In the Interest of C.P., I.P., I.P., S.P., and T.P., Minor Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 26-0421
Filed June 24, 2026
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In the Interest of C.P., I.P., I.P., S.P., and T.P., Minor Children,
B.E.P., Mother,
Appellant,
D.P., Father,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Appanoose County,
The Honorable Richelle Mahaffey, Judge.
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AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS
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Debra A. George of Griffing and George Law Firm, PLC, Centerville,
attorney for appellant mother.

Jonathan Willier, Centerville, attorney for appellant father.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee State.

Julie De Vries of De Vries Law Office, PLC, Centerville, attorney and
guardian ad litem for minor children.
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1
Considered without oral argument
by Greer, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ.
Opinion by Greer, P.J.

2
GREER, Presiding Judge.

A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental
rights to five children. Both parents argue the State failed to prove grounds
for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) (2025); termination is
not in the children’s best interests; exceptions apply to prevent termination;
and the juvenile court should have established a guardianship in lieu of
termination. On our review, we affirm the termination of the mother’s and
father’s parental rights.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The mother and father are the parents of five children (hereinafter
“the children”), born in 2017, 2018, 2020, 2021, and 2023. The mother also
has six other children: two adults; three children who are in a guardianship
with the maternal grandmother, Brittany;1 and one child whose case is still
pending before the juvenile court. The family has a long history of
involvement with the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS), primarily due to concerns about the parents’ domestic violence,
mental health, substance use, and housing instability.

In February 2024, HHS again became involved with the family after
receiving a report that the mother assaulted the father in front of the children.
The mother was arrested, and a no-contact order (NCO) was entered
between the mother and father on February 13. The mother violated the
NCO the next day and again assaulted the father, resulting in another arrest.
There was an NCO between the parents for the duration of this case. The

1
To maintain confidentiality, we have used a random-name generator to replace
real names in this opinion with fictitious names.

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mother’s assault of the father resulted in a founded child-abuse assessment
against her.

During HHS’s investigation, the father reported that the mother was
struggling with her mental health and exhibiting paranoid behaviors,
including covering objects in their home that she believed to be cameras. It
was also alleged that the mother assaulted Brittany, and the social worker
observed injuries to Brittany’s face consistent with the allegation. Around
this same time, the father and Brittany applied to have the mother civilly
committed for her mental health. The mother was involuntarily hospitalized
for seven days.

At this time, neither parent had a job, although the father was in the
process of applying for Social Security benefits due to a disability. Before the
NCO, the family was living in a home owned by the mother’s ex-husband
(hereinafter the “family home”). The parents did not pay the mortgage but
did pay some utilities. The family home had several issues, and the condition
of the home deteriorated throughout this case. The home was next door to
the children’s maternal great-grandparents’ house. The great-grandmother,
Jodie, often helped with the children. After the NCO, the father remained in
the family home, and the mother began living with Brittany; the parents split
time with the children.

On April 23, the State filed a petition to have the children adjudicated
children in need of assistance (CINA). After the parents refused to
participate in services, the State applied to have the court remove the
children from the parents’ custody.

On May 20 and 29, the juvenile court held a contested adjudication
and removal hearing. Both parents denied that there were any issues and

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refused all services. The father did agree, however, that he “had a slip-up
here and there” and used methamphetamine over the past year despite
having a heart condition that could be fatal with continued
methamphetamine use. On May 29, the court adjudicated the children
CINA but did not remove them from their parents’ custody at that time.

After the CINA adjudication, HHS continued to encourage the
parents to participate in services, primarily mental-health and substance-use
treatment. Family-Centered Services (FCS) provided additional support to
the parents and supervised their visits with the children. The father admitted
he needed mental-health therapy but said he was not ready. The mother
declined mental-health and substance-use treatment, although the HHS
social worker noted that the mother’s behavior “mimicked when she was
using methamphetamine in the past.”

In mid-July, HHS determined that a safety plan was necessary after
one of the children reported that the mother had hit him, thrown things, and
broken a mirror at Brittany’s house. The safety plan allowed the children to
remain in the parents’ custody so long as Brittany or other family members
supervised the mother’s interactions with the children.

Despite the safety plan, issues persisted. Concerns arose that the
mother was running out of her prescription medication early and behaving
erratically. The mother refused to show the HHS social worker her
prescription and would not provide any medical information or
documentation. Around this same time, the father reported he was no longer
living at the family home due to black mold. The father had nowhere else to
live. He told HHS the home would likely go into foreclosure.

5
On August 1, the HHS social worker and FCS worker made an
unannounced visit to see the mother. During this visit, the mother left one
of her pills unattended on a kitchen table, accessible to the children; one of
the children gave the FCS worker an open container of razor blades; and the
social worker witnessed one of the children go outside and get into a baby
pool without the mother’s knowledge. The mother refused to participate in
additional safety planning, so the State filed an ex-parte application to remove
the children from their parents’ custody. The court entered the removal
order on August 2, and the children were placed in Brittany’s care.

On August 8, the family home was condemned due to poor living
conditions. The next day, the mother was found in the family home and
arrested for violating the NCO.

