State of Iowa v. Lasondra A. Johnson

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 21-1891
Filed October 25, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

LASONDRA A. JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Joel A.

Dalrymple, Judge.

Lasondra Johnson appeals her conviction and sentence for assault causing

injury. CONVICTION AFFIRMED, AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED IN PART,

REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Mary K. Conroy, Assistant

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.

Considered by Bower, C.J., Chicchelly, J., and Doyle, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
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DOYLE, Senior Judge.

Lasondra Johnson appeals her conviction and sentence on one count of

assault causing injury. Her conviction stems from events that occurred one night

in November 2020, when Johnson shot and killed Jada Young-Mills. On that night,

Johnson accompanied her boyfriend to his mother’s house and waited in a vehicle

parked in front of the house while her boyfriend went inside. While she waited,

three women Johnson knew came by and got in the vehicle to talk with her.

Although their conversation was friendly at first, Mills and Johnson started arguing

and yelling. Johnson ordered Mills out of the vehicle before pushing her out.

Johnson exited the vehicle, and the two began punching and wrestling each other.

Others intervened and separated the women, with Johnson returning to the

passenger seat of the vehicle. But while her boyfriend stood by the passenger

door between her and Mills, Johnson opened the door and fired a Ruger 9mm

handgun. The bullet struck Mills in the back, and Mills later died.

The State charged Johnson with first-degree murder. Eyewitnesses to the

shooting and the events just before it testified at the trial.1 The State claimed that

the fight between Johnson and Mills was over when Johnson fired the gun, while

Johnson claimed she fired in self-defense. Ultimately, the jury acquitted Johnson

of first-degree murder but found her guilty of the lesser-included offense of assault

causing a serious injury. The district court sentenced Johnson to five years in

prison and ordered her to pay $150,000 in restitution to Mills’s heirs or estate.

1 Among the evidence admitted at trial was a surveillance video taken from a house

down the street. The video does not include audio. Because it was dark and the
video was shot from a distance, it is hard to see more than general movements by
Johnson, Mills, and witnesses.
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I. Jury Instructions.

On appeal, Johnson first challenges the jury instructions. We review the

jury instructions for correction of legal error. See State v. Davis, 988 N.W.2d 458,

463 (Iowa Ct. App. 2022). In doing so, we view the jury instructions as a whole

and determine whether they correctly state the law and are supported by

substantial evidence. See id. A jury instruction is improper if it is unrelated to the

factual issues to be decided by the jury. Id. at 466. “Evidence is substantial

enough to support a requested instruction when a reasonable mind would accept

it as adequate to reach a conclusion.” Id. (citation omitted).

Johnson contends that insufficient evidence supports two of the instructions

addressing her justification defense. She challenges Instruction No. 55, which

informed the jury of three situations in which the defendant’s use of force would

not be justified. Johnson objects to the portion of Instruction No. 55 that states her

use of force was not justified if she “was engaged in the illegal activity of Assault

. . . in the place where she used force, she made no effort to retreat, and retreat

was a reasonable alternative to using force.” Johnson also challenges Instruction

No. 58, which required the jury to presume Johnson reasonably believed the use

of deadly force was necessary if the evidence showed Johnson knew or believed

Mills was unlawfully entering Johnson’s vehicle by force. Johnson complains

about the second half of that instruction, which states that the jury “need not” give

the presumption if Johnson was engaged in the crime of assault when she used

deadly force. She argues that the facts do not support giving either instruction

because the evidence did not show she was engaged in an assault when she shot

Mills.
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There is conflicting evidence about what occurred before Johnson shot

Mills. Although there is evidence supporting Johnson’s claim that Mills was still

coming after her when she fired, there is also evidence contradicting it.

Eyewitnesses testified that the fight was over once Johnson was back inside the

vehicle. One of those witnesses testified that while Johnson’s boyfriend tried to

hold the vehicle’s door shut, Johnson pushed it open, pointed the gun at Mills, and

asked, “Where your gun at now, bitch?” before firing. From this evidence, one

could find that Johnson’s acts of pushing Mills out of the vehicle, fighting her

outside it, and displaying the gun while taunting Mills constituted either one

continuous assault or a series of assaults. What occurred was a question for the

jury to resolve. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 62 N.W.2d 241, 242 (Iowa 1954)

(noting the jury’s function is deciding disputed fact questions in a criminal case).

