
me to interpret certain terms in the decree, and I have to use essentially the principles,
standards, for interpreting a contract.” The parties agreed.

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state taxes from [Sasha’s] share of the proceeds prior to distribution to
[her]. [Ryan] shall distribute [Sasha’s] one-half of the sale proceeds within
five (5) days of the sale of the stock. With payment of the sale proceeds
[Ryan] shall provide [Sasha] with documentation of the value of the shares
on the date sold.

Sasha filed a motion under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904,
requesting the court amend its ruling. She noted that exhibit 50, which the
district court referenced in its ruling, “indicates that state and federal income
taxes are withheld prior to the transfer of stock to [Ryan].” Since taxes are
withheld before the shares reach Ryan, the order should be amended to
restrict Ryan from deducting from her share “as to not require [Sasha] to pay
[Ryan] an additional amount of taxes.” Ryan resisted, saying Sasha is not
overpaying taxes.

The court held a hearing on the motion to amend. Sasha argued that
because the parties are dividing the net shares—after Microsoft withholds
shares to account for taxes from the whole quarterly distribution—her half of
the proceeds should not be further reduced. In other words, when Ryan
deducts taxes from her net proceeds, she is no longer receiving half of the
marital asset. Ryan resisted, insisting Sasha is not being double taxed. He
added: “we are here on a motion to amend. So as the Court is well aware,
what [Sasha] needs to show is that a ruling that the Court made in this
contempt hearing is to be amended or modified. I don’t believe [Sasha] has
met that burden, Your Honor.”

The district court denied her rule 1.904(2) motion but “present[ed]
[a] chart to demonstrate how the Microsoft stock proceeds should be
distributed and allocated between the parties as determined in the original
decree.”

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Here is the court’s chart showing the stock distribution for the second
quarter of calendar year 2024.

The court believed that its chart provided the “same information” that
was included in the chart attached to Ryan’s resistance to the 1.904(2)
motion, pictured here.

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But Ryan’s chart awards Sasha just $2,076.96 in proceeds for the
second quarter, while the district court’s chart awards her $4,584.93. Seeking
to clarify that discrepancy, Sasha filed a second rule 1.904 motion. Ryan
resisted, contending the court’s ruling was clear. The district court denied
her second motion. Sasha appeals.

II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Before reaching the merits, we consider Ryan’s claim that Sasha’s
second motion under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) did not toll her
time to file a notice of appeal. In his view, we lack jurisdiction because she
filed her notice of appeal too late.

In general, a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days from a
final order or judgment. Iowa R. App. P. 6.101(1)(b). But this deadline
changes if a party files a timely motion to reconsider, enlarge, or amend under
rule 1.904(2). Such a motion tolls the thirty-day period for appealing; the
clock restarts after the court rules on that motion. Id. To invoke tolling, the
first rule 1.904(2) motion a party files need not be proper—it need only be
timely. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.904 cmt.; see also Carroll v. Samuell, No. 16-0003,
2016 WL 7395757, at *3 n.2 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2016).

But a second rule 1.904(2) motion must be “proper” to toll the appeal
deadline. Iowa R. App. P. 6.101(1)(c). Successive rule 1.904(2) motions are
prohibited unless the court modified its order and “the subsequent motion is
directed only at the modification.” Id.; Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.904(4).

Here, the district court entered its contempt order on January 28.
Sasha filed her first rule 1.904(2) motion on February 11, and the court ruled
on April 4. She filed her second motion on April 15, and the court ruled on
April 30. She filed her notice to appeal May 30. Two questions emerge: Did

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the ruling on Sasha’s first rule 1.904(2) motion modify the initial contempt
order? And was Sasha’s second rule 1.904(2) motion “directed only at the
modification”? See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.904(4).