The mother’s erratic behavior continued, and the HHS social worker
talked with Brittany and Jodie several times about not letting the mother have
unsupervised contact with the children. According to Jodie, the mother did
not listen to them and would sneak into their homes without their knowledge.
On one occasion, one of the children let the mother in after she threatened
to break a window.

On August 24, Brittany reported that the mother had written a suicide
note, which was found by one of the mother’s older children not at issue in
this case. A few days later, the father reported that the mother had threatened
to kill the children. Police were called in both instances.

On August 26, the father was arrested for driving while barred. Several
days later, during one of the father’s visits with the children at Brittany’s
home, one of the children found a syringe, which later tested positive for
methamphetamine, under the deck. Before an adult could take the syringe,

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the child poked one of the other children with the needle. The child who
found the syringe told a family member that he had seen the mother and
father together on the deck and the father had a needle in his hand. Both
parents refused drug testing. On September 2, both parents were arrested
for violating the NCO.

On September 6, after a contested hearing, the court entered a
dispositional order, concluding that continued removal of the children was
necessary. In the order, the court noted, “The original concerns [that
brought the family to HHS attention] . . . have not begun to be addressed, and
ostensibly, progress has backslid for the family.” The court cautioned the
mother “to start taking the recommendations of HHS seriously” and
cooperate with services because “[c]ontinuing to deny that services are
needed flies in the face of the evidence that numerous, serious safety
concerns persist.” The court reiterated: “Progress toward reunification will
be stymied until the parents acknowledge their need for mental health
treatment, substance abuse treatment, domestic violence services, and safe
and stable housing.” Neither parent requested different or additional
services.

Despite the court’s directive, the parents continued to refuse to
participate in services. By this point, the father had begun showing
behavioral indicators of substance use. The mother was again involuntarily
committed for her mental health until it was deemed that she was not
“seriously mentally impaired” as defined in the Iowa Code. The involuntary
commitment case was dismissed on September 24.

In addition to the mental-health and substance-use concerns, both
parents struggled with providing adequate care and supervision for the
children during visits. During several visits, the mother left children

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unsupervised. During one visit, she slapped one of the children in the chest
when he was not listening to her. The HHS social worker noted, “It is clear
it is difficult for [the mother] to keep track of all the children.” For his part,
the father would typically do well during the first hour of visits, but he had a
hard time providing consistent attention to all the children, and he would
often lie on the floor during visits. The FCS worker present would direct the
father to get up and interact with the children. The father often struggled to
discipline the children, sometimes giving up and sometimes becoming
frustrated and yelling. During one visit, the father struck one of the children
on the arm because she was not responding to redirection. During the same
visit, another child was running around with a knife, and the father did not
notice until the FCS worker brought it to his attention. In another visit, while
holding two of the children, the father pulled out a large hunting knife to open
popsicles.

On October 11, the parents were arrested for violating the NCO. Both
parents missed their October 12 visits due to being in jail.

On October 22, the mother was arrested for failing to vacate the
condemned family home. Four days later, the mother threatened to kill
Brittany and then herself. The mother then went to Jodie’s house, grabbed
a butcher knife, and went back to the family home, again threatening to harm
herself. Jodie called the police to do a welfare check on the mother.

On November 1, the mother was arrested for failing to appear on the
domestic-abuse-assault charge. She missed a visit the next day due to being
in jail.

During the father’s November 2 visit, he told two of the children to go
away because his conversation with one of the other children was more

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important. During this same visit, the father became verbally aggressive
toward a child not at issue in this appeal, pointed to the FCS workers and
said, “I don’t care if they are here, I’m going to spank your ass, and they can’t
stop me.”

On November 11, the father informed the FCS worker that his
application for disability benefits had been denied. During this conversation,
the father expressed suicidal thoughts and would not disclose his location.
The FCS worker called the police to perform a welfare check. On November
12, the father was arrested for failing to appear for a hearing on the NCO
violation.

On November 14, Brittany reported that the mother had physically
assaulted her with the children present, and she might need surgery to repair
an injury she sustained. The mother was criminally charged after this assault.
The children confirmed to the HHS social worker that the assault happened,
it scared them, and they all cried. One of the children stated he did not want
to participate in visits with his mother anymore. The mother denied that the
assault happened.

On November 20, the father disclosed that he was providing
methamphetamine to the mother but denied using it himself. Around this
same time, Jodie reported that the mother frequently showed up uninvited
when the children were home despite being told not to. Jodie and her
husband began locking the doors to keep the mother out of the home, but she
continued to sneak in without their knowledge. Brittany reported that the
parents continued to live together in the condemned family home in violation
of the NCO. The back deck of the family home was covered in garbage,

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broken glass, and broken furniture, and there were large pieces of broken
glass in the yard.2

On December 11, during a visit to Jodie’s home, an FCS worker saw
the mother next door at the family home. The FCS worker went over to the
family home and found the father trying to fix a broken window. The father
denied the mother was there, stating he did not violate the NCO. The father
watched the worker as they left, appearing to act as a lookout for the mother.

On December 28, during a supervised visit, the mother threatened one
of the children, saying she would “beat [him] to a bloody pulp.” After this
interaction, the child went to the bathroom and vomited.