Because a reasonable mind could conclude Johnson was engaged in an assault

when she fired her gun, the court did not err in giving Instruction Nos. 55 and 58.

We affirm Johnson’s conviction.

II. Restitution.

Johnson next challenges the order requiring her to pay $150,000 in victim

restitution under Iowa Code section 910.3B(1) (2020). That provision requires the

court to order a defendant to pay at least $150,000 in victim restitution if “convicted

of a felony in which the act or acts committed by the offender caused the death of

another person.” Iowa Code § 910.3B(1). On appeal, Johnson contends the

provision violates her due process rights by allowing the court to award restitution

without a jury finding she caused Mills’s death.
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The State contends that Johnson failed to preserve error for our review. At

sentencing, Johnson argued that awarding victim restitution “would violate the

excessive fines clause of the United States Constitution and the Iowa Constitution

under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Eighth

Amendment, Article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution.” Johnson cited State v.

Izzolena, 609 N.W.2d 541, 550 (Iowa 2000), in which the supreme court noted the

court could not impose a restitution award under section 910.3B “in a case

involving an unintentional or negligent offender. Instead, [section 910.3B] is limited

to an offender who has demonstrated a willful and wanton disregard for the rights

of others in the commission of the crime.” Although she did not cite the

constitutional right to due process, Johnson’s attorney argued that victim restitution

could not be awarded because

the jury did not find anything that showed that shooting [Mills] was an
intentional act or a reckless act. This jury found that Lasondra
Johnson did an act which could have been an act merely to place
others in fear of immediate physical contact which would be injurious
or offensive. They didn’t find necessarily that she shot her on
purpose.

Johnson makes essentially the same argument on appeal. Even so, Johnson

alleges that the restitution awarded under section 910.3B is an illegal sentence,

see State v. Davison, 973 N.W.2d 276, 286 (Iowa 2022) (stating that

section 910.3B restitution is “a form of punishment”), and thus the rules of error

preservation do not apply, see State v. Richardson, 890 N.W.2d 609, 615 (Iowa

2017).

After Johnson was sentenced, the supreme court held that the jury must

find the defendant caused the death of another before the court can impose
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restitution under section 910.3B. Davison, 973 N.W.2d at 287-88 (holding that

imposing restitution under section 910.3B without a jury finding that the

defendant’s acts caused the death of another violates the Sixth Amendment to the

United States Constitution). The court said that the effect of its decision “should

be relatively narrow” because “cases where the $150,000 restitution would be

assessed on a defendant who was not convicted of a homicide felony are, and

likely will remain, relatively rare.” Id. at 288. “[T]o assure a jury finding of causation

in such cases,” the court proposed that “the State would have the option of

submitting a special interrogatory to the jury” like the special interrogatory used to

determine whether a defendant must register as a sex offender. Id. at 289.

Although the district court and the parties did not have the benefit of Davison when

Johnson was tried and convicted, its holding still applies. Thus, we reverse and

vacate the award of $150,000 in victim restitution under section 910.3B.

III. Prison Sentence.

Finally, Johnson contends the district court abused its discretion in

sentencing her to a five-year prison sentence. We review sentencing decisions for

correction of errors at law. See State v. Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d 58, 65 (Iowa 2022).

Because the sentence is within the statutory limits, we will not reverse it without a

showing that the court abused its discretion. See id. The sentencing court abuses

its discretion by exercising its discretion “on grounds or for reasons clearly

untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” Id. (citation omitted).

The sentencing court must consider which authorized sentence provides an

opportunity for the defendant’s rehabilitation and protects the community from

further offenses by the defendant and others. See Iowa Code §§ 901.5, 907.5(1).
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Section 907.5(1) lists the factors that the court must consider in making this

determination, including the defendant’s age, criminal record, the nature of the

offense, and “other factors as are appropriate.”

Johnson first argues the court failed to exercise its discretion by sentencing

her in accordance with a personal, fixed sentencing policy, which “is the exact

antithesis of discretion.” State v. Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Iowa 1979)

(citation omitted). She claims the court’s statements show it adhered to a policy

of incarcerating defendants who use a gun to commit an offense that results in the

death of another. She also argues the court focused on improper sentencing

considerations in imposing her sentence by focusing on an unproven offense

because the court stated she was convicted “of killing another human being”

without any such finding by the jury. See State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 725

(Iowa 2002) (noting that if the court improperly considered unproven or

unprosecuted conduct, remand for resentencing is required).