We answer both inquiries in the affirmative. True, in ruling on Sasha’s
first motion, the court wrote, “the respondent’s motion to enlarge, amend,
or reconsider is denied.” If we considered only that line, Sasha’s second
rule 1.904(2) motion would be improper. See In re Marriage of Okland,
699 N.W.2d 260, 265–66 (Iowa 2005) (“[A] rule 1.904(2) motion filed by a
party following a denial of the party’s prior rule 1.904(2) motion is
improper . . . .”). But in determining whether there was a modification, we
look at the content of the ruling. Cf. Turner v. CCRC of Cedar Rapids, LLC,
No. 20-0973, 2021 WL 3076742, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 21, 2021). In
ruling on Sasha’s first motion, the district court included a chart that was not
a part of its original ruling. As Sasha contends, the court’s chart contradicts
the chart it favorably references from Ryan’s resistance. Sasha’s second
rule 1.904(2) motion sought clarification on that contradiction. Thus, the
second motion was proper and tolled the time to appeal. So, we have subject
matter jurisdiction.

III. Scope and Standard of Review

We generally review interpretation of dissolution decrees de novo. In
re Marriage of Morris, 810 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Iowa 2012). But we review
contempt rulings for correction of errors at law. In re Marriage of Swan,
526 N.W.2d 320, 327 (Iowa 1995). And when a contempt action involves
construction of a dissolution decree, we review for correction of errors at law.
In re Marriage of Anderson, 451 N.W.2d 187, 191 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989).

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IV. Error Preservation

We start with Ryan’s contention that Sasha did not preserve error. “It
is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be
both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on
appeal.” Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). Generally, an
argument raised for the first time in a posttrial motion is unpreserved for
appellate review. Mitchell v. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist., 832 N.W.2d 689,
695 (Iowa 2013).

Ryan asserts, “[a]t no time did Sasha make the argument she was being
‘double taxed.’” True, Sasha did not expressly argue that a second
withholding resulted in double taxation. But, as Sasha counters, “[t]he
substance of the argument [on appeal], that she should receive fifty percent
of the net proceeds, was squarely presented to the district court.” One
purpose of error preservation is to alert the court to an issue at the time when
corrective action can be taken. See Top of Iowa Co-op. v. Sime Farms, Inc., 608
N.W.2d 454, 470 (Iowa 2000). That happened here. Once the district court
set forth a process for distribution, Sasha identified inequities and followed
through with her rule 1.904(2) motions. We find Sasha preserved error.

V. Analysis

Having clarified that we have jurisdiction to hear this case and error
was preserved, we turn to the merits of Sasha’s appeal. She asks us to reverse
the district court’s default orders and “amend the ruling to award each party
fifty percent of the net proceeds upon the distribution of Microsoft stock.”

In considering her request, we begin with the language in the decree.
We construe a decree like other written instruments. In re Marriage of Brown,
776 N.W.2d 644, 650 (Iowa 2009). We give effect to the court’s intent—both

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express and implied—which may be gathered from the four corners of the
decree. In re Marriage of Goodman, 690 N.W.2d 279, 283 (Iowa 2004). Here,
the decree orders:
As to Microsoft stock which Ryan has been awarded as of January 8, 2024,
but which have not yet vested, at the time such stock awards vest, Ryan
shall sell the stocks and pay Sasha one-half of the proceeds after the parties
equally split the payment of any state and federal taxes due on account of
the sale of the stock.

In evaluating the four corners of the decree, we find the decretal court
intended for the parties to split both the taxes and the proceeds equally. See
id. With this intent in mind, we consider the district court’s rulings and the
parties’ arguments.

In its ruling, the district court set out a process for distribution, which
allowed Ryan to deduct value from Sasha’s share of the proceeds, even
though Microsoft already withheld shares to account for income taxes. Then,
after Sasha’s first rule 1.904(2) motion, the district court provided a chart.
Using numbers from the second quarter, the court said the chart
demonstrated “how the stock proceeds are to be allocated pursuant to the
decree” so that “the parties are receiving one-half of the stock proceeds.”
The court maintained that its chart contained the same information as a chart
that Ryan attached to his resistance. But it did not.

The district court’s chart takes the stock proceeds ($14,185.78) and
divides that amount in half, awarding Ryan and Sasha each $7,092.89. The
court then reduces Ryan’s share by the amount that Microsoft withheld
($5,015.93). The subtotals reflect $2,076.96 for Ryan and $7,092.89 for
Sasha. The chart then shows Sasha’s ledger reduced by half of the withheld
amount ($2,507.96). In the end, both parties received $4,584.92 for the
second quarter of 2024, under the court’s reckoning.