On January 30, 2025, the court held a dispositional review hearing and
entered an order concluding that continued removal of the children was
necessary based on the parents’ failure to address their mental-health and
substance-use concerns and due to their lack of stable housing. Again,
neither parent requested different or additional services.

In February, the father told the HHS social worker that the mother
accused him of injecting her with drugs, which he denied. The father did
admit, however, to having used methamphetamine within the last ninety
days. The father reported that due to having missed so many mental-health
therapy appointments in the past, he was on a call-in list but had not been
able to be seen. The social worker encouraged the father to look for a new
therapist, but the father refused.

2
In the meantime, the parents appealed the adjudicatory and dispositional orders
in the CINA proceedings. A panel of our court affirmed. See In re A.G., No. 24-1507, 2024
WL 4966120, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2024).

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The father’s disability benefits were approved in March, but he would
not start receiving the payments until September. The father disclosed that
he had used methamphetamine approximately one month earlier and
admitted he was struggling with his mental health. He admitted that he saw
the mother every day for a few hours and that he had given her money. By
the father’s report, the mother had gotten worse.

On March 15, the mother participated in a supervised visit but was
unable to deescalate the children’s fighting, instead yelling at the children or
ignoring problems. The mother eventually had a “meltdown,” during which
she stormed out of the visit, yelling and throwing things on the ground. The
FCS worker had to step in and redirect the children.

On March 20, the HHS social worker went to the family home, saw
that the back door was halfway open, and encountered the mother, who
reported she was not doing well. The social worker observed open sores on
the mother’s face. The social worker asked the mother if she needed
anything, but the mother said no. The next day, the mother reached out to
the social worker via text from Brittany’s phone asking if the social worker
could get the mother’s Medicaid reinstated because she needed to pick up
medications. The social worker replied asking if the mother had applied for
Medicaid. The mother did not respond.

On March 25, Brittany informed the social worker that the city had
removed the mother from the condemned family home and she had nowhere
to go. The mother would not go to a shelter and refused to stay at a hotel,
instead believing she could stay at Brittany’s house. Brittany and Jodie would
not allow the mother to stay with them, and no other family members were
willing to house her due to her behavior. According to Brittany, the mother

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had been “really bad lately,” having mood swings. By March 31, the mother
was staying with Jodie and refusing to leave.

Now almost a year out from the CINA adjudication on April 3, the
court held another dispositional review hearing and entered an order the
same day confirming that continued removal was necessary for the children’s
safety. The court noted that both parents continued to struggle with their
mental health, substance use, and housing instability.

On April 24, Brittany reported that the mother had canceled the past
three visits. The mother was still going to Jodie’s home despite being told
not to. Brittany believed that the mother had removed a board on the back
door of the family home so that she could stay there. The social worker went
to the condemned home to try to meet with the mother, but no one answered
when she knocked. The social worker observed a board removed from the
back door.

The following day, the mother was arrested for failing to appear for a
pretrial conference in her assault case. She then pled guilty to a lesser charge
of simple assault and was sentenced to thirty days in jail with all but two days
suspended. The mother was placed on probation. The mother was also
charged with failure to vacate a placarded dwelling, second offense.

On May 5, Brittany reported that she took the mother to the
emergency room after the mother said she and the children had bugs crawling
all over them. Brittany would not let the mother be near the children, and
Brittany hoped that the staff at the emergency room would commit her. The
next day, the mother was arrested for violating the NCO.

On May 23, the HHS social worker and FCS worker went to Jodie’s
house to meet with her, the children, and Brittany. The mother was also

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there when they arrived. The mother reported that her recent lack of
attendance at visits was due to health issues. During this conversation, the
mother had a large bandage on her arm and had multiple healing wounds that
appeared to have been picked at. The mother claimed she was living “here,
there, and everywhere” but not at the family home. The mother was no
longer taking her medication as her doctor had withheld it due to misuse.
During the visit, the mother was unable to manage one of the children’s
behaviors and the social worker had to step in.

The next day, during the father’s visit, he told the children he did not
feel like playing, made no effort to stop a physical altercation between two of
the children, cursed at the children, told them he was not going to come to
visits anymore, and threw all of the snacks and water bottles in the trash. He
then fell asleep on the floor until one of the FCS workers woke him up.
During this same visit, one of the children complained of pain and the father
offered him an unlabeled bag of pills. The father later claimed the pills were
from Brittany and were over-the-counter pain medication.

During the mother’s visit this same day, she struggled to manage the
children’s behaviors and made no effort to stop the children from damaging
the playroom where the visit happened. The children damaged games and a
wall and repeatedly kicked glass doors. One of the children kicked the FCS
worker in the shins. This was the last FCS-supervised visit the mother
participated in with the children.

By early June, the mother was staying with a friend and was
inconsistently taking her medication. Brittany reported the mother had
gotten “really bad,” was using drugs, and frequently believed she had bugs in
her body. The mother had cut herself beneath her elbow in an attempt to get
the bugs out of her skin, had given herself a black eye from banging her head

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on walls, and asked Brittany to cut her hand to get bugs out. According to
Brittany, when the mother was around, she did not help with the children,
instead showing up for food and then leaving. The FCS worker encouraged
Brittany to call the police if the mother would not leave the home and
reiterated that the mother was not to be around the children unsupervised.

