State of Iowa v. Todd Ricky Jenkins

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 21-1718
Filed July 26, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

TODD RICKY JENKINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Fae Hoover Grinde,

Judge.

A defendant appeals his convictions for first-degree murder and going

armed with intent. AFFIRMED.

Karmen Anderson, Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Heard by Ahlers, P.J., Badding, J., and Mullins, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
2

BADDING, Judge.

A love triangle with Todd Jenkins, his girlfriend Kiara Morrise, and Morrise’s

new boyfriend Reginald Ward came to a bloody end on October 30, 2019, when

Jenkins shot Ward to death at a gas station in downtown Cedar Rapids. Jenkins

fled the scene, ditched the gun, and was found five months later in an Illinois hotel

room with Morrise. He was charged with first-degree murder and going armed with

intent. Following a bench trial, the district court found him guilty as charged.

Jenkins appeals, claiming (1) the evidence was insufficient to prove the

malice aforethought, deliberation, and premeditation elements of the murder

conviction; (2) the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his use of

force was not justified; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the intent-to-

use and movement elements of his conviction for going armed with intent;

and (4) the court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial on

weight-of-the-evidence grounds. We affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Todd Jenkins loved Kiara Morrise. According to Jenkins, they met in 2016

and dated until December 2019. Beginning sometime in 2018, Morrise was also

dating Reginald Ward, though Morrise said that she and Jenkins had broken up

before she started seeing Ward.

Jenkins and Ward had passing encounters with one another before the

shooting. Morrise remembered one time when she was in a car with Ward, and

he threw a taco at Jenkins’s car—a white Audi. Jenkins recalled two other

encounters. One happened after Jenkins dropped Morrise off at work when Ward,

according to Jenkins,
3

pulled up on me, asked me what do you want to do, like what’s up. I
took it as a threat, but like I said, I told him . . . she’s going to see the
both of us, she’s going to do what she does, so where do you want
to go from here.

On another occasion, Jenkins testified that Ward drove up next to him, “flashed a

gun,” and followed him for a couple of blocks. One of Jenkins’s friends testified

that he became a hermit because of his problems with Ward, refusing to do

anything outside the house. That friend described Morrise as toxic but said

Jenkins’s feelings for her “were very deep.”

Sometime in October 2019, Jenkins sent Morrise flowers with a card that

either read, “I love you,” or “I miss you, Todd Rick.” Admittedly “pissed off” that

Morrise was with another man, Jenkins bought a new gun toward the end of

October—a Glock 43 nine-millimeter pistol with unique “RIP ammo,”1 which is

made to “break away from the base when it impacts soft tissue,” creating “various

wound paths in the body causing damage.” And then, the night before the

shooting, Jenkins texted Morrise things like, “[Y]ou don’t know how it feels to be

hurt by someone you love the most”; “how is this shit so easy for you, like you

wasn’t my best fucking friend”; and “I fucking love you, bro. I don’t deserve none

of this shit you be doing to me.”

Early the next morning, Jenkins drove from his home in Davenport to

Morrise’s apartment in Cedar Rapids. He brought his new gun and ammo with

him. Jenkins borrowed his sister’s gold Ford Fusion for the drive, he said because

his “car was being worked on by a family mechanic.” But Morrise testified that

1 A criminalist at the state crime lab testified that “RIP” stands for “radically invasive

projectile.”
4

Jenkins always drove his white Audi, and she had never seen him drive the Fusion

before.

Geographical data extracted from the Fusion shows that, as early as

5:33 a.m., the vehicle was in the parking lot of a birthing center near a Casey’s gas

station in Cedar Rapids, just a few blocks southwest of Morrise’s apartment.

Jenkins testified that while he was sitting in that parking lot, he texted Ward to have

Morrise put a laundry basket that contained his clothes and some money outside

her front door. Jenkins claimed that he didn’t know Ward was at Morrise’s

apartment until he saw Ward’s vehicle there. The data from the Fusion shows the

vehicle leaving the birthing center parking lot at 5:57 a.m. and traveling to the

nearby Casey’s, where it remained from 5:58 a.m. to 6:01 a.m. The surveillance

system at the Casey’s captured Jenkins parking the Fusion in the lot, briefly

entering the store, and then departing in the Fusion.