At the sentencing hearing, the court stated:

I have considered the arguments of the defense, her request for a
deferred judgment. I do not believe given the facts and
circumstances of this case, history of this case, that a deferred
judgment is warranted.
I have considered all other options including probation. I do
not believe probation is appropriate at this time either. The jury
reviewed the case. The jury did not find that Ms. Johnson was
justified in her behavior, and the jury returned a verdict of this felony
offense resulting in the death of another individual.
In sum, a gun was used. In sum, a gun was discharged. And
in sum, Ms. Johnson killed another human being with the use of that
gun. And it’s the Court’s opinion, given those short, simple facts, that
a prison sentence is appropriate.
....
In pronouncing judgment and sentence the Court has
considered the factors set out in Iowa Code section 907.5 including
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the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, your age,
your character, and your propensities or chances for reform.
Again, for the reasons already stated upon the record, but in
addition, the Court does find the sentence to be appropriate
considering the recommendations of counsel, the nature of this
offense, your age, your limited prior record, but nonetheless a record,
and the sentencing goals and objectives of the Court.

In support of her claims, Johnson also points to the following statement the court

made after her attorney objected to the amount of the appeal bond:

As far as the appeal bond, the Court has already articulated
the reasons for it. With all due respect to the defense, the fact that
the assertion is that the defendant’s not a danger to the community
in light of the fact that we are here for the very reason she killed
another human being frankly doesn’t hold water.
By conviction as we sit here now, not by allegation, but by
conviction, she stands before the Court convicted of killing another
human being. She absolutely is a danger to the community in the
Court’s eyes at this point. She took a firearm under whatever
circumstances either the defense or the prosecution wishes to
present it, the Court sat through the testimony and the jury ultimately
rendered a verdict finding that she took it, she fired it, and she killed
another human being. And so consequently, this is the Court’s
appropriate finding regarding the appeal bond and, with all due
respect to the defense, any objection to that is overruled.

The record does not support Johnson’s claim that the court acted in

accordance with a fixed policy in sentencing Johnson to a five-year prison

sentence. In denying Johnson’s request for a deferred sentence and deciding

against probation, the court focused on the nature and circumstances of her

offense. In particular, the court focused on Johnson’s use of a firearm—a deadly

weapon—and emphasized that Johnson’s act resulted in Mills’s death. But there

is no showing that the court focused on those facts because it was adhering to a

fixed sentencing policy. Rather, the inherent danger of wielding a firearm near a

group of people and the deadly result bear on the question of which sentence best

protects the community.
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Nor does the record show the court relied on an unproven offense when

sentencing Johnson. Johnson focuses on the court’s statement that she stood

before it “convicted of killing another human being.” She argues the statement is

incorrect because the jury acquitted her on charges of murder, manslaughter, and

attempt to commit murder. She also claims that the jury could have convicted her

of assault causing injury solely based on injuries to Mills’s face that she incurred

during the fight. But the evidence at trial shows that Johnson was the only person

who fired a gun that night, and Mills died as a result.

[W]hen a challenge is made to a criminal sentence on the basis that
the court improperly considered unproven criminal activity, the issue
presented is simply one of the sufficiency of the record to establish
the matters relied on. There is no general prohibition against
considering other criminal activities by a defendant as factors that
bear on the sentence to be imposed.

State v. Longo, 608 N.W.2d 471, 474 (Iowa 2000). The sentencing court may rely

on sworn testimony presented during trial to conclude that a defendant committed

other crimes, even if the jury acquitted the defendant of those charges. See id. at

474-75 (“[A] sentencing judge is not required to deviate from the judge’s own

characterization of the nature of a crime committed based on sworn testimony

simply because the jury has characterized the offense differently. Judge and jury

have separate and distinct roles in the criminal justice system, and sentencing is

the sole prerogative of the judge.”). There is sufficient evidence showing that

regardless of her intent, Johnson’s actions caused Mills’s death.

Because the sentencing court properly exercised its sentencing discretion

and did not rely on an improper factor in imposing sentence, we affirm Johnson’s

prison sentence.
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IV. Conclusion.

We affirm Johnson’s conviction on the charge of assault causing injury,

affirm her prison sentence, but reverse and vacate the $150,000 in victim

restitution awarded under Iowa Code section 910.3B(1). We remand for a new

sentencing order consistent with this opinion.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED, AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED IN PART,

REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.