After this, the mother was again civilly committed. On June 16,
Brittany informed HHS that the mother’s involuntary commitment had been
court approved.

On June 19, the HHS social worker met with the father. The father
reported that he no longer gave the mother drugs, but she was regularly using
with another person. Since her committal, the mother had cut off
communication with the father and Brittany, and he was unsure of her
whereabouts. The father estimated he had last used drugs about a month
earlier, admitting to relapsing when under stress. The father planned to set
up mental-health therapy and substance-use treatment the following week,
but he was concerned about the process taking too long.

On June 25, the HHS social worker went to Jodie’s house and found
the mother present. The mother said she had been “doing okay” since her
release from the involuntary commitment and she was trying to apply for
housing assistance but was having trouble with the application. The mother
acknowledged that the case was approaching the permanency hearing, and
that while she loved her children, she was unsure whether she would be able
to care for them given her ongoing health issues.

On June 28, the father attended his visit for forty-five minutes until he
said he felt sick, started cussing at everyone, and left. He did not interact
with the children during this visit.

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On July 17, the father had a substance-use evaluation. The father
reported daily methamphetamine use over the past year, except for a period
of sobriety in November or December. He had last used methamphetamine
two days before his appointment. After this evaluation, the provider
diagnosed the father with methamphetamine-use disorder, severe and
chronic, and recommended extended outpatient treatment. The father
attended substance-use counseling sessions on July 22 and 29. However, the
father admitted to using methamphetamine on July 27.

As of July 24, the mother was coming and going from Brittany’s house
every day. The mother was hiding small packages of unknown substances in
different places that were accessible to the children. The HHS social worker
and FCS worker again spoke with Brittany and Jodie about boundary setting
and not allowing the mother to be around the children unsupervised.

On August 9, the mother broke into Brittany’s house, splashed blue
paint around the kitchen, blocked the kitchen and bathroom sinks, and broke
a mirror. The mother was located at the family home, covered in blue paint.
She was arrested and charged with burglary, criminal mischief, and failure to
vacate a placarded dwelling. The mother remained in jail, unable to bond
out.

In early August, the father reestablished care with his mental-health
therapist. On August 20 and 26, the father attended substance-use
counseling. On August 27, the father met with his mental-health therapist.
Around this time, the father secured a one-bedroom apartment. The HHS
social worker described the apartment as “very small” and unable to
accommodate the children.

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Also on August 27, the State filed a petition to terminate the parents’
rights to the children under Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(e) and (h).
However, due to the age of the children, only the youngest child met the age
requirement for subsection (h). The State did not move to amend the
petition at any time.

In September and October, the father met with his mental-health
therapist four times and attended substance-use counseling eight times. He
admitted to using methamphetamine on September 22 and October 7.
Likewise, the father reported alcohol cravings and that he had last consumed
alcohol on September 22, when he had ten to twelve shots of tequila. At the
October 9 appointment, the father took a drug test, which showed
presumptive positives for THC, amphetamine, and methamphetamine.

In late September, the HHS social worker met with the mother in jail.
The mother expressed willingness to undergo substance-use and mental-
health evaluations. However, when the social worker remarked that the
mother looked better and that it must feel good to be sober, the mother
responded that she had been sober for seven years and substances were not
the issue. While in jail, Brittany provided the mother with money so that she
could call the children. These interactions reportedly went well.

As of November 3, the father had secured a job working a couple days
per week as a cook at a bar. He had begun having supervised visits at his
apartment, where he cooked meals for the children. During these visits, the
father “engage[d] well with the children and pa[id] attention to their needs.”
The father was working on making the apartment more comfortable for the
children.

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On November 4, the mother pleaded guilty to third-degree burglary as
a habitual offender, third-degree criminal mischief, and credit card fraud
under $1,500. Her sentencing hearing was scheduled for December 1. The
following day, the mother underwent a substance-use evaluation, which
recommended extended outpatient treatment.

The father attended substance-use counseling on November 6. He
was unable to produce a urine sample for drug testing during this
appointment.

By mid-November, the mother was out of jail. The father admitted
that she had been staying at his apartment and that he had relapsed on
methamphetamine. The father reported that, one night while she was at his
apartment, the mother had cut herself in an attempted suicide. The father
called for help, but the mother fled. The mother ended up staying in a shed
on Brittany’s property without Brittany’s knowledge. The mother left a
baggie of suspected methamphetamine in the shed. One of the children,
while cleaning up the mother’s blood in the shed, found the baggie and
turned it over to Brittany, who turned it over to police. The mother was again
arrested.

The juvenile court held the first day of the termination hearing on
November 18. The mother was in jail at the time. The guardian ad litem and
HHS social worker recommended termination of both parents’ rights.

The HHS social worker assigned to this case was on medical leave in
December and did not have contact with anyone in this case during that time.
However, the FCS worker met with the father several times in December and
attempted to meet with the mother.