Separate footage from surveillance systems located at a FasMart

convenience store next to Morrise’s apartment, a coffee shop in the same building

as Morrise’s apartment, and a laundromat in the same building collectively show

the following. At roughly 7:21 a.m.,2 Jenkins pulled into the parking area of the

coffee shop and parked in a space from which he could see the door to Morrise’s

apartment building. The footage from the laundromat shows Morrise and Ward

leaving the apartment through that door at 7:42 a.m. Morrise testified that Ward

was taking her to work.

2 The record does not show where Jenkins or the Fusion were between 6:01 a.m.

and 7:21 a.m. A crime intelligence analyst for the police department testified the
vehicle data track for that period was incomplete.
5

Upon their exit, Jenkins quickly backed out of his space, proceeded to

where Morrise and Ward were backing out of their space in Ward’s black Monte

Carlo, and stopped in the travel-portion of the lot. After finishing a two-point turn

out of their parking space, Morrise and Ward drove by where Jenkins was stopped

facing the opposite direction. Even though Jenkins claimed to have texted Ward

that morning about his laundry basket, Morrise testified that she was surprised to

see Jenkins in the gold car as they drove by it. The video shows Jenkins quickly

accelerated as they passed him, made a u-turn, and gave chase to Ward’s car.

With Jenkins in pursuit, Morrise and Ward pulled into a nearby FasMart gas

and parked next to a fuel pump. Security footage shows Jenkins followed them

into the FasMart and parked right next to them. Morrise testified that, at this point,

Ward “said he was going to beat [Jenkins’s] ass,” but she could not recall if Ward

said that to just her or to Jenkins as well. Ward then pulled out of the FasMart,

and Jenkins followed, accelerating rapidly. During the chase, Jenkins called

Morrise’s phone. Ward answered and told Jenkins “to pull over so he could kick

his ass.”

At about 7:50 a.m., Ward pulled into a busy Kum & Go gas station about

two miles away from Morrise’s apartment because, according to Morrise, Jenkins

was still following them and Ward wanted “to beat [Jenkins’s] ass.” The gas

station’s manager was outside cleaning pumps when she heard “the sound of cars

racing down First Avenue.” Video evidence shows the cars speeding into the

station, where Ward parked at a fuel pump with Jenkins pulling in behind him.

Ward got out of his vehicle and, according to the manager, walked “very briskly”
6

toward Jenkins, yelling something like, “come at me, bro.” Morrise followed, trying

to diffuse the situation.

Jenkins testified, “When I saw [Ward] walk towards my car, I loaded my

handgun.” Jenkins then got out of his car and, in his words, “brandished” his gun

at Ward. Surveillance video from across the street shows that Ward kept walking

toward Jenkins, who was backing away around the rear of his vehicle. Morrise

testified that Jenkins was saying, “get back, man, get back,” while Ward was

saying, “shoot it, shoot it, shoot it.” The view from the video of what happened next

between Jenkins and Ward is blocked by a pickup truck.

But in that truck, a couple eating their breakfast had a front row seat to the

fatal confrontation between the two men. The wife testified,

[W]e heard some arguing and looked over and there were two
gentlemen arguing with each other. And I said to my husband, “let’s
get out of here, you know, we don’t want to watch this, we don’t want
to see something bad happen, somebody might have a gun.” And
just like that, the one gentleman flipped up his jacket and pulled out
a gun. I went down on the floor, grabbed my cell phone to call 911,
and my husband kept watching. And then I heard a girl yell, “don’t
shoot him, don’t shoot him.” He put his gun away and my husband
said he put the gun away. I got back up and the gun was put away.
And they started arguing again and the taller gentleman walked
towards the man that had a gun and kinda took a swing at him.
Wasn’t close enough to hit him, but then he brought the gun out. I
was on the phone with 911. I got down again and then I heard two
or three shots.

The wife said the taller gentleman, who was Ward, fell after he took the swing at

Jenkins. Because she ducked down when Jenkins pulled the gun back out, she

didn’t see any actual shots fired. Her husband did, however.