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By contrast, Ryan’s chart shows both parties bear responsibility for the
Microsoft withholding before splitting the net amount. His chart then goes
one step further and requires Sasha to pay him $2,507.97 (half of the
Microsoft withholding). That additional deduction—which is not included
in the district court’s chart—leaves Sasha with only $2,076.96 in proceeds.
Under Ryan’s calculations, the parties do not receive equal allocations.

As Sasha contends, the district court’s ruling contains contradictions.
And when the court denied Sasha’s second rule 1.904(2) motion, it declined
to clarify its ruling. Ryan interprets that as an endorsement of the process
Sasha contested in her first rule 1.904(2) motion. We disagree. The district
court stated in its first rule 1.904(2) ruling that “the parties are receiving one-
half of the stock proceeds after each pays one-half of the state and federal
taxes.” And the district court’s chart illustrates an equal division; its final
row, captioned “Total Proceeds Allocated by Decree,” shows Ryan and Sasha
each receiving $4,584.92. Regardless of the court’s reference to Ryan’s chart,
its ruling carries out the intent of the decree by awarding Sasha half the stock
proceeds and accounting for her responsibility for half the taxes.2

While the decretal court intended the parties to split the taxes and
proceeds down the middle, the process set out in the contempt ruling does
not achieve that equal division. Instead, a division of the net proceeds

2
Based on our reading of the record, the district court’s chart does not accurately
demonstrate the flow of cash. The district court shows the stocks being split between Ryan
and Sasha before Microsoft withholds for taxes. In reality, Microsoft withholds stock from
the start. After this withholding, Microsoft gives the remaining stocks to Ryan. He then
sells those stocks and splits the proceeds with Sasha. So, Ryan and Sasha split the net
proceeds, and both bear equal tax liability as to the withheld stocks. But regardless of how
the district court charted out the process, the court’s end result was clear: the parties
receive equal distributions.

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accurately reflects an equal division of taxes and proceeds. Because Microsoft
already withholds stocks to account for income taxation before depositing
stocks with Ryan, both parties’ shares of income taxes are deducted from the
distribution. As Sasha asserts, requiring her to then pay half of the
withholding to Ryan results in double taxation.

Ryan pushes back. This is his argument: “if there is no equalization
from Sasha, Ryan is the one who walks away at a disadvantage because he
would have paid all of the tax associated with the vesting stock, and capital
gains from selling Sasha’s portion of the stock per her request.” We
understand that there may be taxes owed on the sale of stocks beyond what
Microsoft withholds. These additional taxes depend on any capital gain or
loss on the stocks between the time Ryan received the stocks and the time he
sells the stocks. But neither party argues that the decree addressed capital
gains taxes on the vested stock awards. In fact, Sasha offered a “true-up”
mechanism to account for potential discrepancies at year’s end, but the court
did not include it in the decree. And during the contempt proceedings, the
district court declined to account for capital gains because any change within
the ten days to sell would have been minimal. We find no error in that aspect
of the court’s analysis.

As our bottom line, we reverse the district court’s finding that Sasha
was in default of the provisions in the dissolution decree. We remand with
directions for the district court to implement a distribution process where
Sasha and Ryan equally split the net proceeds from the sale of the vested
Microsoft stock—as envisioned in the decree. This process should include
both past and future stock distributions.

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VI. Appellate Attorney Fees

Both parties request appellate attorney fees. Although the district
court did not find either party in contempt, we still have authority under Iowa
Code section 598.24 (2024) to award attorney fees from a finding of default.
See Anderson, 451 N.W.2d at 189−90 (reading statute to allow award of
attorney fees if the court makes a finding of contempt or default). Whether to
award those fees rests in our discretion. See Okland, 699 N.W.2d at 270. We
consider “the needs of the party seeking the award, the ability of the other
party to pay, and the relative merits of the appeal.” Id. (quoting In re Marriage
of Geil, 509 N.W.2d 738, 743 (Iowa 1993)).

Considering the meritorious nature of Sasha’s appeal, her financial
need, and Ryan’s greater ability to pay, we find an award of $14,000 in
appellate attorney fees to Sasha is reasonable.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

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