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On December 1, the father reportedly bailed the mother out of jail and
let her stay at his apartment. Two days later, Brittany also reported the
mother had been staying at the father’s apartment, coming and going as she
pleased. On December 6, the father canceled his visit with the children
because the mother had “really screwed up his head,” he was a “total mess,”
and did not want the children to see him like that. Around this same time,
the father reported feeling depressed and smoking marijuana to cope.

On December 16, the FCS worker attempted to meet with the father
at his apartment. When the FCS worker knocked, he encountered the
mother, who said the father was at work. The worker noticed a young man
in the apartment and smoke filling the living room. The worker set a time to
meet with the mother on December 18. The mother did not attend the
meeting. The mother was arrested on January 8, 2026 for a probation
violation.

On January 28, the father tested negative for all illegal substances. The
next day, the father met with the HHS social worker, reporting that he
regularly met with his substance-use counselor but did not participate in drug
testing until the day earlier. He claimed he had maintained his sobriety since
a relapse in December and continued to participate in mental-health
counseling.

On January 29, the HHS social worker met with the mother in jail.
The mother refused to participate in a drug test. While the mother was in
jail, Brittany again provided her money so that she could speak with the
children on the phone.

On February 13, the juvenile court held the second day of the
termination trial. The mother remained in jail. Both the mother and father

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testified at this hearing. The mother testified that she was almost forty-one
years old. Before her most-recent arrest, the mother was living in a shed in
Brittany’s backyard. The shed did not have a bathroom or running water.
Brittany later testified that she was unaware that the mother was living in the
shed. The mother maintained that she had not used methamphetamine since
2019 and denied that she had tried to harm herself or had a mental-health
episode in November 2025.

The father testified that he was fifty-five years old. He continued to
participate in mental-health and substance-use therapy, and his last date of
use of methamphetamine was in December 2025. The father continued to
participate in supervised visits with the children. He was still living in his
apartment and working a couple days per week at the bar. He continued to
receive disability benefits and had recently applied to get benefits for the
children.

On February 20, the juvenile court terminated the parents’ rights to
all of the children under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) and as to the
youngest child under subsection (h). The parents appeal.

II. Standard of Review.

We review the juvenile court’s decision to terminate parental rights de
novo. In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014). “We are not bound by
the juvenile court’s findings of fact, but we do give them weight, especially in
assessing the credibility of witnesses.” Id. (citation omitted). “We will
uphold an order terminating parental rights if there is clear and convincing
evidence of grounds for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116.” In
re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010). “Evidence is clear and convincing

19
when there are no serious or substantial doubts as to the correctness or
conclusions of law drawn from the evidence.” Id. (cleaned up).

III. Analysis.

We apply a three-step analysis to termination-of-parental-rights cases.
In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa 2016). First, we consider whether the
State proved a ground for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1).
Id. If the State has proved a ground for termination, we next consider
whether termination of parental rights is in the children’s best interests under
section 232.116(2). Id. at 219–20. Finally, if “the statutory best-interest
framework supports termination of parental rights, we consider whether any
exceptions in section 232.116(3) apply to preclude termination of parental
rights.” Id. at 220.

Both the mother and father challenge all three steps in the analysis.
We first address the mother’s appeal, then the father’s.

A. Mother’s Appeal. The mother’s parental rights to all five children
were terminated under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e), and her rights to the
youngest child were also terminated under subsection (h). The mother
argues the State failed to prove termination was proper under subsection (e),
that termination is not in the children’s best interests, and that exceptions to
termination apply. We consider each argument in turn.

1. Statutory grounds for termination. “When a juvenile court
terminates parental rights on multiple statutory grounds, we only need to find
that one of them supports termination.” In re N.F., No. 24-1328, 2024 WL
4620790, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2024). Because we determine that
the State proved grounds for termination of the mother’s parental rights

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under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e), we need not address the termination
of her rights to the youngest child under subsection (h).

Under subsection (e), termination of a parent’s rights is appropriate if
the State proves: (1) the children have been adjudicated CINA; (2) the
children have been removed from the parent’s custody “for a period of at
least six consecutive months”; and (3) “[t]here is clear and convincing
evidence that the parents have not maintained significant and meaningful
contact with the child[ren] during the previous six consecutive months and
have made no reasonable efforts to resume care of the child[ren] despite being
given the opportunity to do so.” Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(e).

The mother challenges only the third element. The third element
requires the State to show: “the parents (1) have not maintained significant
and meaningful contact with the child during the previous six consecutive
months and (2) have made no reasonable efforts to resume care of the child
despite being given the opportunity to do so.” In re T.S., 868 N.W.2d 425,
437 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015), as amended (Oct. 16, 2015) (cleaned up). “The two
requirements of subparagraph (e)(3) are clearly in the conjunctive:
connected, joined together. Each is separately required, but they are
considered closely interconnected.” Id.

The statute defines “significant and meaningful contact” as including:
the affirmative assumption by the parents of the duties encompassed by
the role of being a parent. This affirmative duty, in addition to financial
obligations, requires continued interest in the child[ren], a genuine effort
to complete the responsibilities prescribed in the case permanency plan, a
genuine effort to maintain communication with the child[ren], and requires
that the parents establish and maintain a place of importance in the
child[ren]’s li[ves].

Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(e)(3).

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“While attending regular visits does lend support for a finding of
significant and meaningful contact, this is not the only factor.” N.F., 2024
WL 4620790, at *4. “There must also be evidence of the ‘affirmative
assumption’ of the duties that go with being a parent.” Id. Included in this
consideration is whether the parent has made “a genuine effort to complete
the responsibilities prescribed in the case permanency plan.” Iowa Code
§ 232.116(e)(3). Making this determination often “requires a qualitative
analysis of [the parent’s] efforts.” T.S., 868 N.W.2d at 438.

The mother argues that she maintained significant and meaningful
contact with the children because she frequently saw the children at
Brittany’s and Jodie’s houses without HHS or FCS involved. The mother
also regularly spoke with the children while she was in jail. The mother
claims she “made a genuine effort to complete the responsibilities prescribed
in the case permanency plan” because she had started mental-health
medication and completed a substance-use evaluation in jail.

We find the mother’s arguments unconvincing. While the mother may
have been able to see and talk to the children whenever she wanted, she did
not maintain “significant and meaningful contact” with the children as it is
defined under section 232.116(1)(e)(3). At the termination hearing, the HHS
social worker reported that the mother was offered fifty supervised visits with
the children. Of those visits, the mother attended seventeen. Two additional
visits were partially attended due to the mother being late. One visit was
canceled due to weather. The mother missed, no-showed, refused, or
canceled thirty visits. Of the supervised visits the mother attended, concerns
about the mother’s behavior toward and supervision of the children were
noted several times. The mother last attended a supervised visit with FCS
on May 24, 2025.

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Regarding the unsanctioned visits the mother had with the children,
she often showed up unannounced and uninvited when it was convenient for
her. As Brittany reported, the mother “would be there, and then all the
sudden she would be gone,” sometimes disappearing for days, only to “show
up for a few hours and play with the kids, and then she would be gone. So
it’s nothing that’s been steady or what a normal parenting help-out thing
would be.”

Further, and importantly, apart from visits with the children, the State
showed by clear and convincing evidence that the mother had not made the
“affirmative assumption . . . of the duties encompassed by the role of being a
parent,” including “a genuine effort to complete the responsibilities
prescribed in the case permanency plan.” Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(e)(3). The
State also showed by clear and convincing evidence that the mother had
“made no reasonable efforts to resume care of the child[ren] despite being
given the opportunity to do so.” Id. The concerns about the family that
brought them to HHS attention—domestic violence, substance use,
environmental hazards, lack of supervision, mental health and volatile
behavior, and noncompliance with services—remain concerns about the
mother. Throughout the life of this case, the mother repeatedly refused to
participate in services and meet with HHS and FCS workers. By the time of
the termination hearing in November 2025 and February 2026, the mother
was in and out of jail, noncompliant with drug testing requests, unemployed,
unhoused, and not participating in mental-health counseling or substance-
use treatment. The mother continued to deny that she had ever relapsed on
methamphetamine, claiming she had been sober since December 2019. She
also downplayed her involuntary committals, denied that she had a mental-
health episode in November 2025, and claimed she had no mental-health
concerns. The mother appears to be unwilling or unable to accept that she

23
needs help, which has prevented her from making any positive changes to be
a safe and stable caregiver for these children.

We conclude the State proved grounds for termination of the mother’s
parental rights to all five children under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e). We
next consider whether termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the
children’s best interests.

2. Best interests. When considering the children’s best interests we
“give primary consideration to the child[ren]’s safety, to the best placement
for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child[ren], and to
the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child[ren].”
Id. § 232.116(2). “It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of
permanency after the State has proved a ground for termination under
section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and
be able to provide a stable home for the child.” In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 41
(Iowa 2010).

When determining the children’s best interests, we “consider[] what
the future holds for the child[ren] if returned to the parents.” In re C.K., 558
N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 1997). “When making this decision, we look to the
parents’ past performance because it may indicate the quality of the care the
parent is capable of providing in the future.” Id.; see also In re M.S., 519
N.W.2d 398, 400 (Iowa 1994) (“We gain insight into the child[ren]’s
prospects by reviewing evidence of the parent’s past performance—for it
may be indicative of the parent’s future capabilities.”).

These children have been in limbo for over two years. They have done
well in their current placement, and they deserve the safety, stability, and
permanency that they will only achieve through termination of parental

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rights. As the juvenile court noted, the mother’s “severe mental health
concerns, methamphetamine use, violence and ongoing instability present a
serious danger to the children,” while “[t]he children are loved and well
cared for by [Brittany].” We agree with the juvenile court and conclude
termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests.
We next consider whether any exceptions apply to prevent termination.

3. Exceptions to termination. Once we conclude the State has proven a
ground for termination, a parent resisting termination has the burden to
prove whether any exceptions to termination apply. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d
467, 476 (Iowa 2018). “The exceptions in section 232.116(3) are permissive,
not mandatory.” In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 324 (Iowa 2021) (cleaned up).
“The court may exercise its discretion in deciding whether to apply the
factors in section 232.116(3) to save the parent-child relationship based on
the unique circumstances of each case and the best interests of the children.”
In re A.R., 932 N.W.2d 588, 591 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019). “[O]ur consideration
must center on whether the child[ren] will be disadvantaged by termination,
and whether the disadvantage overcomes [the mother’s] inability to provide
for [the children’s] developing needs.” D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 709. As always,
the children’s best interests remain our primary consideration. A.S., 906
N.W.2d at 475.