The husband, who described Ward as tall and slender while Jenkins was

shorter and “a little bigger,” testified:
7

We heard some confrontation going on. I rolled my window down a
little bit to see if I could hear any more. All I heard was the screaming
was a little bit louder. The two guys kind of started pushing one
another. The one guy—At that point my wife said we should probably
leave. And I said, well, just wait, see what happens. And she said,
well, watch him pull a gun out of his pants. And no sooner did she
say that, he did. He pulled a gun out of his pants or behind his shirt
in the back. And at that point a girl, a young woman came up, and
she said, “don’t shoot him,” because he pointed the gun at him.
"Don’t shoot him, don’t shoot him.” And he put the gun away. When
he put the gun away, the taller black man stepped back, and then I
don’t know if his feet got tangled up or what, but he looked like he
threw a punch. When he threw the punch, he fell to the ground. And
when he fell to the ground, the gun came out again and he shot. And
at that time I believe he hit him in the leg and the young man tried to
get up and he started walking towards the black sedan dragging—I
think it was his right leg. He fell again. And then the accused, he
went up and shot again three, maybe four times.

Armond Dawson was pulling out of the Kum & Go after buying his morning

coffee when he observed the confrontation. Dawson testified:

I saw two individuals square off in front of each other. One individual
was holding a gun. The other individual was in a fighting stance.
And as a result of that, I decided not to proceed forward to exit the
station because I saw the firearm and I did not want to be in the line
of fire. So I continued to back up. As I began to back up even further,
I saw a gentleman that—excuse me. I guess the deceased or the
victim, I saw him lunge at the person with the gun. And as I continued
to back up, there was a van to my left that obstructed my view so I
could not see what happened after that. I heard gunfire and so I
stopped, and I saw a gold-colored car pull out and leave the gas
station at the exit . . . .

On cross-examination, Dawson clarified that when he saw Ward “lunge” at

Jenkins, he meant, “like a fake, like in a fighting stance . . . like you’re going to

throw a punch or a fake.” He did not see Ward make contact with Jenkins. And

he testified that Jenkins was pointing the gun at Ward before he saw Ward lunge

toward him.
8

After the shooting, Jenkins sped out of the gas station and went to a park in

Muscatine. He stayed there for about forty minutes before driving to a nearby fast-

food restaurant where he switched out vehicles with a relative. Jenkins was not

arrested until March 2020, when federal marshals found him in an Illinois hotel

room with Morrise. As the marshals were gaining entry into the room, Jenkins tried

to jump out a second-story window. During an interview with a police investigator

the next day, Jenkins denied being in Cedar Rapids, even after he was shown a

picture of himself at the Casey’s the morning of the shooting. And he denied

knowing Ward or ever talking to him. He later stated the only reason he had any

contact with Morrise that day was because he “heard something bad was going

on.” While continuing to deny any involvement, Jenkins told the investigator that

he had no hatred for anyone and doesn’t “play offense, only defense.”

Jenkins was charged by trial information with first-degree murder and going

armed with intent. In time, Jenkins filed notices of his intention to rely on

justification defenses. See Iowa Code §§ 704.3 (2019) (defense of self), .7

(resisting forcible felony); see also Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.11(11)(c). At the bench trial

in mid-October 2021, Jenkins testified that he fled the scene and lied to the

investigator because he was “afraid of what was to come next.” What really

happened, according to Jenkins, was that after Ward took a swing at him, Jenkins

ducked. Ward then started pulling on his hoodie and tried to get the gun. Jenkins

recalled thinking, “If he gets ahold of this firearm, I’m fucked.” So he fired shots,

“[o]ne quick one and then four more after that.” Jenkins said the witnesses who

testified that he shot Ward when he was on the ground were mistaken.
9

In its verdict, the court found Jenkins guilty as charged on both counts. In

rejecting Jenkins’s claim of justification, the court found “a number of facts that

negate[d]” that defense:

