In the Interest of R.T. Jr., Minor Child, R.T., Father

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 15-1754
Filed March 9, 2016

IN THE INTEREST OF R.T. Jr.,
Minor Child,

R.T., Father,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Susan Flaherty,

Associate Juvenile Judge.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights. AFFIRMED.

Michael M. Lindeman of Lindeman Law, Cedar Rapids, for appellant

father.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Julie G. Trachta of Linn County Advocate. Inc., Cedar Rapids, attorney

and guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ.
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DOYLE, Judge.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child, R.T. Jr. 1

He claims the State failed to prove the statutory grounds for termination, that he

should be granted additional time to work toward reunification, and that

termination is not in the child’s best interests because the bond between father

and child is strong. We affirm the juvenile court’s order.

We review termination-of-parental-rights proceedings de novo. See In re

A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014). The three-step statutory framework

governing the termination of parental rights is well established and need not be

repeated here. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40-41 (Iowa 2010). The juvenile

court issued a thorough and well-reasoned ruling terminating the father’s parental

rights, and we adopt the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the juvenile

court’s order as our own.

The juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights pursuant to Iowa

Code section 232.116(1)(h) (2013). To terminate the father’s parental rights

pursuant to section 232.116(1)(h), the State must prove: (1) the child is three

years of age or younger; (2) the child has been adjudicated a child in need of

assistance (CINA); (3) the child has been removed from the physical custody of

the child’s parents for at least six of the last twelve months, or for the last six

consecutive months; and (4) there is clear and convincing evidence that at the

present time the child cannot be returned to the custody the child’s parents as

provided in section 232.102. The first three elements are not in dispute here.

Rather, the father’s claim on appeal implicates the fourth element.

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The child’s mother’s parental rights were also terminated, and she does not appeal.
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In regard to whether the child could be returned to the father’s custody,

the juvenile court found:

[The child] is now two years old and has been in foster family
care the majority of his life. His parents continue on the roller
coaster that is created by addiction and untreated mental health
issues . . . .
[The father] has continued to maintain regular contact with
[the child] and regularly attends his visits. Unfortunately, he has not
been able to stabilize his life so that he could safely resume care of
his child. [The father] has had multiple positive drug tests, although
he has continued to deny using the substances he has tested
positive for. He has acknowledged intermittent use of
hydrocodone, sometimes by prescription, but he does not
acknowledge that his use of prescription narcotic medication is an
issue even with his history of substance abuse. [The father] has
incurred criminal charges related to substance abuse, including the
most recent charge of public intoxication on July 3, 2015. [The
father] reluctantly agreed to return to a substance abuse treatment
program in February of 2015. He attended three sessions and then
refused to return after being confronted with a positive drug test for
marijuana. [The father] testified that just prior to the first hearing on
this petition, he scheduled an appointment with a different
treatment agency, though he has not yet re-engaged in any
treatment. [The father’s] testimony regarding his substance abuse
history, his episodes of use since [the child’s] removal, and his
need for ongoing treatment showed either a tremendous lack of
insight or [a complete lack of] honesty.
[The father’s] housing continues to be through the PUSH
program. His employment is intermittent and he has not
demonstrated the ability to maintain a home without support from
this time-limited community housing program. [The father] has
continued to associate with individuals known to have substance
abuse issues . . . .
The Department of Human Services [(DHS)] has offered
services and assistance to the family throughout the course of the
[CINA] proceedings. The offered services have included parenting
education, family team meetings, mental health services, substance
abuse evaluations, substance abuse treatment, drug testing and
supervised visitation. Additionally, the parents receive services
through the Department of Corrections and housing assistance
through the PUSH program. No sustained progress has been
made in addressing the issues which led to the child’s removal.
The parents have been given more than ample time to address
their adult issues and demonstrate that they could provide a safe,
stable, drug free home for [the child], and neither parent has been
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able to do so. [The child] could not be returned to the care of a
parent at this time or any time in the reasonably-near future without
continuing to be a child in need of supervision and requiring the
oversight of the court and the [DHS] to assure his safety. He would
continue to be at imminent risk of harm to his health, safety, and
welfare if in the care of either his mother or father due to drug use,
untreated mental health issues, criminal activity, unsafe associates
and lack of safe, stable, drug free housing. Nothing in the evidence
indicates that this is likely to change in the foreseeable future.

Having reviewed the record de novo, we agree. The State proved by clear and

convincing evidence that grounds for termination exist under section

232.116(1)(h).

On appeal, the father also argues “[a]n additional period of rehabilitation

should be granted to allow [him] to prove he is capable of caring for [the child].”

He asserts a few more months would give him more time to prove he can provide

for the child and keep him safe, and the child would suffer no ill effects. As we

have stated numerous times, children are not equipped with pause buttons. “The

crucial days of childhood cannot be suspended while parents experiment with

ways to face up to their own problems.” In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa

1987). While the law requires a “full measure of patience with troubled parents

who attempt to remedy a lack of parenting skills,” this patience has been built into

the statutory scheme of chapter 232. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 494 (Iowa

2000). Our supreme court has explained that “the legislature, in cases meeting

the conditions of [the Iowa Code], has made a categorical determination that the

needs of a child are promoted by termination of parental rights.” In re M.W., 458

N.W.2d 847, 850 (Iowa 1990) (discussing then Iowa Code section

232.116(1)(e)). Consequently, “[t]ime is a critical element,” and parents simply

“cannot wait until the eve of termination, after the statutory time periods for
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reunification have expired, to begin to express an interest in parenting.” C.B.,

611 N.W.2d at 495. At some point, as is the case here, the rights and needs of

the child must rise above the rights and needs of the parent. See In re C.S., 776

N.W.2d 297, 300 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009). The public policy of the state having

been legislatively set, we are obligated to heed the statutory time periods for

reunification. As pointed out by the juvenile court, the father has been given

more than ample time to address his adult issues and demonstrate that he could

provide a safe, stable, drug free home for the child, and he was not able to do so.

We agree with the court’s conclusion that “[n]othing in the evidence indicates that

this is likely to change in the foreseeable future.” Any additional time in limbo

would not be in the child’s best interests.

The father also argues that termination is not in the best interests of the

child due to the bond between the child and the father. While the record

discloses a bond between the child and the father, the record indicates

termination is in the child’s best interests. The child has been removed from

parental custody for a significant portion of his young life. He has done well

developmentally and physically in his foster home and is “a happy, healthy,

active toddler.” He is bonded to his foster parents. The child is in need of

permanency and security that adoption can provide him.

As an aside on appeal, the father claims the DHS should have given him

more visits with less supervision. There is nothing in the record to suggest the

father requested additional visitation or modification of the existing visitation

schedule. He has not preserved this claim for review. See In re A.A.G., 708

N.W.2d 85, 91 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005).
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Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating the father’s

parental rights.

AFFIRMED.