Here, the mother argues that the exception in section 232.116(3)(c)
applies because termination would be detrimental to the children based on
the closeness of the parent-child bond and that termination was not required
under section 232.116(3)(a) because the children were in Brittany’s care.
Related to her second argument, the mother argues that the court should
have established a guardianship in lieu of termination. We consider each
exception in turn.

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We conclude that the mother has failed to show by clear and
convincing evidence that termination would be detrimental to the children
due to the closeness of the parent-child bond. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c).
While it is clear the mother loves the children, and that the children love her,
she has consistently shown she is unable to place the children’s needs above
her own. She has not made any progress toward addressing her mental health
or substance use, and because of that, she has been an unstable figure in the
children’s lives for years. D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707 (“We do not gamble with
the children’s future by asking them to continuously wait for a stable
biological parent, particularly at such tender ages.” (cleaned up)).
Considering the best interests of the children, we decline to apply the
permissive exception in Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(c).

Turning to the permissive exception in section 232.116(3)(a), the court
need not terminate the parents’ rights when “[a] relative has legal custody of
the child.” However, in this case, Brittany does not have legal custody of the
children, HHS does. See A.M., 843 N.W.2d at 113. For that reason, the
exception in section 232.116(3)(a) does not apply.

In any event, we do not find that a guardianship is appropriate. “A
guardianship is not a legally preferable alternative to termination.” A.S., 906
N.W.2d at 477 (cleaned up). Guardianship is not preferable “because over
the life of the guardianship—potentially until the children turn eighteen—
the court could terminate the guardianship or change the guardian at the
mother’s request or on its own motion.” N.F., 2024 WL 4620790, at *6. A
guardianship “sets up potential conflict between the guardian and the
mother,” and “often does not achieve permanency and stability.” Id.
(cleaned up). “The impermanent nature of guardianships denies children

26
the security and stability that a permanent home provides.” In re A.C.,
No. 23-0567, 2023 WL 3612382, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 24, 2023).

HHS did not recommend a guardianship due to the age of the children
and the concern about the potential financial burden it would place on
Brittany, who was already taking care of several children. Brittany testified
at the termination hearing that adoption was “the best solution” and she was
not open to a guardianship. We decline to create a guardianship for these
children.

Having concluded that the State proved a ground for termination,
termination is in the children’s best interests, and that no exceptions to
termination apply, we affirm the juvenile court’s termination order as it
relates to the mother.

B. Father’s Appeal. On appeal, the father argues: (1) the State failed
to prove grounds for termination under section 232.116(1)(e) and
(2) termination is not in the children’s best interests. In making his second
argument, the father argues that exceptions apply to prevent termination and
that the court should have established a guardianship for the children with
Brittany. We consider the father’s arguments in turn.

1. Statutory grounds for termination. The father argues that the State
failed to prove grounds for termination under section 232.116(1)(e). He
concedes there was sufficient evidence to terminate his rights to the youngest
child under subsection (h). Because we conclude there were grounds to
terminate the father’s parental rights under subsection (e), we need not
consider termination under subsection (h). See N.F., 2024 WL 4620790, at
*3.

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As noted above, evaluating whether the State proved grounds for
termination under section 232.116(1)(e) requires a “qualitative analysis” of
the parent’s efforts, requiring us to “look at the substance of [the father’s]
conduct, not just the form.” See T.S., 868 N.W.2d at 438. Upon our review,
even with recent progress the father made, we conclude that the State proved
the grounds for termination under section 232.116(1)(e) by clear and
convincing evidence. Specifically, the State proved that the father had “not
maintained significant and meaningful contact with the child[ren]” and that
he had not “made . . . reasonable efforts to resume care of the child[ren].”
Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(e)(3).

First, regarding the father’s significant and meaningful contact with
the children, whether the State met its burden of proof on this requirement
is somewhat of a closer call. The father participated in forty-four of the fifty
supervised visits he was offered with the children. That said, the father’s
visits were not all successful. The father often became aggressive, frustrated,
could not safely handle all of the children, and was often unable to deescalate
the children’s behaviors. The father missed two visits due to illness, and
missed four others due to no-show, hospitalization, or incarceration.

Further, despite his struggles during visits, we recognize that the
father had “turned it around quite a bit,” was “more honest with his
struggles,” and had improved his “ability to parent the children” in the
months leading up to the termination hearing. Even so, the issues that caused
the most concern to HHS—substance use, mental health, and the parents’
continued violation of the NCO—were still not resolved by the time of the
termination hearing. Significantly, the father continued using
methamphetamine in September, October, and November, despite his
improved interactions with the children. In December 2025, between the

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first and second termination hearing dates, the father canceled a visit with
the children because, after he bailed the mother out of jail and allowed her to
live at his apartment, he could not handle the visit because the mother
“screwed up his head” and he did not want the children to see him in that
state. He reported being a “total mess” and using marijuana to cope. He
also reported relapsing on methamphetamine around the same time.