The first is that Mr. Jenkins alone was armed on October 30,
2019. The law pertaining to self-defense in the state of Iowa . . .
recognize[s] that an individual who starts an incident that leads to
injury or death may not avail himself of the defense. The court
analyzes the incident that began with Mr. Jenkins driving to Cedar
Rapids in the wee morning hours of October 30, 2019, in a car that
no one would connect to him, while armed with a Glock 9mm pistol
that fires bullets designed to rip 9 wound paths through their target.
After waiting in a parking spot that is away from one’s view while
exiting [Morrise’s] apartment building Mr. Jenkins began to pursue
Mr. Ward and Ms. Morrise. The location Mr. Jenkins chose to park
belies the assertion he travelled to Cedar Rapids to collect his
clothing and money. He continued the pursuit after Mr. Ward
threatened to “kick his ass.” He chased Mr. Ward for two miles until
Mr. Ward parked at the Kum & Go. He followed him into the store
parking lot and exited the Ford Fusion while the angry, but unarmed
Mr. Ward walked toward him. Another fact in the record that
undermines the claim of self-defense is that Mr. Jenkins got out of
the Ford to escalate a war of words, which would have likely become
a fist fight, to a deadly assault with a gun. The eyewitnesses
described the two men, only one armed with a gun, shouting at each
other. [They] described a lunge or a punch thrown by the unarmed
man. [The husband in the truck], who had the clearest view of the
altercation, saw the unarmed Mr. Ward fall to the ground after
throwing a punch that missed, he then watched Mr. Jenkins
approach and shoot him. The bullet trajectory described by State
medical Examiner, Dr. Klein is consistent with Mr. Jenkins standing
and firing the gun while Mr. Ward lies on his left hip, turned slightly
away from Mr. Jenkins in an effort to get off the ground and return to
the Monte Carlo. The court has considered Mr. Jenkins’ actions after
the shooting. Fleeing the scene to another state, remaining at large
for a number of months and failing to mention he had to shoot or be
shot by Mr. Ward when he spoke with police are not actions of an
individual who shot in self-defense.

Jenkins moved for a new trial, arguing in relevant part that the verdicts were

contrary to the weight of the evidence. The court denied the motion and sentenced
10

Jenkins to life in prison without the possibility of parole for first-degree murder, with

a concurrent sentence for going armed with intent. Jenkins appeals.

II. Sufficiency of Evidence

Challenges to the sufficiency of evidence following a bench trial are

reviewed for correction or errors at law, with the court being “highly deferential” to

the verdict. State v. Burns, 988 N.W.2d 352, 370 (Iowa 2023) (citation omitted);

see State v. Myers, 924 N.W.2d 823, 827 (Iowa 2019) (“We review a claim of

insufficient evidence in a bench trial just as we do in a jury trial.”). We view “the

evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the State, including all reasonable

inferences that may be fairly drawn from the evidence.’” State v. Ortiz, 905

N.W.2d 174, 180 (Iowa 2017) (citation omitted). “While we consider all evidence—

exculpatory and inculpatory alike—we are mindful in our standard of review that

the [factfinder] is ‘free to reject certain evidence, and credit other evidence.’” State

v. Seley, No. 22-0419, 2021 WL 2148800, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2023)

(citation omitted).

A. First-Degree Murder

1. Malice aforethought

Jenkins first argues the State failed to prove he killed Ward with malice

aforethought, an essential element of any murder. See Iowa Code § 707.1. He

argues no evidence was presented that he “held any hatred or evil intent towards

Ward” and a mere dislike for him is not malice aforethought. In Jenkins’s view, the

evidence only showed he was trying “to get his stuff and leave,” not start a

confrontation or kill someone.
11

At the start, we note that the malice-aforethought element of murder

“contemplates a ‘condition of mind which prompts one to do a wrongful act

intentionally, without legal justification or excuse.’” State v. LuCore, 989

N.W.2d 209, 217 (Iowa Ct. App. 2023) (quoting State v. McCollom, 151 N.W.2d

519, 525 (Iowa 1967)). Jenkins is correct that malice “does not mean mere spite.”

McCollom, 151 N.W.2d at 525. But it also does not mean hatred or ill will, as he

suggests, instead requiring a “disposition which shows a heart regardless of

human life.” Id.

Malice aforethought involves “a fixed purpose or design to do some physical

harm to another existing prior to the act complained of; it need not be shown to

have existed for any length of time before; it is sufficient if such purpose was

formed and continued to exist at the time of the injury.” State v. Reeves, 670

N.W.2d 199, 207 (Iowa 2003) (cleaned up). “The establishment of malice

aforethought does not require proof of specific intent to kill or motive, and it may

be inferred from the acts and conduct of the defendant on either an express or

implied basis.” LuCore, 989 N.W.2d at 217 (footnote omitted). Specifically, malice

aforethought may be inferred when a dangerous weapon is used. State v.

Green, 896 N.W.2d 770, 780 (Iowa 2017). Yet this inference may be rebutted if

the act was justified, which will be discussed later. See Reeves, 670 N.W.2d

at 207.

The evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, shows

that Jenkins was in a love triangle for nearly a year with Morrise and Ward. While

Jenkins at first professed indifference, when confronted with his text messages to

Morrise the night before the shooting, he admitted that it pissed him off. Roughly
12

a week before the shooting, Jenkins bought a new gun with special ammunition

that the evidence showed had a heightened ability to cause damage—those being

high velocity, hollow point, radically invasive projectiles.

With that in mind, we consider what happened next. Jenkins drove to Cedar

Rapids early on October 30 in a vehicle he did not usually drive. Although Jenkins

said that he was there to get the laundry basket with his clothes and money, the

district court was free to discount that testimony based on its inconsistency with

other evidence and Jenkins’s interest in the trial. See State v. Frake, 450

N.W.2d 817, 819 (Iowa 1990). Once at Morrise’s apartment, Jenkins parked in an

inconspicuous spot until he saw Morrise leave her apartment with Ward. He then

pursued them at high speeds for more than two miles, even though he said that he

was scared of Ward. After they got to the Kum & Go, Jenkins loaded his gun with

the special ammo while the unarmed Ward walked toward his car. Rather than

driving away, Jenkins got out of his car and showed his gun to Ward.

While Jenkins initially backed away from Ward, the deciding factor is what

happened in the blind spot on the video evidence. On this question, the court gave

the most weight to the couple in the truck, given their “unobstructed view of the

vehicles’ approach and the altercation that followed.” Both those witnesses

testified that Ward fell to the ground after taking a swing at Jenkins. Once he was

on the ground, the husband saw Jenkins shoot Ward. After being shot, Ward tried

to get up, but fell again, and Jenkins “came up and shot him point blank three

times.”

These facts—Jenkins’s beef with Ward as the other man in his relationship

with Morrise, purchase of a firearm and ammo shortly before the shooting,
13

clandestine trip to Cedar Rapids, lying in wait and subsequent pursuit of Ward, and

ultimate fatal shooting of him—provides substantial evidence of “a fixed purpose

or design to do some physical harm to another existing prior to the act complained

of.” See Reeves, 670 N.W.2d at 207 (citation omitted). Even without those

circumstances, substantial evidence shows that, when Ward fell, Jenkins took that

opportunity to strike, and then did so again after Ward fell a second time. This

signifies “a disposition which shows a heart regardless of human life,” which is

sufficient for malice aforethought. See LuCore, 989 N.W.2d at 217 (citation

omitted). We therefore conclude the State provided sufficient evidence to support

this element.

2. Deliberation and premeditation

First-degree murder also requires proof of deliberation and premeditation,

see Iowa Code § 707.2(1)(a), which Jenkins argues the State failed to establish.

As to his purchase of the pistol and ammunition shortly before the shooting, he

submits that is consistent with self-defense. And Jenkins repeats his claim that he

was at Morrise’s apartment to get his clothes and money, pointing to his testimony

that he did not know Ward would be there, his explanation about why he was

driving a different car, and the fact that the shooting occurred in a public place.

Yet, “[s]upport for deliberation and premeditation may be found in

circumstantial, as well as direct, evidence,” and “[i]t is well settled that

premeditation and deliberation need not exist for any particular length of time

before the killing to warrant a conviction.” State v. Woodmansee, 233

N.W. 725, 732–33 (Iowa 1930). “Deliberation and premeditation may be shown by

circumstantial evidence in one of three ways: ‘(1) evidence of planning
14

activity, (2) evidence of motive which might be inferred from prior relationships

between defendant and the victim, and (3) evidence regarding the nature of the

killing.’” State v. Linderman, 958 N.W.2d 211, 221 (Iowa Ct. App. 2021) (cleaned

up).

Here, we have all three. First, as to planning, Jenkins bought the new gun

and ammo with heightened lethality a little more than a week before the shooting.

He then brought the gun and ammo on his early morning trip to Cedar Rapids in a

vehicle Morrise and Ward would not recognize. As noted above, the district court

was entitled to discount Jenkins’s explanation for being there. Second, for motive,

we agree with the State that the evidence showed “a jealous and broken-hearted

Jenkins.” Third, on the nature of the killing, Jenkins discharged five rounds in two

bursts while Ward was on the ground and trying to get away. See State v. Poyner,

306 N.W.2d 716, 718 (Iowa 1981) (“The multiple wounds refute any suggestion of

inadvertence or mistake and supply strong evidence of malice and intent to kill.”);

Linderman, 958 N.W.2d at 222 (“A beating of that nature requires inflicting injury

over and over such that a jury could infer deliberation and thoughtfulness with each

blow.”). With this evidence, we find the State met its burden to show deliberation

and premeditation.

3. Justification

The State also had “to prove justification did not exist.” State v.