We conclude the father failed to make an “affirmative assumption . . .
of the duties encompassed by the role of being a parent” and failed to make
“a genuine effort to complete the responsibilities prescribed in the case
permanency plan.” Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(e)(3).

This leads us to the second requirement of section 232.116(1)(e)(3):
that the father had not made reasonable efforts to resume care of the children.
Id. We conclude that the State met its burden of proof to show this
requirement by clear and convincing evidence.

We commend the father for the positive changes he made before the
termination hearing. The father was approved to receive disability benefits,
was working on obtaining benefits for the children, had found a one-bedroom
apartment for himself, and was working two days per week as a cook at a local
bar.

That said, his commitment to meaningful progress was a requirement
and important to the goal of providing stability and permanency for the
children. Despite HHS’s longstanding involvement with this family, most
recently beginning in February 2024, the father was resistant to services for
almost a year and a half and did not begin attempting to address his
substance-use and mental-health issues until a few months before the
termination hearing. To his credit, the father began participating in

29
substance-use treatment in July 2025 and mental-health therapy in August
2025. At his July 2025 substance-use evaluation, however, the father
admitted to daily methamphetamine use over the past year. Throughout his
treatment he also reported nearly monthly relapses—in July, September,
October, November, and December. We commend the father for continuing
to attend treatment and express a commitment to his sobriety despite his
relapses. However, given the amount of time that had passed in this case
before the father got serious about his treatment, this participation in
treatment is too little, too late.

As noted, even with his participation in these programs, the father
continued to relapse on methamphetamine, had not meaningfully
participated in random substance-use testing throughout the case, and
sometimes blamed his positive drug tests on factors outside of his control,
such as when he blamed a positive drug test on taking a hit of someone’s
vape, claiming he thought it was only nicotine. His decision to continue using
methamphetamine is especially concerning given his heart condition, which
could be fatal with continued methamphetamine use. Further, given the
father’s lack of participation in drug testing throughout the case, we are
unable to verify more than short-term sobriety. The father also hindered his
own progress by continuing to enable the mother’s erratic behavior, staying
in contact with her despite the NCO, bailing her out of jail, and letting her
stay at his apartment despite his concerns that she was struggling with her
mental health and sobriety. This behavior continued throughout the period
between termination hearing dates.

In the end, we have significant concerns about the father’s fragile
sobriety, his mental health, and his poor boundaries with the mother, and we
conclude that the State showed that, over the course of the case, the father

30
had not made a genuine effort to comply with the case permanency plan and
had not made reasonable efforts to attempt to resume care of the children.
We therefore affirm the juvenile court’s ruling finding grounds to terminate
the father’s rights to all five children under section 232.116(1)(e).

2. Best interests. The father argues that termination is not in the
children’s best interests because the father is closely bonded with the
children, and the children are closely bonded with each other. In making this
argument, the father appears to allege that statutory exceptions to
termination apply under section 232.116(3). Although he does not make a
separate argument, we consider the statutory exceptions identified in his
briefing in a separate subsection of this opinion.

We conclude that termination of the father’s parental rights is in all
five children’s best interests. We do not doubt that the father loves the
children and the children love him. However, as the juvenile court noted, the
father’s “extensive history of resuming methamphetamine use, and his
inability to keep appropriate boundaries with [the mother] . . . pose a threat
to the children’s safety and wellbeing.” The children deserve stability and
cannot wait on the father’s unpredictable path to recovery. See A.S., 906
N.W.2d at 474 (“Children simply cannot wait for responsible parenting.”
(citation omitted)). Termination is in their best interests.

3. Exceptions to termination. In making his best-interests argument, the
father cited statutory exceptions to termination under section 232.116(3)(a)
and (c), arguing that termination is not necessary as a relative has legal
custody of the children and the closeness of the parent-child bond precludes
termination. As noted above, section 232.116(3)(a) does not apply because
HHS, not Brittany, has legal custody of the children. In any event, for the
same reasons we determined a guardianship is not appropriate in the

31
mother’s appeal, we make the same determination as to the father.
Establishing a guardianship is not in these children’s best interests.

Finally, section 232.116(3)(c) provides that termination is not
necessary when “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the
termination would be detrimental to the child[ren] at the time due to the
closeness of the parent-child relationship.” Upon our de novo review of this
record, we cannot say that the parent-child bond is so strong that termination
would be detrimental to the children. These children have been waiting for
stability and permanency for over two years. It is in their best interests that
they finally have the opportunity to achieve both. For that reason, we decline
to apply the permissive exception to termination under section 232.116(3)(c).

IV. Conclusion.

We conclude that the State proved grounds to terminate the mother’s
and father’s parental rights to all five children under Iowa Code
section 232.116(1)(e); termination of the parent’s parental rights to all
children is in the children’s best interests; and the parents failed to prove that
any statutory exceptions apply to prevent termination. For that reason, we
affirm the juvenile court’s termination of the mother’s and father’s parental
rights to all children.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

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