Thornton, 498 N.W.2d 670, 673 (Iowa 1993). Jenkins argues the evidence shows

“Ward initiated the altercation,” and he “had a reasonable belief that his use of

force was reasonable and necessary to prevent the imminent and unlawful,
15

undisputed use of force by Ward.” Jenkins also contends that he “did not provoke

the use of force as a guise to engage Ward.”

Jenkins filed notices of his intent to rely on the justification defenses of self-

defense and resisting a forcible felony. As to the former, section 704.3 provides:

“A person is justified in the use of reasonable force when the person reasonably

believes that such force is necessary to defend oneself . . . from any actual or

imminent use of unlawful force.” Turning to the latter, section 704.7 provides: “A

person who reasonably believes that a forcible felony is being or will imminently

be perpetrated is justified in using reasonable force, including deadly force, against

the perpetrator . . . to prevent or terminate the perpetration of that felony.”

Since 2017, the statute on reasonable force has provided:

1. “Reasonable force” means that force and no more which a
reasonable person, in like circumstances, would judge to be
necessary to prevent an injury or loss and can include deadly force
if it is reasonable to believe that such force is necessary to avoid
injury or risk to one’s life or safety or the life or safety of another, or
it is reasonable to believe that such force is necessary to resist a like
force or threat.
2. A person may be wrong in the estimation of the danger or
the force necessary to repel the danger as long as there is a
reasonable basis for the belief of the person and the person acts
reasonably in the response to that belief.
3. A person who is not engaged in illegal activity has no duty
to retreat from any place where the person is lawfully present before
using force as specified in this chapter.

Iowa Code § 704.1; accord State v. Lorenzo Baltazar, 935 N.W.2d 862, 869

(Iowa 2019) (noting the 2017 amendment removed “the alternative-course-of-

action language and added the stand-your-ground provision”). While the 2017

amendment changed the implied duty to follow an alternative course of action, it

did not eliminate it. Lorenzo Baltazar, 935 N.W.2d at 870. A duty to retreat is still
16

alive and well “if the activity is illegal or the presence unlawful.” Id. So if the shooter

is engaged in conduct in violation of another criminal statute that directly relates to

the shooting—like going armed with intent—then the duty to retreat disqualifies a

defendant from asserting a justification defense. See id. at 871.

So now, to rebut a justification defense, the State must prove one of the

following: (1) “[t]he defendant started or continued the incident which resulted in

death,” State v. Fordyce, 940 N.W.2d 419, 426 (Iowa 2020); (2) “[t]he defendant

did not have a reasonable belief that it was necessary to use force to prevent injury

or loss”; (3) “[t]he defendant used unreasonable force under the circumstances”;

or (4) “[t]he defendant was engaged in illegal activity in the place where he used

force, he made no effort to retreat, and retreat was a reasonable alternative to

using force.” State v. Ellison, 985 N.W.2d 473, 478 (Iowa 2023).

For starters, there was substantial evidence that Jenkins started and

continued the confrontation that resulted in Ward’s death. See, e.g., State v.

Wilson, 941 N.W.2d 579, 591 (Iowa 2020) (finding substantial evidence to prove

lack of justification where defendant started the confrontation). He began the

pursuit of Ward and continued it, even after the unarmed Ward threatened to beat

Jenkins. While Jenkins did, at one point, back away from Ward at the Kum & Go,

he reengaged when Ward fell. Beyond that, Jenkins knew Ward was unarmed, so

his “use of force was unreasonable because he ‘brought a [gun] to a fistfight—he

used lethal force without any indication that he faced danger that made it

reasonably necessary’ to shoot the unarmed” Ward. Seley, 2023 WL 2148800,

at *6 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Bowers, No. 18-1827, 2020

WL 1310290, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2020)). In other words, substantial
17

evidences shows that Jenkins “escalated the level of force beyond what was

reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. (quoting State v. Hall,

No. 15-0628, 2016 WL 2748358, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. May 11, 2016)).

And Jenkins’s argument for reasonable force is only based on his claim that

Ward reached for and got a hand on the gun. But, viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the State and deferring to the district court on credibility, the

evidence shows that didn’t happen. See State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 343

(Iowa 2021) (“While the defendant has an alternative explanation for the evidence,

the jury was not required to accept the defendant’s version of the events.” (cleaned

up)). It instead shows that, while Ward took a wild swing at Jenkins, he missed

and fell to the ground, at which point Jenkins shot a defenseless Ward, according

to witnesses who watched the shooting. Jenkins nevertheless argues the district

court’s conclusion that Ward was on the ground when he was shot conflicts with

the medical examiner’s testimony. But the medical examiner never said that Ward

could not have been on the ground. Instead, he testified that the position Jenkins

said they were in when the shots were fired was “unlikely.” In our view, a

conclusion that Ward was on the ground when he was shot is supported by

substantial evidence.

Based on these facts, we find sufficient evidence that the force used by

Jenkins was not reasonable, and he was therefore not justified in shooting Ward.

B. Going Armed with Intent

Under Iowa Code section 708.8, a “person who goes armed with any

dangerous weapon with the intent to use without justification such weapon against

the person of another commits a class ‘D’ felony.” On his conviction for this crime,
18

Jenkins repeats the claim that he was justified in the shooting. For the reasons

outlined above, we summarily reject that challenge.

Jenkins also claims “the State did not carry its burden of proving that [he]

intended to use a weapon against Ward” because “when Jenkins left his house

that morning, there was no evidence that [he] knew Ward was at the apartment.”

This argument again depends on the court buying Jenkins’s version of the events,

which it was not required to do. See id. As laid out on the malice aforethought,

premeditation, and deliberation elements of the murder conviction, there was

substantial evidence that Jenkins formed the intent to use his new gun and its

uniquely lethal ammo well before the happenings at the Kum & Go.

And there was also substantial “proof of movement” at the Kum & Go. See

State v. Harris, 891 N.W.2d 182, 185 (Iowa 2017) (“We have . . . explained that

the ‘going’ element of going armed with intent ‘necessarily implicates proof of

movement.’” (citation omitted)). Jenkins testified that as Ward walked over to him,

he loaded the gun, got out of his car, and showed it to Ward as they argued. The

front row witness to their argument testified that after Jenkins shot Ward on the

ground, Jenkins advanced on Ward as he tried to hobble back to his car “and shot

him almost point blank three times” again. This is sufficient evidence of movement.

See State v. Smith, No. 16-1201, 2017 WL 218621, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.

May 17, 2017) (“An armed defendant need not cover any great distance.”); see

also Harris, 891 N.W.2d at 187 (finding movement of knife from inside a bar to

outside sufficient); State v. Pearson, 804 N.W.2d 260, 265 n.1 (Iowa 2011) (finding

movement across kitchen sufficient); State v. Ray, 516 N.W.2d 863, 865

(Iowa 1994) (finding movement from house to front yard sufficient).
19

III. Motion for New Trial—Weight of Evidence

Lastly, Jenkins claims the court abused its discretion in denying his new-

trial motion on weight-of-the-evidence grounds. But, in reality, this claim is just a

repackaging of his challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence.

In any event, we review the district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial

on weight-of-the-evidence grounds for an abuse of discretion—the most

deferential standard of review. See State v. Stendrup, 983 N.W.2d 231, 246

(Iowa 2022); see also State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127, 137 (Iowa 2017). When a

claim is made that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, “the verdict

may be set aside and a new trial granted” if “the court reaches the conclusion that

the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence and that a miscarriage of justice

may have resulted.” State v. Serrato, 787 N.W.2d 462, 472 (Iowa 2010) (quoting

State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 658–59 (Iowa 1998)). “A verdict is contrary to the

weight of the evidence where ‘a greater amount of credible evidence supports one

side of an issue or cause than the other.’” State v. Shanahan, 712 N.W.2d 121,

135 (Iowa 2006) (quoting Ellis, 578 N.W.2d at 658).

In our view, this is not one of those “exceptional cases in which the evidence

preponderates heavily against the verdict.” Ellis, 578 N.W.2d at 659 (citation

omitted). In ruling on the motion, the district court noted its review of the motion,

resistance, its verdict, and the transcript of trial. Based on that review, the court

found “the weight of the evidence presented at trial does support each of the

verdicts that the court issued.” “And because this was a bench trial, the district

court necessarily assessed the credibility of the witnesses in reaching its verdict.”

See Stendrup, 983 N.W.2d at 246. We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s
20

decision and affirm. See id. (“Our review is not to determine whether the verdict

is contrary to the weight of the evidence but only to determine whether the district

court abused its considerable discretion in denying the motion.”).

IV. Conclusion

We affirm, finding the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and

the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial.

AFFIRMED.